NOTABLES AND CLERGY IN MOUNT LEBANON

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND ITS HERITAGE

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NOTABLES AND CLERGY IN MOUNT LEBANON

The Khāzin Sheikhs and the Maronite Church (1736-1840)

BY

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To the memory of my father

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INTRODUCTION

There are few things which are more revealing about power structures in societies than the relations between secular and religious institutions. That is, if one is willing to accept the idea that these relations are a reflection of socio-economic patterns and not only inspired by piety or moral concerns. In the past, the confrontation between moral principles and material interests has often resulted in a symbiosis between political factions and religious establishments; more often than not, however, social tensions and divergent economic or political interests have resulted in power struggles in which secular and religious factions sought to dominate each other, trying to make material interests subservient to moral principles, or vice versa.

This study is concerned with the relations between secular authority and religious institutions in Mount Lebanon from 1736 until 1840, a period which witnessed many upheavals, and which in many respects was more than merely a prelude to the well-known and dramatic events that dominated Lebanese history in the 19th century. There are important studies on the socio-economic and political history of Mount Lebanon in the 19th century, and it has been observed that the Maronite church played a crucial role in the shaping of events.[1] However, very little attention has been paid to the factors which contributed to the predominance of the church and the socio-economic factors which underlay its political emancipation. Some of these factors may be revealed by an analysis of the connections between the Maronite church and the main exponents of secular power within the Maronite community, in the 17th and 18th centuries: the sheiks of the Khāzin family.

In the 17th century the Khāzin sheiks succeeded in consolidating their administrative and economic position in Kisrawān, which would henceforth remain the core area of the Maronite community in Mount Lebanon. Their ascendancy was closely connected to efforts by the French to increase their trade contacts with the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. As their political prominence grew, the Khāzins simultaneously extended their influence over the Maronite clergy and church affairs, and subsequently were not only seen as the foremost political leaders of the Maronite community, but also as patrons of the church. However, from

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[1] See Chevallier, Havemann (1983), Ismail (1955), vol. 4, Touma, and others.

the beginning of the 18th century on, their relations with the church became more complex, firstly as a result of tensions within Mount Lebanon, and, secondly, as a result of the increasing interference of the Vatican in the affairs of the Maronite church. This interference was partly directed against the lay tutelage of the church, and therefore created tensions in Mount Lebanon which affected the Khāzins' authority over the Maronite church and the balance between clerical and secular forces within the Maronite community.

The central question of this study is: how did the relations between the Khāzin sheiks and the Maronite church develop in the period 1736-1840 and how were these relations affected by socio-economic transformations? Perhaps the period chosen reflects some of the complexities involved in this question, since 1736 was the year of the Lebanese Council, in which relations between the Maronites and the Vatican were renewed, and which is consequently seen as a turning-point in the history of the Maronite church, while 1840 marks the end of the administration of Bashīr al-Shihāb, and thus should be considered a turning-point in secular history. This duality indicates that the present study is inspired by the idea that secular and religious history merged to shape the course of events.

Our central question is set within the context of two more general discussions. Firstly, the analysis of historical developments has been based on the assumption that Ottoman history in the period under study was to a large extent shaped by the alternating stages of its incorporation into the capitalist world market, as opposed to the image of an Ottoman society which was inherently stagnant and incapable of reform. Ottoman "decline" is seen as a relative development that resulted not in stagnation but in transformations in response to changes in international economic and political relations. The relevance of this approach to Ottoman history, is, in our view, shown by the studies collected by Islamoglu-Inan in *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, and by several monographs.[2] One of the main questions raised in this discussion is whether the incorporation of areas of the Empire led to the formation of large estates to facilitate the production of commercial crops. In this study, the analysis of socio-economic events will be related to the question of whether in Mount Lebanon tendencies towards the integration of estates into larger units of production occurred and, if they did, in which way did they occur and in which way did they contribute

[2] Islamoglu-Inan (1989), Gerber (1987), Keyder/Tabak and others.

to the regional differentiation, or integration, of the area within the economic framework of the Syrian provinces.

Secondly, the question will be placed within the discussion of the function of waqfs in the Ottoman Empire which has recently gained importance.[3] In this study it is argued that waqfs could be a dynamic element in society, as opposed to the opinion that they constituted an expression of economic and social stagnation. For some, who have discarded the concept of a "stagnant" Islamic society, it may be superfluous to stress this point, but since waqfs were an essential element in the relations between representatives of secular and religious authority in the Ottoman Empire, it seems not irrelevant. It implies, for instance, that the practice of the waqf-institution was predominantly shaped by its economic function, rather than by its religious or legal aspects.

The sources

The research for this study has concentrated on sources which have received relatively little attention from students of Lebanese history. The main primary sources can be categorized as follows:

1. The documents preserved in the archive of the Holy Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith in Rome. These are gathered together in various collections: the *Acta S. Congregationis de Propaganda Fide* contain the proceedings of the general assemblies, held to discuss and judge specific cases; the collection *Congregazioni Particolari* consists of the documents concerning the specific questions discussed by special committees; the main source for Maronite history is the collection *Scritture riferite nei Congressi* ("Maroniti"), which contains a large amount of documents, mostly correspondence, petitions, legal documents, reports, etc. Together with some minor collections, these three are an extremely rich and variegated source for Lebanese history, which is well-preserved and conveniently brought together. It covers the period 1622-1859.[4]

2. The archive of the Khāzin family; this archive, which has been noted by others,[5] contains all kinds of documents, the earliest of which

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[3] Barnes, McChesney, Pascual, David, Baer (1979), Gerber (1983), Tate, Peri.

[4] For a survey of the other collections, see the *Inventory* (Kowalsky). Some documents from the collections of the Propaganda have been published by Fahd, in his various studies.

[5] Abou Nohra, Chevallier (1971) and Touma have seen the part of the archive, which used to be preserved in the collection of the National Museum in Beirut; I have studied the part that is preserved by Mrs. Mona al-Khazin in Ajaltoun and Dr. Farid al-Khazin in al-Naqqash.

date back to the end of the 17th century. The bulk of them, however, dates from the first half of the 19th century. The archive is disorganized and incomplete.

3. Documents from monastery archives; I was able to study some material on the economic and juridical aspects of monasteries from the archives of Dayr al-Kreim (Ghusṭā), Dayr Ḥūb (Tannūrīn), and Dayr Kfīfān. However, I was unable to extensively study the archives of the monasteries of the Lebanese Order, since I was told that they were not sorted out.

4. The archive of the Patriarchate in Dayr Sayyidat Bkirkī, which contains collections of various documents concerning the patriarchates of al-Duwayhī (1670-1704) to Ḥubaysh (1823-1845). Not all preserved documents are mentioned in the register.

5. The archive and library of the Vatican in Rome, which contain a few items on Maronite history.

This material is supplemented by printed sources in Arabic and European languages, and the relevant studies and monographs on Ottoman, Syrian and Lebanese history.

Structure

As there is no authoritative survey of the history of Mount Lebanon in the 18th century, part of this study is dedicated to the general historical context of the period under study. In the first three chapters an attempt is made to put the historical background of Mount Lebanon, both Ottoman and Syrian, into the perspective of the increased interaction of the Syrian Ottoman provinces with the world market. Thus, these chapters are not meant to present a comprehensive account of the history of Mount Lebanon in the 18th century, but rather to provide an overview of the patterns which are relevant to the main subject of this study. Particular attention is paid to the socio-economic position of the Khāzin sheiks.

Next, the relations between the Khāzin sheiks and the Maronite church are studied on two fronts: firstly, the influence of laymen on the clergy, and, secondly, the relations between the Khāzins and the several types of religious foundations, particularly monastic estates. These two fields cover the main area in which clerical and secular interests met. The relations between the Khāzins and the church are studied in the perspective of the socio-economic transformations in Mount Lebanon in the period under study, and the effects of the efforts by the Vatican to strengthen their control over the Maronite church, especially from

1736 onwards. Thus, a pattern can be perceived in the way external and internal forces interacted to shape the structure of social relations within the Maronite community.

The final chapter concentrates on the efforts by the Vatican to revive the reform process in the first decades of the 19th century in a new socio-economic and political situation. Again, the conflicts between the church and the Khāzins will be analyzed and put into their socio-economic context.[6]

[6] Concerning the ideological discussion on Lebanese history, see: Beydoun, Salibi (1988), Havemann (1988), Choueiri (1989), el-Khazen (1991). Note concerning the transcription: the system of the *Encyclopedia of Islam* is adopted, with the exception of the *qāf* ('q' in stead of 'ḳ'); well-known geographical names are spelled in the usual way (Damascus); other names are transliterated (Jūniya). Words of Arabic origin which can be found in the *Oxford English Dictionary* (2nd ed., Oxford 1989) are not italicized and have no diacritical marks (ulema; waqf). Words of Turkish origin and Turkish names which frequently occur in the Arabic sources are transliterated according to the Arabic spelling (Kanj). When the names are commonly used in the Turkish spelling no diacritical marks are used (Ebussuud). For abbrevations of archival sources, see the list of sources.

CHAPTER ONE

THE OTTOMAN CONTEXT

In recent years the process of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire has increasingly been described in correlation with the emergence of the capitalist world-system and European economic expansion from the 16th century onwards. External factors are ascribed a more prominent role in the shaping of Ottoman history, which, in this view, is determined by the incorporation of the Empire into the capitalist world economy, a process that has been conceptualized by Immanuel Wallerstein. This approach focuses on the global effects of the expansion of capitalism, such as the international division of labour, the production of raw materials as opposed to manufacture and industry, and the increasing incongruity between the traditional political structures and the new economic patterns. It stresses the occurrence of divergent responses to the increasing economic penetration from the core areas into the external areas, while it simultaneously analyzes the nature of centralizing and centrifugal forces within these areas. As a result, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire is seen in the perspective of the ascendancy of capitalist Europe.[1]

In the world system approach the Ottoman Empire is seen as a "world empire" in which a single, integrated market was regulated by an all-embracing political structure in the form of a highly centralized state. European efforts to transform the world market to its needs, from the 16th century onwards, put this structure under strain, and set in motion a process which prevented the Porte from solving the recurrent crises in the continuation of the imperial system in a way that should have ensured the preservation of the centralized political control of its economy. Thus, several economic substructures emerged which came to reflect diverging tendencies within the state, created by different responses to the opportunities and contradictions presented by the expanding world market. Hence, the economic unity of the Empire was threatened at a time when political centralization and the consolidation

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[1] See: Wallerstein (1974, 1980, 1989), and, more specifically, Wallerstein (1979) and Wallerstein/Kasaba/Decdeli, in: Islamoglu-Inan (1989); for other contributions to this discussion, see: Islamoglu-Inan (1989) and Gerber (1987).

of the state seemed the only way to counter the forces of expanding capitalism, or at least to regulate the consequences in a way that would guarantee the survival of the imperial state structure. This seems to be the fundamental contradiction underlying Ottoman history in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries.[2]

In studies concerning the effects of the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world economy on local and regional developments, two issues frequently recur as essential factors. Firstly, the role played by the state in determining the parameters of the economy and the extent to which it was able to influence the process of incorporation. Secondly, the effects of the penetrating world market on the functioning of the internal Ottoman market. Of course these two factors are closely interrelated. The existence of an integrated internal market presupposes some measure of state intervention, especially to regulate the flow of commodities and to provide a legal framework to organize trade and labour. However, there is still no consensus about the role of the Ottoman state as a regulator of the domestic economy.[3]

This is especially true with respect to the Ottoman Arab provinces. Some important questions are still largely unanswered: How should the relations between the state and its representatives on the provincial level be characterized? Who represented the state on the provincial level and who should be considered to be representing the forces undermining the state authority? To what extent did the state control the market mechanisms in the provinces, to ensure the coherence of the internal market? As this study is concerned with regional Syrian history, it is necessary to direct some attention to the emergence of centrifugal tendencies on the provincial level, in the context of the precarious position of the central authorities in gradually changing circumstances.

1.1 The Ottoman Empire between centralization and fragmentation

There is no unanimity concerning the dating of and the factors influencing the process of incorporation, which ended with the semi-peripheralization of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. Wallerstein suggests

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[2] Wallerstein (1974), pp. 67, 348; id. (1980), pp. 26, 113, 111; id. (1990), p. 134.

[3] Gürsel, p. 25; Mantran, p. 210; Inalcik (1978), p. 106; Raymond (1984), pp. 130-131; Islamoglu-Inan, 'Introduction', in: Islamoglu-Inan (1989), p. 10; id. 'State and peasants', in: id., p. 104; Islamoglu/Keyder, in: id., pp. 49, 52.

the period 1750-1817, as a phase of renewed expansion of the world market after a prolonged period of contraction. This view is also adopted by Kasaba, whose study is, however, confined to developments in the 19th century. Others have dated the onset of the process of incorporation back to the end of the 16th century, when the economic relations between Europe and the Empire were influenced by the influx of American silver. Others again have argued that the transformative impact of the incorporation process can only be discerned in the second half of the 19th century, when financial difficulties came to a head and large-scale changes in the structure of agriculture took place.[4]

The differences of opinion in this respect seem to spring mainly from different definitions of such terms as "incorporation", "semiperiphery" and "periphery". There is no disagreement, however, about the far-reaching impact of the large supplies of American silver, from the 16th century onwards, on price movements and the financial administration in the Ottoman Empire. It seems obvious that the influx of American silver through the European Levant trade strengthened the economic ties between Europe and the Ottoman Empire, and consequently between the Ottoman economy and the world market. As to the effects of the supplies of silver, it is generally assumed that a "price revolution" occurred in the Ottoman Empire at the close of the 16th century, while the financial policies of the Porte increasingly became determined by the availability or lack of foreign currency, as the domestic production of precious metals was negligible.[5]

Although the impact of monetary fluctuations may be difficult to determine in detail, it should be noted that the scarcity or abundance of precious metals usually has consequences for the distribution and flow of capital. Abundance may stimulate the economic activities of certain groups at the expense of others, while scarcity usually results in the hoarding of precious metals and high interest rates, and to increased efforts by the state to control the flow of money. In both cases new monetary circuits may emerge which are directly related to the regional distribution of economic activity and which may hamper the central control of the financial market. Consequently, although the economic role of the state may be wider than the realm of finance, monetary developments can be considered as a function of the control of the state over

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[4] Wallerstein (1989), vol. 3, pp. 129, 171-177; Kasaba, p. 35; Gerber, p. 66; Wallerstein/Decdeli/Kasaba, in: Islamoglu-Inan, p. 95; Gürsel, p. 147; Mantran (1989), p. 210.

[5] Kasaba, p. 12; Gürsel, p. 82-91; Islamoglu/Keyder, in: Islamoglu-Inan (1989), p. 57; Mantran (1989), pp. 223-224; Inalcik (1978), pp. 348-349. Vilar.

the domestic economy. Or, to put it differently, the uneven concentration of capital is likely to undermine the efforts of the state to preserve its control of the internal market. It is this aspect of the monetary factor which interests us here.[6]

From the late Middle Ages onwards, the Eastern Mediterranean represented the transit store for the bullion flow from Europe to Eastern Asia. As the demand for Asian products, such as spices and silk, increased in Europe, the deficit of the European balance of trade was usually compensated by the export of precious metals. In the 16th century the Ottoman Empire succeeded in monopolizing this traditional role as a transit market for Asian commodities and European bullion. Presumably, enough surplus revenues were derived from this intermediary position to satisfy the needs of the internal market, which, after the conquest of Syria and Egypt, had expanded substantially. The combination of traditional international trade routes and revitalized internal trade routes secured the stability of the Ottoman economy in this period.[7]

In the 17th and 18th centuries bullion was exported to the Ottoman Empire, especially by the Dutch and the French. British merchants were not allowed to export currency and bartered for their silk imports with broadcloth produced in Gloucestershire and Yorkshire. They only made incidental use of cash money to facilitate trade transactions. Tuscany exported limited quantities of gold coins to the Empire in the 17th century, but in general Italian trade with the Ottomans was in decline. In their Capitulations concluded with the Porte, the French had stipulated the free import of currency, but this liberal attitude was mainly exploited by the Dutch, who considerably expanded their trade with the Ottoman Empire in the course of the 17th century by exporting shiploads of coins. In 1689 the French complained to the Porte about the quality of the currency exported by the Dutch, and after a devaluation of the Dutch coins, the French succeeded in establishing themselves as the foremost trading partners of the Ottoman Empire.[8]

As it had no substantial resources of precious metals, the Ottoman Empire was in constant need of imported currency, especially after the

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[6] Wallerstein (1974), pp. 75, 83, 84, 271; id., (1980), pp. 19, 21, 111; Vilar.

[7] Attman (1981), pp. 13-17, 23; id. (1983), p. 7; Owen (1981), pp. 3-4; Wallerstein (1974), pp. 39, 71; see also: Klein.

[8] Masson (1896), pp. 372, 374, 493, 495-496; id. (1896/1967), pp. 506-508; Wood, pp. 146, 152, 153; Davis, pp. 29, 31, 190-192; Belin (1864), pp. 437, 486; Israel, pp. 44-45, 59, 73 ff., 203, 224, 282 ff., 307; Savary (1697), vol. 2, pp. 356-357, 410-411; id. (1742), vol. 1, part 1, p. 206; vol. 1, part 2, pp. 575, 595; Carali, pp. 294-295, 309; Belin (1870), p. 86; 'Instructions' (1685), Ismail (1975-1983), vol. 3, p. 216.

collapse of the domestic currency system in 1669. From the end of the 16th century onwards, the need for money supplies increased significantly, due to inflation caused by the price revolution, increasing war expenses and the gradual shift towards an essentially monetary economy. Thus, external and internal factors determined the growing demand for currency, which was, moreover, dictated by both economic and political circumstances. While European coins penetrated the Ottoman market, the domestic currency entered into a vicious cycle of depreciation, connected with price inflation and repeated devaluations. The ambivalent financial system, in which foreign currency circulated alongside Ottoman currency, which, however, steadily decreased in value when compared to European valuta, dates from this period onwards. Dutch *leeuwendaalders* (*qirsh asadī*) and Sevillian and French coins began to dominate the Ottoman financial market as the value of the Ottoman *akçe* rapidly decreased.[9]

It has been argued that the net income of the state derived from transit trade was relatively limited. The effects on the internal economy, however, were substantial, since it sustained a complex infrastructure of trade routes, trade centres and other facilities, which formed the backbone of the economy of many villages and cities. Trade profits could give an impetus to local economic activity and manufacture, while commercial services and institutions absorbed a considerable amount of labour. Besides, as mentioned above, international trade increasingly became connected with the availability of currency on the domestic market. Consequently, the Ottoman economy gradually suffered the adverse effects of the increasing profitability of the sea routes to Eastern Asia. As the importance of the overland caravan routes declined, the Ottoman Empire gradually became marginalized within the network of international trade routes. This development was further strengthened by the intensive exploitation of the Americas as a production area for the world economy, which caused a shift in the focus of world trade.[10]

The impact of the changes in global trade on the Ottoman economy was not immediately felt. Trade with Europe grew steadily in the 17th

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[9] In the Tripoli region in the 17th century, and taxes were partly paid in silk, broadcloth or olives; in 1646 the Porte asked the governor of Tripoli to remit all the taxes in *qurūsh*, not partly in olives; Dibs, vol. 7, p. 196; Puget de St. Pierre, pp. 160-161; Masʿad, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 38, p. 37; see also: Wallerstein (1974), p. 271; id. (1980), pp. 17, 57-59, 110, 276-277; Gürsel, pp. 84, 90, 92, 160-161; Belin (1864), pp. 422-465; Attman (1983), pp. 31-37, 54, 93-94; Davis, pp. 190-191; Masson (1896), pp. 492-496; Islamoglu/Keyder, p. 57.

[10] Gürsel, pp. 77, 79, 167; Gran (1989), p. 57; Grenville, p. 56.

and 18th centuries. However, the nature of the trade changed as the Ottoman Empire increasingly came to be seen as a market for produce of European manufacture, such as textiles, and as a source of raw materials. The transit trade in Asian products, especially silk and spices, declined, as these were increasingly imported from the producing areas, while bullion was shipped directly from Europe to Eastern Asia. Thus, as the nature of competition on the world market changed with the advance of the colonial economies, the expanding world economy fundamentally affected the traditional economic role of the Ottoman Empire and its central position in the flow of commodities and currency. Obviously, this also influenced economic patterns within the Empire.[11]

The high costs of warfare on the Balkan and Persian fronts and the need to control economic developments led to policies aimed at strengthening the central state and at widening the financial margins of the Porte. From the end of the 16th century onwards, a steadily growing standing army became the core of the Ottoman military forces, rapidly surpassing the cavalry of sipahis. New martial techniques and the regularity of military campaigns fostered the emergence of this corps of Janissaries, and the regular payment of these forces became one of the most burdensome state expenses. This transformation of the military apparatus forced the state to confiscate a larger portion of the economic surplus in cash money and to introduce measures to centralize the collection of taxes. Moreover, the inflation which was caused by the imports of American silver in the 16th century had to be suppressed, as it continually undermined the system of fixed payments to officials and to the military.[12]

In connection with the changes in the military organization of the Empire far-reaching reforms of the system of taxation were introduced. The traditional form of land tenure, consisting of timar holdings providing the core of the Ottoman cavalry, was gradually replaced by the system of tax farms, or *iltizām*. Whereas the timar tenure was based on holdings granted for life in exchange for military duties, *iltizām*s were received by their holders, or *multazim*s, for one year only, in exchange for a fixed amount of taxes. The grants were in principle renewed annually by the Porte or by its representatives, the provincial governors. The *multazim* collected the required sum of taxes, which he

[11] Gürsel, pp. 77, 167; Davis, p. 125; Naff, pp. 88-103; Wallerstein (1974), pp. 337-338; id. (1980), p. 108; id. (1990), pp. 140-141; Masson (1896/1967), p. 502; Attman (1981), p. 25; id. (1983), p. 15.

[12] Gürsel, p. 92; Belin (1864), pp. 281-285, 301, 304, 305.

transmitted to the state, keeping a fixed share for himself. The reforms were aimed at channelling the economic surplus towards the state and at strengthening central control over the military apparatus. However, as a large body of officials and administrators was needed to implement the system of tax collection, they tended to increase state bureaucratic expenditure.

The transformation of the system of land tenure from timar holdings towards tax-farms touched upon the fundamentals of the Ottoman state. The state treasury did receive an increased amount of regular revenues, but at the same time had to delegate part of its authority concerning the exploitation of farm lands and the collection of taxes to a large and diversified body of semi-officials. This implied that the efforts to centralize the military apparatus and state finances inevitably led to the initiation of a process of administrative decentralization. This contradictory tendency was enhanced by the introduction of the *mālikāna* system in 1694, which involved the granting of *iltizām* holdings as lifelong and inheritable quasi-property in exchange for fixed advance payments and annual remittances. Furthermore, public and administrative offices were increasingly being granted to the highest bidder, a development that undermined the traditional system of appointments and grants. The tension between the centralizing and decentralizing tendencies became one of the crucial contradictions within the Ottoman administrative structure, as the government's need for money was parallelled by the needs of local notables, who strove to secure their position within the administration.[13]

The efforts of the central state to consolidate its position were hampered by the endemic inflation and the depreciation of its indigenous currency and the inconsistency of the monetary system, tendencies which were conducive to high interest rates. As the monetarization of the economy and the administration increased, the imperial economy became steadily more dependent on the stable European valuta. The scarcity of reliable currency became one of the central problems, as local and provincial administrators tended to exploit opportunities for capital accumulation to strengthen their positions, while the state was obliged to collect the deficient indigenous coins to implement its monetary measures, and to bring new currency into circulation with a net loss. Capital became concentrated in the hands of those who had acquired intermediate positions in the trade with Europe and those who had key functions within the taxation system and the allocation of high offices.

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[13] Gürsel, p. 101; Belin (1864), p. 351; Mantran, p. 173.

Thus, the flow of currency seems to have been directed away from the central authorities, whose control of foreign trade was limited to the extent allowed by the integrity of the local collectors of custom duties and their administrative superiors.

Of course, the Ottoman authorities were well-aware of the financial dilemmas threatening the economy. In the first decades of the 18th century it was observed that steady flows of money were draining from the Ottoman economy towards India and Russia through imports of textiles and fur, which were not balanced by Ottoman exports. However, the Porte was not inclined to resort to mercantilist policies, and tried to cope with the difficulties by issuing a classic set of measures: a devaluation of the currency to increase the amount of available coins; the stimulation of foreign trade, without considering the balance of imports and exports; the imposition of extraordinary taxes and levies, aimed at skimming off a larger portion of the economic surplus and at compensating losses through inflation; austerity measures, to reorganize the state finances, especially by reconsidering military expenditure; the auctioning of public and administrative offices as *mālikāna*. These measures, which were repeatedly undertaken from the onset of the 18th century onwards, were not only directed at increasing the income of the Empire, but also at reasserting state control over the circulation of money and the financial system and at preserving the volume of commercial traffic.[14]

The centralizing and austerity measures proved to be relatively successful, but in the long term they were not an adequate response to global and internal developments. Global trade continued to develop largely beyond the horizon of the Ottoman Empire, while the draining of currency went on unabated, especially after the British interrupted their supplies to India from 1757-1793. The combination of liberalizing trade measures and devaluation enhanced the dependency on foreign currency, and created a tendency towards the hoarding of stable valuta and the demand for precious metals as a commodity. Moreover, inflation fostered high interest rates, which hampered economic development and commercial activities, and led to the concentration of capital.[15] Extra-

[14] Inalcik (1978), p. 215; Belin (1864), pp. 284 ff., 301 ff., 329, 380, 523; Masson (1896), p. 493; Masters, p. 193; Davis, p. 191.

[15] Savary (1742), vol. 1, part 2, p. 575; Calkoen to Dir. (1740), *Bronnen*, vol. 3, p. 127; 'Memorie,' id., p. 293; Hughes to St. Gen. (1762), id., p. 460; Schutz to Dir. (1769), id., vol. 4, p. 131; Maseyk to Dir. (1771), id., p. 158; Haaften to Fagel (1779), id., p. 278; Haaften to Fagel (1780), id., p. 303; Haaften to Fagel (1781), id., p. 305; Haaften to Fagel (1781), id., p. 333; Testa to Dir. (1804), id., pp. 705-706.

ordinary levies and the public sale of offices and agricultural domains were conducive to corruption and arbitrariness on the part of the local administrators, who, naturally, appropriated a large share of the increased revenues. The arbitrariness, again, led to the disruption of existing economic structures, notably in agricultural estates. Economizing measures for military expenditure, finally, only led to results when they coincided with pauses in the campaigns against Persia and Russia.[16]

The financial crisis in the Empire came to a head in the period 1783-1789, when it became clear that the policies undertaken so far were insufficient to counteract the structural deficit of the balance of payments. Loans on the domestic financial market had until then brought no relief. For the first time the possibility of a foreign loan was considered, notably from Holland, a traditional supplier of currency. By that time, however, inflation had soared and the traditional set of measures, which was adopted once again to counteract the financial deficits, was insufficient. The last decades of the 18th century and the first decades of the 19th century were marked by continual devaluations and, inevitably, the first initiatives to implement a reform program on an unprecedented scale.[17]

Monetary factors may be insufficient to explain the disintegration of Empires, a complex process which involves economic as well as social, political and military developments. However, whether seen as the cause or as merely an important symptom, they indicate tendencies which can reveal the underlying motives for state policies. In the case of the Ottoman Empire monetary developments were associated with a consistent drive towards the centralization of government. Significantly, the efforts aimed at consolidating the financial position of the central state resulted in centrifugal tendencies, as the interests of various constituents of the state apparatus increasingly diverged. In order to achieve a form of centralization of the financial administration, the Porte conceived methods that in practice led to the transfer of part of its economic control to regional authorities. Thus, apparently, increased regional economic differentiation, resulting in a reallocation of capital and the emergence of regional money circuits, became a condition for the preservation of the central state.

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[16] Wallerstein (1974), p. 84; id. (1990), pp. 137-139; Davis, pp. 190-192; Masson (1896), p. 496; Gürsel, pp. 115-118; Grenville, p. 40.

[17] Belin (1864), pp. 381, 519-521, 527; id. (1865), p. 130; Grenville, p. 46; Dir. to Dedem (1792), *Bronnen*, vol. 4, pp. 494-495; Dedem to St. Gen. (1792), id., p. 491; Hochepied to Dedem (1789), id. p. 440; Testa to Dir. (1804), id., pp. 705-706; Hochepied to Dir. (1805), id., pp. 708-709; Hochepied to Dir. (1805), id., 713.

1.1.1 *Regional differentiation*

It has been argued that the conventional approach to the history of the Ottoman Empire, which is based on the assumption that the emerging power of local notables undermined the authority of the Porte and subsequently led to the disintegration of the imperial state, is incorrect, since a certain degree of decentralization had always existed within the Ottoman administration, and in fact constituted one of its mainstays. However, it has to be kept in mind that administrative centralization or decentralization is in itself no indication of the strength or weakness of an economic or political structure, but may represent strength as well as weakness, according to circumstances. Thus, the same decentralization which enabled the Ottoman Empire to build its state structure in the initial stages of its history, may have become a weakness threatening the very survival of the Empire during the period of incorporation into the world market. It is in this context that the centralization efforts from the seventeenth century onwards should be seen.[18]

Although the Ottoman economy can be perceived as an integrated whole with a large measure of central control, it was certainly not monolithic. Especially after the conquest of Syria and Egypt in 1517, regional differentiation existed in various fields. Taxes were levied in various currencies in different parts of the Empire, while different regions and towns built up their own economic structure according to their role in the production of foodstuffs or materials for manufacture, or their position within the international or domestic network of trade routes. Several regions were, for instance, specialized in the growing of cereals; several cities, like Aleppo, were transit markets for European trade, while others acted as distributors of imported products on the internal market. This differentiation, which was largely based on traditional economic patterns, constituted the essence of the Ottoman internal market system, from which the state derived its surplus in the form of taxes and duties. Obviously, in order to secure the stability of these revenues, the state sought to retain a certain degree of control over economic activity.

State control over the economy took on different forms. The Porte proclaimed regulations concerning the export of commodities and the circulation and rates of currencies; it secured the provision of cereals to towns; it regulated internal competition by fixing prices and by the

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[18] Islamoglu, 'Introduction', p. 19; Pamuk, p. 9; Mantran, pp. 271, 347-348.

imposition of taxes; and it provided the extensive legislative and judicial framework which encompassed trade, manufacture and agriculture, in the form of guilds, market inspectors, stipulations for commercial transactions, and a formally very stringent set of rules for the use, ownership and administration of agricultural lands.[19]

Evidence suggests that the Porte steadily became less able to perform its ambitious task. The treaties with the European commercial partners, the so-called Capitulations, became less favourable to the Ottoman Empire over the course of time, while the central authorities were unable to prevent the profitable smuggling of cereals. European merchants sought to penetrate regional markets, which undermined the ability of the Porte to impose its conditions. The guilds and centres of manufacture came to be dominated by local groups, commodity prices became connected to fluctuations on the international market and a large section of economic activity was, at least formally, withdrawn from the tax system by being incorporated into religious or secular foundations (waqf). The control over the status and use of land became inefficient and in the 17th century the Grand Vizier himself illegally converted state-owned land into a waqf. These developments, both directly and indirectly, threatened the revenues of the state, which were, as has been argued above, continually put under strain by inflation.[20]

The inconsistency of the reforms attempted by the Porte to secure its economic basis, was also reflected in new practices concerning the tax-farms. The collection of taxes and the exploitation of agricultural estates, as well as the office of provincial governor, increasingly became auctioned off as commercial undertakings. Inevitably, discrepancies grew between the economic value of offices and domains, and their officially estimated value in the form of taxation. As the level of taxes and the incomes of the governors were fixed, this discrepancy was enhanced by the devaluation of the currency and the increasing regional differentiation in the level of economic activity. The authorities resorted to the introduction of extraordinary taxes or incidental levies, which fostered diversification of the system of taxation and increased their dependence on local rulers. These naturally exploited the situation in an attempt to

[19] Faroqhi, pp. 58, 128-129, 221; Mantran, p. 210; Inalcik (1978), p. 106; Belin (1864), p. 362; Islamoglu, 'Introduction', p. 10; id., 'State and Peasants', p. 104; Islamoglu/Keyder, p. 50; Sunar, pp. 66,67.

[20] Barbir, p. 89; Parry/Yapp, p. 277; Belin (1864), p. 281; Kasaba (1988), p. 18; Faroqhi, pp. 135-136; Islamoglu/Keyder, pp. 50, 52, 57.

appropriate a larger portion of the surplus, to cover the expenses of acquiring their domains.[21]

The regionalization of taxation was not a phenomenon which was contrary to Ottoman administrative practice. The increasing discrepancy between the market value and the official taxation of the domains, however, altered the position and attitude of tax-farmers and officials. Their interests shifted from a sustained loyalty to the Porte to ensure their mobility within the administration, towards an intensified exploitation of their domains as a way of securing capital for advancement within the administrative system. This circumstance resulted in locally inspired economic and fiscal measures to stimulate economic activity, to increase the revenues by extraordinary levies, and to safeguard the authority of the local ruler over the economy. Thus, tax-farmers and administrators were induced to form economic monopolies and to resort to measures for the extraction of surplus which were sometimes tantamount to corruption and fiscal oppression.[22]

Of course, like the central authorities, the tax-farmers and governors also saw their revenues continually threatened by inflation. To them, extraordinary levies were a means of supplementing the income they received from fixed revenues. Furthermore, trade with Europe secured a potentially far more profitable source of currency than any economic activity directed at the internal market. This fostered the spread of smuggling, in some periods and areas, and direct trade contacts between local rulers and European merchants, as well as efforts by the tax-farmers to consolidate their control over production and trade in their domains. This obviously implied that they aspired to taking a larger share in the traditional role of the state in determining the conditions of production and in appropriating the surplus derived from economic growth. Although sometimes the exactions of the tax-farmers led to the disruption of the existing economic patterns and the deterioration of agricultural production, they also created opportunities for certain groups to profit from the changing flows of money, the regionalization of market circuits and the growing diversity of currency rates within the Empire.

It has not been the aim of this chapter to give a comprehensive sur-

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[21] Genc, pp. 346-348; Cohen, pp. 140-147, 184-185, 187, 209-210, 223; Belin (1864), pp. 318-319, 329.

[22] Cohen, pp. 11-16, 21-22, 135, 140-141, 263; Haga to St. Gen. (1615), *Bronnen*, vol. 1, p. 451; Bouwmeester to (1732), id., vol. 3, pp. 41-42; Haga to St. Gen. (1615), id., vol. 1, pp. 449-455; Hochepied to St. Gen. (1761), id., vol. 3, pp. 413-414; 'Traductie van een comm. van de Turkschen Keizer' (1732), id., pp. 31-32.

vey of the gradual disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, which was an extremely complex process involving various sets of factors. Our argument was to show how the political structure of the Empire increasingly became incompatible with long-term economic tendencies imposed by the expansion of the capitalist world market. The changing position of the Empire within world trade had adverse effects on the traditional economic role of the Porte, as a surplus extracting and regulating body, but did not result in a unilinear and unambiguous phase of economic decline. In fact, theoretically the somewhat paradoxical combination of the centralization of monetary flows and the concomitant decentralization of economic control may have been an adequate reply to the requirements of increasing interaction with the world market, since regional differentiation enhanced the opportunities to profit from the trade with Europe, while fiscal centralization should have secured the extraction of sufficient surplus to preserve the integrity of the state. However, as the state was unable to direct the flow of tax revenues towards the central treasury, its policy impeded a new congruency between the administrative structure and the changing economic pattern. Although the reforms conceived by the Porte may have been less inconsistent than is often assumed, they ultimately did not benefit the Empire as the all-embracing administrative structure, but rather served the interests of certain regional or social groups both inside and outside the state apparatus.

Of course these developments affected the social institutions of the Empire. In fact, these institutions assumed an important role in the interaction between the forces of disintegration and centralization. Among these institutions were the numerous religious foundations, or *waqf*s, which were of great importance in the economic and the social structure of the Empire. Thus, the question arises how the practice of waqf in the Ottoman Empire was influenced by the process of socio-economic transformation.

1.2 Waqfs and socio-economic change in Ottoman society

It has been observed that in the course of the 17th and 18th centuries state control over the property, status and alienation of landed possessions decreased, and that the regulations connected with the state ownership of land were less strictly observed. This is usually seen as an indication that the authority of the central state had weakened and had become insufficient to prevent malpractices. It may be argued,

however, that the loosening of state control over land was connected with the gradual transformation of the timar system into the system of tax-farms (*iltizām*). After all, with the introduction of tax-farms, the spread of the monetary economy and the growth of the standing army at the expense of the sipahi cavalry, the necessity to adhere to strict control of the land became less essential, and could be replaced by control over the flow of revenues derived from the agricultural estates. Thus, the alienation of land could no longer directly affect the fighting potential anymore, and military achievements were no longer transformed into land concessions. However, the efficacy of the military apparatus could be affected by interruptions in the flow of taxes towards the central treasury, and consequently state interference with the exploitation of landed possessions came to be concentrated on the maximization of revenues and the centralization of tax flows, to which the transfer of property rights became of secondary importance. Direct juridical control became less relevant, and was, consequently, decentralized, while efforts were made to centralize the state's hold on the flow of economic surplus derived from the exploitation of the soil. It seems logical, in this approach, that it was not the *legal* status of the land which was the crucial element, but rather the *fiscal* status and its economic exploitation, or, in other words, that the rigorous implementation of the categories of ownership became of secondary importance when compared to an efficient exploitation of the rights of disposal.

In the context of this study the Ottoman legislation on land tenure will be briefly outlined, as far as it is relevant for the subject. It should be kept in mind that the theoretical framework, at least in some cases, can only be a distant reflection of reality, and that the actual practice of Ottoman land tenure, in its regional differentiation and historical development, still awaits extensive research.

Islamic precepts provided the basis for the formation of the Ottoman system of land tenure and the administration of landed possessions, both on the juridical and the fiscal levels. At an early stage, however, the legal categories of land were adapted to the specific requirements of the Ottoman administration, which involved the reconciliation of the traditional practices of the tax-farm system and the justification of several measures in the field of *qānūn* legislation, with the general principles of Hanafite jurisprudence. This task was fulfilled by the scholar Ebussuud, who in the 16th century compiled an extensive survey of the Ottoman variant of Islamic land administration. Of course, this theoretical framework cannot be dissociated from the practices evolved in the field

of fiscal administration and consequently from the timar and, eventually, *iltizām* systems and the shape of the land tenure system as it developed during the 16th and 17th centuries.[23]

As in the Sharia, Ottoman legal practice recognized three types of land ownership. The gradual blurring of the distinctions between the legal categories of land does not imply that these categories ceased to exist, although their distinctive features became increasingly formal.[24]

a. The first category consisted of land owned in free property, or *milk*. This category was confined to some carefully described types of land, such as gardens, land on which buildings were erected, or orchards, and was usually relevant to urban settings. Apart from these types of land, plots of land could be granted as free property by the Sultan, who would thus convert their status into *milk*. The amount of *milk* property in the Ottoman Empire was presumably limited, and its significance was relatively small.

b. The majority of the agricultural lands in the Ottoman Empire pertained to the category of state-owned lands, or *mīrī* lands (*arāḍī amīriyya*), which implied that the land was in principle the property of the state and was subject to the payment of the *mīrī* tax. These lands usually formed the bulk of the domains granted as *iltizām* or *muqāṭaʿa*. Some of the *mīrī* lands were considered to be the preserve of administrative officials, such as the governor or the *multazim*, to provide for their sustenance, and were called *rizq*, *khāṣṣ* or *baklīk*. As a general principle the ownership (*raqaba*) of the land was reserved to the Sultan, or, in other words, the state. This implied that exploitation of the soil formally required a concession from the Sultan and that, again formally, the authorization of the Sultan was needed for the alienation of land. This principle should be seen as part of the original timar system on which the Ottoman organization of the military apparatus and the tax system was based. As the military apparatus was financed through the system of the granting of estates (timar) in exchange for military services, direct state control of the land was a *conditio sine qua non* for the functioning of the army. Any slackening of this control would instantly affect the fighting capacity of the state.[25]

c. Waqf lands existed in several types and categories. Firstly, some large waqfs were connected with the court and the state, such as the

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[23] Barnes, pp. 20, 33-34, 36-38, 40.

[24] Belin (1861); for a discussion of the land categories in the Ottoman Empire, see also: Gerber (1987); Cuno (1985).

[25] Inalcik (1978), p. 224.

imperial domains and the foundations associated with the Holy Cities, al-Ḥaramayn. Secondly, there existed a network of waqfs which, on economic and administrative levels, connected the provinces with the capital. This was in the first instance effective on the level of the provincial towns, and its capital was usually initially furnished by high-placed state officials, who, obviously, siphoned off part of the revenues. Another type in this category may be the waqfs founded with the aim of providing the finances for specific state or court services. Thirdly, many waqfs were founded only to function on a provincial level, as they comprised the possessions of provincial notables and served religious institutions in provincial capitals; they were registered in provincial courts and supervised by local ulema. Finally, waqfs were founded in villages and hamlets, which could lie beyond the scope of provincial law courts, and which, accordingly, in the first instance came under the responsibility of village sheiks and local imams.[26]

This classification of waqfs by administrative characteristics should be supplemented by some remarks on the juridical context. Firstly, it should be noted that, at least after the 17th century, when a vizier converted a domain consisting of *mīrī* land into waqf, no official objections seem to have existed against concluding this, in principle illicit, transaction without the previous consent of the state. However, the situation may have varied according to time and location. This also applies to the incorporation of these waqfs into the tax system, as they could be considered as a separate fiscal category, or simply as a waqf preserving its former *mīrī* obligations. Secondly, some waqfs were considered to be based on *ʿurf* legislation or customary practice. As Ottoman law consisted of a combination of Islamic Law and Sultanic decrees, or *qānūn* legislation, this distinction has little practical relevance, as the ultimate conditions which were required by legal theory sanctioned both types of waqf.[27]

1.2.1 *The concept of waqf*

Although religious foundations, or waqfs, represent a complex and important phenomenon in Islamic societies, until now little effort has been made to devise a clear concept of waqf. Studies on waqfs have been few and far between, while approaches have been so diverse as to prevent

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[26] Faroqhi, pp. 44-45; Gerber (1983), pp. 36, 38, 39, 40, 42-43; Barnes, pp. 39-44.
[27] Belin (1864), p. 281; Cuno (1985), p. 111.

the emergence of a coherent view. Moreover, analyses have mainly drawn from the theoretical, juridical, basis of religious foundations, and rather less from the actual practice of founding and administrating waqfs as it evolved in the course of history. This fragmentation of research has fostered some misconceptions of waqfs which have gained a foothold without having been sufficiently tested against the historical reality. These misconceptions include, for instance, the idea that waqfs were primarily conceived to circumvent the inheritance laws of Islam or to prevent confiscation by arbitrary rulers, or that waqfs were merely an institution to provide for social welfare and the sustenance of religious institutions. Views such as these do little justice to the complex nature of the concept of waqf and, moreover, tend to neglect the role of waqfs in political and economic structures.

One of the dominant views concerning waqfs, especially characteristic of the Weberian approach, holds that waqf is a typical expedient of a patrimonial society which hampered the emergence of capitalist economic relations. It is generally accepted that in European history the rise of capitalism was closely connected with the privatization of land, especially in England in the 17th century, and accordingly waqfs, considered to be a form of mortmain property, are seen as the antithesis of capitalist development. With the spread of private ownership of land, the land itself became a commodity whose value became related to market mechanisms, and a means of production which could be exploited as freehold property. The view that waqfs hampered the free circulation of capital commodities is strengthened by the assumption that foundations were of a perpetual and irreversible nature, and that Islamic Law, being of divine origin, was unchangeable and thus unable to allow the exploitation of waqfs to accommodate to changing economic circumstances.[28]

This view of waqfs is probably inspired more by the wish to characterize Islamic society as stagnant and "irrational", than by thorough historical research, as waqfs are described as a means, itself irrational, to compensate for the "irrationality" of the system and the arbitrariness of the patrimonial rulers. Only a broad approach, embracing the extremely variegated manifestations of the phenomenon of waqf, can qualify this narrow and essentially ahistorical conception. In this section some of the practical aspects of the religious foundations in the Ottoman

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[28] Turner (1978a), p. 46; id. (1978b), p. 124; Weber, pp. 644, 706, 795; Gerber (1983), p. 34.

Empire will be analysed in an attempt to support the thesis that waqfs were not necessarily an obstacle to economic activity, but could be a dynamic element supporting economic development and a means of capital accumulation, integrated into the systems of surplus extraction and agriculture. Firstly, however, some of the principles of waqf legislation will be summarized in order to define the legal framework.

In essence, the founding of a waqf consisted of the withdrawal of an object from market circulation for perpetuity for the benefit of a pious purpose. Formally only objects, in general real estate, owned in full property were allowed to be converted. The owner gave up his property rights, determined a pious purpose and, if he wanted to, recorded the directives for the exploitation. He had the right to name an administrator (*mutawallī*) and a supervisor (*nāẓir*; usually the qadi). The conditions for the exploitation were restricted by stringent prescriptions, which were especially aimed at precluding any form of alienation, such as sale or donation, or even the risk of alienation, such as mortgage, and at defining the privileges and duties of the founder, the functionaries and the beneficiaries.[29]

Especially in Hanafite jurisprudence it was thought essential for the well-being of the community for the founding of waqfs to be encouraged. Therefore, it allowed the founder of a waqf the right to appoint himself, or members of his family, or his descendants, as the administrator, or even as the first beneficiaries, provided that the ultimate destination of the revenue, for instance after the extinction of the benefiting family line, was acknowledged to be a pious purpose. This adjustment gave the concept of religious foundations as an idealized religio-juridical means of achieving perpetual salvation a wider economic importance. The economic basis was further elaborated with the aim of facilitating the economic exploitation of waqfs and compensating for the restrictions on their economic use connected with their legal status. Prescriptions especially concentrated on the right of substitution (*istibdāl*) and lease. For instance, to encourage long-term investment of capital in a waqf, several types of lease were devised, covering various terms.

The above indicates that on a theoretical level legal scholars tried to create opportunities to counterbalance restrictions on the economic exploitation of foundations. In addition, waqfs were sometimes exempted from certain taxes, and were thus endowed with a privileged status en-

[29] General introductions to the juridical aspects of waqfs are: Clavel, Luccioni, Shaybānī, Ṭarābulsī; see also *al-Waqf fī al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmīyya.*

hancing their profitability. Still, this set of juridical provisions only shows one aspect of waqfs, and the main question remains of how the legal prescriptions were implemented, presuming that the practice of waqfs was not determined by legal rules only, but by a complex set of factors, which varied in time and place. To illustrate the practice of waqfs in the Ottoman Empire, some examples will be given of several forms of the exploitation of waqfs and the way these forms relate to formal legislation.

It has often been suggested that the legal opportunities provided by waqfs in the course of time were used to secure the possession of landed estates. The status of waqf, with perpetual validity, at least in theory, ensured protection against confiscation and other practices of arbitrary rulers. The suggestion that this consideration was one of the main motives for the founding of waqfs has been contested by some, but is probably not wholly without justification. The juridical prescriptions were conceived in order to secure the preservation of possessions, perhaps not primarily to prevent confiscation, but surely to stabilize the economic value of the object. The most salient case, in this context, is the so-called family waqf (*waqf ahlī*), which was founded for the benefit of a certain line of descendants, with the aim of preventing the estate from disintegrating as a result of the prescriptions of the inheritance laws. Although the "family waqf" is not a distinct category in Islamic jurisprudence, it fits neatly into the outline of Hanafite waqf prescriptions and differs from the pious waqf (*waqf khayrī*) only in that its worldly component is more prominent.

Another type of waqf which was also common in the Ottoman Empire and which was not directly derived from Hanafite jurisprudence, but rather represented a transaction based on Ottoman juridical practice, was what d'Ohsson describes as the *waqf coutumière*. According to this practice, the founder "sells" his property to, for instance, a mosque for a sum that represents approximately 10-15% of the estimated value. Although the object is thus converted into waqf, the founder retains the right of disposal against the payment of an annual rent, equal to the interest on the sum paid by the mosque. Apart from this, the founder has the right to transfer his rights to his descendants or to a third party, while the property is protected against possible financial demands. The mosque benefits from this transaction, since it solidifies its economic basis and increases its revenues in the form of annual rent and a levy (*firāgha*), paid as a fee whenever the rights of disposal are transferred. Moreover, the obligation of maintenance rests with the founder and,

finally, the property reverts to the mosque on the extinction of the heirs of the founder.[30]

This type of waqf clearly resembles the concept of mortgaged property, where the original owner of the land acquires capital to invest in his property, in exchange for pawning his estate. The difference lies in the fact that a waqf was in principle established for perpuity, and that the payment was not considered to be a loan, since it was impossible to redeem the property by repaying the "debt". It seems that the purpose of the transaction was twofold: firstly, the acquisition of capital for investment and an impetus for the exploitation, and, secondly, the preservation of the object as a commodity which not only produced rent, but also retained its economic value.

A second example of waqf practice in the Ottoman Empire concerns the complexes which formed the backbone of the commercial sector of many provincial towns. This variety of waqf was especially applied to revive and uphold trade and handicraft activity. It consisted of a complex of buildings and institutions, which embraced the whole of the trade and manufacture sector of the city, such as the bazaar, shops, workshops, khans, etc., which were thus united within a single administrative structure. Part of the surplus generated within this structure was dedicated to a local mosque or charitable institution in order to justify the status of waqf. Merchants and manufacturers could extend their activities according to an elaborate system of permits and remittances, and benefited from the stability of the properties on the one hand, and from the advantages of the accumulation of capital within an easily monitored and relatively closed circuit. In this way the waqf assumed the characteristics of an investment company or a capital fund, which was created to stimulate economic activity by investment, to secure the preservation of the properties involved, and to generate a surplus from which capital for loans and investment could be supplied. This is in accordance with the general premises which applied to the first example too: the stabilization of property and the stimulation of economic exploitation.[31]

A third example of Ottoman waqfs concerns not a single practice, but rather the way in which waqfs were incorporated into the tax system. As noted earlier, many examples have been uncovered of waqfs which

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[30] D'Ohsson, vol. 1, p. 307-322; see also: Grenville, pp. 42-43.

[31] Faroqhi, pp. 28, 31; Inalcik (1978), pp. 207-208; id. (1978), pp. 132, 134; Raymond, pp. 91-92; Gürsel, p. 132.

were deliberately founded with the aim of profiting from tax privileges, to maximize revenues from landed estates, or to heighten the profitability of investments. This implied that part of the financial surplus generated by economic activity, which was usually appropriated in the form of taxes, remained part of the waqf administration and was deflected away from the central treasury, in some cases without any concrete compensation in the form of increased tax revenues from the intensified economic activity. This circumstance became especially harmful to the state when it became common practice to convert land of the *mīrī* status into waqf, transferring it from one juridical and fiscal category to another. To compensate for this tendency, rulers attempted in various ways to gain control over the waqf revenues and to skim off as much of their surplus yields as possible. To achieve this, they could employ several means; they could have themselves appointed as *mutawallī* or *nāẓir* of existing waqfs, or integrate waqfs into their fiscal system, or even have waqfs dissolved in order to usurp their revenues. Conversely, rulers could attempt to appropriate revenues from areas under their control by converting them into waqfs on advantageous conditions, thus stabilizing their claims.[32]

The necessity to conform the administration of the waqfs to the practices of taxation adds another important dimension to the waqfs: the struggle for political power. In the political context, the question arises: how could the financial surplus circulating in the waqf network be confiscated in order to consolidate political power, or, conversely, how could political influence be employed to gain control over the revenues of waqfs? The key to the answer to this question lies in the juridical apparatus, or, more precisely, the qadis and the muftis. These were not only responsible for legitimizing political power and a social hierarchy, but, more importantly, also represented the link between idealized legal concepts and their application to everyday practice. Moreover, the ulema often had interests in waqfs in their function of *mutawallī* or *nāẓir*. This combination of responsibilities determined the ulema's role as a flexible factor in the shaping of waqf practice, and it may be justifiable to suggest that the practice of waqfs derived from continuous struggle or, perhaps more accurately, continuous negotiation between the religious and secular authorities. As a result of this negotiation, in the course of time various semi-institutionalized waqf prac-

[32] Crecelius, pp. 47, 136, 137, 140, 121, 134; Rafeq (1966), pp. 151-152, 180; id. (1981), p. 656; Barbir, pp. 72, 101; Belin (1864), pp. 296, 307, 347, 374, 375, 526; Gürsel, pp. 118, 119, 120; Inalcik (1978), p. 136; Barnes, pp. 38, 40; Peri, pp. 53-54;

tices evolved, which reflected the manifold interests of the religious foundations.[33]

The above does not pretend to be a full inventory of the waqf types which existed in the Ottoman Empire, but is rather meant to illustrate that the practice of waqf was much more complex than a mere definition by legal precepts might suggest. Therefore, it seems that research into waqfs should be based on the following suppositions:

a. In spite of the immutable character of religious law, the practice of waqf was not static or monolithic, but was integrated into the economic process. Thus, a merely legal approach does not do justice to the variety of waqf types and seems to bring us no further than an inventory of exceptions to a fixed, but highly theoretical, set of legal rules. Political and economic factors should be taken into consideration in order to complete the picture of the system of waqfs;

b. As can be seen from the examples, the main incentive for founding waqfs, or at least a common feature of the various types of waqfs which may reflect the motives behind their foundation, was the wish to preserve the economic value of the property and to stimulate its exploitation. This implies that waqf properties cannot merely be described as an economic "no-man's land" or as "dead" or "immobilized" capital. Of course, in the legal sense, waqfs can be considered to be immobilized property destined for the appropriation of rent only, as they are characterized by Weber. More importantly, however, waqfs were integrated into the economic process, as a means of stimulating investment, and were thus connected with the market mechanism. On the basis of these economic aspects of waqfs one may conclude that waqf property did not lose its market value, or, as some have argued, that waqfs even contributed to the process of the appropriation of the agricultural resources in the Ottoman Empire, and, as a result, to a form of the privatization of the means of production.[34]

Two observations support this view. Firstly, the possession and alienation of landed property in the Ottoman Empire did not concern the object as such, but rather the rights which an "owner" could exercise. In the course of Ottoman history, the value of these rights increasingly became determined by market mechanisms connected with the commercialization of agriculture and the growing discrepancy between the economic potential of estates and the fixed amount of taxes

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[33] See: Crone; Johansen (1990); Krüger, p. 51; Gürsel, p. 112; Baer (1979), pp. 220-221, 233, 237.

[34] See also: Inalcik (1978), pp. 132, 134.

to be remitted to the central treasury. Since the founding of waqfs was a means of stabilizing exploitation rights, in a way the market value of these rights could increase. Secondly, by being converted into waqf, property was not so much withdrawn from a free market circulation, but rather from a circulation which was regulated and controlled by the state. It acquired a status which formalized the privileges enjoyed by the founder at the expense of those enjoyed by the state.

The latter observation, in a paradoxical way, seems to confirm the view of Weber, who argues that the status of waqf was used to withdraw land from state control. However, Weber cites the waqf principle as such as an example to illustrate the "irrational" nature of Islamic society and its inability to develop socio-economic relations which were favourable to the emergence of capitalism. The above suggests, on the contrary, that the practice of waqfs, as it was connected with the market mechanism, was not only no obstruction to changes in socio-economic relations, but could even lead to these changes, as a waqf was not solely a way to restrict the freedom of exploitation, but also, as stable nuclei of real estate property, provided opportunities for capital accumulation and economic development.

c. The three examples show that a rather ambiguous relationship existed between waqfs and the state. Firstly, as explained above, the economic dimension of the waqf could clearly be beneficial to the economy, and, moreover, provided a means of regulating the market mechanisms. On the other hand, these advantages were not always converted into direct revenues for the state, as they often tended to escape the control of the treasury. Secondly, waqfs were part of the struggles for political power, especially as their economic importance increased. Thirdly, waqfs provided for the maintenance of one of the pillars of the state, the religious institutions and the ulema, guardians of the ideological apparatus, but a force which did not automatically identify with the interests of the central state. The first consideration reflects one of the crucial dilemmas in the state's relationship to waqfs, as the state relinquished part of its authority over landed property, in order to stimulate economic activity and to integrate market mechanisms into a more or less controllable institutional network. Not surprisingly, therefore, the state not only attempted to exert control over waqfs and their revenues, but often directly intervened in the administration of waqfs, to adapt the legislation to changing circumstances and to avert malpractice.

1.2.2 *Christian waqfs*

In the preceding paragraphs it is suggested that the practice of waqfs in the Ottoman Empire was shaped by a complex set of factors, of which the juridical prescriptions were only one. As the distinction between Christian and Muslim waqfs was in the first instance juridical, it follows that Christian waqfs were to a large extent subject to the same socio-economic factors as their Muslim counterparts and that they fitted into the overall system as a variant of Ottoman waqf practice. Of course there were conditions which were specifically connected with Christian waqfs, and since these have hardly been studied, it may be useful to present a concise introductory survey.

In Hanafite jurisprudence the prescriptions concerning waqfs founded by Christians do not fundamentally differ from those concerning Muslim waqfs. The main limitation on Christian waqfs is that the beneficiary of the revenues of the waqf should fall in the category of "pious purpose" (*qurba*) in the view of both Muslims and Christians. This implied that Christian waqfs founded for the benefit of "the poor" in general, or specific groups of "poor", either Muslim or Christian, were permitted; Christian waqfs founded for the repair of a mosque, for instance, were considered unlawful, as they could not be considered to be a pious purpose for Christians. Likewise, Christians were not allowed to found waqfs for the erection, repair, expansion or upkeep of their own religious buildings (churches and monasteries), nor for the sustenance of the clergy or monks, as these designations were clearly incompatible with the Muslim's conception of piety. Except for this limitation, Christian waqfs were in principle subject to the same regulations as their Muslim counterparts.[35]

Although this was not acknowledged by Hanafite jurisprudence, the practice of Christian religious foundations had its roots, at least partially, in a separate legal tradition, which derived from the codex of the Byzantine Emperor Justinian (482-565), who sought to provide a legal basis for the synthesis of church and state on the basis of the decisions of church councils. However, the councils of Nicaea and Chalcedon, which were convened to achieve this, failed to produce a single tradition and instead gave rise to divergent tendencies within the Church. As far as the administration of ecclesiastical possessions was concerned, no codification was elaborated, and practice became variegated according to local conditions. Presumably, the various appearances of religious foundations

[35] Ṭarābulsī, pp. 141-143; Shaybānī, pp. 332-341; al-Ramlī, pp. 153, 155.

were influenced by the dominant practice in their environment, which was, from the 7th century onwards, Muslim.[36]

Although some efforts at a historical reconstruction have been made, it has not yet been established to what extent the Byzantine and Islamic legal traditions with regard to waqf merged to shape the eventual elaborate set of Islamic waqf regulations. Besides, no historical continuity has been demonstrated connecting Byzantine law with Islamic Law or with the various branches of church law, surviving in the practices of the Eastern Christian communities and in the development of Canon Law. As long as these lineages remain unclear, it is impossible to analyze Christian waqfs in a broader conceptual framework, and any conclusions remain speculative. It is possible, however, to study the implementation of rules and practices in certain regions and periods.[37]

The limitations set upon the founding of Christian waqfs in the Ottoman Empire were originally intended to prevent the clergy and the church, as an institution, from acquiring a strong, independent economic basis. Apart from obvious dogmatic and religious considerations, the Muslim authorities were anxious to discourage Christians from building an independent network of real estate possessions, which did not serve the interests of society as a whole, or even of the Christian community as a whole, but rather the church as an organizational and administrative body. This especially was seen as a threat since the church represented a centralized and strictly hierarchical organization, which, at least in theory, implied that the administration of clerical possessions could develop under highly centralized control, whereas Muslim waqfs, on the contrary, came in principle under decentralized jurisdiction. Thus, although the Christian communities enjoyed a status which was in many ways conducive to a certain autonomy in the fields of religion and personal status law, it was scrupulously ensured that they would not be able to build an autonomous structure that could take the shape of a "state within the state" or could otherwise endanger the coherence of Ottoman society.

In the field of the judiciary, some degree of autonomy was afforded to Christian communities, but concerning the exploitation of ecclesiastical properties, it was stipulated that any transaction relating to church buildings or monasteries was subject to the authorization of the provincial or central government. Little is known about the implementation of

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[36] Jedin, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 295-309, 487-489; Saleilles; Zhishman; Plöchl; Bréhier; Knecht; Pfannmüller; Gottschalk.

[37] See: Barnes; Cahen.

this policy, but, significantly, little evidence exists of conflicts between the clergy and the Muslim authorities, and in general the governor was seemingly not reluctant to grant permission for the repair of religious buildings and the founding of waqfs for the benefit of churches or the clergy. However, the situation may have varied from governor to governor or according to the proximity of urban and administrative centres.[38]

In the Syrian chronicles of the 18th century, some of which have been written by Christians, few explicit references to oppression by the Ottoman authorities are made, while relatively few cases of controversies are mentioned in the field of waqf legislation. Among the ones that are mentioned is the case of the repair of a church in Aleppo in the 18th century, which was begun in the interregnum between two governors, and, consequently, without official permission. The offending prelate was eventually fined. Several cases are mentioned of churches being built or repaired with official permission, sometimes acquired through the mediation of a Jewish moneylender, or through the payment of a fee.[39]

The legal framework of Christian waqfs consisted of various constituents. Firstly, the precepts of Islamic jurisprudence provided a general outline of principles, focusing on the necessity of restricting any expansion of the church's material interests in and power over society, by impeding the acquisition of ecclesiastical property in the form of foundations; secondly, Ottoman legal practice not only afforded some autonomy to Christian minorities in the field of personal status law, but also adopted a flexible policy towards the maintenance of Christian religious buildings, in order to preserve a structural *modus vivendi* between the Muslim character of the state and the Christian part of the population; thirdly, to a certain extent the Christian communities adhered to their own traditions concerning the foundation and administration of church property.

These constituents together form a complex amalgam of legal rules, which only partly governed the actual shape of the practice of foundations, but which could be called upon in the case of conflicts. The constituents were obviously influenced by socio-economic factors, as in the case of Islamic foundations, and this may have resulted in a form of accommodation to the dominant legal system and some measure of

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[38] See for example: 'Fatwā tārīkhiyya fī al-kanā'is al-qā'ima fī al-bilād al-Islāmiyya,' *al-Majalla al-Sūriyya*, vol. 6, no 3, pp. 150 ff.

[39] Burayk al-Dimashqī, 59, 76, 83, 86, 119, 120; Munayyar, Shiblī/Khalīfa, p. 406; Ṣabbāgh, pp. 175-176; ʿAwrā, p. 169.

conformity between Christian and Islamic practices. Normally the arguments for consensus would have been stronger than those for conflict, and legal differences may have become of secondary importance against the background of social, economic or political interests.

1.2.3 *Waqfs and the ulema*

The observations made above lead to the conclusion that the status and control of land and the system of waqfs were important elements in the transformations witnessed by the Ottoman Empire under the influence of the penetration of the world market. To a large extent regulations and practices in this field affected state control over the economy and the disruption or integration of economic circuits. In the foregoing it has been argued that the lessening of state control over the possession of land can be seen as a more or less logical result of the transformation of the tax-system and the transition from the practice of timar to the system of tax-farms. The case of waqfs is more complex, since it affected not only an important constituent of the system of surplus extraction, but also the position of the ulema, who formed the core of the ideological apparatus on which the state relied for the interpretation and implementation of law and the legitimation of its authority.

Although the structure of the Ottoman state was based on a close cooperation between the secular authorities and the body of religious scholars, and the latter were increasingly incorporated into the state bureaucracy, the ulema should not be seen as a homogeneous group that identified its interests *à priori* with those of the state. Religious scholars were recruited from various segments of society and were prone to having specific interests deriving from their social background, their ascendancy within the ulema hierarchy, their economic situation and their relations with secular groups. Therefore, any change in the socio-economic circumstances could affect the equilibrium between several factions among the ulema and the attitude of these factions towards the central or provincial authorities.

Of course waqf institutions constituted the foremost factor influencing the interrelationship between the ulema and socio-economic forces. They provided the financial basis of the ideological apparatus and of individual ulema and groups of ulema. As they were a part of centralized or regional networks, they were affected by tendencies towards regionalization or centralization and could be instruments of integration on various levels. Thus, the network of waqfs formed one of the bases on which

administrators and ulema built their power on the regional level, but it was also an instrument of the Porte in its efforts to enhance central authority. In periods of transformation, the interests of the state might coincide with those of certain segments of the body of ulema but clash with those of other segments, depending on the position of the ulema within the power structure.[40]

In the present study, where the practice of waqf is involved, it will be studied in this context: firstly, as a socio-economic factor which became an element in the response of local groups to changes occasioned by the integration of the Ottoman Empire into the world-market; secondly, as a reflection of the relations between representatives of the religious and secular authority, and the preservation of the role of religious leaders as guardians of ideology; and, thirdly, as a factor reflecting the balance between centralizing and decentralizing tendencies with regard to the Ottoman administration's efforts at economic integration.

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[40] See for the position and divergent responses of the ulema: Heyd, Repp, Chambers, Levy; see also: Crone, Johansen (1982), Islamoglu (1989) and Voll.

CHAPTER TWO

POLITICS IN OTTOMAN SYRIA

Although Mount Lebanon differed in some respects from the adjacent areas, it was nevertheless an integral part of its Syrian environment, economically, politically and administratively. However, it belonged to the periphery of the Syrian provinces until at least the middle of the 18th century. From the 17th century onwards, efforts by the Porte aimed at fostering the incorporation of the area into the Ottoman administrative structure and at strengthening its political control can be perceived. Thus, developments in Mount Lebanon in the 18th century cannot be dissociated from the two broader frameworks of Ottoman administration, on the Imperial and the provincial level. In this chapter the historical background of Mount Lebanon will be analyzed in this context.

2.1 The Ottoman administration of Syria

After the Ottoman conquest of Syria, or al-Shām, in 1516, the area was divided administratively into the *eyalet*s or *wilāya*s of Aleppo and Damascus. At the close of the 16th century the province of Tripoli was created to control the northern regions of Mount Lebanon. The *wilāya*s, or provinces, were subdivided into, respectively, nine, ten and five sanjaks. The sanjaks were administered by sanjakbeys, who were appointed by the provincial governor, or *wālī*, who himself received his appointment from the Porte, in principle for a one-year term. From the 17th century onwards, however, the most commonly used subdivision of the provinces was the tax-farm, the *iltizām* or *muqāṭaʿa*, which was, of course, not an administrative but a fiscal unit. Tax-farmers, the *multazim*s or *muqāṭaʿajī*s, received their grants on an annual basis in exchange for a fixed portion of the tax revenues. The basic tax for these tax-farms, at least in the agricultural areas, was the land tax, or *mīrī*, which was assessed according to the potential productivity of the state-owned lands (*arāḍī amīriyya*, or *mīrī* lands).[1]

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[1] The best surveys of the history of al-Shām in the Ottoman period, are: Rafeq (1966), Cohen, Barbir, Abu Husayn and Bakhit; for the debate on the relations between the central Ottoman administration and the Syrian provinces, see especially Barbir

The administrative divisions of the area of al-Shām reflected the different economic and military functions of the Syrian towns. Aleppo was a garrison city for the recurrent Persian wars and the internal protection of al-Shām. Moreover, it was one of the main terminals for the great caravan routes from Asia and the most important Syrian transit store for the European trade. The products which arrived from the East were traded in the city's warehouses and exported to Europe through the port of Alexandretta. Aleppo also acted as a market for domestic products, both for internal distribution and export. These functions gave Aleppo a pivotal importance within the Ottoman military and economic structure, as one of the main trade centres of the Empire and a strategic stronghold against threats on the Eastern border. Consequently, Aleppo was firmly embedded in the Ottoman administrative structure and economically tied to the northern hinterland.[2]

The role of Damascus was focused around the organization and protection of the annual pilgrimage to the Hejaz. A large portion of the tax revenues of the provinces of Damascus and Tripoli was dedicated to the equipping and financing of the hadj caravan, while the military power of the governor was usually concentrated on safeguarding the pilgrim caravan and the road to the south. The hadj was so important to the prestige of the Ottoman state and the economy of Damascus and its surrounding countryside, that the position of the governor became largely dependent on his success or failure in organizing this huge undertaking. The governor had to guarantee the strict payment of taxes in order to finance the military escort of the hadj, and to secure a safe passage for the caravan by ensuring the obedience of local administrators along the caravan route, and of the Bedouin tribes roaming through the deserts of Syria and the Arabian peninsula. A successful pilgrimage enhanced the authority of the governor and the Porte, was a sign of political and fiscal stability, and contributed to the prosperity of Damascus and the other towns along the route, as the hadj was not merely a spiritual undertaking, but also a commercial one, involving tens of thousands of pilgrims and merchants. An attack on the caravan was disastrous for the governor as well as for the city.[3]

Apart from its role as the starting point of the annual hadj caravan, Damascus was also the administrative centre of a large and differentiated region, which covered the central plains of inland al-Shām and the

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[2] Raymond (1984), pp. 32, 43-44; Bodman; Marcus.
[3] Barbir; Rafeq (1966), pp. 52 ff; Raymond (1984), pp. 47-48.

Biqāᶜ, the coastal cities, desert areas, and the Lebanese and coastal mountain ranges. Every year, the governor conducted a tour to collect the taxes of the various and sometimes distant *iltizām*s and to dispel any disloyalty on the part of the *multazim*s and local sheiks. In the city itself the governor had to cope with the indigenous political factions, which consisted of merchants, *ashrāf*, tribal chiefs and ulema. He was the link between these local elements and the central authorities, and one of his main tasks was to reconcile local politics to imperial policies.[4]

From the 17th century, the governor of Damascus had several kinds of troops at his disposal to strengthen his authority within the region. Apart from the forces consisting of locally recruited or foreign mercenaries, and several police forces with specified tasks, the most important troops were the Kapikullari, or Janissaries sent by the central authorities, and the Yerliyya, the Janissary corps which had its roots in Damascus. In the course of time, tensions between the two Janissary forces increased, reflecting frictions between rival political factions in the city.[5]

The province of Tripoli was to some extent a dependency of the governor of Damascus. Its governor was appointed by the Porte, but was of lesser rank than the governor of Damascus, and a part of the revenues of the province was destined to support the financing of the pilgrim caravan. In some periods the governor of Tripoli used to act as the commander of the troops accompanying the caravan as a protection against pillagers and Bedouins.

Geological, geographical, economic, and cultural factors contributed to the complexity of the social and political structure of the province of Damascus. The plains in central Syria alternated with mountainous areas, such as Mount Lebanon, the Ḥawrān and Jabal ᶜĀmil. The cultivation of cereals (Ḥawrān) existed alongside sericulture (Mount Lebanon, the Tripoli region) and cotton growing (Galilee). These differences in some cases coincided with religious differentiation, such as the concentration of Druze in the Ḥawrān, the Shiites (*Matāwila*) in the Jabal ᶜĀmil region and the Maronites and Druze in Mount Lebanon. This differentiation led to the emergence of local power centres, which to some extent characterized the administration of the province.

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[4] Barbir, p. 122; Rafeq (1966), pp. 21-23.
[5] Raymond (1984), pp. 72-74; Rafeq (1975).

As the Porte after the conquest of Syria relied heavily on local elements to organize its administration, tension between regionalism and centralization, which was a fundamental feature of Ottoman policy, as explained in the previous chapter, became an endemic factor in Syrian politics. Several chiefs of local origin achieved political prominence on the provincial level, such as Fakhr al-Dīn Maʿn in the first decennia of the 17th century, Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar and the ʿAẓm family in the middle of the 18th century and Aḥmad al-Jazzār at the close of the 18th century. These administrators should not be considered to be incidental cases, but rather as exponents of developments which were to a large extent intimately connected with the nature of Ottoman administration in Syria, which was not only determined by superimposed administrative structures, but also by a continual power struggle between local rivals. The official system provided the political, administrative and ideological framework, and the extent to which it succeeded in absorbing the emerging contradictions and centrifugal tendencies determined the actual shape of the administration.

In this chapter the ascendancy of these regional rulers, who operated in the margins between provincial and imperial politics, will be examined. They all illustrate the dilemmas confronting the Porte and the contradictions which marked the imperial policies with respect to the Arab provinces. Moreover, they reflect the tendencies which evolved essentially from regional responses to the economic changes occurring on an international level.

2.1.1 *Fakhr al-Dīn Maʿn*

The history of Fakhr al-Dīn Maʿn shows that the practice of the *iltizām* system was really based on a precarious balancing-act between power struggles on local, provincial and imperial levels. At the end of the 16th century the distribution of tax-farms in southern Syria and Mount Lebanon was determined by the ability of pretenders to fulfill the regular and irregular financial demands of the provincial and central authorities. Payments involved advance remittances (*muʿajjala*, or *salf*), regular taxes (*māl*; *irsāliyya*) and personal gifts to officials, which acquired a semi-official character (*khidma*). The domains were granted by the governors of Damascus and Tripoli, but sometimes by direct intervention by the Porte. The annual renewal of grants depended on the ability of the *multazim* to fulfill his tax obligations or to secure the support of powerful administrators in Damascus or Istanbul. Holdings could be sublet by the

multazim to local protégés, who provided him with the means to consolidate his power in the region.[6]

It seems that the Shūf mountains proved difficult for the Ottoman authorities to control throughout the 16th century, and that the Druze, who had become relatively rich through sericulture and contraband, repeatedly refused to pay their dues. More or less successful punitive campaigns were launched in 1565, 1574-76 and 1585. Presumably to prevent further disorder, the Porte decided to incorporate a prominent Druze chief into the administration. At first the Porte inclined towards the strong faction led by the Ḥarfūsh family, but in 1592 Fakhr al-Dīn Maᶜn was nominated sanjakbey of Sidon. In 1602 he acquired the sanjak of Ṣafad as well. The appointment of Fakhr al-Dīn was clearly intended to reinforce Ottoman control over the southern parts of Mount Lebanon, which were hard to pacify by military means. However, by bestowing this role upon him, the Porte introduced a powerful new force into the politics of the region, and a rival to the Sayfā governor of Tripoli and the governor of Damascus. Fakhr al-Dīn carefully combined his personal interests as a regional leader with the interests of the state, increasing his power by nominating local allies or other members of the Maᶜn family to positions within the administration of his domains, and by generous gifts to high officials, especially the Grand Vizier in Istanbul.[7]

The ambiguity of Fakhr al-Dīn's role is shown by his support for the insubordinate ᶜAlī Janbulād, who took over the governorship of Aleppo in 1607. This support was probably inspired by the fact that the Porte had summoned Fakhr al-Dīn's arch-rival Yūsuf Sayfā in order to curb the aspirations of Janbulād. After the defeat of ᶜAlī Janbulād, the conduct of Fakhr al-Dīn and his growing military power aroused the suspicions of the central authorities who eventually forced the emir to go into exile in Tuscany (1613-1618). He attempted to take advantage of his stay in Europe to rally support from the Christian sovereigns for a bold project of his, the conquering of the Holy Places with a combined force. However, the situation in Europe was unfavourable for such an undertaking and Fakhr al-Dīn had to content himself with moral support only. During his exile Druze opposition to the Maᶜns came into the open, with

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[6] On the implementation of the *iltizām* system in the Syrian provinces, see: Abu Husayn, pp. 15, 16, 19, 20, 85-87, 96-97, 104-105; until 1715 timars were still registered in al-ᶜAkkār, Ḥibliṣ, pp. 24-36, 44-48; Duwayhī, pp. 463, 464, 475, 476, 486.

[7] Abu Husayn, pp. 77-79, 81, 83; Puget de St. Pierre, pp. 23, 25, 26; Minadoi, pp. 299 ff.; Duwayhī, p. 453; the main Arabic source for the history of Fakhr al-Dīn Maᶜn is: al-Ṣafadī.

the support of the Sayfās, while Yūnus Maʿn attempted to maintain as much of the previous Maʿn control as he could. The Porte tried to play the various factions off against each other. Eventually, the balance of power in the Lebanese mountains was affected by political changes in Damascus and Istanbul. After Fakhr al-Dīn was allowed to return from exile, he resumed his efforts to gather domains under his control, and he succeeded in acquiring Jubayl, al-Batrūn, Bsharrī, ʿAkkār and Ṣafad, while protégés of his administered ʿAjlūn and Nablus. A new power struggle ensued in which grants were bestowed upon the highest bidder.[8]

It should be noted that the various tax-farms which Fakhr al-Dīn held in subsequent periods were never formally considered to be a political or administrative entity, and the emir's control never went unchallenged. Although the emir actively intervened in the administration of his domains, no political structure arose based on a single administrative or political coalition. Power struggles were predominantly determined by money, military power and tactical alliances, not by substructures created outside the sphere of Ottoman administration. Of course, these power struggles had their own momentum, and the official decrees and appointments sometimes proved to be futile or went unheeded. The "Ottoman dimension", represented by Istanbul, Damascus and Tripoli was, however, undeniable, as was the pivotal importance of the payment of *māl*, *salf* and *khidma*. It is also clear that the leadership of the Maʿns was repeatedly contested by political opposition within their domains, among the Druze as well as the *Matāwila*.

The case of Fakhr al-Dīn Maʿn also reveals some other aspects of the *iltizām* system in the Syrian provinces. Thus, although official grants were sometimes not effectuated due to local rivalries, and although local chiefs sometimes succeeded in defying Ottoman policies, it seems that the margin between the theory and the practice of Ottoman administration was conducive to the creation of continual political tensions in which regional chiefs could be played off against each other to give Ottoman governors some freedom to manoeuvre. This attitude shows the flexibility of the Ottoman administrative system, and in spite of the tensions, the Porte undertook no efforts to modify the official system according to certain practical requirements. It might have been the only way of exerting effective authority short of direct military

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[8] Carali, pp. 143, 145, 149, 168, 169, 171-172; Puget de St. Pierre, pp. 57-58; Duwayhī, pp. 457-459, 465; Mariti (1787); see also: Abu Husayn, pp. 24-27, 85, 90-93.

intervention, which was only possible when the Russian and Persian fronts were quiet.

These observations also imply that the authority of *multazims* over their holdings was always ambivalent. In some cases they were no more than supervisors of the collection of taxes, receiving payments from the local notables who were directly responsible for taxation. In other cases they may have been the administrators of their domains who delegated their authority and fiscal duties to their protégés and clientele. Finally, they sometimes intervened personally in the administration of their domains, initiating economic or fiscal reforms. The conglomerates of *iltizāms* gathered together by Fakhr al-Dīn included all these types of domain, and thus the emir operated on various intermediate levels within the system of tax collection. The authority of the Maᶜns in the *muqāṭaᶜas* of ᶜAjlūn and Nablus was probably only nominal; Jubayl and al-Batrūn were on one occasion "rented" from the governor of Tripoli, and eventually reforms to improve agriculture were implemented with the assistance of the governor; in Kisrawān authority was delegated to the Khāzin sheiks, who enjoyed a large degree of autonomy; sometimes properties were bought, and, finally, sometimes the collection of taxes in some *muqāṭaᶜas* was delegated to protégés who officially only held authority over other *muqāṭaᶜas*.[9]

In the 16th and 17th centuries the system of *iltizāms* shows a large degree of flexibility, within the margins of the regular extraction of taxes and revenues. Within these margins a differentiation of administration was allowed. This differentiation gave rise to the establishment of several intermediaries in the surplus-extracting system, who, as a group, constituted the main basis of local or regional power. Fakhr al-Dīn can be seen as an intermediary between the central and provincial authorities on the one hand, and the local notables on the other hand, preserving his power by military force, by financially and politically supporting the local notables, and by responsiveness to the vicissitudes of Ottoman politics. The support of local notables was, at least in some instances, won by creating opportunities for territorial and economic expansion for their families.

The ambiguous position of Fakhr al-Dīn Maᶜn reflects the nature of the regional power centres which probably existed in Syria even before the Ottoman conquest and the way in which the Porte tried to cope with them. It shows how the Ottoman administration attempted to ab-

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[9] Abu Husayn, pp. 71, 86-87, 95-97, 102, 104-105, 116.

sorb regionalizing tendencies within the centrally ruled state structure and to turn seemingly adverse developments to its advantage. It is significant, in this context, that Fakhr al-Dīn repeatedly pleaded his loyalty to the Sultan, and did not initiate a secessionist policy. This balance between the search for *de facto* regional autonomy and continued obedience to the central authorities, and the combination of strength and leniency with which the Porte responded, were to be among the main features of the administration of Ottoman Syria in the subsequent period.

2.1.2 *Regional politics in the 18th century*

After the downfall of Fakhr al-Dīn Maᶜn in 1635 the Porte succeeded in reasserting its control in Syria, and the coalition of opposing regional forces disintegrated. In 1660 the Porte revised the administrative division of Syria by creating the province (*wilāya*) of Sidon, which covered the southern *muqāṭaᶜa*s of Mount Lebanon, the port of Acre and the plains of the Ṣafad region. This measure was intended to create a new power centre in southern Syria and to check the aspirations of the Druze of al-Shūf. Although in the course of the 18th century the importance of Sidon as an administrative and economic centre was surpassed by that of Acre under the rule of Ẓāhir al-ᶜUmar and Aḥmad al-Jazzār, the concept of establishing a new power balance between the central and southern Syrian governorates was logical and successful. After Fakhr al-Dīn Maᶜn no attempts at expansion were undertaken from the Lebanese *muqāṭaᶜa*s.[10]

However, the methods by which Fakhr al-Dīn achieved regional prominence were followed by another Syrian chief, Ẓāhir al-ᶜUmar, a sheik from northern Palestine, who dominated regional politics throughout the greater part of the 18th century. Ẓāhir al-ᶜUmar became a tax-farmer of Ṣafad at the onset of the 18th century, and gradually extended his authority over other tax-farms, with the assent of the governors, offering to protect them against Beduin incursions. In 1727 he defeated the *Matāwila* headed by Nāsīf al-Nassār, and added Jabal ᶜĀmil to his sphere of influence. After having consolidated his position in the Ṣafad region, Ẓāhir requested that he be granted the *iltizām* of Acre, which was refused by the governor of Sidon. At the instigation of his brother, who argued that the Porte did not care who ruled the town as long as

[10] Cohen, p. 120; Rafeq (1966), p. 2.

the *mīrī* was paid regularly, Ẓāhir subsequently occupied Acre and did indeed receive it as a tax-farm. In 1759 Ẓāhir's influence had increased to such a degree that the Porte granted him the governorship of Sidon. Acre remained his administrative centre, and Nāsīf al-Nassār became his most reliable regional ally.[11]

The indulgence of the Porte towards Ẓāhir was only temporary, and shortly after his nomination Ẓāhir was deposed. As he was unwilling to give up Acre, a campaign was launched against him by the governor of Damascus, ᶜUthmān Pasha, but Ẓāhir's troops emerged victorious from several clashes. He enjoyed the support of ᶜAlī Bey al-Kabīr, the Mamluk governor of Egypt, and of a Russian fleet, as Russia was in that period almost continually at war with the Porte. All attempts at subduing him having failed, the Porte granted him a pardon in 1774, and he again received the governorship of Sidon. This move was probably instigated by immediate financial needs only, for shortly afterwards, when peace with Russia enabled the Porte to direct its attention elsewhere, the Ottoman fleet under the command of vizier Ḥasan Pasha attacked Acre and finally succeeded in defeating Ẓāhir. Ẓāhir and his administrator (*mudabbir*) Ibrāhīm al-Ṣabbāgh were killed.[12]

In its efforts to counteract the aspirations of Ẓāhir al-ᶜUmar, and to ensure at least some degree of authority over the Syrian provinces, the Porte relied heavily on the al-ᶜAẓm family, who provided several governors for the provinces of Damascus, Tripoli and Sidon throughout the 18th century. The ascendancy of the ᶜAẓms can be seen as a reflection of the dilemma that faced the central authorities. They were notables of local origin who held the governorate of Damascus for several prolonged periods, which was contrary to the formal administrative rules. It seems that the Porte resigned itself to the inevitability of relying on strong regional administrators to retain its authority, as these could be mobilized against ambitious rivals if the necessity arose. Thus, the ᶜAẓms were allowed to establish a strong power base within the Ottoman administration and in regional politics.

The basis of ᶜAẓm influence was formed by their domains in the Hama region, which they apparently held as *mālikāna*. In the 18th century Ismāᶜīl Pasha al-ᶜAẓm became governor of Tripoli and, eventually,

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[11] Ṣabbāgh, pp. 15-43; Mariti (1772), pp. 27, 32-33, 146; Shihāb (1955), 58, 63; Mariti (1791), vol. 2, pp. 85-86; Āl Safā, pp. 116-121.

[12] Ṣabbāgh, pp. 43-157; Munayyar, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 50, p. 194; Shihāb (1955), pp. 67-69; Shihāb, pp. 91-94, 107-108, 112-113.

of Damascus (1725-1730), while simultaneously his brother Sulaymān and his son Ibrāhīm held the governorships of Tripoli and Sidon. In 1730 the ʿAẓms were deposed after a revolt in Istanbul, but they were quickly restored to favour. In the period 1731-1743 Sulaymān Pasha dominated Syrian politics as the governor of Tripoli and Damascus. He was succeeded by his nephew Asʿad (1743-1757). When Asʿad fell in disgrace after court intrigues in Istanbul and accusations against him concerning his alleged complicity in the pillage of the pilgrimage caravan in 1757, the rule of the ʿAẓm family came to a temporary end. But after the failure of his successor, ʿUthmān Pasha, to contain the aspirations of Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar and, especially, to hold back the Egyptian invasion of 1771, Muḥammad al-ʿAẓm, the grandson of Ismāʿīl, was appointed governor of Damascus (1771-1772; 1773-1783).[13]

The administration of the ʿAẓms marked both the efforts to strengthen the Damascus governorate by the Porte, which allowed a family of local origin to expand its influence for exceptionally long periods, and the decline of Damascus as the Ottoman administrative centre in Syria. The ʿAẓms, especially Asʿad, had to cope with the fierce controversies within the city between the Yerliyya and Kapikullari troops. Moreover, Sulaymān Pasha throughout his administrative career carried on a protracted but ineffective and indecisive struggle against Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar. To make matters worse, the instability of the Syrian provinces served as a pretext for the governor of Egypt, ʿAlī Bey al-Kabīr, to meddle in Syrian affairs. This resulted in an invasion of Syria in 1771 by his military commander Muḥammad Abū al-Dhahab, which virtually eliminated Ottoman control in the province. Central authority was apparently only saved by the political manoeuvres of Muḥammad, who unexpectedly pledged his loyalty to the Sultan and turned against his former patron ʿAlī Bey al-Kabīr.[14]

The authority of the Porte in al-Shām was effectively undermined by the refractory attitude of Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar, who associated himself with strong regional allies and even with Russia, the traditional enemy of the Ottoman Sultan. Ẓāhir succeeded in paralyzing the control of the ʿAẓms over the yearly pilgrimage and the collection of taxes. As long as its hands were tied by the war with Russia, the Porte had to bide its time. The campaign in 1776 against Ẓāhir suddenly seemed to turn the tide.

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[13] Barbir, pp. 96-97; Rafeq (1966).

[14] About Ali Bey, see: Crecelius (1981); Rafeq (1966), pp. 250-252, 260, 271-282; primary sources: Mariti (1772); Ṣabbāgh, pp. 108-109, 118-119, 128-129; Burayk, pp. 103 ff.

The expedition, during which Ẓāhir was killed, coincided with the sudden deaths of ʿAlī Bey al-Kabīr and Muḥammad Abū al-Dhahab, and left a power vacuum in al-Shām. This vacuum was filled by the appointment of Aḥmad al-Jazzār as governor of Sidon, and by maintaining Muḥammad al-ʿAẓm as governor of Damascus. Again, the policy of the Porte seems to have been directed at creating rival power centres in Syria, in order to balance the expansionist administrators against each other.

Al-Jazzār was a Mameluke of Bosnic origin, who started his career in the service of ʿAlī Bey al-Kabīr. After he was forced to leave Egypt, he was appointed administrator (*mutasallim*) of the city of Beirut in 1773. He soon showed himself to be a strong and ambitious administrator, and he was appointed governor of Sidon in 1776 and governor of Damascus in 1783-5, 1790-5 and 1798. By that time the power of al-Jazzār, who relied heavily on his mercenary forces, probably surpassed that of Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar and the ʿAẓm governors. Al-Jazzār succeeded in dominating Syrian politics and, in some instances, defying the Ottoman authorities, until his death in 1804.[15]

The failure of the ʿAẓm governors to control the Syrian provinces from Damascus and the ascendancy of chiefs such as Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar and al-Jazzār, who had their centre in Acre, eventually led to a shift in the regional equilibrium, as from 1760 onwards the position of Damascus as an administrative centre weakened in favour of the coastal towns. This shift was supported by changes in the pattern of economic activity, mainly due to external forces, especially increased trade with France and Egypt.

2.1.3 *External factors*

Although it might be argued that conditions within the Syrian provinces were conducive to the emergence of strong regional leaders, it is clear that trade relations with European countries greatly contributed to the successes of the above-mentioned administrators. The trade contacts between the Syrian provinces and Europe steadily increased from the 17th century onwards, and even in periods of relative decline, became a structural element of the Syrian economy. The prominent administrators of the provinces, but also their less prominent colleagues, had to determine their attitude *vis à vis* foreign trade and to incorporate it into their system of surplus extraction.

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[15] Cohen, pp. 53 ff.; Koury; Rafeq (1966), pp. 307-308.

The intensification of trade contacts between the European nations and the Syrian provinces from the 17th century onwards was never free of political objectives. There was a clear awareness in Europe that the cooperation of local leaders could favour trade, although the coordinating role of the Porte was acknowledged. Thus, the relations between Tuscany and Fakhr al-Dīn Maᶜn fitted into a general pattern of efforts by the Tuscans to increase their political influence in the Levant, as well as to revive the declining Tuscan trade. Significantly, weapons were shipped from Tuscany to Syria to support the revolt of ᶜAlī Janbulād in 1607, and, after its failure, to Fakhr al-Dīn. This convergence of economic and political aims was to remain an important characteristic of the European Levant trade.[16]

The political aims of the European nations should be seen in the light of the increasing penetration of the world economy into the Ottoman Empire. The discrepancy between the formal authority of the Porte and the relative autonomy of the regional leaders, provided the European governments with a means of putting the Porte under pressure in order to obtain favourable modifications to the Capitulations. Moreover, friendly relations with regional leaders were likely to provide opportunities for evading official regulations and for bribing local officials. In this respect, Syria was a vulnerable area within the Empire, as the emporium of Asian goods and one of the focuses of economic activity. Besides, the various Christian minorities in Syria were not only willing to become incorporated into the emerging trade networks, but could also be used as a pretext for political interference. As has been noted, in all these matters the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the European powers underwent drastic changes in the course of the 17th and 18th centuries.

It has been observed by contemporaries that Fakhr al-Dīn Maᶜn derived a large part of his income from foreign trade. He responded adequately to the demand for silk on the European market and his friendly relations with Tuscany, and stimulated sericulture in Mount Lebanon and the export of raw and spun silk from Sidon and Beirut. The success of his expansionist efforts allowed him to not only remove possible obstacles to foreign trade, but even to stimulate and regulate it. Presumably, port taxes in Beirut at the onset of the 17th century compared favourably with those in the other coastal towns, until the Porte succeeded in brea-

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[16] Abu Husayn, pp. 89, 92-93; Mariti (1787); Ismail (1955), vol. 1, pp. 76-97; van Leeuwen (1993); Richards, p. 48.

king Fakhr al-Dīn's control in 1635.[17] The revenues from the export of silk were among the mainstays of Fakhr al-Dīn's political and military power. He was one of the first regional rulers in Syria who made use of mercenary troops to support his policies. The regular payment of taxes, and especially sufficient *khidma*, temporarily ensured him the indulgence of the officials in Istanbul and Damascus.[18]

The case of Ẓāhir al-ᶜUmar resembles Fakhr al-Dīn's to a large extent. Ẓāhir had access to a port under his firm control, and a vast agricultural hinterland in Galilee and the Jabal ᶜĀmil region. The productive capabilities of the domains of Ẓāhir were exploited by the French and the British, who acquired a privileged position on the local cotton market. Significantly, in the early 1700's, the Dutch merchant Maashoek obtained a monopoly on the purchase of cotton crops, in exchange for taking over the tax obligations of the peasants. French merchants, too, roamed the villages purchasing the cotton crops in advance. In this way whole domains and villages under his control produced for the European market. French imports from Acre in particular increased in the 18th century and provided Ẓāhir and his *Matāwila* allies with the means to support their political ambitions.[19]

The economic strength of Ẓāhir can be connected to the ascendancy of the Greek Catholic merchants in Syria and Egypt in the 18th century. Ẓāhir's *mudabbir*, Ibrāhīm al-Ṣabbāgh, was a Greek Catholic and exerted virtually total control over the economic activity in the area under Ẓāhir's domination. Greek Catholic merchants migrated from Syria to Egypt in the course of the 18th century and formed a new trade network in the Levant, which was greatly enhanced by the appointment of a Greek Catholic as the customs administrator of Egypt by ᶜAlī Bey al-Kabīr in 1769. In 1742 Ẓāhir ordered those peasants whose resources were exhausted to borrow money from merchants in Cairo and Acre, in order to stimulate the cotton trade.[20] As the Greek Catholics established their economic and administrative position in Egypt, a new trade pattern emerged between Syria and Egypt, including Livorno and Rome, while simultaneously the centre of trade activity shifted from Aleppo

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[17] Haga to St. Gen. (1615), *Bronnen*, vol. 1, pp. 449-450.

[18] Minadoi, p. 296; Carali, pp. 46, 47, 294; Puget de St. Pierre, pp. 24, 25, 29; Mariti (1787).

[19] Mariti (1772), pp. 23-24, 35; Hasselquist, pp. 174, 187; Hochepied to St. Gen. (1761), *Bronnen*, vol. 3, p. 413; Ṣabbāgh, pp. 55-56; 'Mémoire,' (1717), Ismail (1975-), vol. 1, p. 185; Lemaire, 'Traduction,' (1729), id., p. 244; see also: Cohen, pp. 12-14, 16, 84.

[20] Ṣabbāgh, pp. 55-56.

to the southern regions of Syria and the coastal towns. Trade contacts between these towns and Egypt intensified, strengthening the political alliance between Ẓāhir and ᶜAlī Bey, and undermining the traditional roles of Damascus and Aleppo.[21]

The connections between the ᶜAẓm governors in Damascus and foreign trade are not wholly clear. Damascus, it seems, was less hospitable to foreign merchants and consuls than were, for instance, Aleppo or Sidon. As a centre of administration and the base of the pilgrimage caravan, it was primarily directed towards the domestic caravan trade and manufacture. It appears logical that the ᶜAẓm Pashas in the first instance tried to gain control over domestic trade and production by issuing several "state" monopolies. These monopolies, together with the revenues from their tax-farms in the Hama region, constituted the basis of the vast fortunes of the ᶜAẓms. Apparently, the economic disadvantages of this system, which in general fostered price inflation, were compensated for by the benefits derived from the increasing trade with Europe, especially in the period 1743-1757, under the administration of Asᶜad al-ᶜAẓm. It is known that the ᶜAẓms did engage in foreign trade when they acted as the governors of Tripoli and Sidon, especially in the export of ashes, silk and tobacco.[22]

The administration of al-Jazzār in Syria was marked by continuous and large-scale surplus extraction in the form of extraordinary levies, increasing tax demands, extortions and confiscations. Apparently al-Jazzār was fully aware of the discrepancy between the official tax figures and the economic potential of his domains. He not only attempted to extract that surplus of economic activity, but also tried to confiscate hoarded capital from the population and to control the flow of currency. Moreover, his policies were aimed at the creation of "state" monopolies and the stringent control of foreign trade. His monopolizing policies antagonized the French merchants in Sidon and in general he did little to facilitate foreign trade, which had by then become an integral part of the economy of the Syrian provinces.[23]

Al-Jazzār's ambivalent attitude towards foreign trade should not be seen as a sign of short-sightedness or xenophobic isolationism. It seems that his aim was to gain as much control over the economic activity and the circulation of revenues as he could, and, consequently, to impose

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[21] Philipp (1985), pp. 2, 22, 25, 28, 31, 40; Qar'ālī (1927-1933), vol. 1, pp. 83-86; Hourani (1981), p. 104; Ṣabbāgh, pp. 55-56.

[22] Rafeq (1981), pp. 655-657; id. (1966), pp. 92, 95, 108-109, 122, 177, 178.

[23] Koury, pp. 67, 68, 76; Cohen, pp. 20-23, 234.

his terms on the European merchants in his province. In order to consolidate his position in the region, he sought to balance the necessity of acquiring foreign currency with a limitation of the influence of the merchants and the consuls on the regional economy. It may be no coincidence that the efforts of al-Jazzār to consolidate the political and economic role of the state, as represented by his administration, coincided with the stagnation and subsequent decline of French trade with the Levant, as a whole, and with the Syrian provinces in particular. The French cotton trade was eventually directed mainly at the Aegean provinces.[24]

The case of al-Jazzār shows how sensitive the Syrian economy had become to fluctuations on the international market. These fluctuations affected the internal market mechanisms in various ways. A form of crop specialization occurred in some areas, while new trade centres prospered at the expense of others. Traditional trade patterns were to some extent undermined, but change did not always harm the mechanisms of internal trade relations. The increase in foreign trade was accompanied by an increase in economic activity and efforts to expand the internal market by intensifying trade relations within the provinces and within the Empire. However, as argued above, the shifts that occurred sustained important changes in the regional balance of power and the relations between the provincial governors and the central authorities.

The careers of Fakhr al-Dīn Maᶜn, Ẓāhir al-ᶜUmar, the ᶜAẓm family and Aḥmad al-Jazzār show some important similarities. They all laid the foundations of their administrations by building a local power base, economically and politically, outside the official Ottoman administrative channels. They relied on economic monopolies, the expansion of their holdings and the forging of local alliances to force their way into the Ottoman administration. The Porte clearly tolerated and even stimulated this tendency, while at the same time attempting to check aspirations which could harm the interests of the central state. However, once they were incorporated into the state structure, the administrators proved difficult to handle as they sought to extend their grip on state finances and regional politics. As elsewhere in the Empire, the Porte attempted to balance rival regional power centres against each other and to reconcile tendencies towards regional autonomy with centralizing measures.

It should be noted that, in spite of their regional ambitions, the above-mentioned governors continued to anxiously express their loyalty

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[24] See Philipp (1991).

to the Sultan and to avoid transgressing the margins allowed by the central authorities. They all "bought" their relative autonomy by the regular payment of taxes, including semi-official bribes, and by creating sources of additional revenues by stimulating economic activity and foreign trade, or by introducing state monopolies. This guaranteed them the freedom to establish their own tax system and economic base, while the Porte benefited from a steady inflow of taxes. However, this policy occasioned the emergence of a powerful intermediate stratum within the system of tax collection, which appropriated a steadily increasing part of the revenues derived from trade, and it fostered the emergence of regional economic and financial circuits which threatened the central control of the economy. The role of the central authorities apparently became increasingly marginalized and restricted to the collection of a formally assessed amount of tax revenues.

The question of who should be considered to be "the state" now arises. Did regional potentates, such as Fakhr al-Dīn Maᶜn, Ẓāhir al-ᶜUmar or Aḥmad al-Jazzār represent the state, or were they exponents of the disintegration of state control? Apparently they were both. As the expansion of capitalism and the intensified interaction between the Ottoman Empire and the international market imposed new requirements and dilemmas on the imperial economy, connected with the production of raw materials, regional specialization and regulations for export trade, it seems that stronger state intervention in the economy on the regional or provincial level provided a convenient solution. As in the field of administration, this could only be achieved by accepting a more prominent role for the regional administrators. The regionalization of economic control was beneficial for the central state insofar as it provided revenues which would perhaps otherwise have remained unattainable. On the other hand, however, the emergence of a strong regional layer of official or merchant intermediaries resulted in a considerable decrease in central control. In the 18th century the appropriation of commercial monopolies on the internal market and the increasing leakage of precious metals represented clear encroachments upon the authority of the state, which, by that time, it was unable to prevent. Moreover, the system of export regulations was steadily undermined by the arbitrariness of regional officials and the pressure of the European Capitulation states.

2.2 The Shihāb emirs

From the end of the 17th century until the middle of the 19th century, the history of Mount Lebanon was dominated by the emirs of the Shihāb family, who acted as *multazim*s of the area on behalf of the Ottoman governors, and who succeeded in retaining this position as a quasi-dynastic privilege. How should the role of the Shihābs be interpreted as a factor in Ottoman policies and in the regional Syrian administration?

The heritage of Fakhr al-Dīn Maᶜn's control over several *muqāṭaᶜa*s situated in the Lebanese mountains consisted not of a unification of these domains, but of a more clearly crystallized administrative diversification. It was Fakhr al-Dīn's policy to build his power base upon existing structures or through the incorporation of the intermediate strata of local notables. These notables did not all hold identical positions. Thus, in al-Shūf, the power channels were embedded in the established social structures of the Druze community and its various political factions. Al-Shūf was not only the territorial base of the Maᶜns, but also of the strong Druze opposition against them, which could only be suppressed by forceful means. The case was different for Kisrawān, which under Fakhr al-Dīn's patronage was "colonized" by the Maronite Khāzin sheiks. The sheiks were allowed to expand their possessions, build a clientele of peasants and village sheiks, develop their economic potential, establish their control over the production process, and acquire a strong intermediate position in the system of tax collection. In exchange, they provided Fakhr al-Dīn with military and financial support.

As in Kisrawān, in Jubayl and al-Batrūn new economic opportunities were created by Fakhr al-Dīn and the governor of Tripoli, after the defeat of Yūsuf Sayfā. Although the concomitant administrative reforms were opposed by some, one may assume that at least a few of the notables benefited from the increase in productivity. Contrary to the situation in Kisrawān, however, no single notable family succeeded in dominating the administration of these domains, which was possibly also due to the proximity of Tripoli, whose Ottoman governor was closely involved in the exploitation of the adjacent *muqāṭaᶜa*s and in general adhered to the principle of frequently changing tax-farm grants. The administrative diversity of the Lebanese *muqāṭaᶜa*s reflects the flexibility of the Ottoman *iltizām* system in this period.

The career of Fakhr al-Dīn constituted an important precedent for the Ottoman authorities, showing how a regional chieftain could expand his influence on the provincial level with Mount Lebanon as a power base,

and the Porte was forced to refine its administrative system and to find a balance between reliance on local forces and a strengthening of central authority. It responded with measures which were typical of the methods which it utilized to secure its authority in areas which were difficult to pacify by military means. Firstly, in 1660 Sidon became the capital of a new province, including al-Shūf, al-Matn and Kisrawān. Secondly, in 1697 a tax-farm consisting of a conglomerate of *muqāṭaʿa*s was granted to a member of the Sunnite al-Shihāb family, which had for some time been affiliated with the Maʿns as *muqāṭaʿajī*s of Wādī al-Taym. The grant to the Shihāb emir was in principle renewed annually by the governor of Sidon, to whom he transferred the required taxes.[25]

By these measures a new power centre was created to support the authority of the governor of Damascus and to prevent any chieftain from expanding his power from the mountain area to the south. Moreover, as the governor of Sidon would probably be unable to deal with the complex and variegated set of *muqāṭaʿa*s, the collection of taxes in several estates was delegated to one family of indigenous notables, who did not have their power base in the core area of Mount Lebanon, but who could nevertheless be expected to forge local coalitions. Thus, a complex administrative structure was created, in which the politics of Mount Lebanon were firmly linked to the power struggles on the provincial level, while the local power struggles were to some extent controlled by the intermediate position of the Shihāb emirs. All the parties involved, the governors, the Shihābs and the *muqāṭaʿajī*s, were prone to play their rivals off against each other, in order to strengthen their position, and coalitions could change rapidly.

It would be erroneous to consider the administration of Mount Lebanon by the Shihāb emirs as a political substructure detached from the Ottoman system. Although the Shihāb emirs succeeded in securing their grants until the 1840's, and some of them acquired considerable room for manoeuvre, they remained embedded in the Ottoman administrative structure. As elsewhere in the Empire, some degree of integration of estates was allowed in order to facilitate the collection of taxes, while power struggles among potential tax-farmers were fuelled and exploited in order to prevent the tax-farmers from becoming too ambitious. In fact, the administration of the Shihāb emirs can be seen as a factor fostering the incorporation of Mount Lebanon into the Ottoman system.

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[25] Shihābī, pp. 3-5; the *muqāṭaʿa*s granted to Bashīr Shihāb included Ṣafad, Bishāra, al-Shawāmir, al-Tuffāḥ and al-Shaqīf; Shihāb, p. 87.

The ability of the governor of Sidon to control the Shihābs was facilitated by the fact that the territorial base of the emir was relatively small. However, as in the case of Fakhr al-Dīn, it was not unknown for a Shihāb emir to succeed in forging a strong power base among the *muqāṭaʿajī*s of Mount Lebanon which would enable him to defy the authority of the governor and to disregard tax demands. The integration of the tax domains of Mount Lebanon thus became a political aim in itself within the power structure of Syria. On the other hand, the variegated constellation of the set of *muqāṭaʿa*s enabled the governors to undermine the emir's position. This continuous interaction between forces on the local, regional and central levels characterized the administration of Mount Lebanon in the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century.

As has been said above, some of the Shihāb emirs succeeded in establishing a strong position and in extending their administration, especially Ḥaydar (1706-1732), Milḥim (1729-1753), Manṣūr (1753-1763, 1763-1770), Yūsuf (1763-1790) and Bashīr (1790-1840). It should be noted, however, that their administration was, as a rule, contested by rival Shihāb emirs, who often succeeded in acquiring grants for a short period or in carving out some *muqāṭaʿa*s as grants of their own. Thus, the administrations of Manṣūr, Yūsuf and Bashīr were interrupted several times, while it was no anomaly for the administration to be divided among two or more emirs. This is an indication of the influence of the Ottoman governors and their efforts to protect the regular mechanisms of the *iltizām* system against strong and arrogant local chieftains.

The next paragraphs will focus on the administration of the Shihāb emirs from three angles: their relations with the central authorities, those with the Syrian governors, and those with the local *muqāṭaʿajī* families.

2.2.1 *Mount Lebanon and the Porte*

The Shihāb emirs should not be seen as Ottoman officials deriving their authority from the central state, but rather as rural *multazim*s who received their grants from the provincial Ottoman authorities. The Porte was not reluctant to intervene directly, however, when the necessity arose, in order to strengthen the policies of its provincial governors, or to curb their regional ambitions. Conversely, the Shihāb emirs and the *muqāṭaʿajī*s often sought official support for their position from the Porte, hoping to have their grants confirmed independently from the authority of the provincial governors. Thus the position of the Shihāb emirs was

determined by a continual process of negotiation and the reshuffling of political relations, whose limits were to a large extent established by the formal administrative framework of the Porte, even though official decrees of the Porte could sometimes not be effectuated due to local resistance.

Political frictions among the Lebanese *muqāṭaᶜajī*s sometimes took the shape of a confrontation between the local forces and the central authorities, as some factions allied themselves with the Ottoman administration in order to acquire a dominant position in Mount Lebanon, while others rejected the tax demands of the Ottoman governors and defied their military threats. These alliances did not transcend the margins of the administrative system and all factions usually depended upon the support of allies within the Ottoman administration. Significantly, the ascendancy of the Shihāb emirs at the end of the 17th century was apparently sanctioned both by the governor of Sidon and by the Porte. However, the death of Bashīr al-Shihāb in 1705, who had been nominated to administer al-Shūf and Ṣafad in 1697, brought about tensions which led to the intervention of Ottoman troops in support of the ᶜAlam al-Dīn family, leaders of the Druze faction against Ḥaydar al-Shihāb, who had shown himself reluctant to pay his dues to the governor. The tensions resulted in the famous battle of ᶜAyn Darā in 1711, in which Ḥaydar succeeded in defeating the Ottoman forces and appropriated the administration of the *muqāṭaᶜa*s of al-Shūf. Ḥaydar was subsequently, although grudgingly, accepted as the new *multazim*.[26]

The relations between the Porte and the Shihāb emirs naturally revolved around the payment of taxes and the official legitimation of their position as *multazim*s. While problems concerning taxes were usually delegated to the provincial governors, the Shihāb emirs in particular appealed to the Porte to obtain certain privileges which would enable them to ward off too great an interference by the governors in their holdings. Thus, in the 1750's emir Milḥim al-Shihāb, who had suceeded Ḥaydar in 1732, attempted to acquire a firman confirming his authority over al-Shūf and that of his nephew Qāsim over Jubayl. The attempt failed because Sultan Osman died in 1757 and the political climate in Istanbul changed.[27]

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[26] Shihābī, pp. 3-5, 10-14; Shihāb, pp. 86-87, 91, 93; Shidyāq, pp. 313-315; Munayyar, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 48, pp. 672-676; see also the dispatches of the French consul of Sidon; Ismail (1975-), vol. 1, pp. 89 ff.

[27] Munayyar, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 48, pp. 683-685; id., *al-Mashriq*, vol. 50, p. 196; Shihābī, pp. 43, 116; Shidyāq, pp. 322-323; Shihāb (1955), pp. 71-72.

Another attempt by the Shihāb emirs to establish direct links with the Porte, at the expense of the authority of the provincial governor, occurred in 1776, when the Ottoman fleet under vizier Ḥasan Pasha defeated Ẓāhir al-ᶜUmar, after a long period of political tension in Syria. When Aḥmad al-Jazzār was appointed governor of Sidon, Yūsuf al-Shihāb, who had emerged victorious from a power struggle among several Shihāb emirs in the 1760's, was confirmed as governor of al-Shūf, Beirut, Jubayl and al-Biqāᶜ. Ḥasan Pasha issued a document (*ṣakk*) stating that the authority of the governor of Sidon over Yūsuf was restricted to the collection of the *mīrī* tax. This temporarily strengthened Yūsuf's position against al-Jazzār, who, however, eventually refused to accept the arrangement, occupied Beirut and demanded tax arrears covering three years. He was driven out of Beirut by the Ottoman fleet, but, as was foreshadowed by this incident, the direct subordination of Yūsuf to the Porte was apparently never effectuated.[28]

2.2.2 *The Shihāb emirs and the Syrian governors*

As a rule, the relations between the Shihāb emirs and the Ottoman governors of Tripoli, Sidon and Damascus were strained throughout the 18th century, as were, for that matter, relations between the governors themselves. The interdependence involved the confirmation of the emir's authority (*khulᶜa*) by the governor on the one hand, and the execution of the governor's political and financial demands by the emir on the other. A third issue connected with the governor's interest in the emir's position, was the ability to provide, or withhold, the military support necessary to appease regional tensions.

It has been stated that the extent to which the Lebanese *muqāṭaᶜajī*s complied with Ottoman fiscal or military demands was determined by the military and political strength of the Shihāb emir, or, conversely, by the relative weakness of the Ottoman governors. Milḥim al-Shihāb, for instance, repeatedly succeeded in avoiding the payment of the regular amount of taxes, and in 1748 the governor of Damascus launched a punitive expedition. When in 1749 the *mīrī* proceeds again fell short, Milḥim tried to impose an extraordinary tax of one *qirsh* for every adult male in his domains. This tax was rejected by the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s and subsequently cancelled, but in the same year a double *mīrī* tax (*mālayn*) was collected. This example shows how the Shihāb emirs were forced to find

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[28] Shihābī, pp. 32, 34, 36, 38, 39, 41.

a balance between the pressures from two sides, the Ottoman governors and the *muqāṭaʿajī* families.[29]

After the abdication of Milḥim in 1753 the administration was for some time run by Manṣūr and Aḥmad al-Shihāb, who held the *wilāya* over al-Shūf for several years (1753-1763), and then by Qāsim al-Shihāb (1760). The former were supported by the Junblāṭ clan of al-Shūf and the ʿImād clan of ʿArqūb respectively. A typical power struggle ensued, comprising several factions among the *muqāṭaʿaji* families and involving intrigues on the part of the Ottoman governors. In the course of the 1760's Yūsuf al-Shihāb succeeded in acquiring the support of the governors of Damascus and Tripoli and of the powerful Junblāṭ sheiks, and in 1763 the governor of Tripoli granted him the administration of the *muqāṭaʿa*s Jubayl and al-Batrūn, where he set out to assert his control.[30]

Jubayl proved to be a strong power base for Yūsuf, who gradually extended his influence over the neighbouring *muqāṭaʿa*s and attracted the support of several notable families. His main rival Manṣūr made the tactical mistake of welcoming the Syrian expedition of the Egyptian commander Mohammad Abū al-Dhahab (1771), who was an ally of Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar. Yūsuf, whose position derived from the official provincial administration, was strongly opposed to Ẓāhir as well as to Muḥammad, who was initially a challenge to Ottoman authority in Syria. After the withdrawal of Muḥammad from Damascus, Manṣūr acknowledged his defeat and, subsequently, the administration of al-Shūf was granted to Yūsuf.[31]

As he explicitly owed his position to the intervention of the provincial governors, Yūsuf was obviously unable to withdraw from regional politics. On several occasions Yūsuf was asked to send his forces against the allied troops of the *Matāwila* of Jabal ʿĀmil and Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar. All efforts supported by the governor of Damascus ended in failure. In exchange for his support, Yūsuf was allowed exemption from the *mīrī* tax in 1770 and 1771.[32]

However, enmities and alliances were liable to change in 18th century

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[29] Shihābī, pp. 43, 45, 59, 62-64, 80, 88; Shihāb, pp. 100-102; Shidyāq, pp. 322, 324, 326; Rafeq (1966), p. 246.

[30] Shihābī, p. 85; Shihāb, p. 112; Shihāb (1955), p. 45; Shidyāq, p. 329.

[31] Shihābī, pp. 91-93; Shihāb, pp. 114-116, 132; Shihāb (1955), pp. 47-48; Munayyar (1955), pp. 367-368; Karāma, pp. 39-40; ʿAyntūrīnī, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 46, p. 529; Shidyāq, pp. 330-332; Mariti (1772), pp. 82, 150-151.

[32] Shihābī, pp. 79, 81, 82, 103; Shihāb, pp. 117-119, 122, 132; Shihāb (1955), pp. 51-52; Shidyāq, p. 334; Burayk al-Dimashqī, pp. 106-107.

Syrian politics, and in spite of the former struggles between the two rivals, Yūsuf did not hesitate to call in Ẓāhir's support when the need arose. Thus, in 1772, when Aḥmad al-Jazzār, as *mutasallim* of Beirut, challenged Yūsuf's authority, Ẓāhir and his Russian allies helped to besiege the city until al-Jazzār surrendered. In 1773, when discord over the administration of al-Biqāᶜ arose between Yūsuf and ᶜUthmān Pasha, the governor of Damascus, Ẓāhir's support protected Yūsuf from a punitive campaign. These incidents reflect the apogee of Ẓāhir's power, which the governors of Damascus, Muḥammad Pasha al-ᶜAẓm and ᶜUthmān Pasha, had been unable to control. They also marked the nadir of Ottoman authority in Syria. After all, while the Porte was at war with Russia, the Russian fleet intervened unceasingly in Syrian politics, exploiting an alliance with Ẓāhir which, to the Porte, was obviously tantamount to high treason.[33]

After the fall of Ẓāhir as a result of the intervention of Ḥasan Pasha and the erosion of the authority of the governors of Damascus, al-Jazzār emerged as the new provincial leader. Right from the start of his administration it was clear that al-Jazzār intended to interfere in the affairs of Mount Lebanon, in spite of the privileges granted to Yūsuf by Ḥasan Pasha. He was aware of the financial potential of the Lebanese *muqāṭaᶜa*s and intended to exploit them to the full, since only a steady inflow of revenues could secure his position. Moreover, he realized that to retain his grip on the *muqāṭaᶜīs*, the Shihāb emirs included, he had to incite political rivalry and discord, or, perhaps more precisely, to preserve the system of making the renewal of *iltizām* grants dependent on the regular payment of sufficient amounts of taxes.

In the late 1770's and 1780's a constant power struggle between several Shihāb emirs dominated the political scene in Mount Lebanon, especially after Yūsuf had confiscated the estates of some rival emirs. Al-Jazzār intervened in this struggle by promising the *khulᶜa* to the highest bidder, providing military support to his protégés and, in general, increasing the pressure, especially financial, on the *muqāṭaᶜa*s. Initially, the position of Yūsuf al-Shihāb was challenged by his two brothers Sīd Aḥmad and Efendi, who offered large sums to al-Jazzār to obtain the

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[33] Shihābī, pp. 122, 123-126, 128, 129-130, 135-136, 139, 148, 159, 161; Shihāb, pp. 140-142, 144, 147, 150, 156; Shihāb (1955), pp. 77-87, 90, 91, 98, 100, 103, 104; Shidyāq, pp. 347, 350, 353, 354; Munayyar (1955), pp. 383, 385, 387, 396, 397, 409, 413, 414, 420; Munayyar, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 50, pp. 202-212, 416-420; ᶜAyntūrīnī, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 46, p. 532; Karāma, pp. 55, 58, 59, 63, 68, 82-87, 113, 119, 120.

*khul*ᶜ*a* (1778). After Efendi had been killed in the ensuing fights, the struggle was continued by Sīd Aḥmad, who was joined by Ismāᶜīl al-Shihāb (1783) and Bashīr al-Shihāb (1787). In the meantime al-Jazzār strengthened his position in Syria. He acquired the governorate of Damascus from 1783 until 1785 and again in 1790. By that time, the position of Yūsuf had weakened to such an extent that al-Jazzār had him executed together with his *mudabbir* Ghundur al-Khūrī. The *khul*ᶜ*a* was subsequently granted to Bashīr.[34]

Bashīr al-Shihāb was supported by the influential Junblāṭ and ᶜImād families, but opposed by the Billamaᶜ and Abū Nakad emirs, who were almost equally powerful. Al-Jazzār resumed his policy of playing off one faction against the other as a way of exacting as much revenue as possible from the *muqāṭa*ᶜ*ajī*s. He again succeeded in exploiting the rivalry among the Shihāb emirs, supporting the claims of the sons of Yūsuf, Qaᶜdān and Ḥaydar, who received the *khul*ᶜ*a* in 1790, 1792, 1794 and 1798, and Ḥusayn and Saᶜd al-Dīn, who acquired the *khul*ᶜ*a* in 1794. Thus, the appointment of Bashīr alternated with that of his nephews, as part of a policy which was directed at maximizing the tax yields and preventing the emergence of a stable sub-administration. In this policy the Shihābs held a somewhat ambiguous intermediate position, as they were subjected to the pressures of al-Jazzār but also had to cope with rivalling factions among the *muqāṭa*ᶜ*ajī*s.[35]

In order to counterbalance al-Jazzār's regional power, in 1799 the Grand Vizier offered Bashīr the administration of al-Shūf, Wādī al-Taym, Baalbek, Jabal ᶜĀmil, al-Biqāᶜ and Jubayl as *mālikāna*, with the stipulation that henceforth taxes would be paid to the state treasury without the intervention of the Syrian governors. This was clearly a significant political success, as it seems to have been Bashīr's policy to shake off the pressures of al-Jazzār by establishing some kind of direct subordinance to the Porte, as had been attempted by some of his predecessors. Apparently, however, this privileged position never brought much advantage to Bashīr, since al-Jazzār continued to support his rivals, such as Ḥusayn and Qāsim (1799, 1800), who received the admi-

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[34] Shihābī, pp. 168, 173, 174, 176-178, 180, 200; Shihāb, p. 157; Shihāb (1955), pp. 108-111, 114, 118-119, 120-122; Shidyāq, pp. 359, 362-368; Munayyar (1955), pp. 416, 420, 426, 433, 434, 439-442, 444, 450, 452, 472; Munayyar, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 50, pp. 423-426, 436, 438-443; Karāma, pp. 130, 133, 139-140, 150, 153, 156.

[35] Shihābī, pp. 195, 200, 203, 355; Shihāb, p. 173; Shihāb (1955), pp. 137-139, 144, 146, 149-151, 155, 156, 165; Shidyāq, pp. 370, 371, 373, 376; Munayyar (1955), pp. 473, 474, 478, 481, 482, 489-493, 499, 500, 502-504; Munayyar, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 51, pp. 444-448, 450-453, 457-461, 463-466.

nistration of Jubayl in 1800, and ᶜAbbās and Salmān in 1801 and 1802.[36]

Although the death of al-Jazzār in 1804 relieved Bashīr from the pressure of a lifelong hostile relationship, the administration of al-Jazzār reflected a tendency that was not merely incidental. The new governor of Damascus immediately exacted the total amount of tax arrears, which brought Bashīr in conflict with some of the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s. In 1820 tensions arose between Bashīr and ᶜAbdallāh Pasha of Sidon, who demanded a commitment (*sanad taᶜhīd*) for the payment of 2000 purses within sixty days. Bashīr had to resort to the collection of an extraordinary levy, which he failed to complete. Once again the conflict over taxes gave Bashīr's rivals an opportunity to try their hands, and in the same year ᶜAbdallāh Pasha bestowed the *khulᶜa* upon Salmān and Ḥasan al-Shihāb. However, the two emirs failed to collect the sum demanded by the governor from the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s, and Bashīr regained his position.[37]

After the removal of ᶜAbdallāh Pasha from the governorship of Sidon in 1821, the *iltizām* of Jubayl and al-Shūf was again conferred on Ḥasan and Salmān. The administration of al-Shūf was eventually transferred to ᶜAbbās al-Shihāb, who enjoyed the support of a Druze faction. Bashīr departed for a voluntary exile in Egypt, where he successfully mobilized the support of Muḥammad ᶜAlī for the reinstatement of ᶜAbdallāh Pasha (1823). Bashīr immediately returned to Mount Lebanon and reconciled himself with ᶜAbbās, who in turn received the *iltizām* of Jubayl. Until the Egyptian invasion of Syria in 1831 the relationship between Bashīr and ᶜAbdallāh Pasha remained precarious, especially when the governor claimed the *mālikāna* of Beirut, including the city's tax and custom revenues (1825), apart from several irregular payments (1825, 1828). In 1830 Bashīr sent troops to help the governor subdue the rebellious sheiks of Nablus, but when ᶜAbdallāh Pasha summoned him to delegate auxiliary forces to fight the Egyptian army under Ibrāhīm Pasha, the son of Muḥammad ᶜAlī, Bashīr's response was ambivalent, to say the least.[38]

The period of the Egyptian occupation of Syria (1832-1840) is usually regarded as one of transition, in which the developments which had emerged in the first decades of the 19th century were accelerated and resulted in the social and communal tensions of the 1840's. It is seen

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[36] Shihābī, pp. 659-669; Shihāb (1955), pp. 481-482; Munayyar (1955), pp. 150-156.

[37] Shihābī, pp. 720, 722, 726, 734-735, 737, 747, 784, 795, 802-819.

[38] Koury, pp. 163 ff.; see the letters from the French consuls in: Ismail (1975-), vol. 5, pp. 24, 37, 43-44, 48-49; vol. I, p. 38 (1821-1823).

as a new phase in the history of Syria and the Ottoman Empire, as Ibrāhīm Pasha opened up the area to European trade, and introduced economic, military and fiscal reforms that upset the previous patterns in the province. It especially drew increased European political intervention, since the Egyptian expansion was seen as a threat to the Ottoman Empire as a whole and created a division within the Empire which was eagerly exploited by European diplomacy. Ibrāhīm Pasha considered Bashīr al-Shihāb to be an important ally and he offered him a considerable degree of autonomy in exchange for military support. Consequently, Mount Lebanon was at first little affected by Ibrāhīm's administrative and fiscal reforms. The extent to which the "Egyptian period" contributed to the socio-economic transformations in Mount Lebanon and affected the internal relations of the area still awaits a thorough investigation.[39]

2.2.3 *Muqāṭaᶜajī alliances*

It is beyond the scope of this study to attempt a full survey of the complex alliances among the *muqāṭaᶜajī* families in the 18th century. It is necessary, however, to give some indication of the coalitions on which the political position of the Shihāb emirs to a certain extent depended. These coalitions were usually formed in order to resist fiscal pressures or to support potential candidates of the Shihāb family who aspired to a share of the tax-farms of Mount Lebanon. Consequently, as a rule, these alliances seem to have been incidental and directed at achieving immediate goals, and affiliations could shift rapidly. The incidental nature of the coalitions in the 18th century is illustrated by the position of the Billamaᶜ emirs of al-Matn, who persistently refused to comply with the surplus tax demands of any of the Shihāb emirs. They apparently failed to perceive the advantages of a long-term alliance with one of the emirs to counteract the disruptive influence of the policies of al-Jazzār, and preferred to lean on the stability of their own administration.[40]

The *muqāṭaᶜa* system of Mount Lebanon is often described as a semi-institutionalized structure, with a "feudal" hierarchy consisting of families who bore the heritable titles of "emir", *muqaddam*, or sheik. It is

[39] See for the invasion of Ibrahim Pasha: Qar'ālī (1935); *Mudhakkirāt tārīkhiyya ᶜan ḥamla Ibrāhīm Bāshā ᶜalā Sūriya*; Ghannām.

[40] Shihābī, pp. 161, 436; Shihāb, pp. 136, 156; Shihāb (1955), p. 74; Munayyar (1955), pp. 378, 439, 441-442.

difficult to determine whether in reality these titles reflected the pattern of power relations which grew among the tax-farmers of Mount Lebanon. It seems more likely that the titles referred to a social status which was connected to administrative roles, but which was not part of an institutionalized sub-structure within the Ottoman administration. It is not impossible, however, that they came to be considered as such in the course of the 19th century, when the peculiarities of the *iltizām* system in Mount Lebanon were increasingly regarded as features which separated the area from the Syrian environment.

Traditionally, the Druze *muqāṭaᶜajī*s of al-Shūf and adjacent areas were the most powerful factor in the politics of Mount Lebanon. They were divided into two parties, symbolized by the "white banner" and the "red banner", and usually identified as Yamanīs and Qaysīs respectively. The leaders of the Yamanī faction, the ᶜAlam al-Dīn family, were defeated in the course of the 17th century and settled in Damascus. In 1711 they unsuccesfully attempted to regain their position in al-Shūf with the help of the Ottoman governor of Sidon, and the Qaysī families succeeded in consolidating their position.[41]

In the 18th century, political tensions especially focused on the relations between the Shihābs and the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s of the Shūf conglomerate, the Junblāṭ, ᶜImād, ᶜAbd al-Mālik, Abū Nakad, Arslān, Talḥūq, Billamaᶜ and Khāzin families. These opposed Shihāb authority when it became too burdensome on the one hand, but on the other hand were prepared to comply with tax demands that would not reduce their "autonomy". The Junblāṭs, who were the most powerful of the Druze families, supported Yūsuf al-Shihāb in his struggle against his Shihāb rivals in the 1760's, but in the 1780's they shifted their support firstly to Ḥaydar and Qaᶜdān and eventually to Bashīr. The Abū Nakads, who had been supporters of Yūsuf, although their relationship with him was not immaculate, were violently eliminated in 1797 by a coalition of Junblāṭ, ᶜImād and Bashīr. The ᶜAbd al-Māliks and Talḥūqs changed their allegiance several times, but their opposition was finally subdued by Bashīr in the first decades of the 19th century. The ᶜImāds, finally, were initially inclined to join the Junblāṭ faction, but eventually became estranged from Bashīr.

In the 1820's a new constellation emerged when Bashīr confronted the only powerful rival he had left, sheik Bashīr Junblāṭ, who had colla-

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[41] Estelle to Pontchartrin (1711), Ismail (1975-), vol. 1, pp. 94 ff.; about the discussion of the relevance of the Qays-Yaman division, see: Abu Husayn, pp. 75-76.

borated with Darwīsh Pasha against Bashīr al-Shihāb's favourite ᶜAbdallāh Pasha. Bashīr al-Shihāb could count on the support of the ᶜAbd al-Māliks, Talḥūqs and Abū Nakads, against a coalition of the Junblāṭs, ᶜImāds and ᶜArslāns. After the defeat of the Junblāṭs in 1824 and the destruction of their base at al-Mukhtāra and the execution of Bashīr Junblāṭ, Bashīr al-Shihāb proceeded to redistribute the Shūf domains among his followers. It should be noted here that the removal of such a rich and influential rival as Bashīr Junblāṭ was only made possible by Muḥammad ᶜAlī's support for Bashīr al-Shihāb on the level of provincial politics.[42]

The administrations of Yūsuf and Bashīr al-Shihāb show a quite consistent drive to marginalize the influence of the main Druze *muqāṭaᶜajī*s. In fact, after the conversion of some of the Shihāb emirs to Christianity, in the second half of the 18th century, they increasingly came to lean on coalitions of Maronite groups. This tendency is reflected in the prominent political role played by the Maronite *mudabbir*s of the various Shihāb emirs from the close of the 18th century. These contributed to the incorporation of Jubayl, al-Batrūn and Bsharrī into the power structure of the Shihābs, when Yūsuf acquired the administration of the *muqāṭaᶜa*s in the 1760's. From then on, the Druze, as a political force, were balanced by an increasingly ambitious configuration of Christian, especially Maronite, groups.

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[42] Shihābī, pp. 12, 119, 123-128, 132, 175, 180, 194, 200, 355, 403, 436, 642, 650-655, 669, 685, 688, 694; Shihāb, pp. 135, 136, 156, 157, 168, 199; Shihāb (1955), pp. 74, 77, 78, 117, 122, 139; Karāma, p. 123; Dimashqī, pp. 101-102, 137, 143; Munayyar (1955), pp. 378, 439, 441-442, 453, 474, 499; id., *al-Mashriq*, vol. 48, p. 688; id., *al-Mashriq*, vol. 50, pp. 430, 434, 444, 446-447; id., *al-Mashriq*, vol. 51, p. 445; Shidyāq, pp. 213, 341-342, 354, 362, 365, 368.

CHAPTER THREE

MOUNT LEBANON BETWEEN INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION

One of the main characteristics of Mount Lebanon, in the economic field, was the relatively early development of a form of agricultural specialization in response to commercial opportunities both within the Ottoman Empire and abroad. Although the produce of the area was variegated, sericulture increasingly became one of the mainstays of the agriculture and a major source of revenue for the peasants, the *muqā-ṭaᶜajī*s and the Syrian governors. As silk was such a sophisticated and labour-intensive product, to a large extent it came to shape the structure of agriculture in Mount Lebanon. Moreover, as it was a commodity which was highly valued on the international market, it represented the main product linking the area to the world economy. This meant that Mount Lebanon profited at an early stage from trade opportunities which secured the influx of stable foreign currency. On the other hand, however, the increasing importance of silk as a commercial crop made Mount Lebanon vulnerable to fluctuations on the world market and to the consequences of competition from other silk-producing areas.

This chapter will concentrate on the efforts by the Shihāb emirs to incorporate the *muqāṭaᶜa*s of Mount Lebanon into their *iltizām* and, conversely, on the developments which hampered these efforts and which fostered a fragmentation of the agricultural estates. As silk is seen as a major factor which influenced both processes, a concise survey will first be given of the nature of sericulture and the silk-trade in Mount Lebanon, within the regional and international contexts. Finally, the socio-economic structure of Kisrawān and the economic position of the Khāzin sheiks, as it developed during the 18th century and the first decades of the 19th century, will be examined in relation to the tendencies mentioned above.

3.1 The expansion of sericulture

In spite of its geographical peculiarities, the area of Mount Lebanon was firmly embedded in the economy of the Syrian provinces. Although they were part of a predominantly rural region, from the 17th century on-

wards, at least, the Lebanese *muqāṭaᶜa*s were not self-sufficient. Wheat was supplied by the Ḥawrān region in southern Syria, the Biqāᶜ plain, and Egypt. Rice and coffee were obtained from Egypt, while mutton was provided by Kurdish tribesmen at the market of Zaḥla. The main agricultural produce of Mount Lebanon consisted of grapes, olives, fruit and, especially, silk. Sericulture became the predominant economic activity certainly from the 17th century onwards, when the export of raw silk to Tuscany and France was stimulated by Fakhr al-Dīn Maᶜn, but probably also under the influence of increased economic relations with Damascus and other Syrian towns. Silk was transferred to workshops in Damascus and Egypt and to Aleppo. The main commercial centres for Mount Lebanon were Sidon and Tripoli on the Syrian coast, and Zaḥla for relations with the interior. Compared to Sidon and Tripoli, the ports of Beirut and Jūniya were of minor importance for the Syrian hinterland, at least until the first half of the 19th century, but they nevertheless constituted an important alternative outlet for silk from Mount Lebanon.[1]

The silk sector in the Ottoman Empire was connected with several fields of economic activity, such as the production of raw materials, the weaving industry, and trade, with both the internal and export markets. Various kinds of raw silk were imported from Persia by the annual caravans, and sold to European merchants. As the silk sector was linked with the export trade, it was extremely sensitive to fluctuations in demand on the international market. Silk was a highly valued commodity in Europe as well as in the Levant, and a fierce competition evolved between European and Ottoman manufacturers, and between the different silk-producing regions. In Europe, from the 16th century onwards, Tuscany and Provence were the main centres for sericulture, whereas in the Ottoman Empire Bursa had a highly developed silk industry and became the centre for the trade in Persian silk in the period between 1550-1650. At first, Levantine silk provided the raw material for the European silk industry, but in the 17th century competition from Italian silks increased, while from 1700 onwards East Asian silk was introduced to the world market. From the middle of the 17th century until the first quarter of the 18th century the focus of the Ottoman-European silk trade shifted from Bursa to Aleppo in Syria, and Damietta in Egypt.[2]

The international silk market consisted of a large variety of products,

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[1] Chevallier (1959); Masson (1896), pp. 382, 385.
[2] Wallerstein (1974), pp. 291-292; Davis, pp. 27, 135-137; Cizakca, p. 247; Chevallier (1959).

of different quality, refinement and strength. Different kinds were used for the manufacture of fabrics, such as velours, satin, silk buttons, velvet, etc. In general, Tuscan silk was highly appreciated in Europe, as were the Persian varieties sherbassee and ardasset, which were purchased in Bursa and Aleppo. In the second half of the 17th century the international market was influenced by large quantities of Bengal and Chinese silk, which became available for relatively low prices. Despite the many varieties of silk it appears from the available data that prices varied according to kind and quality, but followed the same general pattern determined by the overall supply and demand of the world market.[3]

Ottoman silk was produced in several varieties, such as the silk from Bursa, Cyprus and the Morea, and Antioch, Byass, Mountain, Barut, Shuf, and Sidon silks from the Syrian coast region. These varieties, consisting of white and yellow silk, differed in quality and use, and, accordingly, in price. Prices also reflected the fluctuations of local harvests both in quantity and quality. In general, it appears that in the 17th and 18th centuries silk from Beirut (probably originally from Kisrawān and al-Matn) and al-Shūf was more expensive than the silks from Tripoli (al-ʿAkkār) and Sidon. Obviously, the price of silk, and accordingly the position of producers on the market, was also determined by supplementary expenses, such as taxes, custom duties, transport and other services. These, again, could be fixed by the central authorities, but to a certain extent also by local rulers and local circumstances. Thus, although Syrian silk is often treated as a separate product set against the other varieties of silk on the world market, the position of local producers in Syria could be widely divergent, depending on the quality of their product, the demand for their specific variety on the international or domestic market, and the trade conditions set by the local governors and the Porte. To give an example, yellow silk, which was produced in Kisrawān and al-Shūf, was preferred in the Ottoman Empire and especially Egypt, while white silks, from the Beirut and Tripoli regions, were popular in Europe. Consequently, although a regional economic specialization occurred in the coastal area of Syria, the nature of the commodity which was produced did not facilitate the economic integration of the region *vis à vis* the international market or the surrounding areas.[4]

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[3] Davis, pp. 27, 136, 137, 140; for prices of silk in the 18th century on the Amsterdam market, see Posthumus, pp. 293-299 (see also appendix 4c).

[4] In 1525 taxes on silk were levied in Beirut, Bakhit, p. 248; Savary (1742), vol. 1, part 2, pp. 568-570; id., vol. 3, 831, 832, 841, app., p. 27; Davis, pp. 33, 143, 144-145, 156; see also: 'Tableau du commerce annuel d'Alep,' in: *Bronnen*, vol. 4, pp. 1596-1597; see also: Masson (1896), pp. 382, 385.

In the period of Fakhr al-Dīn the demand for Syrian silk on the international market seems to have increased, which was probably due to the emir's contacts with the Tuscan cities, and the efforts of French and Dutch merchants to enter the Levantine market. Moreover, the Porte in the 17th century stimulated sericulture in Syria in order to stabilize the supply of the internal market, which had become uncertain due to the Persian wars. Fakhr al-Dīn and the notable families who expanded their activities under his patronage subsequently extended the existing mulberry plantations, especially in al-ʿAkkār, Kisrawān, al-Shūf, Bsharrī, Beirut and Sidon, and attracted foreign merchants by reducing the customs duties for exports from Beirut. Silk from the coastal region was also traded in Aleppo, which was, however, mainly a transit market for Persian silk. After the death of Fakhr al-Dīn, exports of Syrian silk declined due to the competition from Asian silk and, perhaps, as a result of the economic decline of Tuscany. Sometime around 1700, French imports of silk from Sidon stopped almost completely.[5]

In the 1720's the supply of Persian silk to Aleppo was interrupted again, as a result of the continuous Ottoman wars against Persia, and European merchants were forced to look elsewhere for their supplies. The decline of the Persian silk trade came as a cruel blow to the economy of Aleppo, which lost its commercial predominance, and to the revenues of the Empire from the transit trade. To counteract the losses and to secure sufficient supplies for the domestic market, the Porte once more stimulated the extension of sericulture in the Syrian provinces. These tendencies are reflected in the prices of Syrian silk, which rose in the 1720's and 1730's and by the efforts of emir Milḥim al-Shihāb to stimulate sericulture in Mount Lebanon. Following a sudden rise in the demand for silk in Europe, prices peaked in the early 1750's, then declined in the period from 1753 onwards, rose again in the late 1760's, but became especially low in the 1780's. From 1790 on, prices stabilized at a relatively high level. The prices of Syrian silk were influenced by the quantities of Piedmontese silk on the European market, which were small in the 1750's, but increased at the end of the 18th century. Another factor which adversely affected the export of Syrian silk was the shift of the British

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[5] Masters, pp. 23-24; Ismail (1955), vol. 1, pp. 121, 133; Ḥibliṣ, p. 139; see also: 'Mémoire Lempereur' (1685), Ismail (1975-), vol. 1, p. 16; Desguesier to Pontchartrain (1691), id., p. 23; 'Mémoires' (1712), id., p. 113; 'Mémoire' (1688), id., vol. 3, p. 187.

silk trade with the Levant from Syria to Bursa, in the 1780's.[6]

Little is known about the structure of the silk trade of the Lebanese *muqāṭaᶜa*s. It is reported that in the 17th century emir Fakhr al-Dīn personally supervised the sale of silk to the French in Beirut in the month of August every year, and, moreover, fixed the prices himself. Milḥim al-Shihāb is reported to have set a minimum price for silk, to avoid price falls. Generally it is assumed, however, that the silk trade was organized by merchants in Tripoli and Sidon, who had agents in Beirut. Besides, annual caravans transported Lebanese silk from Beirut to Aleppo and Damascus, to be traded or manufactured, and a substantial quantity was shipped from Sidon and Beirut to Damietta in Egypt. It appears that, at least in the 18th century, the Lebanese *muqāṭaᶜa*s were incorporated into several networks of silk trade and manufacture, although these networks may have operated separately from each other, as for instance, silk from Kisrawān was exported from Beirut, while silk from al-Shūf was mainly transferred to Sidon. Apparently in the 18th century the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s had their own commercial channels and themselves assumed various roles.[7]

In the course of the 18th century, especially after the renewal of the French Capitulations with the Porte in 1740, Franco-Syrian trade through the port of Sidon rapidly increased. However, it is not yet clear to what extent Mount Lebanon benefited from this expansion. French imports of Syrian silk seem to have increased, but not as substantially as those of Palestinian cotton. It seems that after 1770 the demand for silk on the French market decreased considerably. There are, however, indications that Lebanese sericulture was expanded in the course of the 18th century, which would not be conceivable without growing, or at least sustained, demand from the Ottoman and international markets, and, presumably, an invigorated indigenous industry. Part of the produce of Mount Lebanon reached the French market through workshops in Damascus, but a more substantial part may have been exported through the

[6] Davis, pp. 35, 42, 48, 129, 130, 139, 149, 160; Chevallier (1959), pp. 43-44; id. (1971), p. 124; Rafeq (1966), p. 179; Masson (1896/1967), p. 513; Masters, p. 30; Kasaba, p. 17; Levi, 808-809; Richards, p. 44; Gargiolli, p. 215; Charles-Roux, p. 7; Islamoglu/Keyder, p. 51; see also: Verrayon to Rouille (1753), Ismail (1975-), vol. 2, p. 108; 'Mémoire Guys' (1824), id., vol. 4, pp. 52-53.

[7] Masson (1896), p. 385, 386, 388; id.(1896/1967), p. 519; Raymond (1973), pp. 173 note 1 (p. 174), 190; Davis, pp. 159, 160; Rafeq (1966), p. 76; Carali, pp. 295, 315-322, 330, 333, 367, 378-379, 382-384 389-399; Ḥibliṣ, p. 236; Ismail (1955), vol. 1, p. 134; Havemann, p. 45; Levi, pp. 808-809; see also: Puget de St. Pierre, pp. 24-25, 34, 193, 194; Mariti (1772), pp. 205-206; Savary (1742), vol. 3, pp. 831, 832; app., p. 27; 'Mémoire Lemaire' (1728), Ismail (1975-), vol. 1, p. 243.

emerging trade network covering southern Syria and Egypt. As has been explained above, in the course of the 18th century several waves of Syrian and Lebanese Christians, predominantly Greek Catholics, migrated to Egypt. The Syrians succeeded in gaining control over the Egyptian-Syrian trade and in setting up an extensive trade network, which also included Marseille and Livorno. Presumably, the "Egyptian connection" provided the Lebanese producers with new trade channels.[8]

The prices of Lebanese silk reached their peak in 1766 and 1776, and the Shihāb emirs attempted to maximize their profits from the enlarged market opportunities. The fact that Yūsuf in the 1780's tried to impose a new tax on silk indicates that sericulture was prosperous enough to provide a source of income that induced the Shihāb emirs and the Ottoman governors to try to skim off a larger share of the surplus. As official taxation remained unchanged, the profitability of the Lebanese *muqāṭaᶜa*s can be deduced from the sums that ambitious Shihāb emirs were prepared to pay in order to acquire the *iltizām*. These payments, imposed by al-Jazzār, took the guise of extraordinary levies and incidental exactions imposed on the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s. Bashīr al-Shihāb used to resort to the collection of double or triple the *mīrī* tax, and in 1807 the governor of Sidon demanded a reassessment of taxes, as taxation was still based on silk prices which had been current one century before. In the first decades of the 19th century, silk prices increased rapidly.[9]

The policy of reassessing taxation and the attempts to tap the capital resources which were accumulated by the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s were met by fierce resistance, which was obviously partly inspired by the adverse effects of inflation. In the last decades of the 18th century and the first decades of the 19th century, especially, inflation soared, inducing the Shihābs to collect two or even three *mīrī* taxes in the same year. Between 1795 and 1830 the value of the currency decreased by approximately 80 per cent. The price of a *kayl* of wheat rose from an average of 2,2-3 q. in the period 1761-1785 to 7-10 q. in the period 1811-1835. Similarly, the price of land used for sericulture increased from an average of 20 q. per *ḥiml* in the 1770's to 160-300 q. in the 1830's. As elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, inflation in Mount Lebanon led to a scarcity of precious metals, the hoarding of gold and silver and high interest rates. It

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[8] Philipp, pp. 2, 9, 22, 25, 28, 31, 40; Raymond (1973), p. 110; Hourani (1981), p. 104; Qar'ālī (1927), vol. 1, pp. 83-86; Abou el-Rousse Slim, p. 65; see also: 'Réponses Taitbout' (n.d.), Ismail (1975-), vol. 3, p. 50; Taules to Aiguillon (1772), id., vol. II, p. 236.

[9] Munayyar (1955), p. 386; Shihāb (1955), p. 184; Khāṭir, pp. 171-172; Shidyāq, pp.

certainly fostered the tendency towards increased commercialization of agriculture and the preponderance of silk as a commercial crop.[10]

Among the other obstacles to economic prosperity were the many political conflicts, which became virtually endemic in the second half of the 18th century. The rivalry between the Shihāb emirs cut deep into political life in Mount Lebanon. Warfare, both to support one of the pretenders or to avert surplus taxes, laid a heavy burden upon the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s and their labour supply, disrupting internal and external trade and draining food stocks. Trade in the whole of Syria came to a complete standstill several times and even the regular trade with Egypt was hampered by blockades and the confiscation of ship loads. The effects of political strife hit some *muqāṭaᶜajī*s harder than others as a result of violence, the havoc caused by passing troops or financial punishment by the victorious emir. Political tensions thus laid a heavy strain on the economic potential of the *muqāṭaᶜa* system.[11]

In the 1820's a new boom in silk exports occurred, which was mainly the result of the increased demand in North Africa and Egypt. The growth of the silk consumption of Egyptian industry especially, which had been revived under the administration of Muḥammad ᶜAlī, seems to have forced up the prices of Syrian silk.[12] Moreover, in 1826 the demand for silk on the internal Ottoman market even induced the Porte to proclaim a ban on silk exports to Europe. This measure was circumvented by the European merchants by shipping their purchases to Cyprus first, where the control was less stringent. However, at this stage prices became so high that export to Europe became unprofitable.[13]

For the Egyptians, the importation of Syrian silk was the more attractive because of the advantageous rates (app. 10%) of Egyptian currency, which was issued by Muḥammad ᶜAlī. Thus, in spite of the high prices, during the administration of Ibrāhīm Pasha the Egyptians twice attempted to obtain a monopoly on the silk crops of Mount Lebanon, in order to satisfy the needs of the factories in Damietta and Alexandria, and in

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[10] Belin (1864); Chevallier (1971), pp. 128-129; devaluations are mentioned by Burayk al-Dimashqī, *passim.*

[11] Munayyar, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 50, p. 456; Karāma, pp. 48, 110, 125, 133; Burayk al-Dimashqī, pp. 61, 64, 86, 104, 107, 108, 115-116; Dimashqī, p. 78; Munayyar (1955), pp. 430, 433-435.

[12] Guys to Ferronays (1828), Ismail (1975-), vol. 4, p. 63; Guys to Damas (1827), id., vol. 4, p. 61; For the Egyptian silk industry in the Muhammad 'Ali period, see: Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, chapter 8; Muhammad 'Ali invited some Druze from al-Shūf to set up sericulture in Egypt (1816), Shihāb, p. 632.

[13] 'Export de Beyrouth', Ismail, (1975-), vol. I, p. 143; Guys to Broglie (1833), id., vol. I, p. 274.

1832 an official silk monopoly was abandoned after virulent protests from producers and traders. In 1834 a government office was set up in Beirut to supervise the marketing of the silk crop. By this time, it had become customary to purchase the crops in advance from producers. Producers were obliged to transport their crops to Beirut, where the Egyptian agents enjoyed preferential treatment. Next it was the turn of the indigenous and the North African merchants, who rendered a profitable trade for the European companies virtually impossible. This semi-monopoly was abolished after general complaints, but the silk trade remained under strict government control in subsequent years.[14]

The Egyptian purchases were apparently paid with shiploads of the relatively stable Egyptian coins and the upward movement of silk prices was sustained in the 1820's and 1830's. This engendered an extension of sericulture in some parts of Mount Lebanon, probably especially in Jubayl, al-Batrūn and Jabbat Bsharrī. Thus, as during the greater part of the 18th century, the upsurge in the silk trade of Mount Lebanon was not caused by direct trade contacts with Europe, but rather through the intermediation of manufacturers in the Ottoman Empire itself, which had become incorporated into trade networks connected with the European market. Seemingly, the demand on the Ottoman market, both for consumption and for the weaving industries, remained an important structural factor.[15]

Even before the ascendancy of Fakhr al-Dīn the export of silk determined the economic structure of Mount Lebanon to a large extent. Agricultural specialization provided the chieftains with a relatively steady source of income which enabled them to establish their power and to control the trade chain. This naturally undermined the economic supervision of the central authorities and the effectuation of state regulations on internal and external trade. Although much smaller than the neighbouring coastal towns, a crucial link in the trade chain was the port of Beirut, which was the only outlet for silk exports which could effectively be controlled by Fakhr al-Dīn, and which avoided the ports of Tripoli and Sidon, which were under more stringent state control. In this period, Beirut was a haven for pirates and a centre of free trade circumventing the Ottoman custom decrees. In the 18th century, the administration of

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[14] Guys to Broglie (1833), Ismail (1975-), vol. 4, p. 257; id., id., vol. 4, p. 261; id., id., vol. I, p. 270; Guys to Rigny (1834), id., vol. I, pp. 330-332; id., id., vol. 4, p. 286; id., id., vol. I, p. 323; id., id., vol. I, p. 338; id. (1835), id., vol. I, p. 358; see also letters by B. al-Shihāb to Khāzins, KHA1.

[15] Guys to Broglie (1833), Ismail (1975-), vol. 4, p. 257.

the city was contested by the Shihāb emirs and the Ottoman governors on several occasions. In 1744 and 1748 Beirut was taken by Milḥim al-Shihāb, who gave a new impetus to sericulture and the silk trade, and in the 1770's al-Jazzār and Yūsuf al-Shihāb almost continuously struggled for the control of the port and its revenues from custom duties. This struggle was continued by Bashīr al-Shihāb and the Ottoman governors of Sidon in the 19th century.[16]

3.2 The muqāṭaᶜa system in Mount Lebanon

From the 17th century onwards sericulture became the main determinant of socio-economic relations in the area of Mount Lebanon. As its importance increased, the estates of the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s were gradually shaped to maximize the profits from the opportunities provided by the expanding world market. This not only affected the position of Mount Lebanon within the Ottoman economy, as a specialized agricultural area and a centre of capital accumulation, but also the social structure within the domains themselves, and the relations between the tax-farming families and the peasants. Of course the two levels are closely interrelated, as factors influencing the colliding tendencies of integration and fragmentation.

It is important to note that the basis for agricultural production in Mount Lebanon was the relationship between the *muqāṭaᶜajī* and the peasants in his domain. Because historical and geographical circumstances varied, the position of the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s of Mount Lebanon and the extent of their control over production was not uniform. The degree to which the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s succeeded in establishing their authority over the domains under their administration also determined their attitude towards the Shihāb emirs, who, as tax collectors, in most cases exerted indirect control only and could not intervene in agreements between the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s and their peasants about the means of production and taxes. Moreover, some *muqāṭaᶜajī*s attempted to have their position as hereditary *multazim*s sanctioned by the Porte in order to circumvent the channels

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[16] Shihābī, pp. 34, 37, 51, 97-101, 781-782; Shihāb (1955), pp. 50-52; Shihāb, pp. 121-124; Munayyar (1955), p. 368, 503; Minadoi, pp. 296, 313; Karāma, pp. 42-43; Shidyāq, pp. 333-334, 338; Puget de St. Pierre, pp. 184, 187; Duwayhī, pp. 466, 473; Dimashqī, p. 15; Haga to St. General (1615), in: *Bronnen*, vol. 1, pp. 449, 450, 457; Maseyk to Dedel (1765), id., vol. 4, p. 29; Maseyk to St. General (1772), id., p. 169; Cohen, pp. 125, 126.

of provincial administration, and were able to transform their holdings into quasi-property.

Despite the differences between the Lebanese *muqāṭaʿa*s, some general characteristics can be perceived concerning the legal framework of their economic exploitation. At least in theory, all *muqāṭaʿa*s were subject to the Ottoman land regime, which meant that most cultivable lands were classified as state-owned, or *mīrī* lands. The cultivator was liable for the payment of a fixed annual land tax (*mīrī*), which was set according to the potential productivity of each tract of land. Registers were kept in which the possession and the taxation of the land were recorded. Contemporary documents mention the possibility of a renewed assessment of taxation (*tawzīʿ* or *daymūs*), but there is no evidence that this was a regular occurrence. As will be explained below, central control over the alienation of lands, for which, formally, official permission was required, became less stringent in the course of the 18th century. Consequently, the distinction between *mīrī* land and freehold property (*milk*) became blurred, an indication of a discrepancy growing between the legal status of the land, and economic requirements.

The exploitation of the cultivable lands took the shape of several kinds of share-cropping agreements (*shirāka*) between the peasants and the tax-farmers, which were in principle concluded voluntarily and tacitly renewed at the beginning of each season. Share-cropping agreements were elaborately described in Islamic jurisprudence. In theory they varied according to the crops: *musāqāh* (cereals), *munāṣaba* (orchards) and *muzāraʿa* (cereals). In principle the peasant acquired the right to cultivate the land after an advance payment of 1/4 of the estimated produce. The tax-farmer provided him with the necessary equipment and seeds. Both partners received 1/2 of the crop. The right to exploit the land was inheritable and the agreement could be dissolved at any time by either party, the tax-farmer then being obliged to return the advance payment, while the peasant had to transfer the land to another cultivator. In general, the basic tax obligations of a peasant consisted of a 1/4 of the *mīrī* tax and a tax levied on the occasion of holidays and festivities (*ʿīdiyya*), apart from contributions to the various costs of production.[17]

As in the case of the legal status of land, the practice of share-cropping and the relations of production were not solely determined by legal rules. As agreements were not always recorded in detail, they were

[17] Surveys of the *muqāṭaʿa* system in Mount Lebanon can be found in Chevallier (1971; 1959), Touma, Abou El-Rousse Slim.

susceptible to multiple interpretations or to changes of practice due to tensions between legal regulations and economic pressures. Especially in Mount Lebanon, where the authority of the central government and, consequently, the influence of the Hanafite legal system were limited, practical factors were important in shaping the actual framework of socio-economic relations. In the next paragraphs an attempt will be made to give a concise description of the administrative structure of the Maronite *muqāṭaʿa*s of Mount Lebanon, Jubayl and Jabbat Bsharrī, before we turn our attention to the administration of the Khāzin sheiks of Kisrawān.

3.2.1 *Jubayl, al-Batrūn and Jabbat Bsharrī*

Before the Maronites of Mount Lebanon migrated to Kisrawān and al-Futūḥ in the 17th and 18th centuries, they were traditionally concentrated in the northern tax-farms of Jubayl, al-Batrūn and Jabbat Bsharrī. In 1636 the Turkish ʿAssāf governors granted the administration of this area to the Shiite *muqaddam*s al-Ḥamāda, after having had their support in subduing a pro-Sayfā revolt in Jāj. The Ḥamādas settled in al-Marqab and al-Batrūn. The administration of the Ḥamādas was greatly affected by the political upheavals of the period. In 1641 the *muqaddam*s were expelled from their holding which was transferred to, successively, the ʿAlam al-Dīns (1641), Milḥim Maʿn (1650) and the Billamaʿs (1656). The Ḥamādas were reinstated in 1674 and 1677 after the victory of the Maʿn faction over the ʿAlam al-Dīn and al-ʿImād coalition, but their position remained precarious until 1711.[18]

The opposition to the Ḥamāda family was not restricted to external forces or rival notable families, but also involved the resistance of local notables, within the *muqāṭaʿa*, to tax policies and alleged arbitrariness. In 1684, 1686 and 1692 local notables, such as the Dandashs (al-ʿAkkār) and al-Raʿds (al-Ḍanniyya) called in the support of the Maʿn and Shihāb emirs against their overlords. In 1692 the Ḥamādas were again stripped of their authority and the tax-farm was divided among the leading families, notably the Dandash (al-ʿAkkār, al-Harmil), al-Hasamī (Jubayl), al-Shā'ir (al-Batrūn), al-Ihdinī (Jabbat Bsharrī, al-Zāwiya), al-Raʿd (al-Ḍanniyya).[19]

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[18] Duwayhī, pp. 401, 455, 498, 531, 519, 524, 526, 538, 539, 541, 545, 559-561, 563, 565, 572-573; ʿAyntūrīnī, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 46, pp. 436-439; id., *al-Mashriq*, vol. 47, pp. 36-41; Dibs, vol. 4, part 7, pp. 189, 191, 203-205, 210-213, 216; Ḥibliṣ, pp. 31, 43-55.

[19] Shihābī, pp. 6-7; Shihāb, pp. 81-82; Shidyāq, p. 299; Ḥibliṣ, p. 24; Duwayhī, 519, 560-561, 563, 565; Dibs, vol. 4, part 7, pp. 95, 210-211, 216.

It should be noted that the Ḥamādas had, in the course of time, "appropriated" possessions in al-Kūra and al-Zāwiya, while concomitantly converting their holdings into *baklīk*, which meant that, although they were repeatedly deprived of their authority, they nevertheless retained a territorial base and were never permanently evicted. In 1712, after the battle of ᶜAyn Darā, the Ḥamādas were once again installed in their previous domain, with the exclusion of al-ᶜAkkār. Ismāᶜīl al-Ḥamāda, the head of the family, divided the *muqāṭaᶜa* into two sub-holdings, one headed by his eldest son Mūsā, the other distributed among the sons of his brother ᶜĪsā. After Ismāᶜīl's death, Mūsā's holding was also split into two fiscal units.[20]

In 1759 the sub-lessees in Jubayl, al-Batrūn and Bsharrī again revolted against the Ḥamādas, this time in conjunction with the Ottoman governors of Tripoli and Damascus. ᶜUthmān Pasha al-Kurjī of Tripoli, who was dissatisfied with the revenues remitted by the Ḥamādas and with the economic exploitation of their holdings, ousted the *muqaddam*s, and in 1761 distributed the area among the local Maronite notables, such as Karam (Ihdin), Ḍāhir and al-Khūrī (Bsharrī) and others. Apparently this arrangement did not solve the conflicts created by the deposition of the Ḥamādas and the ensuing power struggle, and it was only in 1764 that Yūsuf al-Shihāb, who was entangled in a power struggle with Manṣūr, succeeded in acquiring the *iltizām* of Jubayl, al-Batrūn and Bsharrī, and in subduing the resistance of the Ḥamādas in subsequent years.[21]

The acquisition of the northern *muqāṭaᶜa*s of Mount Lebanon constituted an important victory for Yūsuf in his struggle against rival Shihāb emirs. Moreover, he had achieved this victory with the support of the governors of Tripoli and Damascus. Yūsuf immediately set out to assert his control and to reform the administration. In 1766 a reassessment of taxes (*daymūs*) was executed in Bsharrī to revise the fiscal system. A few years later the taxation was again revised to adapt the rates for mulberries and wheat to the prosperous economic circumstances. Apart from the reorganization of the existing structure, domains that had previously been held by the Ḥamādas were redistributed among new lessees, notably the Daḥdāḥ sheiks of al-Futūḥ (Sāḥil Jubayl), Rāmiḥ al-Khāzin (Liḥfid, Tirtij, Jāj), and the Lebanese monastic Order (see chapter 6). Finally, the administration of the area was entrusted to Maronite

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[20] Masᶜad, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 38, p. 40; Dibs, vol. 4, part 8, pp. 500-502.

[21] ᶜAyntūrīnī, *al-Mashriq*, vol 46, pp. 431, 434, 440; id., *al-Mashriq*, vol. 47, pp. 40-41; Munayyar (1955), pp. 365, 367; id., *al-Mashriq*, vol. 48, p. 688; Shihābī, pp. 62, 80, 88; Karāma, pp. 35-36; Shidyāq, p. 326; Dibs, vol. 4, part 8, pp. 502-503.

*mudabbir*s – who sometimes called themselves *muḥāfiẓ* – until 1807, namely, Saᶜd al-Khūrī, Simᶜān al-Bīṭār, Ghundur al-Khūrī, Jirjis Bāz and ᶜAbd al-Aḥad Bāz.[22]

The administrative reorganization of the northern *muqāṭaᶜa*s, initiated by Yūsuf al-Shihāb and by the governor of Tripoli, and supported by the Maronite notables, had important consequences. Firstly, economic exploitation was stimulated by the fiscal measures, with the explicit aim of augmenting tax revenues; secondly, the administrative structure was adapted to suit an efficient economic exploitation and to remove apparently inefficient intermediaries who appropriated a relatively large share without contributing to economic development; thirdly, although Yūsuf did intervene in the administration of the *muqāṭaᶜa*s, the reforms considerably strengthened the position of the Maronite notables, who henceforth were directly responsible to Yūsuf; fourthly, as Jubayl became Yūsuf's political power base, and while economic conditions improved, the importance of the northern *muqāṭaᶜa*s, especially in relation to Kisrawān or al-Shūf, increased; Jubayl was more consistently incorporated into the conglomerate of domains in Mount Lebanon and into the power struggles between the Shihāb emirs; fifthly, the prominent role of the Maronite *mudabbir*s resulted in new channels for the building of clientele networks being created which transcended the scope of the traditionally powerful *muqāṭaᶜajī* families. As the *mudabbir*s were not from these families themselves, their ascendancy probably reflected new forms of social mobility within the Maronite community. This fostered the emergence of new power balances among the Maronites.

3.2.2 *Integration and differentiation*

Due to the diversification of the administrative structure of the Lebanese *muqāṭaᶜa*s, it was by no means easy for the Shihāb emirs to build an unambiguous and stable power base within their *iltizām*. Establishing a power base entailed attempting to impose administrative cohesion and unity, and to enlarge the production unit under their control. Obviously, these efforts depended partly on the authority of the Shihābs over the means of production, contested by the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s, and the port of Beirut, contested by the governors of Sidon. Integration, moreover, entailed reform and especially a uniform system of taxation, and required an

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[22] ᶜAyntūrīnī, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 46, p. 528; id., *al-Mashriq*, vol. 47, pp. 45-47; Ḥattūnī, p. 189; Khāṭir, pp. 56-57, 59; Dibs, vol. 4, part 8, 499, 502-503, 508

infringement upon the deep-rooted interests of the notable families, particularly in al-Shūf and al-Matn. Apart from this, efforts at integration were likely to be thwarted by the Ottoman provincial governors, whose political interests were not served by a strong centralized administrative and economic entity challenging the existing administrative structure of Syria.

It is to be assumed that the increased tax demands of the Ottoman governors in the course of the 18th century, notably of al-Jazzār, would have provided a strong incentive for centralizing political and economic control, as it was in the Shihābs' interests to unify and improve the efficiency of production and the collection of taxes. At least in theory, the creation of a single, large estate would be an obvious response. The exactions imposed by the Ottoman governors were reshaped by the Shihāb emirs into two forms: extraordinary levies and the introduction of new taxes. This practice was already common in the time of Milḥim, who attempted to impose a capital tax to comply with the governor's demands. In 1776 and 1784 Yūsuf al-Shihāb imposed a capital tax (*shāshiyya*; 2 q. per adult male), which was, however, rejected, notably by the Billamaᶜs of al-Matn. In 1780, 1782 and 1784 Yūsuf introduced a new tax (*ṭarḥ*) on silk (5 q. for each *ūqiyya bazar*). In both instances the levies were rejected by at least some of the tax farming families, especially the Billamaᶜs of al-Matn and the Khāzins of Kisrawān, who explicitly refused to share the tax responsibilities which Yūsuf took upon himself to soothe al-Jazzār.[23]

The irregular imposition of extraordinary taxes became endemic in the 1790's, during the continuous power struggles between Bashīr al-Shihāb and the sons of Yūsuf. To fulfill the wishes of al-Jazzār, Bashīr revived the *shāshiyya* in al-Shūf in 1797, consisting of 3 q. for every adult male, with the exception of the Druze religious leaders (*ᶜuqqāl*). His rivals had collected a *shāshiyya* in 1792 for the upkeep of their troops, while in 1799 they levied a double *mīrī* tax (*mālayn*) and a *ṭarḥ*. Bashīr, too, imposed multiple *mīrī* taxes. In 1800 Bashīr introduced a new tax, with the consent of the Druze *ᶜuqqāl*, consisting of 1 *qirsh* per adult male per month, to meet al-Jazzār's demand of a monthly sum of 35.000 *qurūsh*. The tax was paid in al-Shūf, al-Gharb and Kisrawān, but was rejected in al-Matn. The refusal of tax demands was of course at least partly due to the political purport of these taxes, as

[23] Shihābī, p. 127; Shidyāq, pp. 341, 344; Munayyar (1955), pp. 378, 386; Munayyar, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 50, p. 207.

they were clearly inspired by a purely political aim, the acquisition of the *iltizām* from al-Jazzār. Like the governors, the notable families were able to play one emir off against another, change coalitions and support alternative candidates in order to evade fiscal exactions. The inconsistency of the tax system was exacerbated by increasing inflation. Moreover, political rivalry hampered economic activities and the necessity of sustaining troops drained the financial resources. An additional consequence of this situation was the frequent imposition of fines by the victorious emir on the supporters of his rival.[24]

It appears that the increasing tax demands of the Ottoman governors stimulated two contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, the Shihāb emirs aimed at siphoning off the revenues controlled by the *muqāṭaᶜajī* families and thus creating a larger circuit controlled by themselves to comply with the governor's demands. These efforts were based on an increased integration of the Lebanese tax farms. On the other hand, the structure of administration and economic exploitation, combined with the governor's policy of "divide and rule" resisted attempts at integration and even strengthened existing divergences, as coalitions were precarious, tax levies were opportunistic and political control was continuously contested. However, in the long term the rivalry between the Shihāb emirs and political instability ran contrary to the interests of the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s insofar as their economic prosperity was concerned.

In spite of the fragmented economic and social organization of the tax-farms in Mount Lebanon, one would expect that, especially after the redistribution of the domains in 1711, a community of interest among the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s would become apparent, which could lay the foundations of a more or less stable alliance. After all, the authority of the Shihāb emirs was not solely enforced by military means, but also relied on coalitions among the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s who were willing to cooperate. However, it appears that coalitions were predominantly tactical and aimed at withstanding tax demands or counterbalancing the emergence of rivalling factions, and were not directed towards creating political integration or a restructuring of social relations within the *muqāṭaᶜa*s. In fact, coalitions could shift rapidly, not supporting the Shihāb emirate as an institution, but rather the individual emirs who aspired to acquiring the *iltizām*. This is especially visible in the virtually endemic power struggles in the period of al-Jazzār, when interests could suddenly diverge or converge

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[24] Shihābī, pp. 134, 135; Munayyar (1955), pp. 453-454, 478-479; id., *al-Mashriq*, vol. 50, p. 447; id., *al-Mashriq*, vol. 51, p. 449; Shidyāq, p. 368.

according to circumstances. The above suggests that al-Jazzār was extremely succesful in preventing a stable alliance among the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s from being formed, aimed at an integration of the area. However, his demands did put pressure on Bashīr al-Shihāb to enable him to counter his intrigues and to expand the area from which he drew his financial resources. As has been explained above, the competition over the acquisition of land eventually culminated in a confrontation between the two exponents of political power, Bashīr al-Shihāb and Bashīr Junblāṭ, which ended in the execution of the latter.

How did Bashīr proceed to extend the area under his control, and, moreover, how did he attempt to integrate this area into a unified administrative structure? Firstly, like his predecessors, Bashīr used force to impose his authority. Troops were deployed to subdue the rivalling emirs, but also to pacify certain regions and to punish refractory *muqāṭaᶜajī*s. Fiscal campaigns were thus largely identifiable with military campaigns. Thus, in 1792, Bashīr, albeit unsuccessfully, attempted to break the opposition in al-Shūf by military means; in the beginning of the 19th century the opposing coalition of Druze families led by the ᶜImāds was defeated by force. It should be noted that these military victories did not necessarily result in the total eclipse of the dissident families, but rather in curtailing their power, redistributing their wealth and a temporary subservience. However, it is no coincidence that the greater part of the traditionally powerful *muqāṭaᶜajī* families, especially the Druze, but also the Maronite Khāzins, were weakened and forced into the defensive. Only in the 1840's, when Bashīr was sent into exile, were the Druze chieftains able to retrieve some of their former power.[25]

Secondly, military pressure and political intrigues were subordinate to the collection of taxes, which were a crucial element of Bashīr's relations with al-Jazzār. Like his predecessors, Bashīr exacted several extraordinary levies. As the demands of al-Jazzār became more persistent, Bashīr looked for ways to systematise his pattern of extraordinary levies, for instance by negotiating a new taxation in 1800, hoping to extract a surplus on a more regular basis. This effort seems to have failed, and when in 1803 al-Jazzār made Bashīr's investiture conditional on the payment of 25.000 *qurūsh* for al-Shūf and 10.000 *qurūsh* for Jubayl, he again had to resort to extraordinary taxation. In 1806 Bashīr gave orders to execute a new assessment of the various *muqāṭaᶜa*s, to support a revision of the taxation. In 1820 the demands made by

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[25] Shihāb (1955), p. 117; see also above, note 34.

ᶜAbdallāh Pasha were once again met by extraordinary levies, which Bashīr was unable to impose. The only measure which could reflect an attempt at fiscal reform, was the abolishment of travel and trade fees (*aghfār*) levied in the towns (1812).[26]

Thirdly, in 1818 and 1820 Bashīr tried to impose a system of *wakīl*s to delegate the collection of taxes, he himself retaining ultimate authority and the right to deprive the *wakīl* of his responsibilites. Consequently, members of the Billamaᶜ, ᶜAbd al-Mālik, Talḥūq, Arslān and Khāzin families were appointed *wakīl* of the domains under their control, excluding, significantly, al-Shūf, the domain of the Junblāṭs and ᶜImāds, and Jubayl, which he probably saw as his personal preserve. It is not certain whether this measure should be seen as a genuine innovation and an attempt to impose a new system, as an institutionalization of existing practices, or merely as a renaming of normal procedures. It reflected an effort to formalize his authority over the *muqāṭaᶜajī* families which were largely under his control, and his prerogative to incorporate them into the administration as mere "officials". Moreover, the appointment of Ḥasan al-Shihāb over Kisrawān and Jubayl in 1807 implied that for the first time an administrative unification of the core area of the Maronite community was achieved. This is confirmed by the fact that al-Jazzār extended his tax demands to Jubayl, which was thus withdrawn from the province of Tripoli and incorporated in the area of Jazzar's jurisdiction. Thus, a dichotomy was created between the areas under the tight control of Bashīr, and al-Shūf. However, the integration of the Maronite *muqāṭaᶜa*s, which at this stage included al-Matn, after the conversion to Christianity of the Billamaᶜs, was not complete, since Bashīr Junblāṭ apparently considered himself to be *mutasallim* of al-Shūf, which included Kisrawān, and there are indications that at least some of the Khāzin sheiks were more inclined to accept the authority of Bashīr Junblāṭ than that of Bashīr al-Shihāb.[27]

Fourthly, it may be argued that economic developments in the early 1800's worked in favour of Bashīr and enabled him to consolidate his position. The last decades of the 18th century had witnessed economic difficulties which had affected the position of the *muqāṭaᶜajī* families in the rural areas especially. The supply of capital decreased due to a decline of the silk trade, the disruption of trade and traffic due to political strife, increasing tax demands, and a set-back in the trade to

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[26] Shihābī, p. 580; Munayyar, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 51, pp. 478-479.

[27] Shihābī, pp. 641, 685; Munayyar, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 51, p. 466; Gandolfi to Prop. (21-11-1807), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 15, f. 344.

Europe as a result of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt and the continental blockade. Economic decline was not general, however, and there are indications that whereas the *muqāṭa^{c}ajī*s were forced to sell land and go into debt, other groups profited from the new economic opportunities. The measures of Yūsuf and Bashīr had led to a reallocation of capital resources, since the accumulation in the circuit of the traditionally powerful *muqāṭa^{c}ajī* families was substituted by accumulation by moneylenders in the market towns, protégés of the Shihāb emirs, and tradesmen in Beirut, Dayr al-Qamar, Zūq Mīkhā'īl and Zaḥla. The formation of these groups was stimulated in the first decades of the 19th century, when trade with Europe was resumed and Beirut rapidly expanded to become one of the main ports on the Syrian coast. It seems that the old social constellation built on agricultural exploitation and the relations between *muqāṭa^{c}ajī*s and peasants, gradually became superseded by trade networks comprising the market towns (*qā^{c}ida*s) and ports, which were connected to the networks between Syria and Egypt which had emerged in the course of the 18th century. They were upheld by groups who combined landed possessions with interests in trade. This development was buttressed by the increase in silk prices from 1809 onwards. This new alignment became the mainstay of Bashır's authority, enabling him to reduce his dependence on the *muqāṭa^{c}ajī* families. Again, however, the integrative impact of this alliance seems to have been limited, as it included mainly Christians and antagonized traditional forces who entrenched in their struggle to retain their prerogatives. It did not lead to any centralization of Bashīr's authority over al-Shūf.[28]

Fifthly, the administration of Bashīr coincided with a period of severe crisis suffered by the Porte. It marked the transition between an almost total collapse of central authority, due to the inability of the government to stabilize its financial resources, and the first efforts to strengthen central authority by a centralization of the administration, economizing measures and social and fiscal reforms. The first culminated in the military advance of the Egyptian army under Ibrāhīm Pasha, while the second is symbolized by the first of the Tanzimat-decrees, the Hatti Gülhane of 1839. Both tendencies fostered the integration of the *muqāṭa^{c}a*s of Mount Lebanon as a substructure within the Syrian provinces, firstly as a crystallization of one of the economic circuits within Syria, second-

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[28] Havemann (1983), 9, 66-67, 70-76, 79, 82, 83-86; Chevallier (1971), pp. 202-203; Abou el-Rousse Slim, pp. 100-101, 144; Burckhardt, p. 309.

ly as a mainstay of centralized control in an otherwise relatively unstable area.

A word remains to be said about the position of the peasants in this period, which saw the onset of a process of far-reaching transformation. Information about the effects of the political upheavals on social relations, notably the position of the peasant, is scarce and the situation may have differed substantially in the various *muqāṭaʿa*s. According to Volney, in the second half of the 18th century the peasants were forced into a vicious cycle of selling their crops in advance and borrowing money at high interest rates. The interruption of trade contacts and the production process under the influence of warfare obviously put the peasant's circumstances under strain, which was probably made even worse by price inflation and the indirect effects of the increased expenses of the tax farmers. There emerged, however, a seemingly contradictory tendency, which is shown by Yūsuf's attempts to expand productivity in Jubayl. The documents show that there was a labour shortage which enabled the peasants to profit from certain tax privileges and opportunities in order to improve their position or to migrate to areas where the cultivation had expanded. Other documents show that a similar situation prevailed in al-Matn. There, the debts of the peasants decreased in the 1890's. Only in the 19th century did the problems of the *muqāṭaʿajī*s lead to increased pressure on the peasants. It would seem that economic difficulties were not general and that the Shihāb emirs as well as the *muqāṭaʿajī*s attempted to create opportunities to counteract them.[29]

3.3 Kisrawān and the Khāzin sheiks

The area of Kisrawān traditionally constituted one of the central parts of the Lebanese Mountains. It became an important power base for the Turcoman ʿAssāf governors in the 16th century, when it was administered as a *nāḥiya* of the sanjak of Sidon-Beirut, which was part of the Ottoman province of Damascus. It was administered by the ʿAssāfs from its main village, Ghādīr, until it came under the control of Yūsuf Sayfā, then *beylerbey* of Tripoli, in 1593. Soon the area became a source of dispute between the Maʿn emirs of al-Shūf and the Sayfā-governors of

[29] Volney, pp. 378-379; Burckhardt, pp. 308-309; Abou El-Rousse Slim, pp. 96-97, 191, 201.

Tripoli. In 1598 the area was occupied by Fakhr al-Dīn for one year, before it was officially added to his domains in 1607.[30]

The Maronite al-Khāzin family migrated from Jāj, in Jubayl, to Ballūna in Kisrawān at the end of the 16th century, and settled in ᶜAjaltūn in 1606. There exists some controversy over the exact political and administrative role of the Khāzin sheiks under the leadership of Fakhr al-Dīn. It seems beyond dispute, however, that their ascendancy was closely connected to the rise of the Maᶜnid faction among the Druze tax farmers of al-Shūf. In fact, the title of *sheik* indicates that the family was incorporated into the Druze hierarchy of tax-farmers. The head of the family, Abū Nādir al-Khāzin, apparently acted as Fakhr al-Dīn Maᶜn's adjudant, and became one of his most influential supporters. He was several times assigned the task of collecting the taxes of the domains of Kisrawān, Jubayl, al-Batrūn and Jabbat Bsharrī (1616, 1617, 1618, 1621). In 1617 he received Kisrawān as an inheritable tax farm. The fate of the Khāzin family became closely connected with that of the Maᶜns, and after the execution of Fakhr al-Dīn, Abū Nādir fled to Tuscany, leaving Kisrawān in the hands of the leaders of the anti-Maᶜn faction, the ᶜAlam al-Dīn family. After the victory of Milḥim Maᶜn over the ᶜAlam al-Dīns in 1637 and Abū Nādir's subsequent return to Mount Lebanon, the Khāzins regained their position as the tax-farmers of Kisrawān.[31]

Abū Nādir succeeded in consolidating the position of his family in Kisrawān by buying land from the Matāwila, who lived in Kisrawān and were apparently poor. After Abū Nādir's death in 1647, his responsibilities were taken over by his only son, Abū Nawfal Nādir, who, moreover, was charged by Milḥim Maᶜn with collecting the taxes in al-Batrūn (1650), and in al-ᶜAkkār and al-Batrūn (1652, 1658). Abū Nawfal continued his father's policy of acquiring land in his domain, and in 1671, Sultan Mehmet IV issued a decree, granting Kisrawān to Abū Nawfal and his descendants. The Khāzin administration of Kisrawān was confirmed after the battle of ᶜAyn Darā in 1711, although part of the estate, Sāḥil Qāṭiᶜ, was detached from Kisrawān and added to the domain of the Billamaᶜs. Under the Khāzins Kisrawān became an almost exclu-

[30] Abu Husayn, pp. 21, 22, 24, 36; for the early history of the Khāzins, see: Duwayhī, pp. 394, 453, 457; Shidyāq, p. 305; 'Makhṭūṭa Kafr Dabyān,' 'Makhṭūṭa Ghusṭā,' and 'Makhṭūṭa Biqaᶜtūtā,' in: Khāzin/Masᶜad, vols. 1 and 3; Bakhit, p. 123.

[31] Duwayhī, pp. 392, 394, 417, 478, 481, 511, 514, 518, 519, 553, 568; Ḥattūnī, pp. 65-67, 71-72, 78-81; Shidyāq, pp. 14, 73, 214; Fakhr al-Dīn to Nemias (1631), Carali, vol. 1, p. 340; Abū Nādir to Grand-Duke (1631), id., vol. 2, p. 358; Shihāb, pp. 75-76; Dibs, vol. 4, part 7, pp. 206-208; Roger, pp. 19-20.

sively Maronite domain and by the end of the 17th century the political and economic centre of the Maronite community had shifted from Bsharrī to Kisrawān.[32]

The Khāzin sheiks fitted smoothly into the new economic and political pattern which was shaped by French and Tuscan interests in Syria in the first half of the 17th century, and which was based on the extension of trade and the professed support of Christianity against alleged Muslim oppression. This combination of interests eventually induced the French to nominate the head of the Khāzin family, Abū Nawfal, as vice-consul of France in Beirut in 1658, with the permission of the Porte. The appointment of Abū Nawfal immediately provoked the resistance of the powerful lobby of Marseille merchants, who contested the nomination of a commercial representative who was not a "Marseillais". After a conflict concerning financial matters, Abū Nawfal was discharged from his function, but in 1662 he was reinstated as consul after the mediation of some Jesuit missionaries and Maronite *muṭrān*s. In this function he was succeeded by his descendants Abū Qānṣawh Fayyāḍ (1679-1691), Ḥuṣn (1697-1707) and Nawfal (1708-1758).[33]

The consulate of the Khāzin sheiks reflected the serious efforts of the French to gain a foothold in the Syrian Ottoman provinces. However, these attempts eventually proved to be somewhat premature, or even inconvenient, as the Khāzin sheiks did not hesitate to call on the French King to achieve political aims which were, as yet, beyond the reach of the French government. The sheiks repeatedly asked for financial support, while Abū Nawfal requested help to conquer the government of Mount Lebanon, and Ḥuṣn demanded permission to fly the French flag. Nāṣīf ibn Nawfal asked for diplomatic support to reconquer his timar, which had been confiscated by the ʿAlam al-Dīns. In addition, he requested French diplomatic mediation in order to acquire a tax reduction for some members of his family and the right to remit the tax revenues of Kisrawān, Jubayl, al-Batrūn and Jabbat Bsharrī directly to the governor of Sidon. In 1726 he applied to be admitted to the royal court. These requests were rejected, as the French government feared political com-

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[32] F. al-Khāzin, 'Nubdha...' Khāzin/Masʿad, vol. 3, pp. 312-313, 322; Shaybān al-Khāzin, id., p. 438; Niebuhr, vol. 2, pp. 435-436; Ḥattūnī, pp. 10, 93, 123-124, 133.

[33] Duwayhī, pp. 531, 567-568; Ḥattūnī, pp. 82, 83, 85, 90-92; Arvieux, vol. 2, p. 361; Puget de St. Pierre, pp. 207, 310; Shidyāq, p. 141; Amieu, 'Relation de Syrie pour l'an 1650,' Rabbath/Tournebize, vol. 1, pp. 412, 424; Poiresson, 'Relation des missions de la Comp. de Jesus en Syrie (1652),' id., p. 70; Poirresson to Royon (1653), id., vol. 2, pp. 197, 297.

plications and unrewarding expenses. In the course of time requests from the Khāzin sheiks were increasingly neglected, and no member of the family was appointed consul after the death of Nawfal in 1758, in spite of many requests by his descendants. This decision was supported by referring to a law dating from 1685, forbidding foreigners to perform the function of French consul.[34]

The prerogatives connected with the function of consul enabled the Khāzin sheiks to tighten their grip on the mechanisms of production and trade in their domain. Moreover, they acquired the customary consular right to levy a fee of 2 percent of the value of all trade with France in Beirut. This was an additional source of foreign currency that obviously strengthened their economic position. Apart from these benefits, their rank as consuls of France greatly enhanced their social status and political prestige and facilitated their own trade with France (silk and olive oil). The revenues from the consulate were strongly contested among family members.[35] The rise to prominence of the Khāzin family was thus intimately related to the increase of silk exports to France in the 17th century. It appears that the Khāzins were also involved in Fakhr al-Dīn's trade contacts with Tuscany, and they founded trade houses in Sidon and Beirut as early as 1634.[36]

During his lifetime Abū Nawfal divided the tax-farm of Kisrawān among his eight sons (1679). The eldest son, Abū Qānṣawh Fayyāḍ, received one third and the supreme authority; Abū Nāṣīf Nawfal acquired another third, while the remainder was distributed among the six other sons. As a result, the Khāzin family spread over the various parts of Kisrawān at the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th century, the main branches, or "households" (*bayt*s), settling in Ghusṭā (*awlād* Abī Qānṣawh, *awlād* Abī Nawfal), ᶜAjaltūn (*awlād* Abī Nāṣīf, *awlād* Abī Nawfal) and Zūq Mīkhā'īl (*awlād* Ṭarbayh). Off-shoots of the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh settled in Darᶜūn (*awlād* Nawfal ibn Ḥuṣn) and Sāḥil ᶜAlmā (*awlād* ᶜĀd ibn Sakhr). After the death of Nawfal ibn Nādir in 1758, who had acted as the head of the family and consul of France, a document was drafted which transferred the administration of Kisrawān to twelve sheiks. Each one in turn assumed the foremost

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[34] See for the details of the Khāzin consulate: Ristelhueber.

[35] Estelle to Pontchartrain (1704), Ismail (1975-), vol. 1, pp. 55-56; Poullard to Pontchartrain (1714), id., p. 160; apparently, Nawfal only asked 1.5 %, 'Mémoire Poullard' (1719), id., p. 204.

[36] Poullard to Pontchartrain (1714), Ismail (1975-), vol. 1, p. 160; Qar'ālī (1926), pp. 350-351.

responsibility. From this time onwards, no one sheik acted as the head of the family.[37]

Under Abū Nādir al-Khāzin the foundations were laid for the future administration of Kisrawān, later to be revised by Abū Nawfal and by the reorganization of 1758. According to the chronicler Shaybān al-Khāzin, the most remarkable feature of the taxation of Kisrawān was that the *mīrī* tax was imposed upon the holdings (*arzāq*) of the Khāzin sheiks themselves, which apparently was exceptional for holders of "temporary fiefs". Apart from the *mīrī*, levies included capital taxes (*jāliyya*), taxes on cattle and mill-stones, spinning fees (*shawbaṣa*) and the *ᶜīdiyya*. According to the firman of the Sultan, the total sum of tax revenues amounted to 28.000 q. in 1671. In 1711 Abū Nawfal received the *iltizām* of al-Futūḥ from the Sultan for one year.[38]

The administration of the Khāzin sheiks in Kisrawān was marked by a thorough "colonization" of the area under their authority. They expanded sericulture, attracted peasants from the northern domains and adequately responded to political and economic opportunities. Moreover, they were anxious to prevent administrative functions and the means of production from slipping from their control. Although they sometimes appointed agents (*wakīl* or *dihqān*) in certain villages, it seems that in general they tended to monopolize the system of tax collection as much as possible. Apart from this, they controlled the production and trade of silk, exploiting the only silk scale in Kisrawān, which was located in Zūq Mīkhā'īl, and supervising the marketing of the harvest and the exports to France and Egypt. This tight control probably contributed to the efficiency of the exploitation of the domain, as the exclusion of intermediate stages in the tax collecting process and in the economic structure prevented the siphoning off of revenues. As Kisrawān became predominantly Maronite under the patronage of the Khāzin sheiks, and as there was no inherited, rival administrative structure which had to be incorporated into the new system, the social structure in the domain was apparently relatively cohesive. Probably the combination of a well-defined power structure and a moderate tax regime contributed to the remarkable stability of the Khāzin administration in Kisrawān during the 17th and 18th centuries.[39]

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[37] Shaybān al-Khāzin, Khāzin/Masᶜad, vol. 3, p. 443; Niebuhr, vol. 2, p. 436; the document is analyzed by Chevallier (1971), pp. 132-134.

[38] Shaybān al-Khāzin, Khāzin/Masᶜad, vol. 3, pp. 446-447.

[39] Dibs, vol. 4, part 8, p. 490.

3.3.1 *The Khāzins in the 18th century*

After the victory of Ḥaydar al-Shihāb in 1711, Kisrawān was administered as a dependency of al-Shūf under the Shihāb emirs and the governor of Sidon. Little is known about any involvement of the Khāzins in the power struggles among the Shihābs, although apparently in 1714 they concluded a treaty with the Junblāṭs. Presumably, as there was no single family leader, the Khāzins were not likely to announce a unified stand but there is no evidence that dissension threatened the family interests in Kisrawān, and the various branches of the family were probably content to follow the policies of the Junblāṭs.[40]

It seems that the position of the Khāzin sheiks was severely affected by the upheavals of the 1780's and 1790's. Apart from external pressures, caused by the tax demands of the governors, inflation, warfare and the disruption of trade, the resources of the Khāzins were exhausted by fines exacted by the emir, and the increase in family members, which was not compensated for by territorial expansion or heightened productivity. Only once, in 1771, was some territory added to the Khāzin domains, when Rāmiḥ ibn Ḥaydar (*awlād* Abī Nawfal) received Liḥfid, Tirtij and Jāj in Jubayl as a grant from Yūsuf al-Shihāb. In general, the family seemed to have suffered from financial haemorrhages and from the rapid fragmentation of its properties. The Khāzins complained to the French King that the emirs "robbed" them of their possessions, and in some instances they hid their property and fled. From this period onwards several branches of the family were forced to sell land to meet the tax demands and extraordinary levies.[41]

Even within Kisrawān, economic hardship was not general, however, and, as is shown by the case of Jubayl, efforts to stimulate economic activity can be perceived alongside signs of recession. In Kisrawān, too there were groups which were apparently able to accumulate capital and

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[40] Ḥattūnī, pp. 123, 124, 247; Shaybān al-Khāzin, vol. 3, p. 503; treaty between the Khāzins and the Junblāṭs (1169/1715), Hīshī, vol. 3, pp. 22-23; sometimes the Khāzin branches chose their own representatives: docs. *awl.* A. Nawfal/A. Nāṣīf (11- Tishrīn al-Awwal-1203), *awl.* A. Nāṣīf (21-9-1193), *awl.* A. Nawfal/A. Nāṣīf (1180), in KHA1; Kisrawān was usually considered to be an administrative dependency of al-Shūf: Shihāb (1955), p. 482; Munayyar (1955), p. 155; see also the agreement between the Khāzins and Sīd Aḥmad al-Shihāb (n.d.), KHA1.

[41] Ḥattūnī, p. 189; Khāzins to King Louis XVI (n.d.), ʿAbbūd (1911), p. 71; Shaybān al-Khāzin, vol. 3, pp. 430, 443-447, 450-453, 487, 503; M. al-Khāzin to Prop. (11-11-1784), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 12, f. 450; Craveri to Prop. (29-11-1784), id., vol. 12, f. 462; Squillace to Prop. (12-11-1784), id., vol. 12, f. 466; Fadil to Prop. (30-10-1784), id., vol. 12, f. 428; Craveri to Fadil (3-8-1784), id., vol. 12, ff. 330-332, 340 ff.

to invest in agricultural land. An interesting example can be found in a *waqfiyya* for Dayr Sayyidat al-Luwayza, by means of which a large cluster of lands was donated to the estate. The founder, a certain Ṭabīb, explicitly stated that the land, which had partly been bought from Khāzin sheiks, had been acquired with his personal means and labour, not by inheritance. Tax documents, too, show that control of the land became increasingly differentiated and that the Khāzins' control of the land was confined to small plots owned by individual members. This tendency towards differentiation can also be seen within the Khāzin family itself, as is illustrated by the ascendancy of the Khāzin branch in Zūq Mīkhā'īl.[42]

At the partition of Kisrawān in 1679, Ṭarbayh ibn Nādir al-Khāzin acquired the domains of Zūq Mīkhā'īl and ʿAyn Ṭūrā, which was a relatively small property. He settled in Zūq Mīkhā'īl and he, and later his son Mūsā, subsequently started to buy land to expand the estate.[43] Under Mūsā's administration a group of Greek Catholics migrated to Zūq Mīkhā'īl, and were employed by him as *shurakā'*. In addition to this, Mūsā operated the only scale for the weighing of silk in Kisrawān. He thus controlled a vital link in the silk marketing process in the *muqāṭaʿa*, from which he received a surplus revenue. Since Mūsā had no brothers, the family domain remained intact and was not divided up as in the case of the three larger branches. All these factors enabled Mūsā, and later his sons Sharwān and Jaffāl, to accumulate a relatively large capital reserve.[44]

During the 18th century, little is heard of the *awlād* Mūsā. However, at the end of the century, the branch started once again to purchase land, part of which was sold to them by other Khāzin sheiks. It seems that from this time onwards the brothers Jaffāl and Sharwān, and particularly Bishāra Jaffāl, increased their share in the family property.[45]

3.3.2 *The Khāzins and Bashīr al-Shihāb*

Especially after 1799, Bashīr al-Shihāb's policy was to achieve some form of administrative integration of the domains under his control. The tax demands of the governor of Sidon forced him to break substructures based

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[42] *Waqfiyya* Dayr Sayyidat al-Luwayza, Fahd, *Tar.*, vol. 1, 352-357.

[43] Purchase documents, 1078, 1087, 1089, 1111, 1114, 1131, 1135, 1140, 1141, 1142, 1147, 1153, 1162, 1164, 1706, 1708, 1745, in KHA.1.

[44] Ḥattūnī, pp. 24, 137; Shaybān al-Khāzin, Khāzin/Masʿad, vol. 3, pp. 413, 479, 481.

[45] Purchase documents, 1183, 1188, 1210, 1768, 1772, 1773, 1792, 1806, 1807, 1811, 1816, 1825, 1826, 1231, KHA.1.

on the vested interests of the *muqāṭaᶜajī* families, which always threatened to undermine systematic fiscal policies. The Khāzins too were affected by Bashīr's measures.

In 1800 Bashīr appointed his brother Ḥasan as administrator of Kisrawān, thus effectively degrading the Khāzin sheiks to a subservient role. Ḥasan consequently set out to undermine the economic monopolies of the Khāzins. He built warehouses in Jūniya and demanded that the Khāzins' posessions in the town be handed over to him, arguing that port facilities were state property. Previously, al-Jazzār had complained that trade had been conducted from Jūniya evading state control. He had demanded measures against this and had at one time forbidden any trade between Beirut and Kisrawān. A legal verdict by Jirmānūs Ādam on Ḥasan's claims was in favour of the Khāzins. Next, Ḥasan opened his own silk-scale in Jūniya, in an effort to break the monopoly of the Khāzins in Zūq Mīkhā'īl. Apparently sheik Bishāra Jaffāl al-Khāzin went to Jūniya personally to dismantle the scale.[46]

In 1806, Ḥasan ordered a reassessment of Kisrawān's tax potential. The Khāzins evaded this by bribing Jirjis Bāz, the Maronite *mudabbir* of Bashīr, who was related to the Khāzins by marriage, and in 1806 Bashīr pledged to leave their tax obligations unchanged. When the plot was revealed, the Khāzins were punished with a fine of 50.000 q. The reassessment had also been demanded by the governor of Sidon, who argued that the taxes of Kisrawān had not been revised since the times of Fakhr al-Dīn Maᶜn.[47] In 1807, Bashīr assigned the task to his *mudabbir* al-Daḥdāḥ, which resulted in new fiscal agreements. However, Bashīr several times showed his concern about the economic situation in Kisrawān, fearing that the estate would fall into ruin, and one document indicates that he abolished several levies to facilitate the restoration and exploitation of the land.[48]

In 1807, after the execution of Jirjis Bāz, Ḥasan was appointed administrator of Jubayl as well. This event, the unification of the two Maronite core areas, was, according to papal envoy Gandolfi, tantamount to a "re-

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[46] Ḥattūnī, pp. 217, 219-220; Dimashqī, pp. 109, 122; 'Réponses Guys' (1806), Ismail (1975-), vol. 4, p. 98; Craveri to Prop. (3-8-1784), *S.C/Mar.*, vol. 12, ff. 330-332, 340 ff.

[47] B. al-Shihāb to Khāzins (1806), KHA.1.

[48] The *mīrī* was fixed at 1 q. per 10 *ḥiml*; the spinning tax (*shawbaṣa dawālīb*) was fixed at 2/3 *fiḍḍa* per *qirsh*; the *tadbīr* at 1 q. per *kayl*; the tax on olives at 1/4 q. per 100 *jafna*; the tax on olive-presses at 1 *zulṭa* and on mills at 3 q. However, the documents show that surplus fees were levied (*ṣarf*, 3 *maṣārī* per q.; *kasr al-aqlām* and *rajāʿī*), and that in some cases a *mīrī* of 5 2/3 m. per *ḥiml*, or 1 q. per 7 *ḥiml* was imposed.

volution". However, the integration seems to have been only superficial, since by this time the Khāzins were preparing to shake off the control of the Shihābs. A curious document reveals that the Khāzins secretly approached the *mutasallim* of Beirut with the proposal that they should henceforth pay their taxes to the *dīwān* of Beirut in order to circumvent Bashīr. Later, they were inclined to prefer the authority of Bashīr Junblāṭ, who called himself *mutasallim* of al-Shūf, to that of the Shihābs.[49]

After Ḥasan's death in 1808, Bashīr turned once again to the Khāzins for the incorporation of Kisrawān into his *iltizām*. He appointed Bishāra Jaffāl in Zūq Mīkhā'īl as chief tax-collector for the whole *muqāṭaᶜa*. In 1823 he appointed Faḍl al-Badawī al-Khāzin, who had distinguished himself during the turbulences of 1821, as an admittedly somewhat ambivalent support for Bashīr, but he was soon dismissed in favour of Bishāra. The appointments were sometimes confirmed by Bashīr Junblāṭ.[50] In exchange for his services, Bishāra received considerable tax privileges: he was exempted from the *khidma*, *dukhkhāniyya*, *ᶜīdiyya*, *mīrī*, the *jawālī* for 50 persons, the *ᶜaddād* for 150 head of cattle, and the tax on the silk scale.[51]

Bishāra gathered together an estate of considerable size during his period as tax collector. Several Khāzins claimed that he had unjustly appropriated family possessions, probably because he had bought up land from impecunious relatives. At one time a relative, presumably in need of money, sold his whole inheritance to Bishāra. Having become the richest member of the Khāzin family, Bishāra died in 1825 without a son. His estate was immediately claimed by Bashīr, who argued that according to Ottoman regulations the properties of anyone who died without an heir reverted to the state. The claim was contested by Bishāra's widow and sister, Badwāniyya and Ziyāra, who succeeded in saving part of the inheritance. One fifth was inherited by his cousin Yūsuf ibn Fransīs al-Khāzin (via his mother); a large part was sold to be able to pay Bashīr, who contented himself with 170.000 q.; the remainder was converted into a waqf, for Dayr Sayyidat Bishāra, to which Badwāniyya and Ziyāra retired. Remarkably, the two women acted for a time as successors to Bishāra in

[49] Gandolfi to Prop. (21-11-1807), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 15, f. 344; 'Articulo di Lettera di Mgr. Gandolfi,' (1819), *Acta*, vol. 195, f. 324; id., vol. 196, f. 216; Khāzins to *mutasallim* Beirut (n.d.), KHA.1; letters from Bashīr Junblāṭ, and verdicts on legal cases also in Hīshī.

[50] See various undated letters from Bashīr al-Shihāb, Salmān/Ḥasan al-Shihāb, Bashīr Junblāṭ to Khāzins and/or Faḍl or Bishāra al-Khāzin, KHA.1.

[51] Bashīr al-Shihāb to Khāzins (n.d.); B. al-Shihāb to Bishāra al-Khāzin (n.d.); B. Junblāṭ to Faḍl (1236/1820); KHA.1; Sarkīs to Prop. (9-6-1821), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 17, f. 733.

his function as tax collector. Eventually, however, Bashīr appointed his nephew ᶜAbdallāh.[52]

3.3.3 *Moneylenders*

It was part of Bashīr al-Shihāb's policy to strengthen his ties with the merchants and moneylenders in the market towns of his domains. Special favours were bestowed upon the merchants of Dayr al-Qamar, Zaḥla and Zūq Mīkhā'īl, which at the turn of the century were growing into centres of trade and manufacture. The support of these groups, which probably had connections with the trade network of the Greek Catholics covering southern Syria and Egypt, was especially important in the case of financial need. It was not unusual, in the 1820's, for Bashīr to request large loans from these merchants, which were to be paid back out of the revenues of the next *mīrī* collection. Ḥasan al-Shihāb repeatedly requested loans from Kisrawān, and eventually it became usual for Bashīr to ask Faḍl as well as Bishāra al-Khāzin to collect capital in the form of loans from the "wealthy" of the *muqāṭaᶜa*, which would be balanced with the *mīrī*.[53]

Of course, this was an attractive option for Bashīr. He could control the timing of his revenues, without being hampered by insolvent or recalcitrant sheiks. Although this method guaranteed a steady source of capital, it meant that another layer was introduced into the tax system, which inevitably demanded its price. The moneylenders and tradesmen had probably built up their capital by hoarding currency in times of inflation, by staying aloof from the controversies between the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s and the emirs in the 1780's and 1790's, and by profiting from the new commercial opportunities and the new tax regulations issued by Bashīr. Tax documents from Kisrawān show that as early as 1801 the moneylenders, mainly from Zūq Mīkhā'īl, had deeply penetrated the fiscal system. In 1818 the tax remittances of whole villages went through their hands, and sometimes remained in payment of their debts. Some of the moneylenders had

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[52] Ḥattūnī, pp. 256, 259-260; Dimashqī, pp. 126-128; Shidyāq, pp. 74, 145, 389; Y. al-Khāzin to Prop. (12-2-1836), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 21, f. 668; Badwāniyya al-Khāzin to Prop. (14-2-1836), id., f. 670; ᶜAbdallāh to Badwāniyya (1242), KHA1; in 1828 the *awl.* A. Qānṣawh agreed to take turns to collect the *mīrī*, KHA1.

[53] B. al-Shihāb to Faḍl (n.d.); Ḥasan al-Shihāb to Bishāra al-Khāzin (n.d.); 'ᶜAbdallāh al-Shihāb to Khāzins (1255/1839); KHA.1; the population of Kisrawān made an agreement with the moneylenders in Zūq Mīkhā'īl to refuse loans to Bashir; the latter did not comply with the agreement; see: Population of Kisrawān to pop. of Zūq Mīkhā'īl (n.d.), KHA1.

monasteries among their clientele. Most of them lent money to Bashīr at one time or another.[54]

Because they represented a vital link in the system of tax collection, the moneylenders automatically had to deal with the Khāzin sheiks. The tax survey of 1818 reveals that by that time many sheiks of the three main branches had incurred debts to the moneylenders, as a result of their *mīrī* obligations. The list indicates that financial problems were probably confined to certain households, but also that certain moneylenders had managed to channel a considerable part of the tax revenues of Kisrawān into their treasuries.[55]

With their capital reservoir the moneylenders acted as a buffer between the sheiks and Bashīr. They could cover discrepancies between the needs of Bashīr and the actual surplus which was generated by economic activities and extracted through taxes. Conversely, the Khāzins could build up debts without disrupting the tax system and fear immediate repercussions from Bashīr. In the 1830's and 1840's, this led to the accumulation of debts by the Khāzin sheiks and contributed to the impoverishment of most branches of the family.[56]

The group of moneylenders in Zūq Mīkhā'īl did not confine themselves to monetary transactions, but eventually also acquired properties. It is no coincidence that, after the death of Bishāra Jaffāl, when his estate had to be sold to comply with Bashīr's demands, a large portion was sold to the merchants to whom Bishāra was in debt. Apparently the moneylenders not only came to control the financial position of the Khāzins, but also directly took over part of their capital resources and economic potential. In this way, the economic and fiscal roles of the

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[54] The most prominent creditors: Zūq Muṣbaḥ and Zūq Mīkhā'īl to Luḥūd Bākhūs; ʿAjaltūn to Fransīs Sābā; Rayfūn to Ḥabīb al-Duqqī; Ghusṭā and Mazraʿa Kafr Dabyān to Jabūr al-Jawharjī; Sāḥil ʿAlmā to Yūsuf Shadīd; monasteries: Niqūlā Munayyar, Mūsā Murād and Anṭūn Mulaḥḥama; 'Ḥisāb mīrī 1216' (1801); 'Bayān Maqbūḍ al-Mīrī' (30-6-1819); KHA.1.

[55] Indebted Khāzin sheiks: *awlād* A. Nāṣīf: Zuʿaytar and Khāzin Khālid (VII) to Fāḍil al-Mudawwar; Bishāra and Yūsuf Shaybān (IX) to Fransīs Sābā; Wafā and Ṣābir Shaybān (IX) to Niqūlā Munayyar; Niqūlā Diyāb and brothers (XI) to Anṭūn Qaṭṭān; *awlād* A. Nawfal: Sajʿān and *awlād* ʿAbbūd (XVII) to Anṭūn Qaṭṭān; Hind (XVIII) to Fāḍil al-Mudawwar; *awlād* A. Qānṣawh: Kalīm, Wardān Ṭarrāf and Lūwīs Ṭarrāf (II) to Ḥabīb al-Duqqī; Khaṭṭār Nīsān and Mīlān ʿAdrā (II) and Yūsuf Hadīfa (X) to Yūsuf ʿAllām; 'Bayān al-duyūn al-maṭlūba min al-marḥūm al-shaykh Bishāra' (1826); 'Bayān maqbūḍ al-mīrī' (30-6-1819); KHA.1.

[56] Chevallier (1971), pp. 200-207; Havemann (1982/1984), p. 60; Gandolfi to Prop. (25-7-1809), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 15, f. 462; id. (3-2-1817), id., vol. 17, f. 72; Losana to Prop. (1832), *Acta*, vol. 196, f. 238.

Khāzins became increasingly marginalized, especially after the death of Bishāra Jaffāl.[57]

3.3.4 *The economy of Kisrawān in 1840*

The sources repeatedly indicate that the estates of Kisrawān were in a bad state in the first decades of the 18th century. The exploitation of some agricultural lands was neglected, and there were no signs of systematic efforts to restore or expand the lands under cultivation, in spite of Bashīr's exhortations. It seems strange that the Khāzin sheiks apparently did not succeed in capitalizing on the new trade opportunities which occurred in Mount Lebanon in the period 1810-1840. While Beirut became one of the main trade centres on the Syrian coast, and Bashīr al-Shihāb drew a large part of his income from the export of silk, the Khāzins were unable to improve their economic situation. This may be explained by the fact that the Khāzins did not have a foothold in Beirut, an inconvenience which could not be compensated for by their grip on Jūniya, especially after Bashīr decreed that the whole silk crop should be transported to Beirut. As the French consul remarked in 1814, Kisrawān produced exclusively for the Egyptian market, where the various kinds of yellow silk were more in demand. This means that opportunities for the expansion of sericulture were available in Kisrawān. However, there are indications that there was a labour shortage in the *muqāṭaʿa*, while by this time the Khāzins had lost their control of the means of production, having sold most of their land, lost their grip on the marketing of the crops of Kisrawān, and probably even of their silk scale in Kisrawān. Moreover, their role as tax-collectors had become marginalized by the interference of moneylenders and the reforms of Bashīr al-Shihāb.[58]

The difference in economic development between Kisrawān and the northern Maronite *muqāṭaʿa*s is illustrated by the observations of Laurent in 1840. Although in the 18th century Jubayl, al-Batrūn and Bsharrī are usually described as poor areas, in 1840 the three areas (including Ihdin) produced almost four times as much silk as Kisrawān and 25% more wheat; Kisrawān produced no tobacco, which had become an important

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[57] Several purchase documents (1826); 'ʿIlm mubīʿ al-rizq' (1826); 'Bayān al-duyūn' (1826); KHA.1; see also: 'ʿIlm mīrī takhuṣṣ awlād Yūsuf Fransīs Abū Jabr al-Khāzin' (n.d.), KHA2.

[58] Taitbout to Talleyrand-Perigord (1814), Ismail (1975-), vol. 3, p. 114; Réponses (1812), id., pp. 94-95; B. al-Shihāb to Khāzins (n.d.), KHA1; Kruse/Müller, vol. 1, p. 237; B. Junblāṭ to Khāzins, KHA1; Gandolfi to Prop. (25-7-1809), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 15, f. 462; id. (3-2-1817), id., vol. 17, f. 72.

product of Jubayl and al-Batrūn. The per capita income in the northern *muqāṭaᶜa*s was, consequently, much higher than in Kisrawān (40.000 inhabitants, as compared to 17.000 in Kisrawān).[59]

The poor economic performance of the Khāzins is the more curious in the light of another strange event. In 1821 it was discovered that for thirty years Nawfal al-Khāzin (ibn Ḥuṣn) had been registered in Istanbul as consul for France in Beirut. The French government, in surprise, asked the consul of Sidon to make further inquiries. It appeared that the Ottoman endorsement was genuine, and therefore Nawfal was acknowledged by France as vice-consul of Beirut under a French consul. However, Nawfal, who was approaching the age of seventy, does not again appear in the sources, and one can only conclude that he either died soon after, or that his position was formal only.[60]

In spite of the many adversities suffered by the Khāzins in this period, their authority did not completely evaporate. It seems, however, that this authority was based on traditional prestige and became ever more confined to Kisrawān. During the Egyptian occupation, Fransīs al-Khāzin became one of the leaders of the resistance against Ibrāhīm Pasha, and joined the Ottoman forces who landed at Jūniya in 1840. However, the aftermath of the defeat of Ibrāhīm Pasha showed that they were no longer seen as the representatives of the Maronites as far as the negotiations about the future administration of Mount Lebanon were concerned.[61]

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[59] Laurent, pp. 467-468; Kruse/Müller, vol. 1, p. 146; the unequal growth of the population is also shown by the changes in the amount of *ᶜushūr* collected in Beirut and Jubayl and al-Batrūn, and the wish of the population to create a separate diocese: Pop. Jub. and al-Batrūn to Prop., *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 21, f. 688; 'Istanze Fil. Gemaiel' (1796), id., vol. 14, f. 411; 'Istruzioni' (5-12-1814), id., vol. 16, f. 296; *Acta*, vol. 144 (1776), ff. 168-170; in 1170/1756 taxes for Jubayl were estimated at 8600 q., 'Māl al-jadīd sana 1170', KHA1; in 1809 it was estimated at 150.000 to 200.000 q., Guys to Champagny (1809), Ismail (1975-), vol. 4, p. 222.

[60] Nawfal to French King (1816); Fr. Consul Trip. to Nādir al-Khāzin (1819); KHA.1; Martin to Rayneval (1821), Ismail (1975-), vol. 3, pp. 173-174; 'Provision du Consul de France a Baruth' (1821), id., pp. 175 ff; Reynault to Dessolles (1819), id., vol. 5, pp. 19-22.

[61] d'Armagnac, pp. 100ff.; Nawfal, pp. 311ff.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE MARONITES

In the previous chapters, an outline has been given of the historical forces which shaped the socio-economic structure of Mount Lebanon within the Ottoman and Syrian context. In this chapter we will concentrate on the relations between the lay notables, particularly the Khāzin sheiks, and the Maronite clergy. Firstly, the position of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire will be briefly discussed, followed by an outline of the hierarchical structure of the Maronite church and the relations between laymen and the clergy prior to the Lebanese Council of 1736. Next, a reconstruction of the various conflicts which surfaced during the Lebanese Council will be given. These were a manifestation of previous frictions and foreshadowed the deep tensions of the years after 1736. Finally, the upheavals within the Maronite church in the period 1736-1818 will be analyzed, in relation to the increasing intervention of the Vatican in Maronite affairs and the attitude of the Khāzin sheiks *vis-à-vis* the rivalling factions among the clergy. In 1818 a church council was held which is usually considered to be a milestone in the efforts at reforming the Maronite church. As this council dealt predominantly with the administration of monasteries, it will be discussed in chapter 7 of this study.

4.1 Christians in the Ottoman Empire

As the Ottomans expanded towards the Balkan peninsula, an increasing number of Christian communities of various denominations came under their jurisdiction. To these were added, in 1517, the large Christian communities of Syria and Egypt. Although it has often been observed that the Ottoman Empire should be regarded as a multi-religious or multi-national society, little is yet known about the way in which the various components were integrated into a single administrative structure. It is assumed, however, that the implementation of an institutionalized incorporation in the form of the so-called millet-system, granting the religious minorities an official status and some measure of autonomy, did not predate the 19th century. Apparently, before this time, the

administration of the Christians was merely based on a set of pragmatic and incidental measures.[1]

The Christian communities in the Ottoman Empire constituted a variegated, heterogeneous element. Their legal status partly derived from Islamic legal rules, and partly from the practical requirements of administration. Thus, the position of the Christians in the Greek peninsula and the Balkans, who for the first time came under the sovereignty of an Islamic state, substantially differed from that of the Syrian Christians and the Copts in Egypt, who had been integrated into Islamic societies for centuries. For the first group, a new practice had to be conceived, while for the second group existing practices were continued without difficulty.

A further differentiation among Christian communities derived from their geographical distribution and their affiliation to the Orthodox or to the Latin rites. The Greek Orthodox, for instance, who were the majority in the European parts of the Empire, but had adherents in Syrian cities too, and who, moreover, had their spiritual centre in Istanbul, were treated differently from the Copts, who were concentrated in the distant province of Egypt. Moreover, the Greek Orthodox were considered an "indigenous" community, as opposed to the Roman Catholics, who were mainly represented by the European merchant colony in Istanbul, the European monastic orders in Jerusalem and the relatively small uniate communities. As a result, the Greek Orthodox patriarch was formally installed by the Ottoman authorities and received his investiture from the Porte in exchange for a certain autonomy in the field of the judiciary. The Roman Catholics were granted an extraordinary status, being "protected foreigners", while locally concentrated communities, whether of one of the Eastern rites, such as the Copts, or of the Latin rite, such as the Maronites in Mount Lebanon, were usually dealt with on the level of the provincial administration. Sometimes the indigenous Catholics were forced to pay for their status with extraordinary levies.

The above suggests a form of decentralization within the Ottoman system which afforded the Christians a degree of religious freedom and social integration, and enabled the state to avoid communal frictions without endangering the Islamic character of the state. It reflects the typical Ottoman practice of reconciling religious precepts with the exigencies of administration and social harmony. Although they were not

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[1] For a general survey of the position of Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire, see Braude/Lewis and Frazee.

considered as the equals of the Muslim subjects, as long as the Christians were prepared to pay the *jizya* tax, they could aspire to being treated as minorities protected by law.

Of course, the fact that Christians were essentially unequal to Muslims was not without consequences. Firstly, the restrictions put upon the Christians' economic activities—such as the official ban on their becoming *multazims*—induced them to engage in such activities as trade, moneylending and manufacture. They were often selected as financial functionaries by governors or *multazims*, not only because they were proficient accountants, but also because they lacked a structural socio-economic power base independent of their superiors. Their share in international commerce especially was greatly enhanced when the bulk of the Asian trade, dominated by Muslims, shifted in the favour of the trade relations with Europeans, who preferred to deal with their co-religionists. In the 18th century various trade networks, both in the Ottoman Empire and Europe, were set up by Christians from the Levant, who capitalized on their combined role of commercial and cultural intermediaries.

Inevitably, the limitations set upon the Christians' economic activities and their orientation towards trade with Europe tended to blur the identification of their interests with those of the Ottoman state. Several groups were attracted by the opportunities provided by the extended influence of the European powers and by the alternative ideological options provided by the Vatican and, from the 16th century onwards, contacts between the Vatican and the Eastern churches were strengthened. This led to tensions which were especially felt by the Greek Orthodox community, which in the beginning of the 18th century was disturbed by the secession of a faction which adopted the Catholic rite and identified with European commercial interests.[2]

In principle, conversion from one Christian rite to another was permitted by Ottoman law, but the adoption of the Latin rite instead of one of the Orthodox ones was considered a challenge to the Ottoman system. It was enthusiastically supported by the Europeans, especially the French, who wanted to enhance their influence on the political level by claiming the role of protector of the Catholic communities in the Empire. While groups of Levantine Christians were incorporated into the French colonies by the purchase of official documents (*baraᶜats*) offering them a privileged status, French missionaries, who were officially allo-

[2] Haddad; Philipp.

wed to proselytize among non-Catholic Christians, gained a foothold in Syria and strengthened the prestige of France as the foremost advocate of Catholicism. However, the French were also aware that religious tensions could harm their relations with the Ottoman state and their commercial interests.

The case of the Greek Orthodox Church shows that the Christian communities in the Ottoman Empire were not monolithic or homogeneous themselves. Their outlook varied according to their geographic concentration, their rural or urban orientation, their economic activities, their ethnic origin, and their contacts with the central authorities. Thus, for example, at the onset of the 18th century a split occurred in the Greek Orthodox Church which reflected contradictions between the Greek and Arab elements, Syrian versus centralizing factions, and rapprochement to Europe versus continued integration into the Ottoman social structure. Needless to say, these tensions were stimulated to a large extent by the growing penetration of European commerce into the Ottoman Empire. As shifts occurred in the communal networks within the Empire favouring the emergence of new ones, the social structure of communal groups came under strain.

The increasing frictions between the Ottoman system and the Christian minorities eventually resulted in a redefinition of the status of Christians in the Empire, and in efforts to re-establish the equilibrium between central control and communal autonomy. This occurred under the vigilant eye of the European powers, in the period of the Tanzimat reforms. These reforms were designed to create new kinds of social integration by assigning the Christian prelates a defined role within the administration as the recognized leaders of their communities *vis-à-vis* the central state. In 1806 the first of a series of Imperial Decrees concerning the Christian subjects was issued by Sultan Selim confirming the freedom of the Christian clergy.[3]

4.2 The Maronite clergy

The Maronites originally had few contacts with the Ottoman authorities, or, if such contacts did exist, little evidence of them has survived. In a document from 1609, the governor of Tripoli formally endorsed the judicial authority of the patriarch, summoning the Maronites to comply

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[3] Khaṭṭ Sharīf of Sultan Salīm III (1806), Nawwār, p. 174.

with his judgement. Some sources mention a more or less regular recognition of the "bishop of Ihdin" (i.e. the patriarch) by the Ottoman authorities in the 17th century. What the implications of these decrees probably were, is shown by a *buyuruldi* issued by the governor of Tripoli in 1705, acknowledging the newly chosen patriarch and confirming the freedom of the clergy, on condition that the *mīrī* tax be paid without default.[4]

Officially, the Maronites were obliged to pay the *jizya* tax, or poll tax for non-Muslims. It seems that in the 17th century poll taxes were paid in the coastal cities and the Mountain in various forms (*kharāj*, *shāshiyya*, *jāliyya*). Sometimes the clergy and monks were explicitly exempted since they were considered "poor" and thus not subject to taxation. There are, however, indications that extraordinary arrangements were agreed upon for the financial relations between the clergy and the local authorities. Patriarch ʿAwwād (1705-1733) in particular paid regular amounts to the Ḥamāda *muqaddam*s of Bsharrī.[5]

The history of the relations between the Maronite church and the Roman Mother Church are still a matter of debate and polemics. Little is known about the structure of the Maronite church before contacts with the Vatican were restored, and several delegations were sent to Mount Lebanon to report on the situation of the Christian communities from the 16th century onwards. Usually, however, the history of the Maronite church is divided into two stages: the period before the Lebanese Council in 1736, which is marked by a diffuse organizational structure and the predominance of the patriarch over the *muṭrān*s; and the period after the Council, which formalized the hierarchical and organizational structure of the church, sealed the union of the Maronites with Rome and introduced reforms touching upon the authority of the patriarch and the role of laymen in church affairs. In this chapter some aspects of the organization of the Maronite church and the relations between lay notables and the church will be analyzed, as they can be perceived before 1736, especially in the period leading up to the reforms of the Lebanese Council.

As far as we know, before the 18th century the organization of the Maronite church was predominantly based on customary practice, as no

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[4] Gov. Tripoli to Maronites of Bsharrī, 1609, Ziyāda, p. 71-72; Duwayhī, p. 418; *Iʿlām* by the governor of Tripoli (1171/1705), Patr. Arch., Coll. *Duwayhī*, no. 23.

[5] A document for the exemption of the *jizya* tax, granted to a monastery in Tripoli (1692), see: Zayyāt, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 36, p. 404; *ṣakk* between Mūsā Ḥamāda and Patr. ʿAwwād (1717), Ziyāda, p. 72.

codices of regulations for the legal basis of the church hierarchy and organization existed. As sources for the history of the Maronites before 1700 are scarce, a reconstruction of the structure of the Maronite church in this period can only be tentative.

Traditionally, the Maronite community was, at least formally, led by the patriarch and the church hierarchy, which was shaped according to the model of the Eastern Christian churches. Before the 18th century the patriarch enjoyed full authority over the body of clergymen consisting of metropolitans (*muṭrān*), deacons (*khūrī*), priests (*qass*) and chaplains (*shidyāq*; *shammās*). In theory, the rank of *muṭrān* was not identical to that of *usquf* (litt. "bishop"), or *ra'īs al-asāqifa* ("archbishop"), but in practice the distinction disappeared in the course of time. The duties of the prelates were twofold: ritual performance, i.e. the right to hear confessions and to perform the sacraments; and administrative rights and duties, such as the nomination of clerics, the collection of tithes, etc. This study will concentrate on the second category, as it is intimately connected to the social role of the clergy and the relationship between the church and the secular powers.[6]

The title of the patriarch read "Patriarch of Antioch and all of the Orient" (*Baṭriyark Mawārina Anṭākiya wa-Sā'iral-Mashriq*), but this formulation was never endorsed by the Vatican and was only used by some patriarchs. The patriarch was entitled to ordain *muṭrān*s—although it was apparently no rarity for ordinations to be performed by other *muṭrān*s—, while the conclave of *muṭrān*s elected the patriarch, whose nomination was then formally confirmed by the Vatican by the sending of the pallium, a garment symbolizing the patriarchal dignity. Officially all priests were elegible to succeed to the patriarchate, but in practice only *muṭrān*s were elected. The *muṭrān*s, to all intents and purposes, acted as the patriarch's vicars and were assigned existing dioceses, parts of dioceses or an honorary title (*sharafī*; *fakhrī*).[7]

The prelates of the Maronite church drew their revenues from various sources, both regular and irregular. These can be summarized as follows:

a. the revenues of the patriarchal see, the monastery of Qannūbīn in Jabbat Bsharrī. In the course of the 18th century, the possessions of Dayr Qannūbīn fell into ruin, as the patriarch became accustomed to reside in the district of Kisrawān, as will be explained below;

b. an important source of revenue was the tithe, or *ᶜushr* (pl. *ᶜushūr*).

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[6] Armala, pp. 168 ff; Féghali, p. 40; see also the reports of Dandini and Eliano; Fahd (1961).

[7] Armala, p. 854; Hefele, pp. 259-260, 281.

The collection of the *ᶜushūr*, the amount due to the patriarch, and the allocation of villages to the *muṭrān*s was a continual source of discord, and it is uncertain to what extent the *ᶜushūr* were ever collected on a regular basis;

c. according to customary practice, the sacred oil, which was extensively used in Maronite ritual, was personally distributed among the clergy by the patriarch. The clergy paid annual visits to the patriarch to collect the oil in exchange for presents or a fee, which represented a considerable share of the patriarchal income;

d. upon his nomination the *muṭrān* paid an unfixed fee to the patriarch; in turn, the *muṭrān* regularly received fees from the community for the religious duties he performed. The level of these fees is, by their very nature, difficult to assess;

e. from the 17th century onwards it was not exceptional for Maronite clerics to travel to Catholic Europe to collect gifts, obviously appealing for commiseration with the hardships suffered by their fellow-Christians under Muslim rule. Gifts from France and Italy were usually dedicated to the erection or restoration of monasteries;

f. among the irregular financial resources of the clergy should be included the payments by laymen or by fellow clergymen to ensure consecration or nomination. This practice was of course regarded as simony, which was explicitly forbidden at several councils;

g. although evidence in this respect is scarce, the clergy may have derived irregular revenues from their involvement in trade, moneylending and administrative services. Thus, in 1596 prelates were forbidden to collect taxes on behalf of the secular authorities, which was an obvious source of capital accumulation. In the 17th century a papal envoy condemned the Maronite monks for their involvement in moneylending, and in the 18th century another papal envoy suggested limiting the interest rates on moneylending to twelve percent, to avoid usury.[8]

From the sources it cannot be assessed whether these practices and this hierarchical structure were systematically upheld. In addition to this, it is unlikely that the authority of the patriarch in practice was sufficient to cover the Maronite communities outside Mount Lebanon, or even

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[8] Shiblī, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 51, pp. 299, 319; the French community in Syria also gave financial support, ᶜAbbūd, (1911), p. 13; the French King eventually forbade French vessels to embark people intending to collect money in France, Qarāᶜalī/Zanda, in: Fahd, *Tārīkh* vol. 3, p. 108; Féghali, p. 58, 197, 245, 305; Hefele, pp. 24, 296, 305; Shiblī, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 25, p. 347; Lābūdī to Iskandar, 1731, Fahd, *Tārīkh* vol 1, p. 336; Nachi to Tamburini, 1596, *Lettres édifiantes*, vol. 1, p. 247.

outside Jabbat Bsharrī. Obedience to the patriarch among the communities in Aleppo, Damascus and Cyprus was probably to a large extent only nominal.

4.2.1 *The clergy and the Khāzin sheiks in the 17th century*

Although information is scarce, some historians have described the relations between the Maronite clergy and laymen before the 18th century as a rather harmonious symbiosis. This, perhaps too idealized, picture suggests that the patriarch's authority was required to legitimize secular leadership, while the latter fulfilled the role of patrons of the church and the clergy, who provided the financial support of the church and, according to customary practice, participated in the election of patriarchs and the nomination of *muṭrāns*. This symbiosis also involved a *de facto* division of judicial capacities, as the clergy could act as arbitrators, but were ultimately dependent upon the executory powers of the secular leaders. The functioning of this symbiosis clearly required a high degree of social coherence, based on an unambiguous political and communal loyalty, which presupposed social stability, limited outside interference, a slow pace of economic change, and a fairly balanced population growth.[9]

These conditions began to change in the course of the 17th century. Although reliable population figures are lacking, it is generally held that an increase of the Maronite population occurred during the 16th and 17th centuries, resulting in the propensity of the Maronites to migrate from Bsharrī to other areas of Mount Lebanon, especially to Jubayl, Kisrawān, al-Matn, and the Shūf regions. This development coincided with the new opportunities for economic activity provided by the expansion of Fakhr al-Dīn Maʿn. As the relations with their environment became more complex, relations within the Maronite community also became more ambiguous.[10] The simultaneous development of the economic opportunities and the changes in the social structure of the Maronite community, is reflected by the ascendancy of the Khāzin sheiks in Kisrawān, who came to dominate the Maronite community and the church from the 17th century until well into the 19th century. The Khāzin sheiks thus came to embody not only the tensions between change and continuity in the Maronite community, but also the tensions between secular and clerical authority.

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[9] Touma, 51, 567.
[10] Salibi (1965), p. XX; Polk, p. 129; Gibb/Bowen, vol. 2, p. 232.

As has been noted in chapter 2, the rise of Fakhr al-Dīn cannot be separated from the extension of sericulture in Mount Lebanon and the expansion of trade with France and Tuscany. This is equally true for the rise to prominence of the Khāzin sheiks, who acquired a substantial share in the foreign trade and were apparently the ideal intermediaries for promoting European interests in the Syrian coastal areas. French contacts with the Maronites can be traced back to a pledge of protection by Louis XIV in 1649, which was confirmed by the general clauses on the protection of Christians in the Ottoman Empire in the French Capitulations with the Porte. Although these formal bonds between the French and the Maronites had few direct consequences, they could be revived at any time to serve and legitimize the political aims and interests of either party.[11]

The ties between the Khāzin sheiks and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany were established as a result of emir Fakhr al-Dīn's efforts to attract European support for his policy of regional expansion, at a time when Tuscany was attempting to expand its share of the Levant trade. Abū Nādir al-Khāzin and Abū Ṣāfī al-Khāzin accompanied Fakhr al-Dīn on his exile to Italy in the years 1613-1618, and thus added a Christian element to the political image of the emir, which enabled the Tuscans to devise, at least theoretically, a religiously inspired policy concerning the Levant and the Holy Cities. This policy obviously involved the Vatican as well, whose interest in the Maronite community had been resuscitated at the close of the 15th century. At this stage, however, the Vatican was not interested in any attempt to forge a new Holy League to invade Palestine, which in any case seems to have been only a theoretical option. Nevertheless, in 1656 sheik Abū Nawfal al-Khāzin received a papal decoration for his exertions on behalf of the Catholic faith. Acclaimed by the French court and by the Vatican as defenders of the Catholic faith amidst the "thorns" of Islam, the Khāzins came to be considered to be the foremost representatives of the Maronite community and successfully strove to become the political leaders of the community.[12]

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[11] Bulaybil, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 52, pp. 202-203; d'Arvieux, vol. 2, p. 360; Volney, p. 386; Niebuhr, vol. 2, p. 446; Ristelhueber, pp. 22, 189; Chebli, p. 44; Masson (1967), pp. 136, 446, 476; Shiblī, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 51, p. 307; Letters from the Khāzins to the French King in: Ph. al-Khāzin, pp. 152-153, 160, 164-167, 217; see also the letters from the French consuls in this period, in : Ismail (1975-).

[12] See about Fakhr al-Dīn's exile in Tuscany: Mariti, Carali, Ṣafadī; Ḥattūnī, pp. 69, 83, 85; Duwayhī (1976), p. 568; d'Arvieux, vol. 2, p. 361; Ristelhueber, pp. 148, 158-162, 197.

The ascendancy of the Khāzin sheiks can be seen as an important factor in the increasing social differentiation within the Maronite community and the growing complexity of social relations. If there was a tradition of communal leadership exerted by the patriarch, from the 17th century onwards this was balanced by the strong *de facto* leading role of the Khāzins based on political and economic power. The cohesion of the community was not only affected by territorial expansion, but also by the widening gap between those families who succeeded in profiting from the new political and economic constellation, such as the Khāzin sheiks, and those who were unable to adapt to the new circumstances. Furthermore, the new role of the Khāzin sheiks required a definition of their attitude within extra-communal politics, as their contacts with the Syrian Ottoman framework of administration and with the neighbouring tax farming families, especially the Druze and the Matāwila, became more frequent. Finally, the Khāzins represented the tendency within the community towards an outspoken orientation towards Europe, which came to be an important mainstay of their economic control and of their political attitude.

The political prestige of the Khāzin sheiks, and even their position as consuls of France, was partly founded on the endorsement of the Maronite prelates and the European missionaries. In the course of the 17th century, when the Khāzins asserted their control over Kisrawān, the symbiosis between secular and clerical authority took the form of an all-embracing secular patronage over the church and the dominance of lay interests. It should be noted that this lay interference was not inconsistent with tradition, as no clear definition of the role of laymen in the church existed. The privileges acquired by the Khāzins were not seen as an infringement of traditional practice or of clerical independence as it was justified by their secular authority and, moreover, provided the clergy with obvious advantages.

The influence of the Khāzin sheiks in clerical matters concentrated on two aspects, which were, as far as the clergy were concerned, closely interrelated: the nomination of prelates and the founding and administration of clerical and monastic possessions. Traditionally, the main Maronite notables were consulted on the occasion of the election of the patriarch. In practice, from the 17th century onwards, this custom implied that the Khāzin sheiks had to approve the chosen candidate, before he could receive the pallium from Rome. It has been recorded, for instance, that the delegates who had travelled to Rome in 1633 to obtain the confirmation of the election of Jirjis ʿUmayra had to return to Mount

Lebanon empty-handed, as they were unable to produce the endorsement letters from the Khāzins which were required by the Vatican. In 1670 discord broke out between the Khāzin sheiks and the elected patriarchal candidate al-Duwayhī, since, according to some sources, sheik Abū Nawfal had not previously been consulted. In 1710, finally, the Khāzin sheiks used their influence to have the *muṭrān*s depose Patriarch Yaᶜqūb ᶜAwwād and appoint a Khāzin protégé, Yūsuf Mubārak. These examples, which supposedly were recorded because they represented irregularities in the prevailing pattern, show that in the course of the 17th century the patriarchate came under the control of the Khāzin sheiks to a large extent.[13]

The authority of the Khāzin sheiks over the patriarchate was enhanced by their interference in the ordination of the *muṭrān*s, who were officially responsible for the election of the patriarch and provided the candidates. Moreover, the *muṭrān*s were, again officially, directly responsible for the administration of the dioceses covering the Khāzin domains and for the collection of the *ᶜushūr*. *Muṭrān*s who were ordained as a result of the intercession of the Khāzin sheiks in the 17th century were, as far as we know, Isḥāq al-Shadrāwī (Tripoli; 1629), Sarkīs al-Jamrī (Damascus; 1658) Yūsuf Mubārak (Baalbek; 1683) and Buṭrus Makhlūf (Cyprus; 1674). Eventually, the three main branches of the Khāzin family acquired the privilege of selecting the *muṭrān*s of the dioceses of Aleppo (*awlād* Abī Nāṣīf), Baalbek (*awlād* Abī Qānṣawh) and Damascus (*awlād* Abī Nawfal). This privilege was acknowledged by Patriarch Yaᶜqūb ᶜAwwād. It is, therefore, evident that the Khāzin sheiks also interfered in dioceses which officially had no connection with their administrative territory, an indication that they saw their role in church matters as an extension of their political power within the community as a whole.[14]

In the sphere of clerical possessions, the Khāzins deployed considerable zeal in the founding of monasteries and churches in the 17th century. Of course, these activities were related to the restructuring of the exploitation of Kisrawān and the immigration opportunities for the Maronite population. As the various aspects of the monastic estates

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[13] Touma, pp. 51, 567; Ḥattūnī, p. 94; Ḥarfūsh, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 5, pp. 689-690; Ghibrā'īl, vol. 2, part 1, p. 494; Khāzin/Masᶜad, vol. 3, p. 514.

[14] Ḥattūnī, p. 88; Ristelhueber, pp. 122-126; Sh. al-Khāzin, Khāzin/Masᶜad, vol. 3, p. 397; Daḥdāḥ, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 7, p. 748; id. *al-Mashriq*, vol. 8, p. 401; d'Arvieux, vol. 2, p. 366; Qar'ālī (1929-32), *al-Majalla al-Sūriyya*, vol. 5, pp. 250-251; id., *al-Majalla al-Sūriyya*, vol. 7, p. 441; Dibs, vol. 4, part 7, pp. 299, 314-327.

will be discussed below in chapter 5, it will suffice to say here that the Khāzin sheiks claimed far-reaching privileges concerning the administration of the monasteries in their domain and actually considered themselves the proprietors of the monasteries they founded. The monasteries founded by the Khāzins not only strengthened the economic and territorial base of the church, but simultaneously enabled the sheiks to assert their control over the revenues of the clergy and the territorial expansion of the church. The Khāzins also proved hospitable to foreign missionaries. In 1652 they founded Dayr ʿAyn Ṭūrā for the French Jesuits and in 1681 Dayr Ḥarīṣā for the Franciscan mission. These provided useful intermediaries in their contacts with the French and the Vatican.[15]

The privileges mentioned above gave the Khāzin sheiks a strong foothold in the organizational apparatus of the church. The advantages which they derived from this position, at least in the political field, primarily concerned the legitimation of their leadership both with regard to the Maronite community, and with regard to regional and international societies. In practice, this legitimation procured them, for example, repeated intercession on their behalf by the patriarch, the *muṭrān*s and the missionaries at the French court and the Vatican. Thus, during the conflict over the consulate of Abū Nawfal in 1658, the Marseillan lobby met a clerical pro-Khāzin lobby consisting of Jesuits and the Maronite *muṭrān*s al-Shadrāwī and al-Jamrī, who were deliberately sent to France to plead Abū Nawfal's case. Al-Jamrī eventually blessed Abū Nawfal's consular guise. As has been mentioned before, the Khāzin sheiks did not fail to exploit their image as benefactors of the church for material purposes. They repeatedly asked for financial support from the French, while once they refused to pay for a shipload of arms sent by the Vatican, arguing that they held a papal decoration.[16]

Apart from acquiring them religious merit and economic benefit, the foundation of monastic estates and the Khāzins' authority over the administration of the monasteries greatly facilitated the sheiks' control over the church administration. Several *muṭrān*s took up residence in monasteries in Kisrawān, which promised to provide a stable income,

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[15] See: Sh. al-Khāzin, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 4; van Leeuwen (1994).

[16] Duwayhī, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 1, p. 393; Shadrāwī, pp. 941, 944; Ghālib, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 22, pp. 108-109; Daḥdāḥ, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 7, p. 1022; Ristelhueber, pp. 150, 152, 155, 157; Daryān, p. 193; Lābūdī to Iskandar (1731), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, p. 337; Qar'ālī (1932), vol. 2, pp. 285-286; Anaissi (1921), pp. 118, 122, 131, 132; Abū Qānṣawh to Prop. (4-2-1683), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 1, f. 198.

while church councils usually met in Kisrawān under the protection of the Khāzins. In the course of time, the patriarchs came increasingly to reside in Kisrawān, while the patriarchal see in Qannūbīn fell into decay. As a result, the centre of the Maronite community, economically, politically and socially, gradually shifted from Jabbat Bsharrī to Kisrawān, and the Khāzin sheiks succeeded in drawing the clergy into their territorial sphere of influence, at the expense of the influence of the Ḥamāda sheiks of Jabbat Bsharrī. This territorial aspect is illustrated by the conflicts that arose over the election of the successor of Patriarch al-Duwayhī in 1704. Ḥuṣn, the head of the Khāzin family at that time, insisted that the election take place in Kisrawān, since he feared interference from the Ḥamādas, by way of intimidation or bribes. The Ḥamādas were naturally interested in the election in view of their economic relations with the estate of Qannūbīn, which lay in their domain. When, after much ado, the election was held in Kisrawān, the choice fell upon Ḥuṣn's protégé Jibrā'īl al-Blūzānī, who was the abbot of Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh in Kisrawān, which had been founded under the auspices of the Khāzins.[17]

Of course, the privileges enjoyed by the Khāzin sheiks were not necessarily disadvantageous to the Maronite church. The expansion of the monastic estates and churches widened its range and strengthened its financial base. The territorial control and political strength of the Khāzins guaranteed the clergy a relative autonomy *vis-à-vis* the non-Maronite rulers, such as the Ḥamādas, in the fields of jurisdiction, financial administration and the construction of ecclesiastical buildings. These opportunities for self-assertion were supported, financially and diplomatically, by the intensified contacts with the French and with the Vatican. Thus, on the one hand, the church profited from the shield provided by the Khāzins by expanding its economic and social network. On the other, the increasing interference of the Khāzin sheiks in church matters reflected a shift in the power balance between the notables and the clergy which was to disrupt the traditional symbiosis. The patriarch was no longer the sole symbol of Maronite unity, as the political, economic and social leading role was appropriated by the Khāzin sheiks. As this development in turn reflected social changes, the apparent community of

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[17] Ristelhueber, pp. 225-231; *Muṭrāns* to Prop. (1704), Khāzin/Masʿad, vol. 3, p. 517; *Muṭrāns* to Prop. (1704), co-signed by 14 Khāzin sheiks, 'Wathā'iq tataʿallaq', id. pp. 148-150; the governor wanted Patriarch al-Khāzin to come and live under his *ḥukm* in Jubayl or Jabba; Gazeno, p. 25; Qar'ālī (1932), vol. 2, p. 281; Masʿad, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 38, p. 36.

interests between the clergy and the notables did not correspond to the complexity of social relations any more, and tensions between secular and clerical interests became inevitable. Both interests became increasingly connected with the contacts with the French and the Vatican, upheld by both the clergy and the notables.

4.2.2 *Growing diversity: the Khāzin sheiks and the clergy in the first decades of the 18th century*

It seems that the Khāzin family succeeded in preserving their unity during the whole of the 17th century, under the guidance of the head of the family, who combined his administrative responsibilities with the function of French consul. After the dispersion of the various branches over Kisrawān at the turn of the 18th century, however, political interests began to diverge, and the first signs of discord appeared. The territorial distribution of the family meant that individual branches acquired the supervision over separate monasteries and established relations with their own protégés among the clergy. As has been noted, this resulted in the privilege of controlling the dioceses of Aleppo, Baalbek and Damascus for the three main branches. This differentiation of interests was to have important consequences for the unity of the clergy, especially when the Khāzin sheiks did not remain content with indirectly influencing clerical administration, and several members of the family assumed positions within the church hierarchy.

Another factor complicating the relations between the church and the notables was the foundation of the first Maronite monastic organization, the Lebanese Order (al-Rahbāniyya al-Lubnāniyya), which occurred around 1700. In 1693, three men from Aleppo obtained permission from Patriarch al-Duwayhī to found a monastic brotherhood, and subsequently succeeded in establishing small monastic communities in Jabbat Bsharrī. The Order witnessed considerable growth in the first decades of the 18th century, both in membership and in the acquisition of monastic possessions. As the Order had to be integrated into the existing structure of the church, notably in the fields of finance and clerical possessions, conflicts were unavoidable, and from the beginning of the century fierce tensions occurred between the patriarch and the protagonists of the Lebanese Order. These tensions became even more manifest when several members of the Order became *muṭrān*s and the frictions were thus incorporated into the clerical hierarchy. The first members of the Order who attained the rank of *muṭrān* were ʿAbdallāh

al-Qarā^calī (1716; Beirut), Jirmānūs Farḥāt (1725; Aleppo), Ighnāṭiyūs al-Sharabiyya (1732; Damascus) and Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin (1733).[18]

Patriarch Isṭifān al-Duwayhī, who died in 1704, was succeeded by Jibrā'īl al-Blūzānī, a protégé of Abū Nawfal and Ḥuṣn al-Khāzin. However, al-Blūzānī died before he received the pallium, and subsequently Ya^cqūb ^cAwwād was elected patriarch, although not unanimously. In the years following his election, Patriarch Ya^cqūb ^cAwwād was accused of financial misconduct and indecent behaviour, and in 1710 he was deposed by a conclave of *muṭrān*s in Dayr Mār Sarkīs wa-Bākhūs in Rayfūn (Kisrawān). At the instigation of the Khāzin sheiks of ^cAjaltūn and Ghusṭā, the *muṭrān* of Baalbek, Yūsuf Mubārak, who was from Rayfūn and a protégé of the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh al-Khāzin, was elected "anti-patriarch". The head of the Khāzin family, Nawfal, who had succeeded his father as consul of France in 1708, declared that Mubārak was fit for the task of patriarch but eventually supported ^cAwwād.[19] The conflict, which threatened the unity of the Maronite community, drew the intervention of the Vatican and of the French consuls of Sidon and Tripoli. According to Nawfal, the people were on ^cAwwād's side, and were only outwardly professing support for Mubārak. In 1714 ^cAwwād was reinstated as patriarch. Although the *muṭrān*s, who had not acted unanimously, resigned themselves to the instructions of Rome in this instance, the sheiks of Kisrawān refused to comply. They sent a letter to the French consul of Sidon expressing their dissatisfaction with his interference, and threatening to call in the support of the Ottoman authorities, as they would not accept any French authority over their affairs. Only after ^cAwwād had solemnly visited Kisrawān in 1714 did the sheiks formally acquiesce to his restoration, but in 1719 and 1721 they again complained. For his part, ^cAwwād repeatedly accused the Khāzin sheiks of preventing him from collecting the *^cushūr*, leaving him in deplorable financial circumstances.[20]

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[18] *Bull. Pont.*, App. 2, pp. 47-50; Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, pp. 205, 339 ff; Farḥāt, 'Tārīkh', in: id., vol. 1, pp. 47 ff; Lābūdī/Zanda, 'Tārīkh Lubnānī,' in: id., vol. 1, pp. 17 ff; Qarā^calī, 'Mudhakkirāt,' in: id., vol. 3, pp. 218 ff.

[19] Letters between the French consul and Nawfal, Ismail (1975-), vol. 1, pp. 84, 98-99, 122, 140-141, 148, 150, 152, 159; document of ^cAwwād's removal: *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 2, f. 2; Nawfal al-Khāzin to Prop. (1712), id., ff. 141-142.

[20] Ristelhueber, pp. 225-239; Ḥarfūsh, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 8, p. 351; 'Shahāda *muṭr.* Y. Mubārak,' in: 'Nubdha Tārīkhiyya ^can Dayr Rayfūn,' Khāzin/Mas^cad, vol. 2, p. 593; Qarā^calī, 'Mudhakkirāt,' Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 3, p. 264; Declarations of loyalty to the Vatican by the Khāzins: *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 2, ff. 314, 339, 353, 440; complaints by ^cAwwād (1715): *S.C./Mar.*, vol 3, ff. 94, 101, 102-103; Nawfal to Prop. (1712?), id., vol. 2, ff. 141-142; see also: Tayah, *Orient Syrien*, vol. 3, pp. 117-118, note 56.

According to Patriarch ᶜAwwād himself, the frictions around his person were instigated by the Khāzin sheiks of ᶜAjaltūn and Ghusṭā, who wanted to depose him, a measure that, according to him, was the prerogative of the Sultan only. Whatever the true causes of the discord may have been, it revealed for the first time a significant clash of interests in church affairs between the different branches of the Khāzin family, affecting their control of the patriarchate. For the first time, too, the conflict brought about the active intervention of external forces, viz. the French consuls and the Vatican, accentuating the split between the Khāzin consul (Nawfal) and the other family branches. This outside intervention, partly induced by the Khāzins, would henceforth become a regular phenomenon.[21]

One of the main concerns of the Khāzin sheiks regarding Yaᶜqūb ᶜAwwād may have been his willingness to accommodate to the demands of the Ḥamāda *muqaddam*s of Jabbat Bsharrī, concerning the taxation of the estate of Qannūbīn. The Khāzins accused ᶜAwwād of giving away possessions of the estate to the Ḥamādas and of entrusting the estate to "Turks and Greeks". Significantly, Yūsuf Mubārak intended to move the patriarchal residence to Kisrawān. After his reinstatement, the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf al-Khāzin invited ᶜAwwād to come and live in Kisrawān, an offer that was declined by ᶜAwwād. However, although in 1717 ᶜAwwād signed an agreement with the Ḥamādas to settle their financial differences, the Khāzin sheiks did not definitively lose their control over the patriarch or the patriarchal see, as in 1726 the patriarch nominated an administrator (*wakīl*) for the estate of Qannūbīn with the explicit consent of some of the Khāzin sheiks. The document which was drafted for this purpose was signed by *muṭrān* Ḍarghām al-Khāzin, sheik Nawfal and some sheiks of the branches *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh and *awlād* Abī Nawfal. In addition, a document was drafted in which the Khāzins pledged to provide for the livelihood of the *wakīl*, and was signed by Nawfal and sheiks of the *awlād* Abī Nawfal and *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf. This arrangement can clearly be seen as a means of counterbalancing the influence of the Ḥamāda *muqaddam*s on the patriarchate and, accordingly, on the ecclesiastical domains

[21] According to Lorenzo, the whole affair was instigated by six sheiks and one *muṭrān*: Lorenzo to Prop. (12-10-1714), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 2, 468-469; other letters from Lorenzo (1713/1714): id., vol. 2, ff. 366, 368-370, 383; Fahd (1984-1985), vol. 2, pp. 53, 54, 79, 80, 94, 99, 103-105, 110, 111, 124; Ḥattūnī, p. 122; Ristelhueber, pp. 241-244, 261-262, 266, 269; Qarāᶜalī, 'Mudhakkirāt,' Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 3, p. 78; Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, p. 279; Qar'ālī (1932), vol. 2, pp. 312, 327-328; Anaissi, p. 137.

in Bsharrī. Again, regional spheres of influence appeared to be intertwined with the Khāzin's wish to control the clergy. The clergy, however, would never be as cohesive as before.[22]

4.3 The Maronites and the Vatican: the Lebanese Council

The dating of the original contacts between the Maronite community and the Roman Mother Church always has been a matter of debate. Some claim that ties with the Vatican were never broken, while others date the restoration or the establishment of relations back to the 12th or to the 15th century. It is beyond the scope of this study to enter into this discussion. Suffice it to say that definite evidence exists that in the course of the 15th century contacts were established or re-established. In this period, the Vatican, under the influence of increasing missionary activity in general, adopted a policy aimed at strengthening its authority over the Oriental Christian communities and at eliminating dogmatic divergencies and unacceptable ritual practices. From the 16th century on, the Vatican repeatedly sent delegations to Mount Lebanon assigned with the task of reforming specifically Maronite practices concerning ritual and church administration, and of abolishing digressions from Roman orthodoxy. In 1584, the Maronite College in Rome was founded, to enable Maronites to be trained for clerical functions under the supervision of the Vatican. Another important institution in this context was the *Sacra Congregatio De Propaganda Fide* (usually named "Propaganda"), which was founded in 1622 to exert jurisdiction over all the missionary regions, including those in the Ottoman Empire.[23]

The re-emerging interest of the Vatican in the Maronite community, which cannot, in fact, be dissociated from the Maronites' political contacts with France and Tuscany, led to increasing interventions by Rome

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[22] Dahām al-Khāzin to Prop. (n.d.), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 2, f. 438; Nimr al-Khāzin to Prop. (n.d.), id., f. 439; Khāzins to Prop. (8-10-1719), id., vol. 3, f. 153; id. (18-7-1721), id., vol. 3, f. 217; see also: Ḥawā to Prop. (22-1-1722), id., vol. 3, ff. 288-289; Poullard to Prop. (8-5-1714), id., vol. 2, f. 414; there apparently existed fierce opposition to ʿAwwād in Aleppo; statements by the Khāzins that D. Rayfūn is suitable to be the Patriarchal See (15-7-1710; May 1710, 15-6-1710): id., ff. 43, 49, 51; Mubārak to Prop. (19-4-1713), id., ff. 217-218; De La Roque, cited in: Le Roy, p. 143; Lābūdī/Zanda, Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 3, p. 23; Ḥattūnī, p. 139; Ziyāda, p. 72.

[23] On the history of the Propaganda, see: *Sacrae Congregationis De Propaganda Fide Memoria Rerum, 1622-1972*, 3 vols., Rom etc. 1971; N. del Re, *La Curia Romana*, Roma 1970, pp. 185-203; Frazee, pp. 88 ff.; about Eliano, see: Fahd (1961); see also: van Leeuwen (1994).

in Maronite clerical affairs in the 17th and 18th centuries, and, conversely, to a greater Maronite dependency on the patronage and judicial authority of the Mother Church. In 1736, this gradual *rapprochement* culminated in a church council which had the ambitious aim of laying down principles for the future organization of the Maronite church. This council, which was later named the "Lebanese Council" (al-Majma^c al-Lubnānī) also aimed to restructure the Maronite church in order to accommodate it to external and internal changes, such as the renewed contacts with Europe and the growing divergencies within the Maronite community, and was supervised by a special papal envoy (*qāṣid rasūlī*), the famous scholar Yūsuf al-Sim^cānī (Giuseppe Assemani).[24]

4.3.1 *Prelude*

In the first three decades of the 18th century, new contradictions surfaced in the Maronite church. Conflicts deriving from the complexity of the interference of the Khāzin sheiks, who by now no longer acted in concord, from the renewed ties with Rome, and from the foundation and incorporation of the Lebanese Order, determined the attitudes of the prelates during the Lebanese Council to a large extent, and in general foreshadowed the frictions which afflicted the Maronite community throughout the 18th century. These generally took the form of personal controversies between prelates, but reflected underlying conflicts between the clerical and secular factions, which, in their turn, resulted from conflicting tendencies that transcended the level of personal rivalries. In order to present a clear picture of the Lebanese Council, it will be useful to introduce the most prominent participants before the proceedings of the Council are reconstructed.

It was agreed that the Council was to be supervised by Yūsuf al-Sim^cānī, who had settled in Rome as a scholar and an expert on Oriental Christian communities. In 1735 al-Sim^cānī had submitted a report on the situation of the Maronites to the Propaganda, in which he criticized the lack of a coherent definition of the jurisdiction of the patriarch, resulting in arbitrary behaviour *vis-à-vis* the *muṭrān*s. As the Maronites had become "free to exert their religion" he deemed the time ripe for introducing reforms. Al-Sim^cānī subsequently received special authorization as a papal envoy to coordinate the implementation of the reforms suggested in his proposals. Of course, he was chosen for his knowledge of

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[24] Raphael, p. 123;

the conditions among the Maronites and probably for his role in the renewal of contacts between the Maronites and Rome. From the reports of the Council it becomes clear, however, that al-Simʿānī's personal influence in Mount Lebanon was not based on clientele networks derived from family or clan ties, regional affiliations or patronage by secular factions. Apparently his connections with the Maronite community were largely restricted to the clergy, or, to be more precise, with the representatives of the Lebanese Order. That his outlook was in the first instance a Roman one, may on the one hand have obscured his understanding of the practicability of the reform proposals, although on the other hand it is possible that he was considered, at least by some of the parties involved, as an impartial arbiter with an untainted view of the procedures and formal rules. However, the papal authorization could not prevent al-Simʿānī from being drawn into controversies which were probably less idealistic than he might have foreseen.[25]

As al-Simʿānī had received a special, or in other words exceptional or incidental, authorization, he was likely to clash with the patriarch, who naturally represented the regular authority within the Maronite church. One of the main issues covered by the reform proposals was the juridical position of the patriarch, which made the exceptional supervisory status of the papal envoy inevitable, in order to counterbalance the formal and traditional powers of the patriarch. However, this stimulated the patriarch to use these powers in an arbitrary way in order to avoid the undermining of his position. This ambiguity was enhanced by the fact that the patriarch was to be the main person responsible for carrying out the reform measures, which partly affected his own jurisdiction, and by the fact that he could not isolate himself from the dominant factions among the clergy and in the community as a whole. These considerations should be kept in mind in an assessment of the motives of the patriarch in asking Rome for permission for the Council to be held in the first place.

It is not without significance that the Lebanese Council was presided over by the first patriarch belonging to the Khāzin family. Ḍarghām al-Khāzin, a son of Abū Qānṣawh Fayyaḍ, was born in Ghusṭā and, after adopting the monastic cloth, became abbot of Dayr Sarkīs wa-Bākhūs in Rayfūn, near his native village. In 1726, or shortly before that date, he was ordained titular *muṭrān* of Ghusṭā, according to some sources

[25] Anaissi (1911), pp. 239-246; Fromage to Le Camus (1736), *Lettres édifiantes*, vol. 2, p. 212; Assemani to Prop. (9-5-1735), *C.P.*, vol. 94, (1727-1738), ff. 39-47, 'Osservazioni sopra li Articoli Proposti alla Sa Cong. d. P. F.'.

because his support was required for the excommunication of *muṭrān* Jirmānūs Farḥāt of Aleppo, a prominent member of the Lebanese Order, who was opposed by a faction among the *muṭrān*s. Whatever may have been the case, the excommunication of Farḥāt was prevented by the Khāzin sheiks of ᶜAjaltūn, presumably the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf, who claimed tutelage over the diocese of Aleppo and had sought the ordination of Farḥāt in 1725.[26] In 1733, Ḍarghām was elected patriarch under direct or indirect pressure from the Khāzin sheiks, after discord among the *muṭrān*s had thwarted a first election round. Initially, *muṭrān* Ilyās Muḥāsib was elected, who had been a staunch adversary of the Lebanese Order since the conflicts in the period of Patriarch Yaᶜqūb ᶜAwwād, and who was now accused of simony. According to one account, Ḍarghām was appointed without a formal vote, in order to avoid an escalation of the frictions and to appease the Khāzin sheiks, who were, however, divided among themselves. After his election the patriarch took the name Yūsuf Ḍarghām al-Khāzin.[27]

The Lebanese Order was represented by a strong faction in the clerical hierarchy, comprised of the *muṭrān*s ᶜAbdallāh al-Qarāᶜalī, Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin and Ighnāṭiyūs al-Sharabiyya. From the patriarchate of Yaᶜqūb ᶜAwwād onwards, frictions had repeatedly occurred between members of the hierarchy and the Order, especially concerning the latter's financial basis and religious capacities. These conflicts had occasioned strong animosity between *muṭrān* Ilyās Muḥāsib and the *muṭrān*s of the Lebanese Order, which was exacerbated by the refusal of the *muṭrān*s to support Ilyās' candidacy for the patriarchate in 1733, in spite of a pledge to do so by al-Sharabiyya.[28]

ᶜAbdallāh al-Qarāᶜalī was one of the co-founders of the Lebanese Order and was its superior-general from 1699-1716. In this function his policy was to strengthen the relations with Rome and with Patriarch

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[26] Qar'ālī (1929-32), *al-Majalla al-Sūriyya*, vol., vol. 5,, no. 4, pp. 247-248; Farḥāt died in 1732.

[27] Qashūᶜ to Ra'īs ᶜĀmm (1729), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol 1, p. 246; Lābūdī to Simᶜānī (1728), id., vol. 1, p. 312; Lābūdī to Y. al-Qarāᶜalī (1739), id., vol. 1, 372; Qarāᶜalī to Prop. (1733), id., vol. 2, pp. 20-21; Nā'ib and Mud. to Ra'īs ᶜĀmm (1728), id., vol. 3, p. 161; Saᶜd to Simᶜānī (1728), id., vol. 3, pp. 176-177; 'Nubdha Tārīkhiyya ᶜan Dayr Rayfūn,' in: Khāzin/Masᶜad, vol. 2, pp. 598-599; Duwayhī, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 1, p. 392; Ḥattūnī, p. 139; Le Quien, Coll. 76; Ghālib, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 28, p. 585; Qar'ālī (1932), vol. 2, pp. 425, 427-429; Letters of the patriarch, in: Najm, 'Dhayl,' pp. 149-172; Anayisī, p. 49; Anaissi, p. 143.

[28] Lābūdī to Iskandar (1728), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, p. 293; Lābūdī/Zanda, 'Tārīkh Lubnānī,' id., vol. 1, pp. 180, 181; Mud. to Simᶜānī (1729), id., vol. 1, p. 196; Fahd (1973), pp. 56-57; Qar'ālī (1929-32), vol. 5, no. 4, p. 249.

Ya^cqūb ^cAwwād in order to broaden the organizational base of the Order. Relations with the patriarch, however, were often tenuous, as the latter feared the financial implications of the Order's expansion. In addition to this, a dispute arose over an amount of money which ᶜAwwād had deposited with the Order, which he had considered a safe treasury. After ᶜAwwād's deposition by the dissident *muṭrān*s in 1710, ᶜAbdallāh told *muṭrān* Jirjis Yamīn of the deposited sum, which, he assumed, was the property of the patriarchal see. This provoked the anger of the ᶜAwwād family, who, in the words of al-Qarāᶜalī, wanted to use the money to win the support of the Ḥamāda *muqaddam*s. The conflict, which involved Yaᶜqūb ᶜAwwād, who was reinstated as patriarch in 1714, was apparently solved in 1716, when the patriarch signed a repayment order for the sum in question, in exchange for al-Qarāᶜalī's intervention on his behalf with the secular rulers, presumably the Khāzins and the Ḥamādas.[29]

Al-Qarāᶜalī was consecrated *muṭrān* of Beirut in 1716 at the request of the Khāzin sheiks of ᶜAjaltūn (*awlād* Abī Nawfal), although he maintained that he had initially refused to accept his nomination, as he feared that it was aimed at curbing his freedom of action as superior-general of the Order, and at drawing him under the jurisdiction and authority of the patriarch. This assumption does not seem unfounded, although as a *muṭrān* al-Qarāᶜalī did not lose the opportunity to exert his influence. In the same year he was appointed *muṭrān* of Damascus, probably with the aim of retrieving a Maronite church in Damascus which had been appropriated by Greek Catholics. This brought him into conflict with Simᶜān ᶜAwwād, who had just been consecrated *muṭrān* of Damascus. It probably was no coincidence that, shortly afterwards, Ilyās Muḥāsib, the most pronounced adversary of the Order and a protégé of the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh al-Khāzin, was consecrated *muṭrān* of Ghusṭā (1717). The two nominations sparked off a power struggle within the clerical hierarchy, which became especially fierce after al-Qarāᶜalī had opposed the candidacy of Ilyās for the patriarchate in 1733. Presumably, as noted above, al-Qarāᶜalī's opposition to Ilyās, which was motivated by accusations of simony, was instrumental in the election of Ḍarghām al-Khāzin, who, being a member of the Abū Qānṣawh branch, was perhaps seen as an acceptable compromise.[30]

The second *muṭrān* of the Order, Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin, was a member

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[29] 'Mudhakkirāt al-Qarāᶜalī,' in: Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 3, pp. 260, 261, 266, 267.

[30] Qarāᶜalī to Prop. (1720), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 274; Lābūdī to Dibsī (1735), id., vol. 2, p. 349; Fahd (1973), pp. 168, 182-184; Ḥarfūsh, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 5, p. 783.

of the Abū Nawfal branch of the Khāzin family (Ṭalīᶜ ibn Abī Kanᶜān Qays). He was several times given the function of *mudabbir*, and was consecrated *muṭrān* of Bānyās (*sharafī*) by his uncle *muṭrān* Ḍarghām in 1730. In 1733, Ḍarghām, after having been elected patriarch, nominated Ṭūbiyā administrator (*wakīl*) of Qannūbīn, a function which had already been put under the surveillance of the Khāzin sheiks. The reports on Ṭūbiyā's *wikāla* differ, but apparently Ṭūbiyā saw himself as obliged to invest an amount of 857 *qurūsh* to cover the expenses of the patriarchal see, which he borrowed from his brother Kanᶜān. Eventually he claimed the money back from the patriarch, who, however, refused to pay, discharged Ṭūbiyā and appointed Ilyās Muḥāsib in his place. Ṭūbiyā and the head of his *bayt*, his brother Kanᶜān, went to emir Milḥim al-Shihāb to lodge a complaint against the patriarch, claiming that the money was part of the *mīrī* due to the emir by Kanᶜān. As a result, Milḥim supported Kanᶜān's claim and sent troops to force the patriarch to pay. However, Yūsuf Ḍarghām, who was supported by the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh and consul Nawfal al-Khāzin, stuck by his refusal, and the conflict remained unresolved until 1740. Ṭūbiyā's administration of the patriarchal see had also led to a conflict with his predecessor *muṭrān* al-Duwayhī, who maintained a financial claim on him, which was all the more urgent since his request to receive the disposal of a plot of land for his livelihood had been refused by the patriarch (1725).[31]

In most of the conflicts mentioned above, *muṭrān* Ilyās Muḥāsib was a prominent participant. After his failure to be elected patriarch, he allied himself with Yūsuf Ḍarghām and became his *wakīl*. Apart from this he was abbot of the monastery Mār Shalīṭā in Ghusṭā. These two functions gave him a powerful position among the clergy, since from the time of Patriarch Yaᶜqūb ᶜAwwād the patriarchal see had been in debt to Dayr Mār Shalīṭā because of a visit of the patriarch to the monastery. Moreover, Ilyās had consecrated the *muṭrān*s Ighnāṭiyūs al-Sharabiyya (1732) and Jibrā'īl ᶜAwwād (1733) and had them sign a document in which they promised to support him and to remit their income, apart from the *ᶜushūr* and a small allowance, to Dayr Mār Shalīṭā. Of

[31] 'Waṣiya Y. Isṭifān,' (1760), ᶜAbbūd (1909), vol. 2, p. 382; Ṭūbiyā to Simᶜānī (1740), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 402-403; Mud. to ᶜAbd al-Aḥad (1740), id., vol. 2, p. 398; Lābūdī to Dibsī (1740), id., vol. 2, p. 540; Lābūdī to Dibsī (1736), id., vol. 2, pp. 202-204; Ra'īs ᶜĀmm to Simᶜānī (1745), id., vol. 2, p. 417; Lābūdī to Dibsī (1735), id., vol. 2, pp. 347-349; Lābūdī to Dibsī (1737), id., vol. 2, p. 352; Report al-Simᶜānī, Fahd (1973), p. 182; Nawfal thought the interference of the emir inappropriate, id., pp. 144-146; Ḥattūnī, p. 142, 143; ᶜAyntūrīnī, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 46, p. 569.

course, this provided Ilyās with leverage for putting pressure on the *muṭrān*s to join his faction.[32]

As has been explained above, by this time no conflict within the church hierarchy could occur without the direct involvement of secular notables such as the Khāzin sheiks, whose interests were firmly connected with the clergy, especially after the election of Yūsuf Ḍarghām al-Khāzin as patriarch in 1733. However, at this stage the Khāzin sheiks had ceased to act as unanimously as they had in the previous century, and a gradual divergence of interests can be perceived related to the territorial spread of the family branches. By now, conflicts involving the church usually had repercussions on the secular administration, although sometimes indirectly.

The Khāzin sheiks who were most intimately involved in church affairs were the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh, who were the main patrons of Patriarch Yūsuf Ḍarghām and *muṭrān* Ilyās Muḥāsib, who originally came from Ghusṭā. Furthermore, their domain comprised the diocese of Baalbek and several monastic estates, notably Dayr Mār Shalīṭā, which was the see of Ilyās Muḥāsib, and Dayr Mār Sarkīs wa-Bākhūs in Rayfūn, which was chosen as the patriarchal see by Yūsuf Ḍarghām. As a result of this the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh defended their interests by strongly supporting the faction of the patriarch and Ilyās.

This policy was likely to clash with the interests of other Khāzin *bayt*s. Thus, the Yūsuf-Ilyās alliance caused a breach in the previous cooperation between the patriarch and his nephew Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin (*awlād* Abī Nawfal), when the latter was discharged from the *wikāla* of Qannūbīn. This was clearly a setback for the influence of the *awlād* Abī Nawfal on the administration of the patriarchal see, as it had been conceived by the agreements of 1726, and facilitated the relocation of the patriarchal see to Kisrawān. Apart from this, the conflict between Ṭūbiyā and the patriarch had a financial aspect which touched upon broader family interests, since Yūsuf Ḍarghām refused to repay the sum of money that had been lent to Ṭūbiyā by his brother Kanᶜān.[33] The *awlād* Abī Nawfal also controlled the diocese of Damascus and had a hand in the nomination of *muṭrān* ᶜAbdallāh al-Qarāᶜalī in 1716. They supervised the monastery of Sayyidat al-Luwayza near ᶜAjaltūn which was administered by the Lebanese Order.[34]

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[32] *ṣakk*s between Ilyās and Ighnāṭiyūs, and Ilyās and ᶜAwwād (1732): *C.P.*, vol. 104, ff. 366-367.

[33] Shaybān al-Khāzin, Khāzin/Masᶜad, vol. 3, p. 528.

[34] Lābūdī to Dibsī (1736), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, pp. 202-204.

The interests of the *bayt* of Abū Nāṣīf were restricted to the diocese of Aleppo and its dependency in Kisrawān, Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh. Aleppo was the wealthiest diocese of the Maronite community, and the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf were anxious to secure their privileges concerning the nomination of its *muṭrān*. When ʿAbdallāh al-Qarāʿalī, who was himself from Aleppo, was nominated *muṭrān* of Beirut in 1716, the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf had him sign a document in which the *muṭrān* pledged to refrain from any claims to the diocese of Aleppo and even from travelling to the city of Aleppo, on penalty of a fine. A few years later, the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf prevented the expulsion of Jirmānūs Farḥāt from the clergy, and helped him to acquire the diocese of Aleppo in 1725. This interference with the selection of *muṭrān*s was at least partly inspired by financial considerations, as is shown by a conflict between the Khāzin *bayt* and *muṭrān* Ḥūshib in 1736, concerning the claim by the Khāzins that the *muṭrān* had failed to comply with the financial obligations which had been agreed upon at his nomination. The sheiks even went so far as to threaten the *muṭrān* with physical violence in order to squeeze the money out of him.[35]

The divergence of interests among the *bayt*s of the Khāzin family complicated matters for the sheik who, in accordance with tradition, held the positions of the head of the family and of consul of France. The function of consul was passed down the line of the descendants of Ḥuṣn, and in 1708 the consulate was assumed by Nawfal ibn Ḥuṣn. On the one hand, the traditional authority connected with this function required that Nawfal should try to reconcile contradictions within the community and that he should stand above narrow factional interests. On the other hand, his authority was rooted in traditional privileges which reflected long-standing family interests in the church, a circumstance which naturally made Nawfal inclined to take a conservative attitude as far as church reform was concerned. Apart from this, in his capacity of consul he was exposed to potential pressure from the French colony in Syria, especially the other consuls and missionaries, who in turn had relations with the Vatican. This external factor gave Nawfal a somewhat peculiar role, as he had to reconcile a wide scale of variegated interests. In fact, Nawfal was not very successful at preventing the corrosion of his authority, and whereas his predecessor Ḥuṣn had succeeded in forging family interests into a unified stand in

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[35] Qar'ālī (1929-32), vol. 7, no. 7, pp. 441-442, 444; Fahd (1973), pp. 166-171; Assemani to Prop. (11-6-1737), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 5 (1737-1740), ff. 69-72.

church affairs, Nawfal fell victim to the increasing centrifugal tendencies and felt forced to side with the protagonists of the traditional vested interests in the church hierarchy and the outspoken conservative stand of the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh. Sheik Nawfal, finally, had little sympathy for al-Qarāᶜalī and the Lebanese Order.[36]

As becomes clear from the outline above, the embryonic Lebanese Order could not avoid taking a stance in the many clerical conflicts and their secular consequences. As the Order represented an innovative force within the community, it obviously had less to gain from the protection of traditional interests than from the promulgation of reforms. It had representatives within the church hierarchy who were patronized by the *awlād* Abī Nawfal, with the exception of the line of Nawfal, and, to a lesser degree, the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf, and it exploited the monasteries in Kisrawān within the domains of these two *bayt*s. The Order's interests lay primarily in the restriction of the authority of the patriarch, the smooth incorporation of the Order into the church organization, and a reform of the traditional forms of patronage of clerics and monasteries by laymen, which were the backbone of the traditional structure.[37]

Finally, al-Simᶜānī explicitly requested the attendance of delegations from the European missions in Syria, obviously hoping to draw their support for his reform proposals. Representatives of the Eastern Catholics were also invited.[38]

The above paragraphs roughly outline the complex mosaic of opposing factions which were mainly formed during the prelude to the Lebanese Council and which included the main actors who influenced the proceedings of the Council when it finally met in 1736. It should be noted, however, that not all the participants spoke out in favour of or against reform. The *muṭrān*s Simᶜān ᶜAwwād, Jibrā'īl ᶜAwwād, Fīlībūs al-Jumayyil, Isṭifān al-Duwayhī and Ḥannā Isṭifān were less closely bound to any one faction, although for various reasons they were unsympathetic towards Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin or ᶜAbdallāh al-Qarāᶜalī.[39]

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36 Assemani to Prop. (3-7-1737), id., f. 103; Nā'ib ᶜĀmm and mud. to Ab ᶜĀmm (1728), id., vol. 3, p. 158; Khāzins to Pope (1719), Qar'ālī (1932), pp. 257, 262; Nawfal to Prop. (1-1-1722), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 4, f. 281.

37 On monasteries, see below, chapters 5 and 6.

38 Report al-Simᶜānī (3-7-1737), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 5, f. 103.

39 Simᶜān ᶜAwwād and al-Qarāᶜalī had a dispute over money, see: Ḥawā to Prop. (22-1-1722), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 3, ff. 288-289.

4.3.2 *The Lebanese Council*

In the light of the various conflicts preceding the Lebanese Council, a balanced discussion by the participants of the advantages and disadvantages of reform was unlikely, and the prospects for the deliberations seemed limited. Although individual enmities tended to blur the central issues, they were not merely personal, but reflected the factional interests transcending the personal level. Thus, the tensions between the notables and the clergy, and between the factions opposing or supporting reform, were the expression of deeper controversies that derived from changes in the relations between secular and clerical forces, and between segments of the social and political structure of the community. However, before the social dimension of the reform tendency can be analyzed, it is necessary to present a brief outline of the proceedings of the Lebanese Council and its aftermath.

After the Vatican had granted permission for the Council to be held, the papal envoy Yūsuf al-Simᶜānī arrived in Beirut on the 17th of June 1736. He was welcomed by Tūmā al-Labūdī, the superior-general of the Lebanese Order, and took up his abode in Dayr Sayyidat al-Luwayza in Kisrawān, where he was visited by some of the *muṭrān*s, including Ṭūbiyā, and several Khāzin sheiks. A few days later al-Simᶜānī visited the patriarch in Qannūbīn and emir Milḥim al-Shihāb in Dayr al-Qamar. During a tour in Kisrawān, al-Simᶜānī was accompanied by the Khāzin sheiks of the three *bayt*s, who offered him presents and lodging. After these greeting ceremonies, al-Simᶜānī again settled in Dayr Sayyidat al-Luwayza.[40]

In spite of the flawless reception, the first signs of discord soon came to the surface when al-Simᶜānī refused to comply with the invitation of Patriarch Yūsuf Ḍarghām to visit him in Rayfūn, and instead insisted that the patriarch come to Dayr Sayyidat al-Luwayza. Yūsuf Ḍarghām conceded, and after the meeting it was agreed that the preparatory sessions of the Council would take place in Dayr Mār Sarkīs wa-Bākhūs in Rayfūn. Soon, however, dissension again broke out, now concerning the location for the meetings of the actual Council. Al-Simᶜānī preferred Dayr Sayyidat al-Luwayza, part of the estates of the Lebanese Order, while the patriarch preferred Dayr Mār Sarkīs wa-Bākhūs, which he considered to be the patriarchal see. Opinions among the *muṭrān*s varied: al-Qarāᶜalī, al-Sharabiyya and Simᶜān and Jibrā'īl ᶜAwwād supported the

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[40] Fahd (1973), pp. 76-92, 103, 110; Assemani, *Relazione*, p. 4; Lābūdī to Prop. (1736), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, pp. 183-187.

view of al-Simᶜānī, while al-Jumayyil, al-Duwayhī and Isṭifān agreed with the patriarch. Two influential *muṭrān*s were absent, possibly from tactical considerations: Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin had sent a representative and Ilyās Muḥāsib had simply ignored a call from al-Simᶜānī to join his fellow-*muṭrān*s. At this point the patriarch summoned him to come to Kisrawān. As usual, the differences of opinion among the clergy were reflected in the attitude of the notables as well: the sheiks *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh of Ghusṭā, who held the supervision of Dayr Mār Sarkīs wa-Bākhūs, supported the patriarch, and the *awlād* Abī Nawfal, sheiks of ᶜAjaltūn, including Dayr Sayyidat al-Luwayza, supported al-Simᶜānī.[41]

During the first preparatory meeting the proposals for reform, as formulated by al-Simᶜānī in the "agenda" of the Council (*kitāb al-majmaᶜ*), were read. However, the afternoon session had to be ended prematurely when a fierce dispute arose between the patriarch and the *muṭrān*s over the proposals concerning the distribution of the sacred oil. According to al-Simᶜānī's proposal the distribution would henceforth be the responsibility of the *muṭrān*s. This meant that the members of the lesser clergy (*khūrī*s) would not be obliged to apply to the patriarch every year, as had been the custom until then. When the issue was raised, the patriarch refused to continue the proceedings. Negotiations followed, in which the patriarch demanded that no changes in his faculties be made, and, moreover, that the foreign missionaries who were present at the meeting and who strengthened the reformist faction, be denied further admission. He declared himself prepared to allow the Council to continue only when all the *muṭrān*s complied with these demands. However, the *muṭrān*s of the Lebanese Order, al-Qarāᶜalī and al-Sharabiyya, withheld their consent.[42]

Seeing that deadlock was imminent, Patriarch Yūsuf Ḍarghām called in the support of sheik Nawfal al-Khāzin, who, in conjunction with the sheiks Khāzin ibn Khālid (*awlād* Abī Nāṣīf) and Qablān ibn Dahām (*awlād* Abī Qānṣawh), encouraged the patriarch to block the Council until all *muṭrān*s had accepted his conditions. When al-Qarāᶜalī showed himself to be uncompromising, the patriarch denied him permission to attend the meetings. According to al-Simᶜānī, however, it was beyond the competence of the patriarch to refuse *muṭrān*s access to clerical councils. Consequently, the meeting in which this question was discus-

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[41] Fahd (1973), pp. 112-115; Lābūdī to Zondadari (1737), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, p. 115; Muṭr. to Prop. (1738), id., vol. 2, pp. 144-145; Assemani, *Relazione*, p. 8.

[42] Fahd (1973), pp. 116-118; Lābūdī to Prop. (1736), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, pp. 184-185; Qarāᶜalī to Prop. (1736), id., vol. 2, p. 216, note 1; Assemani, *Relazione*, p. 9.

sed ended in general disorder. The patriarch expelled the foreign missionaries, after which al-Simʿānī, accompanied by the *muṭrān*s al-Qarāʿalī, al-Sharabiyya and Simʿān and Jibrāʾīl ʿAwwād, departed for Dayr Sayyidat al-Luwayza. Some of the Khāzin sheiks tried unsuccessfully to force al-Simʿānī to return to Rayfūn.[43]

Several days followed during which letters were exchanged between the parties. The patriarch expressed his regret over his rude treatment of the foreign missionaries; sheik Nawfal wrote to al-Simʿānī that on further reflection he had urged the patriarch to proceed with the Council; sheik Sarḥān al-Khāzin (*awlād* Abī Nāṣīf) sent al-Simʿānī explicit permission to stay in Dayr Sayyidat al-Luwayza to await the turn of events. At this stage Ilyās Muḥāsib arrived in al-Luwayza. After discussing matters with al-Simʿānī, he declared himself to be opposed to the continuation of the Council and refused to acknowledge the authority of the papal envoy. He joined the patriarch in Rayfūn and, moreover, convinced Simʿān and Jibrāʾīl ʿAwwād to follow his example. Strengthened by the arrival of Muḥāsib, the patriarch proposed the following conditions to al-Simʿānī: the papal envoy was to send the reform proposals to the patriarch, who would then discuss the text with the *muṭrān*s; the reform measures which were deemed adequate would immediately be adopted, while the "inadequate" ones were to be dropped; finally, a Council should be convened without the foreign missionaries.[44]

While the factions were thus engaged in a stalemate, Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin arrived in ʿAjaltūn. Al-Simʿānī sent him the *kitāb al-majmaʿ*, with the request to bring it to the patriarch and the *muṭrān*s, on the condition that they would unreservedly confirm the proposals. After the mediation of Ṭūbiyā, the details of which are unclear, the patriarch and the *muṭrān*s came to Dayr Sayyidat al-Luwayza, escorted by sheik Kisrawān al-Khāzin (*awlād* Abī Nāṣīf). The patriarch drafted a document demanding the exclusion from the Council of the foreign missionaries, and of the monks and graduates of the Maronite College in Rome, all, of course, protagonists of reform. Sheik Nawfal, however, now unexpectedly pleaded in favour of the continuation of the Council, after having been severely reprimanded by the French consul of Sidon, who had

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[43] Fahd (1973), pp. 118-121; Lābūdī to Zondadari (1737), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, p. 115; Lābūdī to Rossioli (1738), id., vol. 2, p. 235; Qarāʿalī to Prop. (1736), id., vol. 2, p. 216; Lābūdī to Prop. (1736), id., vol. 2, p. 185; Mud. to Dibsī (1738), id., vol. 2, p. 356; Lābūdī to Simʿānī (1739), id., vol. 2, p. 360.

[44] Fahd (1973), pp. 122-126.

acted on a complaint from al-Simᶜānī.[45] When the *muṭrān*s al-Qarāᶜalī and al-Sharabiyya kept rejecting any concessions, the patriarch finally gave up his resistance. The ceremonial sessions of the actual Council were subsequently held from September 30 to October 2 in Dayr al-Luwayza, in the presence of representatives of the European missionaries and of several Oriental Christian communities, apart from delegations from the major notable families, including both the Khāzin branches of Ghusṭā and ᶜAjaltūn. The reform proposals were now unconditionally and formally adopted.[46]

This account of the discussions during the Lebanese Council is mainly based on sources which represent the view of al-Simᶜānī. However, it seems justified to assume that the discord afflicting the Council derived directly from the controversies that had arisen in the first decades of the 18th century. Consequently, as the controversies during the Council largely followed the pattern of previous conflicts, the above account of the Council is probably not unreliable. Moreover, the attitudes of the various factions do not seem illogical. The intentions of the Lebanese Council were to explicitly limit the faculties of the patriarch, who, not surprisingly, tried to hold on to his prerogatives. According to al-Labūdī, the patriarch opposed the new system of distribution of the sacred oil since the *khūrī*s on their annual visits used to bring presents to the patriarch, a source of revenue which he did not want to be deprived of. Furthermore, the effectiveness of his authority over the lesser clergy would diminish in favour of the authority of the *muṭrān*s. The Khāzin sheiks attempted to protect the interests they had acquired in the church, which by now had diverged to such a degree that the various *bayt*s patronized opposing factions, each according to its alliance within the church hierarchy and its secular interests. The authority of sheik Nawfal, caught between the factions, proved insufficient to reconcile the parties or even to mediate between them, he himself having to defend his secular interests as well as his influence in church matters. The *muṭrān*s, finally, were forced to take a formal stance amidst these complex contradictions.[47]

According to a report from al-Simᶜānī to the Propaganda, the sheiks Kanᶜān, Asad and Yunus al-Khāzin (*awlād* Abī Nawfal) had supported

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[45] Martin to Maurepas (1736 and 1737), Ismail (1975-), vol. 2, pp. 19-22, 46-47.

[46] Fahd (1973), pp. 69, 125-132; Lābūdī to Prop. (1738), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, p. 221; Lābūdī to Prop. (1736), id., vol. 2, pp. 186-187; Lābūdī to Qarāᶜalī (1739), id., vol. 2, p. 367; Assemani, *Relazione*, p. 10.

[47] Lābūdī to Zondadari (1737), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, p. 114.

the reforms; Nawfal and some of the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh (probably Sakhr, Khaṭṭar, ᶜĀd, Santū, Qablān) had signed the final draft reluctantly, while Khāzin and Junblāṭ al-Khāzin (*awlād* Abī Nāṣīf) had been uncooperative. The people generally opposed the reforms, and the attendance of the foreign missionaries had been indispensible in obtaining the required outcome. The conclusion of the Lebanese Council and the adoption of the reform proposals were merely an initial victory for the reformist faction. In the aftermath of the closing session, al-Simᶜānī tried unsuccesfully to implement one of the major measures that concerned him: the segregation of the so-called "mixed monasteries", whose communities comprised of male as well as female inhabitants. Violent disputes flared up again showing that the parties were by no means reconciled (see chapter 5). Al-Simᶜānī finally left Mount Lebanon in February 1737.[48]

Patriarch Yūsuf Ḍarghām refused to comply with the reform measures without a struggle. In an obvious effort to weaken the position of the main reformist *muṭrān*s, the patriarch deprived al-Sharabiyya of his diocese in favour of Ilyās Muḥāsib. Moreover, he forbade the *muṭrān*s al-Qarāᶜalī and Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin to collect the *ᶜushr* in their respective dioceses, and set out to collect it himself. In addition he closed the churches of Zūq al-Kharrāb, Zūq Mīkhā'īl and Zūq Musbaḥ in the diocese of al-Qarāᶜalī, and threatened ᶜAwwād with the same measures unless he committed himself to the payment of a higher amount of *ᶜushr*. This course of action provoked the anger of the Khāzin sheiks of these villages, but the intervention of sheik Saqr ibn ᶜAbd al-Mālik (*awlād* Abī Nāṣīf) and the *awlād* Abī Nawfal was not sufficient to achieve a reconciliation. Eventually the *muṭrān*s themselves defied the patriarch's decrees and reopened the churches.[49]

4.3.3 *The reform measures*

In a long exposé to the Propaganda, Patriarch Yūsuf Ḍarghām al-Khāzin tried to refute the allegations made against him by al-Simᶜānī in his report on the Lebanese Council. Apart from being an attempt at self-justi-

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[48] Reports of al-Simᶜānī (3-7-1737; 28-6-1737), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 5, ff. 103-106; see also: Vat. Arch., *Missioni*, no. 118.

[49] Qar'ālī (1932), vol. 3, p. 572; Lābūdī to Simᶜānī (1738), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, pp. 227-228; Lābūdī to Dibsī (1736), id., vol. 2, p. 197; Lābūdī to Qarāᶜalī (1739), id., vol. 2, pp. 167-168;; Muṭr. to Simᶜānī (1739), id., pp. 1654-166; Muṭr. to Prop. (1738), id., vol. 2, p. 138; Muṭr. to Prop. (1738), id., vol. 2, pp. 142, 143; Lābūdī to ᶜAwwād (1738), vol. 2, p. 155; Mud. to Simᶜānī (1738), id., vol. 2, p. 157.

fication, the petition is a plea to uphold the traditions of the Maronite church and to avoid sudden changes. The patriarch stated that al-Simᶜānī had accused him of three major infringements: the usurpation of absolute power, especially to deprive bishops of their diocese, as if they were mere suffragans; shameless simony, since he asked for money for the distribution of the sacred oil; and the violation of the supreme authority of the Holy See, because he had suspended prelates who had requested the mediation of the Propaganda. The patriarch in turn accused al-Simᶜānī of having suspended prelates arbitrarily, against his orders, and of having intentionally undermined his authority in order to reduce him to a merely titular patriarch.[50]

To refute the first accusation—the usurpation of power—, the patriarch cited the report of papal envoy Dandini (1596), to show that in the Maronite tradition the patriarch enjoyed full authority in the Mountain, and that the bishops only had "delegated jurisdiction", by benevolent commission of the patriarch (*benigna commissione*). The proposed reforms, implying independent authority and defined dioceses for the *muṭrān*s, would only lead to the impoverishment of the patriarch and his complete dependence on the "Governatori", who "rule more with the sword and passion than with laws". Thus, by opposing sudden reforms, the patriarch was not inclined to tyranny, but merely protecting his traditional authority and the efficient organization of the church.[51]

The second accusation—the annual payments by the clergy to obtain the sacred oil—, was similarly rejected by the patriarch. According to him, it had been the custom from time immemorial for the prelates to visit the patriarch once a year, to pledge their obedience and to report on the state of their diocese. On this occasion, the prelates used to bring presents to show their respect in the form of a voluntary "oblation". This payment did not have any connection with the distribution of the sacred oil, and the amount was not fixed, but was determined by the benevolence and means of each individual prelate. Consequently, any association with simony should be rejected.[52]

The third accusation—the violation of the authority of the Vatican—, concerned the patriarch's disciplinary measures in the aftermath of the Lebanese Council, against the *muṭrān*s Ṭūbiyā, Ighnāṭiyūs and ᶜAbdallāh. The patriarch justified his actions by referring to the grave misdemeanors of these *muṭrān*s, especially the fact that Ṭūbiyā had sought the

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[50] Gazeno, *Risposta alla Relazione*, ff. 3, 4, 8, 11, 16.
[51] Id., ff. 30, 31, 36, 37.
[52] Id., ff. 40-42.

help of the emir against the patriarch during the Council. Since, firstly, the patriarch had rightly demanded inspection of the Council's agenda in advance; secondly, the emir had no right whatsoever to interfere in the allocation of dioceses; and, thirdly, the prelates in question had refused to remit the *ᶜushūr* due to the patriarch, the recourse to the emir should be regarded as a grave infringement of the authority of the Holy See and, of course, of the patriarch himself.[53]

In general, the patriarch claimed that he had acted in accordance with Maronite traditions and with the directives of the Vatican, and that al-Simᶜānī had acted unfairly, aiming at depriving the patriarch of his income and his authority over the *muṭrān*s, the lesser clergy and the population.

The lawyer of the Propaganda fiercely denounced the petition, which, according to him, had been "dictated by a humanist in disguise" (*infarinato umanista*), intending to cast doubt on al-Simᶜānī's report. The proceedings of the Lebanese Council had been unanimously accepted and thus were irreversible. The principle of fixed residences for prelates, enjoying a separate jurisdiction, had been accepted by the Council of Trent and codified in Canon Law, in order to avoid malpractice. The existence of "titular" bishops had been discarded by Trent as they were prone to becoming "vagabonds" (*vagabondi*). The income of the patriarch would not necessarily become endangered by the reforms, provided that the number of dioceses be limited. As for the sacred oil, it had been clear, since Trent, that any payment for the acquisition of the sacred oil should be considered as simony. This was confirmed by a decree (1718) concerning a similar practice among the Melkites. Thus, all the claims of the patriarch should be rejected unequivocally.[54]

The petition of the patriarch was, as expected, discarded, as it contradicted the essence of the Vatican's intentions. In 1742, Pope Benedict XIV issued a brief containing some supplementary decrees concerning the most delicate issues: the geographical division of the Maronite dioceses, the sees of the *muṭrān*s and the distribution of the *ᶜushūr*. This brief completed the set of measures which formed the core of the reforms promulgated by the Lebanese Council. They focused not only on Maronite liturgy and the distribution of the sacred oil, but, more importantly, on the legal faculties of the patriarch and the *muṭrān*s and the relations between the church and laymen.[55]

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[53] Id., ff. 48 ff.

[54] *Ponente*, ff. 25, 27, 28, 30.

[55] *Bull. Pont.*, vol. 3, pp. 12, 14, 16; *Relazione di alcuni Acc.* [1744], ff. 52-58; Anaissi (1921), p. 166; Anaissi (1911), pp. 258, 260, 261-262.

According to the decrees of the Lebanese Council, the election of the patriarch should take place within ten days of the decease of his predecessor, by at least six *muṭrān*s, without any interference by laymen. Election procedures stipulated a secret vote with a two-thirds majority. The elected candidate then sent an envoy to the Vatican to receive the pallium. Finally, the new patriarch had to take up residence in Dayr Qannūbīn, his official see, and was to exert jurisdiction over a separate diocese of his own.[56]

The patriarch represented the supreme authority within the Maronite church, although he was subordinate to the decisions of the Propaganda Congregation in Rome. All Maronite prelates and monks owed obedience to him and he enjoyed the highest legal authority concerning conflicts within the church. He consecrated the *muṭrān*s, granted them their dioceses and received the tithes which were collected by the *muṭrān*s. His permission was required for the building of churches and monasteries, and for the foundation of waqfs, and he could legally withdraw monasteries from the jurisdiction of *muṭrān*s through "exemption". The disciplinary measures within his power varied from temporary suspension to excommunication. The right to remove *muṭrān*s from their office was, however, reserved for the Vatican.[57]

The *muṭrān*s were to be consecrated by the patriarch, after consultation with the other *muṭrān*s. The regulations left an opportunity for the Maronite notables to put forward candidates for *muṭrān* nominations, without, however, enjoying any power over the actual ordination, the so-called right of "presentation", or *presentatio*. The number of regular *muṭrān*s was to be confined to eight, i.e. the number of dioceses (Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, Tripoli, Cyprus, Sidon and Tyre, Jubayl and al-Batrūn, Baalbek). The *muṭrān*s were to reside in permanent, fixed residences within their dioceses and their jurisdiction was explicitly limited to one diocese. At his investiture and each following year the *muṭrān* paid five *qurūsh* to the patriarch in order to obtain a letter permitting him to collect the *ʿushr* in his diocese. He was allowed to keep ten percent of the revenues for himself, remitting the remaining sum to the patriarch. The distribution of the *ʿushūr* was to be as follows: Aleppo 350 q.; Damascus 250 q.; Beirut 300 q.; Tripoli 450 q.; Cyprus 250 q.; Sidon and Tyre 300 q.; Jubayl and Batrūn 300 q.; Baalbek 300 q.; (total 2500 q.). Upon his ordination, a *muṭrān* was to pay the patriarch an

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[56] Najm, pp. 434, 441; Hefele, pp. 259-260.
[57] Najm, pp. 323-324, 408, 443; Hefele, pp. 251-260.

additional fee which was not fixed, but which could not exceed ten percent of the formal revenues of his future diocese (25-45 q.). Apart from the regular *muṭrān*s, the patriarch was allowed to nominate two *muṭrān*s as vicars for spiritual and administrative affairs. The sacred oil was to be distributed without a fee. The patriarch was to receive a regular stipend from the *muṭrān*s to compensate for his loss of income and henceforth administered a separate diocese (Sidon and Tyre).[58]

These regulations reflected the main reforms originally issued by the Council of Trent in the 16th century and now applied to the Maronite church as well. They meant a rigorous break with traditional Maronite customs and met, therefore, with considerable resistance from within the community. The struggle over the reforms and over the influence of laymen in church affairs did not end here, but instead became fiercer in the subsequent period.

4.4 Clergy and notables (1736-1818)

The Lebanese Council is usually considered to be a turning-point in the history of the Maronite church. The process of *rapprochement* with Rome was formally sealed, while a set of rules was compiled which outlined church organization and served as a legal source to settle disputes among the clergy. Besides this, arrangements were made to define the future relationship between the church and the Maronite notables. The Lebanese Council officially confirmed some tendencies which had grown within the Maronite community in the 16th and 17th centuries on the one hand; on the other, however, it introduced elements which were not indigenous, under the influence of the increasing contacts between the Maronites and the Vatican. Apart from officially confirming the supreme authority of Rome, these were intended to eliminate certain customs in Maronite tradition which tended to reduce the independence of the church and to draw the clergy into the orbit of secular authority, or at least to balance the influence of local laymen with the supreme authority of the Vatican.

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[58] Najm, pp. 366, 325, 368, 369, 373, 441; Hefele, p. 255, 287; the boundaries of the dioceses: Aleppo: the city; Tripoli: the town and surroundings, al-Zāwiya; Jubayl and al-Batrūn: the towns and surroundings, ᶜĀqūra, Dayr al-Qamar, Bsharrī; Baalbek: part of Ghādīr, Ghusṭā; Damascus: other part of Ghādīr, ᶜAjaltūn, Biskintā, Zūq al-Kharrāb; Cyprus: the island, Bikfayyā, Bayt Shabāb; Beirut: the town and surroundings, al-Matn, al-Jurd, al-Gharb, al-Shaḥḥār; Tyre and Sidon: the towns and surroundings, al-Shūf, al-Biqāᶜ, Wādī al-Taym; see: Daḥdāḥ.

Whatever the importance of the Lebanese Council as a manifestation of changes in the Maronite community may have been, it basically marked the onset of a protracted process of reform in which several parties attempted to gain control of the structure of the church and safeguard their interests. Once again, the events connected with this process reveal a complex tangle of personal rivalries and frictions, which were a reflection, however, of broader controversies between factions defending specific interests, or tensions deriving from underlying social or political changes. This is particularly true in the case of the Maronite notables, especially the Khāzin sheiks, but the position of the Lebanese Order remained a sensitive issue, too. Both of these matters were connected to the strengthened authority of the Vatican, which was by now no longer prevented by formal arguments from interfering in Maronite affairs.

The regulations introduced by the Lebanese Council, which diminished lay influence over consecrations and restricted the authority of the patriarch, enhanced the independence of the regular *muṭrān*s. At least officially, the notables were excluded from participation in clerical elections, while attempts to put pressure on the patriarch in order to control the *muṭrān*s became less effective than before. Moreover, the regulation that the patriarch and the *muṭrān*s should each reside in a fixed see within their diocese deprived the notables of an important means of controlling the administration of the church, as hitherto they had attempted not only to have their protégés elected as the patriarch or a *muṭrān*, but also to have these protégés settled in monasteries in their own domains, which facilitated supervision and made the prelates economically dependent on the sheiks. A formal distribution of episcopal residences would prevent the centre of clerical authority and the centre of secular authority coinciding.

The Khāzin sheiks were of course aware of the consequences of the reforms. Their claims to the patronage of the dioceses of Aleppo, Baalbek and Damascus were now officially annulled, while their overt attempts to control the patriarchal elections would henceforth be illegal. Since the Khāzin sheiks were not willing to relinquish their privileged position without a struggle, the implementation of the Lebanese Council's regulations became the subject of a prolonged dispute, not only among the clergy, but also among the Khāzins themselves, who defended their role as the secular leaders of the community and the protectors of the clergy. To refer to the period following the Lebanese Council as a "period of reform" would not be appropriate, as no sus-

tained, consistent effort to implement the adopted regulations can be perceived. Moreover, it was to take more than a century to produce a definitive Arabic text of the decisions of the Council.[59]

4.4.1 *Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin and Simʿān ʿAwwād*

After the death of Patriarch Yūsuf Ḍarghām al-Khāzin in 1742, the tensions within the Maronite hierarchy focused on the struggle between two professed enemies, Ilyās Muḥāsib and Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin, over the succession to the patriarchate. The conclave for the election of the new patriarch was held in Dayr ʿAyn Warqa in Kisrawān, in the presence of several notables. Ṭūbiyā was not only absent, but later claimed that he had not been informed of the meeting. Initially, the choice fell on Simʿān ʿAwwād, who, however, refused to accept his election, probably anticipating conflicts with the obstinate *muṭrān* Ilyās Muḥāsib, who still had a strong position among the clergy. In a second voting Ilyās Muḥāsib was elected. When news of Ilyās' selection was brought to Ṭūbiyā by *muṭrān* al-Sharabiyya, he immediately called upon a Syrian Catholic *muṭrān* to ordain two monks of the Ḥalabī faction as *muṭrān* and then had himself elected as patriarch by these four prelates. Ṭūbiyā subsequently succeeded in rallying broad popular support for his election from the dioceses of Tripoli, Cyprus and Jubayl, and from his *bayt*, the *awlād* Abī Nawfal, from the Ḥamāda *muqaddam*s, from the Maronites of al-Shūf and from the French dragoman in Tripoli. Ilyās was supported by sheik Nawfal al-Khāzin and the *bayt*s *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh and Abī Nāṣīf al-Khāzin, and by the Ḥubaysh sheiks. This faction accused Ṭūbiyā of having bribed emir Milḥim al-Shihāb to endorse his nomination, with money provided by *muṭrān* Arsāniyūs Shukrī.[60]

The simultaneous emergence of two new patriarchs was an anomaly that threatened the formal unity of the clergy and induced the intervention of Rome. With remarkable promptness of action, the Vatican declared both elections null and void and decreed that Simʿān ʿAwwād be installed. Rome emphasized that this interference was to be exceptional, and that the Maronites were free to choose their patriarchs as they wished. The Khāzin sheiks succeeded in convincing Ṭūbiyā and Ilyās

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[59] For the history of the text of the Lebanese Council, see Tabar (*Sacrae Congregationis*, vol. 3/II, pp. 52-56), and Fighālī.

[60] Letters of recommendation (1742), in: *C.P.*, vol. 95; 'Extrait de quelques lettres des Missionaires du Levant' (1756), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 7, ff. 533-536; Khāzin sheiks to Prop. (1-7-1743), id., vol. 6, f. 268.

to renounce their claims to the patriarchate and resign themselves to the verdict of the Vatican. The consecration of the two *muṭrān*s by Ṭūbiyā, Jirmānūs Saqr and ᶜAbdallāh Ḥabqūq, was legalized by the papal envoy who had been commissioned to settle this case.[61]

As has been explained above, the tensions between Ṭūbiyā and the previous patriarch, Yūsuf Ḍarghām al-Khāzin, partially derived from the fact that Ṭūbiyā was a prominent member of the Lebanese Order. Ṭūbiyā had been *mudabbir* for several terms; in 1730 he was nominated "honorary" *muṭrān*, in 1736 he obtained the diocese of Cyprus and finally he was nominated *muṭrān* of Tripoli and vice-patriarch in 1750. In 1747, after the death of Ilyās Muḥāsib, and again in 1750, he was reinstated as administrator (*wakīl*) of the patriarchal see, a function which had been at the root of his rivalry with Ilyās. However, his relations with Patriarch Simᶜān ᶜAwwād were strained and they were further complicated by the tensions within the Lebanese Order, which, from the 1740's onwards, occupied the Maronite clergy.[62]

4.4.1.1 *The Lebanese Order and the patriarchate*

Relations between the Lebanese Order and the patriarch had been difficult since the time of Patriarch Yaᶜqūb ᶜAwwād. Disagreement over the financial resources of the Order and the lack of a clear definition of the Order's status within the Maronite church had fueled conflicts, which to a large extent determined the procedures of the Lebanese Council. It is not surprising that in 1742 five *muṭrān*s who resented the interference of the Order with the Lebanese Council signed a document in which they stated that in future no members of the Order would be consecrated *muṭrān*.[63]

In the decade which followed the Lebanese Council, frictions within the Order came to a head, causing a deep rift between the two dominant factions and eventually leading to the partition of the Order into a Ḥa-

[61] Correspondence in: Dāghir (1958), pp. 68-72; Ḥattūnī, pp. 152-155; Dib, pp. 189-191; Hefele, pp. 275-276; *Bull. Pont.*, pp. 76, 79, 87, 91, 131; Anayisī, p. 51; Anaissi (1911), p. 249; report of al-ᶜAnayisī, cited in Fahd, *Tar.*, vol. 2, p. 27; id., p. 27 note 1; Ḥabqūq was the superior of Dayr Ṭāmīsh, under the supervision of the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf al-Khāzin, Shiblī, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 51, p. 299; *Relazione* (1744), 'Breve' (1743), pp. 59, 63, 67.

[62] Dāghir (1958), p. 68; Daḥdāḥ, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 7, p. 1022; letter of the *muṭrān* of Nablus, Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, p. 255; id., vol. 5, p. 92; Hefele, pp. 279, 281; ᶜAwwād to Prop. (1747), Khāzin/Masᶜad, vol. 1, p. 391; *Bull. Pont.*, vol. 4, p. 127; documents on the *wikāla* (1742, 1745, 1747): *C.P.*, vol. 104, ff. 364, 376.

[63] The document is published by Qar'ālī (1929-32) *al-Majalla al-Sūriyya*, vol. 7, no. 7, pp. 435-436.

labī and a Baladī branch in 1770. The tensions in the 1740's were partly due to its success. Its membership had grown steadily and the Order's landed possessions had increased considerably. In 1744 signs of unrest appeared when a number of monks held a meeting (*majma*ᶜ) in Dayr Sayyidat Mashmūsha in al-Shūf which was not authorized by the superior of the Order or the *mudabbir*s. The first issue discussed was the question of which members had the right to be admitted to *majma*ᶜs and to vote. Until then only a select group of members had enjoyed these rights, thus provoking the irritation of the rank and file. Underlying their arguments was a growing dissatisfaction with the apparently too autocratic administration of an isolated faction within the Order, whose authority rested on the support of a minority of members who had originally come from outside Mount Lebanon, mainly from cities such as Aleppo, Damascus, Tripoli, Sidon, and Beirut. It was claimed that this faction not only dominated the Order's administration, but had accumulated vast debts upon its estates for which the individual monasteries were ultimately responsible.[64]

The dissident monks elected their own superior-general, a certain Yuwākīm al-Ḥāqilānī, and four *mudabbir*s, and presented their case to Patriarch ᶜAwwād. The other faction held a *majma*ᶜ in 1745, in which Arsāniyūs ᶜAbd al-Aḥad was elected superior-general. At this point the claims of both factions were brought before the Propaganda in Rome, together with complaints about procedures and the supposedly partial attitude of the patriarch. In 1747 the Propaganda issued its verdict in the case, annulling the decisions of the *majma*ᶜ of Dayr Mashmūsha and calling for a restoration of unity. To appease those involved, in 1747 the patriarch summoned both factions to a council in Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh to achieve a reconciliation. However, this call was boycotted by the congregations of three monasteries, so that once more the council only represented the faction of al-Ḥāqilānī. In 1748, a renewed effort was more successful, and through the mediation of the patriarch, and under pressure from him, a new leadership of the Order was installed, consisting of two representatives of the ᶜAbd al-Aḥad faction and two of the Ḥāqilānī group. The reconciliation was facilitated by a tribunal formed in 1745 consisting of four European missionaries, who had thoroughly discussed the claims of both parties.[65]

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[64] See for the conflicts within the Lebanese Order: Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 4; Darᶜūnī to Simᶜānī (1745), id., vol. 2, pp. 416-418; see also below, chapter 5.

[65] Ṭūbiyā to Patr. (1744), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 4, pp. 37, 41, 42; fetwa, id., pp. 54-55; *ittifāq*, id., pp. 56-57; report of the committee, id. pp. 78 ff; reconciliation by the Patr., id., pp. 73-75.

There were several causes of the conflicts within the Order. With its expansion the heterogeneity and differentiation in regional origin of its members had increased. This affected both the administrative procedures, which had become inflexible, and the rights and duties of the individual monasteries. In the course of time distinct factions emerged, one dominated by members of urban origin, the so-called Ḥalabīs, and the other comprising members of rural origin, the Baladīs. The issues at stake were, firstly, the voting rights of the various categories of members and the authority of the patriarch over the Order's leadership, and, secondly, the efforts of both factions to win monastic communities over to their side in order to acquire a larger share of the Order's possessions. Although on the first issue the Ḥalabī view was endorsed by the Vatican and the Ḥalabīs were predominant in the board of the Order, because the Baladī faction was much larger in number and enjoyed the support of the patriarch, they succeeded in creating a *de facto* domination of monastic possessions. Not surprisingly, the reconciliation of 1748 soon proved to be no more than a truce, as dissension was by now deep-rooted.

Patriarch ᶜAwwād became involved in the conflict between the Ḥalabīs and Baladīs at an early stage. At first he was pressured by the Ḥalabīs to settle in Dayr Qannūbīn, where he was subject to the financial exactions of the Ḥamāda *muqaddam*s. He accused Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin, himself a Ḥalabī, of having conspired with the *Matāwila*, and he borrowed 3000 *qurūsh* from some Khāzin sheiks of Kisrawān (presumably the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh) to expand his own monastery (Dayr Sayyidat Mashmūsha) in, significantly, al-Shūf. Ṭūbiyā, in turn, accused the patriarch of illegitimately attempting to subject the Order to his authority with the help of the Baladīs. This allegation was only supported by the *muṭrān*s al-Sharabiyya and Saqr, themselves Ḥalabīs, and by his *bayt* the *awlād* Abī Nawfal.[66]

During the patriarchate of Simᶜān ᶜAwwād, the tensions within the Order could not be resolved, and after his death in 1755 the Baladīs attempted to draw the election of his successor into their dispute with the Ḥalabīs. While the other *muṭrān*s convened in the Ḥalabī monastery Dayr Sayyidat al-Luwayza, the *muṭrān*s Jibrā'īl ᶜAwwād (Acre), Fīlībūs al-Jumayyil (*sharafī*) and Antun Muḥāsib (Jubayl and al-Batrūn) met in Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh with the Baladīs and the sheiks Khāzin ibn Khā-

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[66] Sh. al-Khāzin, Khāzin/Masᶜad, vol. 3, pp. 523, 525; ᶜAwwād to Simᶜānī (1746), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 4, p. 63; Ḥalabīs to Pope (1744), id., p. 129; Dib, p. 193.

lid and Mīlān al-Khāzin (*awlād* Abī Qānṣawh). They stipulated that they would only participate in the patriarchal election if the future patriarch pledged to refrain from disciplinary measures against the Baladīs and that the diocese of Aleppo be again put under the surveillance (*taṣrīf*) of the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf al-Khāzin. The Baladīs apparently lacked sufficient support to enforce these demands, and eventually all *muṭrān*s gathered in Dayr ᶜAyn Ṭūrā and elected Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin as patriarch.[67]

Utilizing his authority as patriarch, Ṭūbiyā sent letters exhorting the parties to reconciliation, but he specifically demanded that the Baladīs resign themselves to the verdict of the Vatican issued in 1747, threatening to excommunicate all those who refused or who supported transgressors, whether he be sheik, notable or peasant. By now it was too late to mend the *de facto* split of the Order, and in 1762 all sanctions were lifted. In 1768, an agreement was drafted about the partition of the Order into two branches, and this was officially endorsed by the Propaganda in 1770.[68]

4.4.2 *Yūsuf Isṭifān and Mīkhā'īl al-Khāzin*

Mīkhā'īl al-Khāzin (Ḥarb ibn Nādir ibn Abī Naṣr; *awlād* Abī Nawfal al-Khāzin) was consecrated "honorary" *muṭrān* at the request of his relatives. Patriarch Yūsuf Isṭifān, who had succeeded Ṭūbiyā in 1767, eventually declared that Mīkhā'īl had agreed that he would never, neither personally nor through the intercession of others, lay claims to a diocese or any financial allowance (*maᶜāsh*). According to the patriarch, this promise was also signed by Mīkhā'īl's brother. In spite of this, however, during the council of Ghusṭā in 1768 Mīkhā'īl sought to obtain jurisdiction over ᶜAjaltūn, which was, at least according to the patriarch, contrary to the wishes of Mīkhā'īl's own relatives. That Mīkhā'īl was nevertheless ordained, aroused the anger of the sheiks *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf al-Khāzin, who claimed the nomination of the *muṭrān* of Damascus, to which ᶜAjaltūn belonged, as their privilege, and refused to acknowledge him as their *muṭrān*. Apparently, however, Mīkhā'īl's

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[67] Rājī to monks (1756), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 4, pp. 248-249; ᶜArīḍa of the Ḥalabīs (1759?), id., pp. 159 ff; Ḥalabīs to Pope (1753), id., p. 190; Sh. al-Khāzin, Khāzin/Masᶜad, vol. 3, p. 526; Rājī to Lābūdī (1756), id., vol. 1, p. 469; Ḥattūnī, p. 181;

[68] Simᶜānī to Ṭūbiyā (1755), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 4, pp. 220-221; Ṭūbiyā to comm. (1755), id., p. 226; Papal Decree (1754), id., p. 233; id. (1760), id., p. 322; Ṭūbiyā to monks (1757), id., pp. 288-292; id., (1757), id., pp. 293-294; *muṭrān*s to Baladīs (1758), id., p. 310; *Iᶜlām* Ṭūbiyā (1762), id., pp. 329-331; *Iᶜlām* (1768), id., p. 371; *Iᶜlām* (1770), id., p. 384; *Bull. Pont.*, vol. 3, p. 131.

bayt, the *awlād* Abī Nawfal, living in ʿAjaltūn also, insisted on his ordination.[69]

Like Mīkhā'īl, Yūsuf Istifān had been a controversial figure since his consecration as *muṭrān* of Beirut in 1754. He soon came into conflict with the superior of Dayr ʿAyn Warqa, whose supervision was the preserve of the Istifān family. Patriarch Ṭūbiyā had him removed from the monastery, whereupon Yūsuf founded his own monastery in Ghusṭā, Dayr al-Ḥuṣn, allegedly with gifts from France. Frictions with Ṭūbiyā came to a head when Yūsuf was the only *muṭrān* to refuse to sign a document condoning a provisional arrangement for the number of dioceses, which was contrary to the arrangement envisioned by the Lebanese Council. As a result Ṭūbiyā deprived Yūsuf of his diocese, claiming that he was insubordinate, that he had plotted with the refractory monks, that he had built a monastery without his consent, and that he had received the diocese from his uncle by way of inheritance, contrary to church rules. This step was opposed by the Maronite notables of Beirut and the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh and Abī Nāṣīf al-Khāzin.[70]

After the death of Ṭūbiyā in 1766, Yūsuf was elected patriarch, at first enjoying the support of the anti-Ṭūbiyā faction. In 1768 he presided over a council in Ghusṭā, during which he started initiatives which would change the distribution of the *ʿushūr*. Moreover, the council explicitly forbade clerics to seek the support of secular notables in order to obtain clerical functions. A letter sent by the inhabitants of Ghusṭā concerning conflicts over Dayr ʿAyn Warqa was denounced by the council, and the patriarch categorically rejected any lay interference in church matters.[71]

However, the attitude of the patriarch aroused the dissatisfaction of some of the *muṭrān*s. These met in Mīkhā'īl al-Khāzin's monastery, in Rām Būdiqn in Kisrawān, to draft a complaint against the patriarch to be sent to the Maronite community and the Propaganda. The main grievances were the location of the patriarchal see, the exaction of high

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[69] *Taqrīr* Valeriano (1773), ʿAbbūd (1911), p. 40; response Y. Istifān to litigations (1773), id. pp. 34-35; Istifān to Prop. (1781), id., p. 93; Moretta to Prop. (13-1-1774), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 9, f. 100; Shartūnī, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 46, p. 563; Abbud (1909), vol. 2, p. 353;.

[70] Sh. al-Khāzin, Khāzin/Masʿad, vol. 3, p. 527; Istifān to *muṭrān*s (1764), ʿAbbūd (1911), *dhayl*, pp. 27-29, 33; id., pp. 6-9, 13; Ṭūbiyā to Prop. (1-5-1762), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 8, ff. 44-46; id. (10-8-1762), id., vol. 8, 100-104; id. (14-7-1754), id., vol. 8, ff. 207-210; 'Dubia', id., vol. 8, f. 159.

[71] Hefele, pp. 285-288; Fahd (1975), pp. 159-174.

fees from monasteries for the sacred oil, the upsetting of the distribution of the dioceses, and the proposed changes in the system of collecting the *ᶜushūr*. From the documents regarding this conflict it becomes clear that the discord focused on the proposed *ᶜushūr* obligations of the dioceses of Anṭūn Muḥāsib (Jubayl and al-Batrūn), Jibrā'īl Mubārak (Baalbek) and ᶜAbdallāh Yamīn (Tyre and Sidon). The patriarch attempted to win the support of the Khāzin sheiks, but during a convention in Dayr Sayyidat Bkirkī attended by the sheiks and the *muṭrān*s, the sheiks of Ghusṭā urged the patriarch to comply with the demands of the *muṭrān*s. Fruitless negotiations on the distribution of the *ᶜushūr* ensued.[72]

After some time the complaints against Patriarch Yūsuf Isṭifān were augmented by the accusation that he had condoned the foundation in 1750 of the Order of the Sacred Heart by the mystic Hindiyya ᶜAjīmī, a congregation which had gained wide appeal among Maronite novices. The Order of Hindiyya had been placed under the patronage of *muṭrān* Jirmānūs Saqr and the patriarch, and the *muṭrān*s and the Khāzin sheiks had subsequently requested the Vatican to recognize the new order. Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin even bought Dayr Sayyidat Bkirkī in their domain from the Ishᶜayyā Order and granted it to Hindiyya, with the consent of the Khāzin sheiks. This procedure provoked fierce opposition from the Jesuit missionaries in Mount Lebanon, whose pupil Hindiyya had previously been and who declared Hindiyya a heretic. Rumours were spread about grave abuses which had allegedly occurred in Dayr Sayyidat Bkirkī. As several female members of the Khāzin family had joined Hindiyya's Order, the sheiks chose sides with the patriarch against his opponents.[73]

The rumours about Hindiyya caused a deep rift within the Maronite community and were cited by Mīkhā'īl to strengthen his stand against the patriarch. In this he was encouraged by papal envoy De Moretta,

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[72] Complaints by the *muṭrān*s (1769), ᶜAbbūd (1911), pp. 23-24; answer of the Prop. (1771), id., pp. 19-20; *Taqrīr* Valeriano (1773), id., pp. 37-38; *muṭrān*s to Pope (1773), id., (1909), p. 351; *muṭrān*s to Prop. (1770), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 5, pp. 232-235; *muṭrān*s to Prop. (1775), id., p. 239; Ra'īs ᶜĀmm to Prop. (23-4-1772), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 8, ff. 813-814.

[73] ᶜAwwād to Prop. (1750), Khāzin/Masᶜad, vol. 1, p. 345; ᶜAwwād and *muṭrān*s to Prop. (1751), id., p. 346; *muṭrān*s to Prop. (1752), id., pp. 395-396; *muṭrān*s to Patr. (1775), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 5, pp. 245-246; the monasteries which joined Hindiyya's Order, were: Bkirkī, Sa. al-Bizāz, al-Ḥusn, Jirjis ᶜAlmā, ᶜAbbūd (1909), vol. 2, p. 418; Khāzins and Patr. to Prop. (20-8-1753), *C.P.*, vol. 118, f. 617; id. (20-9-1753), id., vol. 118, f. 648; a contemporary portrait of Hindiyya can be found in: Aswad, vol. 2; for a concise history of Dayr Bkirkī, see Ṣfayr.

who arrived in Mount Lebanon in 1775 with a brief issued by the Propaganda to restore order in the Maronite church. The brief comprised seven decrees (*aḥkām*) mainly concerning the collection of the *ᶜushūr*. The patriarch refused to proclaim the decrees before an envoy, who had been sent to Rome to plead his case, had returned. This was interpreted both by his adversaries and by the papal envoy as a refusal to comply with the Papal orders, and an additional complaint was raised with the Vatican, this time including the Hindiyya case.[74]

In 1779, following the advice of De Moretta, the Propaganda decided to temporarily deprive Yūsuf Isṭifān of his patriarchal faculties, and he was summoned to travel to Rome to account for his behaviour. In the meantime Mīkhā'īl al-Khāzin, leader of the opposition, was to act as vice-patriarch, enjoying all patriarchal prerogatives, except the right to consecrate *muṭrāns*. It was clearly stated that Mīkhā'īl was awarded this dignity because, as was emphasized by De Moretta, he enjoyed the support of his relatives and was a staunch adversary of the Order of Hindiyya. To ensure a livelihood for Yūsuf during his suspension, it was decided that Mīkhā'īl would concede three-quarters of the income of the patriarchal see to him. These decisions of the Propaganda were announced in letters to the *muṭrāns*, the Maronite notables Saᶜd al-Khūrī and Simᶜān al-Bīṭār (the *mudabbirs* of Yūsuf al-Shihāb) and the sheiks al-Khāzin and Ḥubaysh.[75]

The majority of the Khāzin sheiks (*awlād* Abī Qānṣawh and Abī Nāṣīf) now supported the patriarch against their relative Mīkhā'īl. In an undated letter to the French king Louis XVI, signed by ten sheiks of the branches *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf, Abī Qānṣawh and Abī Kanᶜān Qays, they asked for mediation on behalf of the patriarch against the Papal envoy, the "rebellious" *muṭrāns* and the Baladī monks. According to them, Mīkhā'īl was incapable of handling the affairs and let himself be led by the Baladī monks. Another letter to the King with the same intention was signed by 37 Khāzin sheiks. Initially, they had acclaimed the foundation of the Order of Hindiyya, and several women of their family had joined the Order. By now, however, their enthusiasm for the Order had

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[74] Seven decrees: *C.P.*, vol. 135, ff. 368-393, 394-416; Moretta to Prop. (1775), id., pp. 47-53; report de Babiano (1779), id., pp. 53-57; Isṭifān to Pope (1777), id., pp. 59-60; Isṭifān to Pope (1777), id., pp. 61-63; id., p. 80; Moretta to Pope (1774), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 5, pp. 326-330; ᶜĀqil to Pope (1774), id., pp. 330-331; ᶜĀqil to A. al-Aḥad (1777), id., p. 348; Diyāb to Prop. (1778), id., pp. 349-350.

[75] Moretta to Prop. (1775), ᶜAbbūd (1911), p. 52; Castelli to Isṭifān (1779), id., pp. 65-67; verdict Prop. (1779), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 5, p. 264; Anaissi (1911), p. 412; *Bull. Pont.*, App., pp. 253, 259, 279; 'Risoluzioni', *C.P.*, vol. 136, ff. 672-674.

cooled, and their wish to have Yūsuf Isṭifān reinstated as patriarch had overcome their support for Hindiyya.[76]

In 1780, the Papal envoy De Moretta presided over a council in Mayfūq, which endorsed the Papal decree, abolished Hindiyya's Order of the Sacred Heart and ordained that the possessions of the patriarchal see be put at the disposal of the vice-patriarch. Three *muṭrān*s refused to participate in the council because they opposed the acceptance of the decree, arguing that it would only cause disorder and injustice within the community. This view was also adopted by the Khāzin sheiks, who sent a letter to the Pope, requesting him to withdraw the decree, which they thought superfluous after the adoption of the regulations of the Lebanese Council. Furthermore, it was stated that the council of Mayfūq had been convened under pressure from the Shihāb emir. The suspended patriarch rejected the decisions of the council of Mayfūq, although he was prepared to hand the possessions of the patriarchal see over to Mīkhā'īl, provided that the latter paid the debts that rested on them. After the mediation of the Khāzin sheiks the administration of the estate was entrusted to Anṭūn Muḥāsib and some of the Khāzin sheiks.[77]

At this point a change occurred in the Vatican's perception of the conflict. Apparently the information provided by De Moretta was no longer trusted and the protestations in favour of Yūsuf Isṭifān began to be taken seriously. In a speech before the Propaganda in 1781 Cardinal Antonelli declared that the hopes of the Vatican to have order restored by a swift implementation of the decrees had been futile. It had become clear that the vice-patriarch had not responded adequately to the requirements of his delicate task, and that he lacked the necessary support. One of the grievances against Mīkhā'īl was his adamant refusal to pay Yūsuf his rightful allowance. For three years Yūsuf had received nothing. Under pressure from the Khāzin sheiks, especially those of Ghusṭā,

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[76] Khāzin sheiks to Louis XVI (n.d.), ʿAbbūd (1911), pp. 69-72; Khāzin sheiks to ?, id., p. 80; ʿAbbūd (1909), vol. 2, p. 352; the Khāzin girls who had been frantic supporters of Hindiyya now complained that they were treated worse than their Aleppine 'sisters'; Arm. Patriarch to Prop. (23-6-1752), *C.P.*, vol. 113, ff. 57-58; *Muṭrān*s to Prop. (18-6-1752), id. f. 160; Tīrīziyā al-Khāzin to Prop. (n.d.), id., 187; Khāzins to Prop. (n.d.), *S.C./Mar*, vol. 8, f. 575; *awl.* A. Qānṣawh to Prop. (n.d.), id., vol. 13, f. 408; Khāzins to Prop. (23-6-1780), *C.P.*, vol. 138, f. 483; Mīkhā'īl wanted to transfer the three monasteries belonging to ex-Hindiyya nuns to the Baladī Order, Fāḍil to Prop. (n.d.), id., vol. 138, f. 459.

[77] Report Isṭifān to Prop. (1781), ʿAbbūd (1911), p. 92; Isṭifān to Prop. (1782?), id., p. 172; Isṭifān to Prop. (1781), id., 128-134; id., p. 114-116, 135; *muṭrān*s to Prop. (1780), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 5, p. 267; Khāzin sheiks to Pope (1778), id., pp. 268-269; Hefele, pp. 288-296.

Mīkhā'īl paid 200 *qurūsh* to Yūsuf in 1779. In 1783, however, Antonelli ordered him to pay him another 600 q. for the current year and the same amount for each following year.[78]

In 1783, the Propaganda decided that Yūsuf Isṭifān should be restored in principle to the patriarchate, provided that he sign a declaration of repentance. Yūsuf refused to meet this condition, reportedly causing great distress in Mount Lebanon. Sheik Saᶜd al-Khūrī, the Maronite *mudabbir* of emir Yūsuf, then called a meeting of the clergy and the notables. Although he invited only three sheiks, twenty appeared, including ten Khāzin sheiks of the *bayts awlād* Abī Qānṣawh and *awlād* Ṭarbayh. Petitions were drafted asking the Propaganda for the rehabilitation of Yūsuf Isṭifān, and documents were signed which were to underline the restored unity within the Maronite community. However, from another source it becomes clear that this reconciliation was for appearances only, and that it had been achieved only under heavy pressure. In 1784 some Khāzin sheiks, Mīkhā'īl al-Khāzin, and the *muṭrān*s Jibrā'īl Mubārak, Mīkhā-'īl Fāḍil and Arsāniyūs Shukrī sent a petition to the Propaganda, claiming that the decree of 1783 was contrary to the principles of ecclesiastical freedom and a "thousand years old tradition". Nevertheless, Yūsuf Isṭifān was reinstated in 1784. Mīkhā'īl showed him his respect, while the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf and *awlād* Abī Nawfal al-Khāzin expressed their gratitude in letters to Rome, and asked for an arrangement to provide for the maintenance of their daughters who had left Hindiyya's Order.[79]

After his rehabilitation Yūsuf convened a council in ᶜAyn Shaqīq. To strengthen his position against his opponents, he decided to involve the Maronite notables in the proceedings and asked them to present to the council their wishes regarding the nomination of *muṭrān*s and, after the suppression of the Order of Hindiyya, the status of Dayr Sayyidat Bkirkī. A large number of prominent families, among whom the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf, the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh and the *awlād* Ṭarbayh, sent the council a list of twelve demands, the most important of which were,

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[78] *Taqrīr* Antonelli (1781), ᶜAbbūd (1911), pp. 136-137; Moretta to Isṭifān (1780), id., pp. 125-126; Isṭifān to al-Khūrī (?), id., p. 141; Isṭifān to Prop. (1782?), id., p. 164; Antonelli to Mīkhā'īl (1782), id., p. 175-176.

[79] Tawdūsiyūs to Prop. (?), ᶜAbbūd (1911), p. 174; Antonelli to Mīkhā'īl (1782), id., p. 175; Tiyyān to Isṭifān (1782), id., p. 183; *muṭrān*s, Khāzin sheiks, al-Khūrī to Prop. (1784), id., pp. 189-191; Tiyyān to prop. (1784), id., p. 198; report Antonelli (1784), id., 204; id., p. 195; Khāzin sheiks to Prop. (1784), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 5, pp. 279-280; *Bull. Pont.*, App., p. 279; Mikh. al-Khāzin, 3 *muṭrān*s, 3 superior-generals and 12 Khāzin sheiks to Prop. (15-3-1784), *C.P.*, vol. 142, ff. 97-102; letters about the livelihood of ex-Hindiyya Khāzin girls (17883; 1787), *S.C.*, vol. 12, f. 191; vol. 13, f. 289.

firstly: Dayr Sayyidat Bkirkī was to be recognized as a patriarchal see, together with Dayr Qannūbīn; secondly, all *muṭrān*s and the patriarch would settle in Dayr Bkirkī; thirdly, the *ᶜushūr* were to be brought together in Dayr Bkirkī; fourthly, monasteries were to be placed under the exclusive authority of their abbot. The council approved these demands, on the condition that the notables refrained from interfering with *muṭrān* nominations and church affairs in general. This arrangement, moreover, would have to be endorsed by emir Yūsuf al-Shihāb. These conditions were rejected by the notables, who argued that their interference had been permitted by the Lebanese Council. Their petitions were included in the proceedings of the council.[80]

As was to be expected, the decisions of the council of ᶜAyn Shaqīq were denounced by the Propaganda, and shortly afterwards the Melkite *muṭrān* Jirmānūs Ādam was appointed special envoy to preside over another council. Firstly, he was asked to deal with the still lingering question of the allowance for Yūsuf Isṭifān during his suspension. Cardinal Antonelli expressed his regret that Mīkhā'īl, in spite of the instructions from the Propaganda, had still not been granted a diocese. The Khāzin sheiks had suggested that Mīkhā'īl be paid an allowance from the revenues of the patriarchal see, instead of receiving his own diocese. The patriarch had accepted this proposal, which was, however, rejected by Mīkhā'īl. After Ādam had pronounced his verdict, Mīkhā'īl received the diocese of Damascus, in exchange for remitting the arrears. This debt, which had in the meantime mounted to a considerable sum, was paid by the Khāzin sheiks.[81]

In 1790 a council was held in Dayr Sayyidat Bkirkī presided over by Jirmānūs Ādam. The council nullified the decisions taken by the council of ᶜAyn Shaqīq, although the right of presentation by the notables was maintained. The claim by the Khāzin sheiks that they had the privilege of nominating the *muṭrān* of Tripoli was rejected by Ādam who thus confirmed that the privileges of the Khāzins connected to the ordination of the *muṭrān*s were no longer valid.[82]

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[80] *Aᶜyān* to council, Fahd (1975), pp. 208, 209, 211; id., pp. 224-225; Hefele, pp. 299-301; ᶜAbbūd (1909), vol. 2, p. 502.

[81] Hefele, p. 303; ᶜAbbūd (1911), pp. 212-213; Antonelli to Isṭifān (1787), Bulaybil, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 51, p. 705; Antonelli to Ādam (1787), id., 706; Prop. to Mīkhā'īl (1787), id., p. 697; Khāzin sheiks to Prop. (1787), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 5, pp. 282-284; Report Ādam (1790), id., p. 292.

[82] Hefele, pp. 303-307; Ādam to prop. (1790), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 5, p. 289; Istruzioni Prop. (1796), Anaissi (19/1); Castelli to Moretta (1779), ᶜAbbūd (1909), vol. 2, pp. 362-363; *Acta*, vol. 166 (1796), f. 13; id., vol. 163 (1793), ff. 119-121, 153; *muṭrān*s pledge

The conflicts around the person of Patriarch Yūsuf Isṭifān have been interpreted as a complex clash between the traditional forces within the Maronite community and the increased discipline imposed by the Vatican. Yūsuf Isṭifān is seen as a guardian of tradition, as it became manifest in the emergence of the Order of Hindiyya and an increased propensity towards mysticism and popular belief, as opposed to the orthodoxy that was legally imposed by Rome. Yūsuf Isṭifān, who energetically supported Hindiyya, is thus a tragic victim of conflicting tendencies which he was unable to contain or to regulate. A tentative proposal for reform by the council of Ghusṭā in 1768 met with a concerted attempt by the Maronite notables to restore or preserve their traditional privileges, making use of the controversies which divided the clergy. This provoked an intensification of the interference of the Vatican, which in 1790 led to a new defeat of the notables' efforts to regain their influence.[83]

Acceptance of the demands of the notables in 1790 would have greatly enhanced the position of the Khāzin sheiks, since it meant a rigorous centralization of church administration within the boundaries of their domain. The apparent radicalness of these demands may obscure the dissensions which underlay them. A century of conflicts had driven the Khāzin sheiks apart and since Nawfal's *échec* at the Lebanese Council no single *bayt* or member of the family could claim ultimate authority, leadership or even an intermediary role. As in the case of Ṭūbiyā, the position of Mīkhā'īl was not based on unrestricted support from his family, except perhaps his own *bayt*, the *awlād* Abī Nawfal.

The conflicts occurred in a period of great upheavals in Mount Lebanon, caused by the rivalry among the Shihāb emirs, and therefore acquired an important political dimension as both parties sought the support of contending emirs. The *mudabbirs* of emir Yūsuf, Simᶜān al-Bīṭār and Saᶜd al-Khūrī, played an especially prominent role, advocating the reinstatement of Yūsuf Isṭifān, but denouncing the Order of Hindiyya. Yūsuf Isṭifān obtained the support of Sīd Aḥmad and Ismāᶜīl Shihāb, too, who, moreover, attempted to rehabilitate Hindiyya. In this complicated situation, Yūsuf Isṭifān apparently asked the Khāzin sheiks

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their obedience, *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 14 (1789-1797), f. 110; Mīkhā'īl al-Khāzin was eventually appointed *qadi* by Bashīr al-Shihāb; claims by the Khāzins to Trip.: Qar'ālī (1929-32), *al-Majalla al-Sūriyya*, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 250-251; *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf to Prop. (25-9-1781), *C.P.*, vol. 139, ff. 553-556; declarations from the population of the diocese, and other documents (1762, 1787, 1791) in KHA1.

[83] Defense of Hindiyya (1784), in: Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 5, pp. 366 ff.; there is a voluminous file on Hindiyya in the archives of the Propaganda, which deserves a separate study.

to intercede on his behalf with al-Jazzār in Acre against emir Yūsuf, in exchange for a promise to accept their wishes concerning the ordination of *muṭrān*s. Isṭifān allegedly paid 200 purses to al-Jazzār to check the aspirations of emir Yūsuf.[84]

Some significant new factors emerged on the side of the notables. Firstly, it is not without relevance that in this period the Khāzin *bayt* of Zūq Mīkhā'īl (*awlād* Ṭarbayh) seems to have interfered in church matters for the first time. Secondly, the two *mudabbir*s of Yūsuf al-Shihāb, the sheiks Saᶜd al-Khūrī and Simᶜān al-Bīṭār, assumed a prominent and explicit role trying to control both the conflicts within the Maronite community and the relations between the community and the Shihāb emir. These two developments should not be seen as mere coincidence, but as structural changes within the network of relations between the notables and the church. Both the *awlād* Ṭarbayh and the two *mudabbir*s represented forces which had emerged from the sidelines of the traditional social structure dominated by the core *bayt*s of the Khāzin family.

Apparently, after the conflicts over Yūsuf Isṭifān the majority of the Khāzin sheiks considered it to be in their interests for order to be restored, as opposed to the more precarious option of continued opposition to the reforms. This may partly have been the result of the influence of the *awlād* Ṭarbayh from Zūq Mīkhā'īl, who by now had possibly become one of the richest branches of the family and who, moreover, did not have the same vested interests in church affairs as the three main *bayt*s. The *awlād* Ṭarbayh had no Maronite monasteries in their domain except Dayr al-Ziyāra in ᶜAyn Ṭūrā, which was supervised by Jesuit missionaries and which played a minor role in the church administration and the power struggles within the hierarchy. Apart from this, they did not have any protégés among the clergy who were protagonists of traditional interests.

If there was something like a reform process, it was put to a severe test by the eventful patriarchate of Yūsuf Isṭifān. According to the chronicler Shaybān al-Khāzin, the Papal envoy Jirmānūs Ādam played

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[84] Squillace to Prop. (10-12-1784), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 12, ff. 458-459, 467; id. (10-10-1781), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 11, f. 424; Yus. al-Duwayhī to Prop. (15-4-1780), id., vol. 11, f. 26; Squillace to Prop. (10-10-1781), id., vol. 11, f. 424; Y. Isṭifān to Prop. (30-3-1779), id., vol. 10, f. 514; Robert to Prop. (13-4-1779), id., vol. 10, f. 436 see also: Sup. Karīm al-Tīn to Prop. (27-8-1784), id., vol. 12, f. 370; Squillace to Prop. (12-11-1784), id., vol. 12, f. 456; Y. al-Shihāb to Prop. (1-7-1785), id., vol. 2, f. 438; Ra'īs ᶜĀmm Bal to Prop. (3-12-1777) *C.P.*, vol. 136, f. 382; Bīṭār to Prop. (10 adhar 1788), id., vol. 139, f. 533; Khāzins to Prop. (n.d.), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 13, f. 181.

an important role in restoring discipline among the Maronite clergy at the close of the 18th century. He contributed to the solution of the conflict between Patriarch Yūsuf Isṭifān and Mīkhā'īl al-Khāzin, and led the council of 1790 which reconfirmed the regulations of the Lebanese Council and thwarted the efforts of the Maronite notables to obstruct the reforms. Notwithstanding the personal contribution of Ādam, it should be noted that some of the deep-rooted sources for the conflicts that had afflicted the community during the 18th century had to a certain extent lost their acuteness. Firstly, a continual source of tension had been removed by the formal partition of the Lebanese Order and the incorporation of the Order into the church administration by the councils of 1768, 1773 and 1790. Secondly, the conflicts involving the collection of the *ᶜushūr* and Hindiyya's Order had demonstrated that the Vatican did not fear energetically intervening in Maronite affairs in order to further the implementation of the reform proposals. By now, church affairs were no longer exclusively the realm of the Maronite clergy and notables, but were part of the broader framework of the Roman Catholic Church.[85]

In spite of this comparative peace, tensions were by no means over. Shortly after his reinstallation, Patriarch Yūsuf Isṭifān consecrated two *muṭrān*s in order to strengthen his faction, Yūsuf al-Tiyyān, who had played an intermediary role in the relations between Isṭifān and Rome, and Yuḥannā al-Ḥilū. This immediately provoked protests from the majority of the Khāzin sheiks, who had not been consulted. Apart from this, there were contesting claims to the diocese of Beirut. These sprang from an order by al-Jazzār in 1779 that the Maronite *muṭrān* of Beirut, Mīkhā'īl Fāḍil, immediately take up residence in the town. If he refused to do so, the Maronite church in Beirut would be converted into a mosque. Mīkhā'īl Fāḍil, however, refused adamantly, in spite of the insistence of the Khāzin sheiks. Thereupon the Khāzins and Yūsuf Isṭifān arranged that the diocese of Beirut be allocated to Yūsuf Najm (or "Nujaym"), who was consecrated in 1779, after Fāḍil had allegedly renounced his claims.[86]

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[85] Isṭifān to *muṭrān*s (1764), ᶜAbbūd, *dhayl*, pp. 27-29, 33; id., pp. 6-9; on the councils, see: Hefele, pp. 274-313; Fahd (1975). Bulaybil, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 51, pp. 404-405; id., *al-Mashriq*, vol. 52, p. 34; Shartūnī, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 46, p. 448; Hefele, p. 304; Sh. al-Khāzin, Khāzin/Masᶜad, vol. 3, p. 534.

[86] Documents on this issue: *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 11, f. 365; vol. 10, f. 632; id., vol. 10, ff. 632-635; Khāzins to Prop. (2-6-1787), id., vol. 13, f. 310; 'Ragioni' (18-3-1782), *C.P.*, vol. 139, ff. 454-459; Jumayyil had to sign a document upon his ordination, promising that he would pay 50 q. on top of his *ᶜushūr*, and that he would accept the resolutions of the council of ᶜAyn Shaqīq, Jumayyil to Prop. (2-2-1787), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 13, f. 207.

As Yūsuf Istifān was suspended at that time, the legal status of Yūsuf Najm remained dubious, and Fāḍil kept insisting on his rights, using his influence as a member of a rich Beiruti family. The conflict simmered until 1786, when an agreement was reached. Fāḍil would retain the diocese for a payment of an *ᶜushr* of 450 q. (previously 300 q.), 150 of which would be handed to Najm for his livelihood. This agreement carried the approval of the Khāzins, but when Najm was ordained *muṭrān* of Damascus the next year, they again protested, claiming that the patriarch had failed to consult them and that the diocese had been promised to Mīkhā'īl al-Khāzin.[87]

The conflicts were still unresolved when in 1793 Mīkhā'īl Fāḍil succeeded Isṭifān. Fāḍil died in 1795, before he received the pallium. Subsequently, Fīlībūs al-Jumayyil was elected, allegedly after pressure from emir Bashīr al-Shihāb and his *mudabbir*. The election of Jumayyil was opposed by the *muṭrān*s al-Tiyyān, al-Ḥilū, Najm and Būlus Isṭifān, who complained that the patriarch had bribed the emir and had delegated the affairs of the patriarchal see to his relatives. Moreover, he had granted the diocese of Beirut, still claimed by Najm, to *muṭrān* Mīkhā'īl Fāḍil, the nephew of his namesake, and had consecrated Iqlīmūs (Isṭifān) al-Khāzin before his election had been confirmed by Rome. In turn, Jumayyil accused al-Tiyyān of having consecrated Jirmānūs al-Khāzin without his consent. To strengthen his position against the dissident *muṭrān*s, Jumayyil presented a list of twelve propositions to Rome, for confirmation by the Propaganda. These propositions included: a. a rejection of the claims of the refractory *muṭrān*s to the diocese of Beirut (Najm) and to the revenues of the patriarchal residence; b. a termination of the intrigues against his authority and pledges of obedience; c. the authority of the patriarch concerning *majmaᶜ*s and verdicts should not be contested; d. monasteries should come under the jurisdiction of the *muṭrān* of the diocese. Jumayyil died in 1796, before the response of the Propaganda and the pallium could reach him.[88]

Tensions resurfaced with the election of Patriarch Yūsuf al-Tiyyān, which was opposed by the majority of the Khāzin sheiks and the Khāzin *muṭrān*s, who claimed that, again, the election had taken place under

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[87] Agreement between Fāḍil and Najm (1786), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 13, ff. 161-162; see also *awlād* Abī Nawfal to Prop. (?), id., vol. 7, ff. 77-79.

[88] Khāzins to Prop. (2-6-1787), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 13, f. 310; *Muṭrān*s to Prop. (1795), id., vol. 14, ff. 477-479; Tiyyān to Prop. (8-11-1795), id., ff. 437-439; Mūsā to Prop. (1800), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 5, p. 57; request confirmation Jumayyal (1795), id., p. 302; Jumayyal to Prop. (1795), id., pp. 406 ff., 478 ff; *Acta*, vol. 166 (1796), X, f. 22; *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 14, ff. 395, 411, 414, 443, 447-449, 468.

pressure from emir Bashīr and his *mudabbir*s. In 1800 the Khāzin sheiks sent a letter to the Propaganda expressing their dissatisfaction with the behaviour of al-Tiyyān, who was accused of acting contrary to the rules, usurping church properties, arbitrarily discharging clergymen, appropriating money and inciting discord. The anti-Tiyyān faction was joined by papal envoy Luigi Gandolfi, who settled in Mount Lebanon in 1807 to revive the reform process. According to him, the patriarch did not meet the required moral standards of behaviour, mixed in matters of secular government, practiced simony, and stirred up discord among the notables. He advised al-Tiyyān to retire. This he did in 1808.[89]

The above shows that the Khāzin sheiks by no means acquiesced in the setbacks they suffered in holding on to their influence in clerical affairs. In fact, as Gandolfi noted, as their secular authority gradually diminished, they sought to compensate this by tightening their grip on the clergy. At the close of the 18th century, the Khāzins were still represented among the clergy by three *muṭrān*s: Jirmānūs al-Khāzin (Qays ibn Rāmīḥ ibn Ḥaydar; Damascus), who acted as papal envoy until his death in 1806; Isṭifān al-Khāzin (Saḥḥāb ibn Hadīfa ibn ʿAbd al-Mālik; 1749-1830), who succeeded Jirmānūs and supervised Dayr Mār Yūsuf Balluna, a waqf founded by his uncle ʿAbd al-Salām; and Ighnāṭiyūs al-Khāzin (Efendi ibn Diyāb ibn Junblāṭ; Tripoli), who was a member of the Baladī Order. In 1805 Anṭūn al-Khāzin (Nāyif ibn Nawfal ibn Ḥuṣn) was ordained *muṭrān sharafī*; in 1808 he received the diocese Baalbek. In addition to these, one member of the Khāzin family became prominent in the Baladī Order, Simʿān al-Khāzin (Ibn Sālim ibn Junblāṭ), who was appointed *mudabbir* several times and served two terms as superior-general (1799-1802; 1805-1808). In 1794 Jirmānūs, Isṭifān and Simʿān drew up a document pledging to support each other and to secure offices for each other within the clergy. The agreement was endorsed by two sheiks of the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf. If he ever became patriarch, Jirmānūs promised Ighnāṭiyūs to transfer the diocese of Tripoli to him, and to exempt him from the *ʿushūr* for a period of two years. Moreover, after the abdication of al-Tiyyān, according to Gandolfi, the Khāzin sheiks hatched a plot to have Simʿān al-Khāzin elected patriarch. The plot,

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[89] Khāzin sheiks to Prop. (1800), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 5, p. 306; id., pp. 309, 311, 312, 401; Mūsā to Qardāḥī (1796), id., p. 418; id. (1796), id., p. 422; Khāzins to Prop. (1801), *Acta*, vol. 169 (1801), f. 95a; documents on al-Tiyyān: *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 15, ff. 260 ff., 275; Gandolfi to Prop. (3-10-1807), id., f. 342; id. (22-10-1808), id., vol. 15, ff. 363-364; id. (21-11-1807), id., vol. 15, ff. 344-346; id. (25-9-1809), id., vol. 15, ff. 462-463; Khāzin sheiks to Prop. (15-3-1789), id., vol. 14, ff. 30-31; id. (n.d.), id., vol. 2, ff. 588-589.

which involved the Khāzin *muṭrān*s and *muṭrān* Bulaybil of Cyprus, who was promised a yearly allowance from the patriarchal see, was thwarted by Gandolfi, who threatened to punish the participants severely. Eventually Yuḥannā al-Ḥilū was elected, the only one capable of continuing the reform process according to Gandolfi.[90]

A number of the sheiks' grievances against al-Tiyyān may have been connected with his efforts to resuscitate the reform process, or, at least, to consider measures to implement the reforms associated with the administration of monasteries. In this al-Tiyyān was followed by his successor Yūsuf al-Ḥilū, who also met with opposition from the Khāzins. Under pressure from the Propaganda, emir Bashīr and the Daḥdāḥ and Junblāṭ sheiks, al-Ḥilū agreed to convene a council in al-Luwayza in 1818, which is usually seen as a decisive breakthrough in the reform process, as it succeeded in initiating a reform project concerning the administration of monasteries, in spite of the resistance of the majority of the Khāzins.

4.5 Concluding remarks

The turbulent events which the Maronite church witnessed in the course of the 18th century can be fitted into a pattern which was shaped by both external and internal factors. Three main controversies can be discerned: firstly, the increased interference of the Vatican in Maronite affairs created a split between the factions favouring or opposing reform. The tensions concerned not only the church administration, but also spiritual matters, as is illustrated by the affair of Hindiyya. Some see Hindiyya's Order as a manifestation of popular belief among the Maronites, which was frustrated by the wish of the Vatican to impose its authority; secondly, the growing influence of the Lebanese Order shook the power balance within the Maronite clergy, as it became an important element in factional strife; thirdly, from the beginning of the 18th century, the Khāzin sheiks became increasingly divided and failed to secure their predominant position within the church by a unified stand.

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[90] Gandolfi to Prop. (25-7-1809), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 15, ff. 462-463; agreement Iqlīmūs, Jirmānūs and Simʿān al-Khāzin (2-9-1794), id., vol. 14, ff. 477-479; Gandolfi to Prop. (21-11-1807), id., vol. 15, ff. 344-346; id. (22-10-1808), id., vol. 15, f. 363; letter from the Khāzins about al-Tiyyān (1806) in KHA1; Khāzins to Prop. (n.d.), id., vol. 1, f. 585; *Muṭr*. to Prop. (1795), id., vol. 14, f. 479; agreement Jirm./Ighn. (1795), id., vol. 14, f. 477; Khāzins to Prop. (2-6-1787), id., vol. 13, f. 312; *awl.* A. Nāṣīf and A. Nawfal to Patr. (12-4-1806), KHA1.

It should be noted that the first two factors were an expression of the increasing interaction of the Maronite community with external forces, represented by the efforts of the Vatican to incorporate the Maronite church into the framework of the Mother Church, and by the initiatives taken by the Maronite community of Aleppo to revive monasticism in Mount Lebanon. This is confirmed by the conflicts over Patriarch Yūsuf Isṭifān which focused, firstly, on the recognition of the authority of the Vatican and the reforms of the Lebanese Council, and, secondly, on the Order of the Sacred Heart founded by Hindiyya, which was sponsored by the Maronites of Aleppo. The increasing importance of external factors shows that from the end of the 17th century onwards the Maronite community as a whole was no longer isolated and had become incorporated into wider cultural and social patterns.

What were the consequences of this development for the internal social structure of the Maronite community and, especially, for the relations between the Khāzins and the church? Firstly, as has been said above, in the 18th century the Khāzin family cannot be regarded as a unified faction. Some branches of the family sought to utilize the opportunities provided by external factors in order to enhance their influence in ecclesiastical matters, while others saw these factors as a threat to their vested interests. Secondly, the discord among the sheiks was reflected in their support for separate, often rivalling prelates, who could belong to opposing factions as far as their response to the reform proposals, or to the Lebanese Order or Hindiyya was concerned. As the reform proposals were explicitly aimed at reducing lay influence in church administration, efforts were made to reconcile these differences in order to have the traditional lay privileges restored. However, the interests of the various branches of the family did not converge any more. In fact, extension of the influence of one branch could result in loss of influence for another branch. Therefore, it was relatively easy for the Vatican to have the regulations abolishing lay privileges reconfirmed in 1790.

The relations between the Khāzins and the Vatican were not only determined by intervention from outside Mount Lebanon. In the course of the 18th century, shifts occurred within the social structure of the Maronite community that affected the traditional preeminence of the Khāzin sheiks and their position as patrons of the church. In fact, their discord was a symptom of their declining secular power, which was accelerated by the many upheavals at the end of the century. Moreover, the occupation of Jubayl and al-Batrūn by Yūsuf al-Shihāb opened up new prospects for the Maronite community and, particularly, for new

groups within the community. Thus, the increasing interference of the Maronite *mudabbir*s of Yūsuf and Bashīr al-Shihāb tended to counterbalance the traditional influence of the Khāzins. This became especially clear during the conflict over Yūsuf Isṭifān, which not only had an ideological, or ecclesiastical dimension, but also a political dimension. The Khāzins sought to compensate for their loss of political influence by strengthening their grip on the church and the clergy, but they were generally unable to prevent the disintegration of the structure which supported their privileges, and the emergence of a new structure which included new components, such as the Maronite *mudabbir*s and the Lebanese Order, and which was to some extent the result of responses to external forces.

CHAPTER FIVE

MARONITE WAQFS IN THE 18TH CENTURY

The relations between the Khāzin sheiks and the Maronite clergy, which have been discussed in the previous chapter, were to a large extent influenced by the mutual, and sometimes contradictory, interests in the exploitation of clerical possessions. Maronite religious foundations in Mount Lebanon occurred in a complex legal framework, which reflected the position of the Maronite community *vis-à-vis* the Ottoman environment and the Druze and Shiite neighbours. Partly due to this complex context, the practice of Maronite waqfs was shaped by Islamic and Ottoman regulations only to a limited extent, as described in chapter one. This chapter will focus on some of the legal and practical aspects of Maronite waqfs as they evolved in the 18th century, and especially on the relations between the Khāzin sheiks and some of the autonomous monasteries in Kisrawān in the 17th and 18th centuries. In this context the term "autonomous" does not refer to a form of independence from lay patronage, but, on the contrary, to the fact that they were supervised by lay patrons and were not part of the broader framework provided by the Maronite monastic order, the Lebanese Order. Four monasteries with specific connections with the Khāzin family will be singled out as examples of the various types of foundations: Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh, Dayr Mār Sarkīs wa-Bākhūs, Dayr Sayyidat al-Bizāz and Dayr ʿAyn Warqa. These cases will serve as examples of the various ways in which the relations between the Khāzins and the monasteries in Kisrawān evolved.

The practices concerning religious foundations in Kisrawān in the 17th and 18th century were largely shaped by custom, and it seems only natural that they were incorporated into the initiatives to reform the organization of the church. Thus, at the Lebanese Council, regulations were introduced which were intended to formalize the status of the monasteries, the relations between the monasteries and their lay patrons, and the authority of prelates over ecclesiastical possessions. In section 5.3 of this chapter these regulations and the way they affected waqf practice will be discussed.

5.1 Maronite waqfs

Until the 17th century, the clerical properties of the Maronites in Mount Lebanon were largely confined to the core area of the community in Jabbat Bsharrī. In this period the material interests of the church and the monasteries were small, and the upkeep of religious structures and, for instance, the taxation of estates was arranged by *ad hoc* agreements with the local Shiite overlords. This decentralization of authority, which was of course due to the isolated territory of the Maronites, meant that the direct administrators, the Ḥamāda *muqaddam*s, gradually acquired financial interests in the clerical possessions in their domain, especially the patriarchal see in Qannūbīn, and that they refused to remain aloof from rivalries in the church hierarchy.

The establishment of the Khāzin administration in Kisrawān heralded an important change in the practice of the founding and exploitation of Maronite church property. Initially, the Khāzins, too, had had to deal with their Shiite neighbours in the area and with the official ban of the building of churches in the Ottoman Empire. The erection of a church in Ḥarājil in 1671 had to be arranged with the local Matāwila, who stipulated that the altar be directed to the south; that there be no bells; and that the church not be named "*kanīsat* Ḥarājil", or "Sayyidat Ḥarājil". If the conditions were met, the Matāwila promised to support the building of the church. Although the position of the Khāzin sheiks became increasingly strengthened in the first decades of the 17th century, in 1635 the construction of Dayr Mār Shalīṭā, near Ghusṭā, met with resistance from the Sunni chiefs of the Sayfā family. Likewise, in 1647 the Sunni community of Beirut protested against the alleged construction of a church in ᶜAjaltūn by Abū Nawfal al-Khāzin. Abū Nawfal denied the allegation that the structure represented a church and was given the right of the matter by the Hanafite qadi. These frictions gradually disappeared as the Khāzins became the predominant authority in Kisrawān and succeeded in turning the domain into a structural part of the territory controlled by the Maronites.[1]

Although the founding of Maronite waqfs was certainly not exceptional in the 17th century, no clear definition of procedures seems to have been formulated. Evidence suggests that the founding of waqfs was subject to the authorization of the patriarch as well as the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s,

[1] Ḥattūnī, pp. 76, 82; Ḥarfūsh, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 5, p. 298; Zughayyib, pp. 20-21; see also a waqf (1094/1682) endorsed by Yusuf Ḥamāda, KHA1.

although this shared responsibility was not formalized and exceptions certainly may have occurred.

In the 17th century a gradual shift in the character and function of waqfs can be perceived. As the consolidation of the administration of the Khāzin sheiks in Kisrawān amounted to a gradual "colonization" or "Maronitization" of the area, the founding of churches and monasteries aimed to provide religious services for the immigrant Maronite population. In this way waqfs were not merely an expression of piety, but became an important element in the mechanism of strengthening the secular administrative power of the Khāzins. Newly founded monastic estates contributed to the expansion of the lands under cultivation and attracted peasant families from elsewhere. As the foundations eventually ended up largely beyond the scope of Ottoman legal supervision, specifically Maronite practices related to waqfs evolved, which were mainly based on the socio-economic demands imposed by the exploitation of the domain. This practice, in turn, served the Khāzins' material interests *vis-à-vis* their overlords, as the waqfs under their authority were protected against confiscation and thus strengthened their claims to the revenues of parts of their domain. In several respects, waqf properties became a mainstay of the Khāzins' authority, both in the economic and in the ideological sense.[2]

The development of specific practices under the wing of the Khāzin administration meant that the influence of the Hanafite and Ottoman regulations diminished. However, it remained in the interests of both the Khāzins and the church to be able to have transactions and practices enforced by the broader administrative framework, consisting of Druze and Sunni *muqāṭaʿajī* families and the Ottoman authorities, and, not surprisingly, a tendency towards the adaptation of juridical practices to the dominant legal system can be perceived. Thus, although documents were recorded and registered without the intervention of Sunni ulema, they nevertheless conformed to Hanafite directives for the drafting of official documents, and did not essentially differ from documents drafted by Sunnis or others. This, of course, indicates the lack of a specifically Maronite chancellory tradition, but also shows the integration of the Maronites in a wider legal and socio-economic environment.[3]

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[2] Ḥattūnī, pp. 10, 136-137, 189; Sh. al-Khāzin, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 5, p. 119; Daryān, pp. 207-208; see also the case of Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh, chapter 5.2.1.
[3] See especially Ebied/Young, pp. 2, 13-16, 18.

5.2 "AUTONOMOUS" MONASTERIES IN THE 17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES

As has been indicated above, in the 17th century the establishment of the Khāzin family in Kisrawān was associated with renewed activity in the field of waqfs. Firstly, churches were founded in the new home villages of the Khāzins, such as Ballūna (1600), ᶜAjaltūn (1647;1680) and Ghusṭā (1689); secondly, monasteries were erected for the foreign missionaries who settled in Kisrawān in this period with the help of the Khāzin sheiks, in ᶜAyn Ṭūrā (Jesuits; 1652) and Ghusṭā (Franciscans; 1681); thirdly, some important monasteries were founded under the supervision of the Khāzins, which acquired estates of considerable size and became centres of the ecclesiastical organization. As will be explained below, it was not always clear to what extent the Khāzins should be seen as founders, participants in the foundation, benefactors, or mere supervisors in their function as *muqāṭaᶜajī*s. In most cases no unambiguous foundation acts were drafted and in the course of history Khāzin authority, even without a clear definition, became more or less self-evident. Eventually, when conflicts arose, this ambiguity led to difficulties or even to the impossibility of unravelling the respective rights of the interested parties.[4]

5.2.1 *Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh*

Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh was founded in Sāḥil al-Qāṭiᶜ, Kisrawān, in 1673 by Jibrā'īl al-Blūzānī, *muṭrān* of Aleppo, with the support of sheik Abū Nawfal al-Khāzin and with donations from the diocese of Aleppo. These three participants were to remain involved in the fate of the monastery until it was handed over to the Lebanese Order in 1727. The monastery was intended to be kept under the administration of the *muṭrān* of Aleppo, and in fact remained to some extent dependent on gifts from the Maronites of Aleppo. With the distribution of Kisrawān among the sons of Abū Nawfal in 1679, the monastery came under the administration of the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf, who, moreover, claimed the privilege of nominating the *muṭrān* of Aleppo. In 1705, after the death of Jibrā'īl al-Blūzānī, they used their influence to secure the consecration of his

[4] Monasteries in Kisrawān founded in the 17th century: Dayr Sayyidat al-Luwayza, Dayr Mār Yuḥannā Ḥarrāsh, Dayr Mār Shalīṭā, Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh, Dayr Mār Sarkīs wa-Bākhūs; for a survey of Khāzin waqfs, see: Sh. al-Khāzin, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 4, 974-976; id., *al-Mashriq*, vol. 5, 115-117.

cousin Mīkhā'īl to the diocese of Aleppo and as superior of Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh. In 1714 emir Ḥaydar al-Shihāb detached the area of Sāḥil al-Qāṭiᶜ from the Khāzin domain and added it to the domains of the Billamaᶜ emirs of al-Matn, with the exception of the monastic estate of Dayr Ṭāmīsh. While the monastery itself remained under the jurisdiction of the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf, the landed possessions of Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh were divided between Zūq al-Kharrāb, in the domain of the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf al-Khāzin, and Bayt Shabāb, which was part of the domain of the Billamaᶜs. The division likewise applied to the *mīrī* tax obligations.[5]

The exploitation of the monastery and its estate was complicated by the fact that in the beginning of the 18th century its possessions had merged with those of Dayr Mār Ishᶜayyā in near-by Antilyās. Initially, this monastery had been sustained by gifts from Ṭāmīsh, but gradually the possessions of Mār Ishᶜayyā had increased and the revenues were shared by both monasteries. Some monks from Ṭāmīsh moved to Mār Ishᶜayyā with the consent of Mīkhā'īl al-Blūzānī. Another complicating factor was that Mār Ishᶜayyā came under the authority of the Billamaᶜs. In 1722 Patriarch Yaᶜqūb ᶜAwwād, who, of course, had a history of tensions with the Khāzin sheiks, decreed that the revenues of Mār Ishᶜayyā were due to the patriarchal see—on what grounds is not clear. He subsequently enforced a separation of the twin monasteries and with the help of emir Aḥmad Billamaᶜ he removed the Ṭāmīsh monks from Mār Ishᶜayyā. Pleas from the Khāzins to the patriarch and to al-Labūdī—the superior-general of the Lebanese Order who was a friend of emir Aḥmad—, to restore the previous situation, were to no avail.[6]

After the partition, Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh appeared to be economically unprofitable, especially since it was burdened by debts, mainly owed to the Billamaᶜ emirs, while the revenues consisted almost exclusively of donations from Aleppo. Moreover, the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf now put pressure on Mīkhā'īl al-Blūzānī to retire as *muṭrān* of Aleppo in favour of Jirmānūs Farḥāt, a prominent member of the Lebanese Order. Al-Blūzānī, however, stipulated several conditions for his abdication:

a. all properties of Farḥāt should revert to Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh after his death;

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[5] *Sijill* of the monastery, in: Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, pp. 157-164; Lābūdī to Simᶜānī (1727), id., vol. 1, p. 290 note 1; Lābūdī/Zanda, id., vol. 3, p. 121; Daryān, 207-208; Ḥattūnī, p. 10.

[6] Lābūdī/Zanda, Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 3, pp. 117-121, 184, 189.

b. a member of the Blūzānī family should remain the abbot of Ṭāmīsh;

c. impoverished members of the Blūzānī family should be permanently permitted to derive their maintenance from the monastery;

d. the monastery was not to be transferred to the Ḥalabī Order;

e. the sheiks *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf were entitled to respect and their due (*wājib*) because the monastery "belonged to them" (*li-annahu dayruhum*);

f. the *ra^ciya* of Aleppo was to be officially connected to the monastery, and not come under Farḥāt's jurisdiction;

g. the families of Jibrā'īl and Mīkhā'īl al-Blūzānī should be maintained by the monastery.

To these far-reaching conditions, Farḥāt replied evasively, but accurately, that as far as he was concerned no formal connection existed between Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh and the diocese of Aleppo, and that, consequently, the conditions were pointless. However, ᶜAbdallāh al-Qarāᶜalī exhorted him to accept al-Blūzānī's demands in the interest of the Lebanese Order, and finally Farḥāt complied.[7]

In 1725 Farḥāt was ordained *muṭrān* of Aleppo, and in the same year Mīkhā'īl al-Blūzānī died. The Khāzin sheiks thereupon asked Farḥāt, who resided in Aleppo, to come to Kisrawān and take over the administration of Ṭāmīsh. Farḥāt politely thanked the sheiks for their intercession on behalf of his consecration, but nevertheless turned down the request, and instead proposed that the monastery be handed over to the Lebanese Order, suggesting that the Khāzins retain their rights (*al-ḥaqq al-sharᶜī*), while the Order acquired the right of disposal (*taṣarruf*). Moreover, the connection between the diocese of Aleppo and the monastery was to remain intact, in spite of Farḥāt's initial objection, and the *muṭrān* of Aleppo should henceforth be selected from the Order's congregation in Ṭāmīsh. Finally, the nuns in Ṭāmīsh should be transferred to Dayr Ḥarrāsh.[8]

The *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf agreed with this proposal, which would at least secure their interests in the monastery. One of them, ᶜAbd al-Mālik al-Khāzin, however, who had an old score to settle with the Lebanese Order over the exploitation rights of a mill, tried to prevent the execution of the transaction and called in the help of the patriarch. The pa-

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[7] Qar'ālī (1929-32), *al-Majalla al-Sūriyya*, vol. 4, pp. 475-477; vol. 5, pp. 40,43, 44; vol. 7, p. 378; Masᶜad (1934-1935), *al-Manāra*, vol. 5.

[8] Qar'ālī (1929-32), *al-Majalla al-Sūriyya*, vol. 5, pp. 44-49; Ḥattūnī, pp. 140-141; Lābūdī/Zanda, Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 3, p. 111; Masᶜad (1934-1935), *al-Manāra*, vol. 5.

triarch subsequently prohibited the Order from taking over the monastery. To make matters worse, the nuns who lived in Ṭāmīsh refused to be transferred to another monastery.[9]

It is not clear how the controversy between the patriarch and the Order was finally resolved. Whatever may have been the case, in 1727 the transfer of Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh did take place, with the approval of the patriarch, emir Ḥaydar al-Shihāb and ᶜAbd al-Laṭīf al-Qāḍī, judge of al-Shūf and its dependencies. Jirmānūs Farḥāt signed a document conceding the property (*milk sharᶜī*) and the right of disposal (*taṣarruf*) to the Order, including the right of purchase, sale and exchange (*muqāwaḍa*). Jibrā'īl al-Blūzānī signed a transfer document (*taslīm*), confirming the terms of Farḥāt and the Khāzin sheiks, designating the monastery as a perpetual waqf for the Order. Witnesses were Nāṣīf, Khāzin, Asbar, Yūnus, Diyāb, Fayyāḍ and Sulaymān al-Khāzin. Finally, the sheiks Khāzin, Nāṣīf, ᶜAbd al-Mālik and Sarḥān al-Khāzin—with Sulaymān and Qays al-Khāzin as witnesses—drafted a transfer document, granting the right of disposal (*taṣarruf sharᶜī*) to the Order, while pledging to protect the estate. They promised not to interfere with the monastery nor to transform it forcibly into an episcopal residence. However, the monastery was obliged to provide for the maintenance of the inhabitants and to read masses for the father and uncle of the donators.[10]

The Khāzin sheiks attempted to retain the profitable symbiosis between Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh and the diocese of Aleppo, and they continued to demand privileges from the *muṭrān*s whose election they ensured, and somewhat prematurely, from their successors. In 1732 the Khāzins endorsed the ordination of Jibrā'īl Ḥūshib, who pledged to pay 150 q. *khidma*, an annual fee of 20 q. and any gifts he received from his diocese. Apparently, Ḥūshib did not meet these conditions, and in 1736 the papal envoy Yūsuf al-Simᶜānī was requested to pronounce a verdict in this case. The claims by the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf were confirmed. The rights of the sheiks concerning the diocese of Aleppo were also confirmed by Patriarch Yūsuf Ḍarghām al-Khāzin and Ilyās Muḥāsib (1742). In 1763 the Khāzins attempted to prevent the ordination of Arsāniyūs Shukrī, because they demanded the payment of a large sum due from his predecessor. Shukrī was nevertheless ordained by Patriarch Ṭūbiyā, who thus caused a *de facto* dissociation of the diocese from the

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[9] Masᶜad (1934-1935), *al-Manāra*, vol. 5, pp. 790-792;

[10] *Sijill*, Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, pp. 158-161, 164-166; Lābūdī/Zanda, id., vol. 3, pp. 110-126; Qarāᶜalī, '*Tārīkh*', id., vol. 3, pp. 227, 250-251; id., vol. 10, pp. 403-404.

awlād Abī Nāṣīf. In 1790 this dissociation was formalized by the nullifying of any documents alleged to support their claims. The ties between the monastery and the diocese remained intact, however, as the Maronite community of Aleppo repeatedly pledged that their gifts were exclusively destined for the monks of Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh.[11]

5.2.2 *Dayr Sayyidat al-Bizāz*

At the beginning of the 18th century the various branches of the Khāzin family spread over Kisrawān and each gained control over a sub-domain. In this way some also obtained the rights of supervision over existing monasteries, such as Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh, while others founded new monasteries. One of the newly founded monasteries was Dayr Sayyidat al-Bizāz, founded by the Khāzin sheiks of Sāḥil ᶜAlmā, an off-shoot of the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh.

There is some uncertainty about the exact year in which Dayr Sayyidat al-Bizāz was founded. Al-Ḥattūnī mentions 1749, while Shāhīn al-Khāzin prefers 1763. This uncertainty is not conclusively removed by the collection of documents which will be analyzed here, as the *waqfiyya* which is designated as the foundation act is undated. In the earliest documents (1736-1759; 1764) a shrine (*maqām*) is mentioned, dedicated to Sayyidat al-Bizāz, with a deacon (*khādim*) and a church (*kanīsa*). Then in two documents (1759; 1770) the name Dayr Qalb Yasūᶜ is given, referring to the controversial Order of Hindiyya, while the name Dayr Sayyidat al-Bizāz is used for the first time in 1763, and from 1769 onwards appears in a regular way. This evidence suggests that some monks had settled around a shrine, out of which a monastery eventually evolved as it increased its possessions. The actual foundation of the monastery may be retraced to an investment, in the form of a waqf, which gave the shrine a viable economic basis. An excerpt from a *waqfiyya*, preserved in the Khāzin archive, dates the foundation back to 1763. It includes the right of the founders and their descendants to the celebration of masses, an annual *ᶜīdiyya* and the patronage (*wilāya*).[12]

Even before the actual foundation of the monastery, transactions took

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[11] Documents in: Qar'ālī (1929-32), *al-Majalla al-Sūriyya*, vol. 4, pp. 244, 245;id., vol. 7, p. 434, 441-443; Fahd (1973), pp. 169-171; Letters from Aleppo (1728, 1745, 1773), Qar'ālī (1929-32), *al-Majalla al-Sūriyya*, vol. 7, no. 7, p. 434; Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 4, p. 142; vol. 5, p. 115; verdict on the Ḥūshib case: KHA1; agreement between the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf and Y. ᶜAwwād (1732): Patr. Arch., Coll. *Y. ᶜAwwād*, no. 47; KHA1.

[12] *TWSB*, ff. 21a, 20c, 17a, 25a, 17b, 25b, 18b, 26b, 27a; Ḥattūnī, p. 170; Sh. al-Khāzin, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 5, p. 115; excerpt of *waqfiyya*s in: KHA1.

place between the Khāzin sheiks of Sāḥil ʿAlmā and the shrine (Sakhr, 1732; ʿĀd, 1747; ʿAdrā, 1759, 1763; Shadīd, 1759). In 1763 Maryam (ʿĀdā) bint ʿĀd al-Khāzin is mentioned as *khādima* of Dayr Sayyidat al-Bizāz for the first time, and in 1765 she is mentioned again together with her sister Mubāraka (Jafla). They have a certain *qass* Mubārak as their *murshid* (teacher, supervisor). In a contract from 1770 Maryam is called superior (*ra'īsa*) of Dayr Qalb Yasūʿ, which indicates that she had joined the Order of the Sacred Heart, founded by Hindiyya. In 1772 she acts as superior of Dayr Sayyidat al-Bizāz for the first time, and in 1796 for the last time. In that year a male superior is mentioned as well. In a contract from 1816 the name Kalīma al-Khāzin appears as *khādima* of the monastery.[13]

The two documents which apparently should be considered to be the foundation act are an undated *waqfiyya* and a *waqfiyya* from 1764, both signed by ʿĀd al-Khāzin. In the first document some mulberry trees and a plot of land are converted into waqf for the shrine Sayyidat al-Bizāz. Moreover, future building costs will be provided for. The right of disposal rests with the patriarch. In the second document several possessions are converted into waqf for the shrine Sayyidat al-Bizāz for the maintenance of the "deacons" (*khādimūn al-mawḍiʿ*) in exchange for the celebration of masses. The waqf is founded in the presence of the sheiks ʿAdrā and Darwish, and it is stipulated that the land remain under the control (*taḥt yad*) of the Khāzin sheiks, as far as protection and the payment of the *mīrī* tax are concerned. Among the witnesses is ʿAdrā's and Darwīsh's nephew al-Ḥājj Sarkīs.[14] It is no coincidence, of course, that the designation Dayr Sayyidat al-Bizāz appears in the contracts at a time when Maryam al-Khāzin is mentioned as superior. It seems that in 1764 the formative stages of the monastery, started at the beginning of the century, had been completed and that in that year Sayyidat al-Bizāz could be formally considered as a monastery.

Whatever the exact year of foundation may have been, the possessions of the waqf considerably increased in the period 1755-1779. Most transactions concern the purchase of land. In the last two decades of the 18th century the amount of acquired land decreased considerably (670 q. purchases; 3 waqfs; one *taṣrīf*), and a period of steady decline followed (1800-1834), as during these years only one waqf was founded and land was sold for a sum of 1000 q., which, even when inflation is

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[13] *TWSB*, ff. 20c, 25d, 26b, 25b, 20b, 25d, 21b, 27a, 29a, 22d, 40a.
[14] *TWSB*, ff. 17a, 18a.

taken into account, represents a considerable amount when compared to the purchases of the previous period.

The prosperous years of the monastery roughly coincided with the *ri'āsa* of Maryam, in whose name many of the transactions were concluded. The majority of the waqfs and the purchases comprised parts of the estates of the Khāzin sheiks ᶜĀd and ᶜAdrā, who also contributed financially to the construction of the monastery, as can be seen from an undated letter from ᶜĀd to ᶜĀdā and Jafla, in which he promised to send money to hire a craftsman. The large part of the estate which was sold in 1816 became the property of Mīlān ibn Khashān ibn ᶜAdrā al-Khāzin, who was eventually to become the superior of a revived Dayr Sayyidat al-Bizāz in the 1840's, under the name of *khūrī* Jibrā'īl. The close links between the monastery and the Khāzins, which give its foundation and administration the character of a family undertaking, perhaps explain why the sheiks did not explicitly stipulate any material or juridical privileges in their *waqfiyya*s, apart from the general supervision of the estate. These privileges were probably tacitly agreed upon, as is shown by a *waqfiyya* from 1844, which proves that financial obligations were in fact levied, since mention is made of "the *ᶜīdiyya* as used to be imposed on them". Remarkably, too, most transactions are not complemented by a confirmation by the Khāzin sheiks, not even the sale of 1816.[15]

The data provided by the documents is insufficient to estimate the size of the estate of Dayr Sayyidat al-Bizāz, especially since the purchased lands are not minutely described and the information about the *mīrī* tax and the yields of the possessions is incomplete. It is possible, however, to deduce from the documents that the economic activities of the monastery were focused on sericulture, wheat, orchards (figs, almonds, olives) and vineyards. Apart from this, the monastery possessed a share in a water mill (*ṭāḥūn*). About the way in which the estate was exploited, and the relations with peasants, the documents contain no explicit information.[16]

5.2.2.1 *The formation of the estate*

As the collection of documents *Tārīkh Waqf Sayyidat al-Bizāz* presents a complete survey of the land acquisitions of the monastery, the composition of the estate can be analyzed according to the various types of transactions.

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[15] *TWSB*, ff. 20a, 40a, 36b.
[16] *TWSB*, ff. 17a, 17b, 19c, 21c, 22c, 21d, 23b, 26b, 27b, 28a.

a. Waqfiyyas

The waqf documents in the collection vary from a few lines to more elaborate contracts, such as the two aforementioned *waqfiyya*s of ʿĀd. The *waqfiyya*s dating from before 1764 refer to the shrine, the church, or the *khādim* or *wakīl* of the shrine as the receiving party, which are thus considered as legally competent individuals or entities. In later transactions, Maryam al-Khāzin acted as the representative of the monastery.

a/1. A *waqfiyya* from 1736 concerns a plot of land bought from sheik Khāzin Santū al-Khāzin, which is converted into waqf. The *khādim* of the shrine acquires the right of disposal (*taṣarruf*) of the yields, against the payment of 80 q., and no other party may interfere in the case of sale, exchange or waqf. After the *khādim*'s death the revenue will become a waqf for the benefit of the shrine.[17]

a/2. A *waqfiyya* from 1759 entrusts the *taṣarruf* of a piece of land to the *wakīl* of the shrine; another, from 1777, to the monks of Dayr Sayyidat al-Bizāz. In documents dating from 1793 onwards, the lands converted into waqf are described as becoming part of the *amlāk* of the monastery, while from 1796 they are explicitly categorized as the free property (*milk*) of the monastery.[18]

a/3. One waqf (1759) is founded with the aim of repaying a debt.[19]

a/4. Another waqf (1768) consists of a fig orchard donated to the monastery, on the condition that the inhabitants cultivate it and submit half of the yield to the donator, probably a widow. After her death the property will become a perpetual waqf for the benefit of the monastery.[20]

b. Sale contracts

In the case of sale transactions, the right of disposal is conceded to specified persons (usually *ra'īsa* Maryam) or the monastery.

b/1. In a contract from 1747 it is stipulated that the purchased land should provide for the livelihood of a certain nun. After her death the land will revert to the church on the condition that twenty masses be read for her salvation. This contract, obviously some form of pseudo-waqf, bears a confirmation by "Patriarch" Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin and *muṭrān* Anṭūn Muḥāsib.[21]

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[17] *TWSB*, f. 21a.
[18] *TWSB*, ff. 25b, 29d, 28c, 29a.
[19] *TWSB*, f. 26b.
[20] *TWSB*, f. 24a.
[21] *TWSB*, f. 20b.

b/2. To a contract from 1768 is added the consent of patriarch Yūsuf Isṭifān, since the alienating party is a minor. As the sale is indispensible for providing for the latter's income, he declares the sale legally valid.[22]

b/3. An important transaction concerns the sale of a plot of land to the value of 1000 q. by Kalīma and Jafla (*khādima*s of Dayr Sayyidat al-Bizāz) to Mīlān al-Khāzin, who is represented by sheik Khaṭṭār ibn Nīsān al-Khāzin (1816), as he was at that time presumably a minor. The contract, which makes no mention of a *ra'īs* or *ra'īsa*, is supplemented by a confirmation by *muṭrān* Anṭūn al-Khāzin.[23]

c. Various contracts

c/1. Donation (*hiba*): the collection contains two donation contracts and a combined *hiba*/ waqf. The donations are granted by ᶜĀd (1756), who pledges to support a future *qass* for the shrine and to provide for building costs; and from ᶜAdrā (1801), who in this way repays a debt to Jafla.[24]

c/2. Transfer (*taṣrīf*): in one document (1796) the right of disposal of a plot of land, part of the estate of Dayr Sayyidat al-Bizāz, is transferred to the superior of the monastery, called Jāmātī, with the obligation to pay the *mīrī* tax to the donators.[25]

c/3. Partition (*qisma*): two contracts refer to the partition of lands between two owners, one of whom is sheik ᶜĀd. The partition takes place in connection with the founding of a waqf (1769), presumably not in favour of Dayr Sayyidat al-Bizāz. The other one concerns a division of a plot of land between *khūrī* Ighnāṭiyūs Jamātī and sheik ᶜAdrā (1796). Several sheiks act as witnesses.[26]

c/4. Exchange (*muqāwaḍa*): the only exchange contract in the collection refers to a plot of land (mulberry and almond trees) bartered against its equivalent (*nāẓir*), as defined in a *ḥujja* which is not added. The *banāt* ᶜĀdā and Jafla acquire the *taṣarruf* (1766).[27]

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[22] *TWSB*, f. 20b; of course, Ṭūbiyā was not patriarch in 1748.

[23] *TWSB*, f. 40a.

[24] *TWSB*, ff. 17b, 19b.

[25] *TWSB*, f. 41a; Jamātī originally came from Sidon; he played an important role in the administration of Dayr Bkirkī during the Hindiyya-period; Diyāb to Prop. (1777), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 10, f. 14; Robert to Prop. (13-4-1779), id., f. 536; Superior K. al-Tīn to Prop. (27-8-1784), id., vol. 12, f. 370.

[26] *TWSB*, ff. 19c, 22a.

[27] *TWSB*, f. 21c.

5.2.3 *Other monasteries in Kisrawān*

Among the other monasteries in Kisrawān was Mār Sarkīs wa-Bākhūs in Rayfūn, which was probably founded in 1655 by Sulaymān Mubārak at his personal expense, but with the aid of sheik Abū Qānṣawh al-Khāzin. The subsequent purchases of land were executed in the presence of the sheiks Junblāṭ al-Khāzin (1660) and Nādir and Junblāṭ al-Khāzin (1679), and with the support of sheik Ḥuṣn al-Khāzin and the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh. One of the documents mentions a certain *khūrī* Yūsuf Mubārak as a co-founder. Since other documents mention yet other founders, the question as to the precise date and procedure of the actual foundation remains unanswered.[28]

In 1818 a document was discovered, containing an agreement from 1681 between Abū Qānṣawh Fayyāḍ al-Khāzin and seven monks of Mār Sarkīs, stipulating that:

a. services were to be performed for himself and his mother, and for *muṭrān* Jirjis Ḥabqūq, who had assisted with the foundation of the monastery;

b. he and his descendants would provide support to the monastery;

c. monks and nuns would only be allowed to enter the congregation or to conclude legal transactions with his consent;

d. any member of the Khāzin family entering the congregation would enjoy preference for the position of superior;

e. the monks would not be allowed to accumulate capital, but were to put their revenues at the disposal of the monastery.[29]

Obviously, these stipulations imply a far-reaching, even exclusive, authority for the sheiks over the monastery's administration, especially in the secular field. Moreover, as in the case of Ṭāmīsh, the interests of the Khāzin sheiks were connected with their claims to a diocese, notably the appointment of the *muṭrān* of Baalbek, which is shown by a statement of Yūsuf Mubārak, to the effect that his election, at the end of the 17th century, occurred with the help and at the expense of sheik Abū Qānṣawh, and by a statement of Jibrā'īl Mubārak, who pledged his obedience to sheik Khaṭṭār al-Khāzin (1713).

Again, a complicated pattern of privileges and interests is revealed. Significantly, the document of Abū Qānṣawh contains no reference to

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[28] Some of the documents concerning Mār Sarkīs have been published in: 'Nubdha Tārīkhiyya ʿan Dayr Rayfūn,' in: Khāzin/Masʿad, vol. 2; see for archival references chapter 7.

[29] 'Nubdha Tārīkhiyya,' Khāzin/Masʿad, vol. 2, pp. 591-593.

the right to nominate the superiors of the monastery, a position which, with some interruptions, became virtually the preserve of the Mubāraks, who were responsible for the expansion of the monastery's estate. The Mubāraks, moreover, monopolized the position of *muṭrān* of Baalbek, too, from 1713 until 1807 (except 1755-1763). These "monopolies" were obtained under the supervision of the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh al-Khāzin, who considered them to be their privilege. Thus, when patriarch Yūsuf Ḍarghām al-Khāzin, a member of the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh, was elected patriarch in 1733, he chose Mār Sarkīs as his residence and acted as its superior. Apart from this, the estate of the monastery consisted mainly of land purchased from or under the supervision of the Khāzins in the first half of the 18th century. In this way a complex tradition developed which was based on mutual interests in the fields of secular and church administration, but which was not recorded in clear legal terms. Privileges and functions became merged in a such a way that they were difficult to disentangle.[30]

Not all the monasteries in Kisrawān were under such stringent surveillance by the Khāzins. An important exception was Dayr ʿAyn Warqa, near Ghusṭā. Dayr ʿAyn Warqa was founded by *qass* Jirjis Khayr Allāh Isṭifān in 1660, with the support of the Khāzin sheiks. Jirjis was eventually ordained *muṭrān* of Beirut, and the Isṭifān family retained the monastery as their preserve, with the diocese of Beirut until 1766. In 1779 the monastery was transformed into a college for boys by Patriarch Yūsuf Isṭifān.[31]

The transformation of Dayr ʿAyn Warqa was achieved by an elaborate *waqfiyya*, turning all the possessions and legal rights of the estate into a waqf for the upkeep of the school. It is explicitly stated that the monastery had been handed over from one superior of the Isṭifān family to the next in a legal way (*bi-al-ṭarīqa al-sharʿīyya wa al-ḥuqūq al-kanā'isiyya*), uninterruptedly from its foundation onwards (*bi-taslīm ghayr munqaṭaʿ*) with the consent of the successive patriarchs and the lay rulers.

The conditions stipulated by Yūsuf Isṭifān can be summarized as follows:

a. the minimum number of pupils is fixed at eighteen (two from every diocese and two from the Isṭifān family); the actual number may vary according to the prosperity of the waqf;

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[30] Register of purchases, *S.O.*, vol. 947, f. 482; see also references in chapter 7.
[31] ʿAbbūd (1911), pp. 215, 217, 219.

b. no prelate has any rights or authority (*ḥaqq*, *tasalluṭ*, or *taṣarruf*) over the college, except the patriarch. However, even the patriarch may not transfer any of the revenues to another destination;

c. an administrator (*wakīl*) will be appointed by the patriarch to supervise the estate and budget;

d. when a member of the Isṭifān family becomes incapable of earning a living, the monastery will provide for his maintenance;

e. besides the aforementioned *wakīl*, a director will be appointed, who is responsible for the selection of teachers and the management of the school. Both functionaries are to be supervised by the patriarch and have to present an annual account; if they are to prove incapable, they can be replaced by the patriarch; members of the Isṭifān family enjoy preference over other candidates and can join the congregation whenever they wished;

f. neither the patriarch, nor the *muṭrān*s, nor the lay rulers, nor any member of the Isṭifān family, are allowed to change the intention (*maᶜnā*) of the document, nor alter the regulations. The secular rulers (Ghundur al-Khūrī, the Khāzin, Ḥubaysh and Daḥdāḥ sheiks) are requested to support the initiative. The document is signed by patriarch Yūsuf Isṭifān, *muṭrān* Būlus Isṭifān and *khūrī* Ibrāhīm Isṭifān; witnesses are four *muṭrān*s and Yūsuf al-Khāzin, superior of Dayr Baqlūsh; the lay notables mentioned above give their consent and pledge their support.[32]

In 1797 the *waqfiyya* was confirmed by the *muṭrān*s and patriarch Yūsuf al-Tiyyān.[33]

5.2.4 *The Khāzins and the autonomous monasteries*

Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh, Dayr Mār Sarkīs wa-Bākhūs, Dayr Sayyidat al-Bizāz and Dayr ᶜAyn Warqa represent the four types of relationships between the monasteries in Kisrawān and the Khāzin *muqāṭaᶜajī*s. In the case of Dayr Ṭāmīsh a far-reaching conjunction of secular and clerical interests is revealed, emanating from the symbiosis between the monastery and the diocese of Aleppo. The patrons of the monastery—not the founders!—clearly intended to derive direct gain from their position by skimming off the revenues collected from the Aleppine Maronite community. In the course of the 18th century, however, this prerogative eroded as the Lebanese Order dissociated itself from the

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[32] ᶜAbbūd (1911), pp. 221-225; an Italian copy in: *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 14, ff. 307-310.
[33] Tiyyān and *muṭrān*s to notables (1797), ᶜAbbūd (1911), pp. 226-227.

Khāzins and ended their grip on the diocese of Aleppo.

The case of Dayr Mār Sarkīs, likewise, presents a form of symbiosis between the supervising *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh al-Khāzin and the Mubāraks, who were simultaneously superiors of the monastery and *muṭrān*s of Baalbek. However, no documents exist to prove that the Khāzins derived any financial benefits from their connection with the diocese and the monastery, apart from the normal arrangements for taxation.

The example of Dayr Sayyidat al-Bizāz stresses the social function of the monasteries, as a refuge for family members who aspired to a monastic life, unmarried daughters and family members who were disabled or became impoverished. Of course, this social function was an important consideration for the Khāzins to keep their control over waqfs, as an insurance against impoverishment and as a means of relieving pressures within the family. There is no indication that the Khāzins ever intended to use Dayr Sayyidat al-Bizāz to enhance their control over the clergy. Apparently, the monastery was not seen as an economic undertaking or as a centre of church administration, but rather as an extension of the family estate.

Apart from a few similarities, the college of ᶜAyn Warqa presents a different picture. Here, the role of the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s was explicitly limited and contained by the request to provide financial support. The ties of the founding family with the monastery, and their privileges, were strictly defined, while the function of *wakīl* was introduced under the exclusive supervision of the patriarch. Thus, the interference of the lay notables was markedly reduced, even concerning the administration of the possessions of the monastery. However, financial support of impoverished family members, from the revenue of the estate, was explicitly stipulated.

The various types give a general idea of the relations between the Khāzins and the monasteries in their domains, which were similar to the cases of other monasteries founded in the 17th and first half of the 18th century. The latter two were transferred to the Lebanese Order, while the others were "family-owned" monasteries and/or sees of *muṭrān*s. Thus, the interests of the Khāzins in the administration of the church and its institutions, on various levels, were secured by a complex combination of traditional prerogatives, administrative authority and recorded privileges. Not surprisingly, the Khāzin sheiks on several occasions left no doubt that they considered the monasteries which had been founded by their ancestors, and even other monasteries, to be their property, and

that they would not tolerate any interference by the church authorities.[34]

In general, the conclusion that the inconsistency of the legal rules for Maronite waqfs in the 17th and 18th century worked to the advantage of the lay patrons, or of the exponents of secular authority seems justified. The authority of the Khāzins over the monasteries in their domain became more or less self-evident in the course of time. Although their authority was not formalized in all cases, the practice of waqf had predominantly evolved under their protection, and they tended to claim their rights with a reference to tradition.

5.3 Attempts at reform

Remarkably, in none of the documents cited in the preceding paragraphs to illustrate the practice of Maronite waqfs in the 18th century, is any reference made to the reforms of the Lebanese Council of 1736. The juridical nature of the transactions, the definition of rights and the conditions for exploitation were, it seems, determined by the legal tradition, as it had been shaped and still was being shaped, without an appeal to the authority of the official church regulations as imposed by the Vatican. This may partially be explained by the fact that until the 19th century no uniform text of the Council's decisions was available and that the reform process itself was a continual source of controversy. Nevertheless the Council did issue rules concerning waqfs and church properties, and the Vatican repeatedly exhorted the Maronites to comply with these orders. The regulations not only concerned the conditions for lay patronage of clerical and monastic possessions, but also touched upon two important and sensitive issues: the establishment of fixed residences for the patriarch and the *muṭrān*s, within the boundaries of their dioceses, and the partition of the so-called "mixed monasteries" or "double monasteries", in which both men and women resided.

The issue of the fixed abodes of bishops within their dioceses was first raised at the Council of Trent, to counteract the practice of "absentee" prelates who exerted a nominal control over the dioceses from which they derived their revenues, while they delegated the actual administration to subordinate clerics. This habit gave rise to malpractices and criticism, since it reflected a tendency among the clergy to use ecclesias-

[34] Khāzin sheiks to Vatican (1752), Khāzin/Masʿad, vol. 1, p. 413.

tical interests to maximize their gains from worldly possessions. To counteract this tendency the Council adopted new regulations for the administration of dioceses, among which figured the strict obligation for *muṭrān*s to reside in a fixed residence within the boundaries of their diocese. The implementation of this rule in the Maronite context required four sensitive tasks: the exact definition of the boundaries of the dioceses; the limitation of the number of *muṭrān*s to the eight ordinaries and two patriarchal vicars; the designation of monasteries as episcopal residences; and the fixation of the *ᶜushūr* to provide the financial foundation of the diocese.

The discussion about the fixed residences of the *muṭrān*s was among the controversial issues at the Lebanese Council. The regulations contained several clauses that were aimed at preventing absenteeism. The final touch, however, was added by the decree of Pope Benedict XIV (1742), which arranged the fixation of the boundaries of the eight Maronite dioceses, while the principle of fixed residences was confirmed.[35]

With regard to ecclesiastical property, such as churches and monasteries, the Lebanese Council adopted the following regulations, in accordance with the practice of the Roman Church as determined by the Council of Trent:

a. The erection of churches is subject to the authorization of the bishop; any foundation must be economically viable enough to provide for the maintenance of the church and the dignitaries, and must be adequately equipped;[36]

b. Church properties must be properly administered in order to secure their preservation; clergymen must pledge to their superiors (*muṭrān* or patriarch) that they will not sell, donate, pawn or exchange clerical or monastic properties without the consent of the patriarch; the leasing of church properties should be confined to a period of three years; the rent should preferably be collected in annual installments;[37]

c. The authority over church properties is entrusted to the bishop, under the ultimate supervision of the patriarch; the bishop can delegate the administration to a curator (*qayyim*), who is to present the accounts two times each year; he has the right to appoint functionaries for the

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[35] Jedin, 'Der Kampf um die bisschoffliche Residenzpflicht, 1562/3,' in: *Il Concilio di Trento*; Almeida Rolo, 'l'Application de la reforme du Concile de Trente a Braga,' in: id.; Jedin, *Handbuch*, vol. 4, pp. 476 ff., 483, 493-494, 513, 516; Anaissi (1911), pp. 260-267.

[36] Najm, pp. 443-444, 459, 461.

[37] Najm, 391-394, 453-455, 463.

administration of monasteries (*tawallī*), who may or may not be "presented" by the lay patrons (*ṣāḥib al-wilāya*);[38]

d. The rights of the patrons must be respected; however, no-one is to be allowed to conclude transactions that will harm the prosperity of the property, and founders are not allowed to appropriate any part of the revenues of their foundation; founders of monasteries may nominate the first superior, but the choice is the preserve of the monks;[39]

e. Several provisions are laid down to prevent clerics from acquiring an interest in church properties, such as the separation of personal from church property, a ban on the appropriation of revenues, the reversion to the church of properties obtained by prelates during their function, etc. Finally, monks are not allowed to acquire property in their own name, but must transfer it to the superior and the monastery; conversely, the superior may not donate property to individual monks; monks are not allowed to engage in trade or money-lending.[40]

Among the recommendations for reform suggested by al-Simᶜānī before the Lebanese Council, was the compilation of a legal codex for the Maronites, based on 17th century European models.[41] This codex was to fill an important lacuna, because the Maronite clergy, though allowed jurisdiction in clerical as well as civil cases by the Porte, could not draw upon a single coherent legal source. The Maronite clergy were accustomed to using legal formulas or legal concepts derived from Islamic Law. This can be perceived in a codex compiled by *muṭrān* ᶜAbdallāh al-Qarāᶜalī in 1720, entitled *Kitāb Mukhtaṣar al-Sharīᶜa*. Al-Qarāᶜalī's text closely follows the categories of Islamic jurisprudence and its terminology, and is probably a compendium of *al-Fatāwī al-Khayriyya*, the most outstanding fetwa collection by the muslim scholar al-Ramlī.[42]

The rules on waqf provided by al-Qarāᶜalī can be summarized as follows:

a. *al-Waqf*: al-Qarāᶜalī distinguishes between a donation (*hiba*), possi-

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[38] Najm, pp. 390, 464.

[39] Najm, pp. 458-459.

[40] Najm, pp. 392, 490-491.

[41] The sources mentioned by al-Simᶜānī are: Voello e Giustello [Voel & Justel], *Bibliotheca Juris Canonici Vetus*, Paris 1661; *Basilicon idest Universi Juris Romani in Grecam Linguam Traducti Synopsis*, Paris 1647, *C.P.*, vol. 94 (1727-1738), sessione 9-5-1735, ff. 46-47; Jedin, *Handbuch*, vol. 3, part 1, p. XXXI.

[42] For a discussion of al-Qarāᶜalī's sources, see: ᶜAlwān; his findings seem to be confirmed by the manuscript Patr. Arch. no. 194, which is not a fetwa collection by al-Qarāᶜalī, but an extract from a juridical textbook; it contains no references to specifically Maronite practices.

bly in favour of people who cannot be considered as "poor", and *ṣadaqa* or waqf, which serve to benefit the poor. The purpose of a waqf is the benefit (*nafᶜ*) of the poor in this world, and the benefit of the founder in the hereafter;

b. *al-Mawqūf*: the object of a waqf should be of durable value and preferably consist of real estate. Money may be the object of a waqf, provided that it has been deposited in a bank. It is permitted to conclude a lease contract (*ḥikr*), but sale is prohibited when the waqf is profitable or when the revenues are designated for a church;

c. *Alladhī yūqifuhu*: the founder of a waqf should fulfill the following conditions: he must be adult (*bāligh*), *compos mentis* (*rāshid*), free (*ḥurr*), acting out of free will (*mukhtār*) and healthy of mind and body (*fī ḥāl salāma wa-ṣiḥḥat ᶜaql*). When the waqf consists of real estate (*ᶜaqār* or *mazraᶜa*) he can only reclaim it if he is forced to do so by a ruler and fears for his life. When he becomes impoverished, a declaration of poverty (*ḥujjat al-faqr*) is not sufficient to reclaim the waqf. However, the founder will become the first beneficiary. The bishop administers the waqfs that do not consist of real estate, as he has authority (*musalliṭ*) over all church possessions;

d. *Alladhī yūqafu ᶜalayhi*: a waqf may not be founded for the benefit of persons whose behaviour is incompatible with piety and religious prescriptions, unless they repent. Nor may the revenue of a waqf be abused in this sense;

e. *Mutawallī al-waqf*: the *mutawallī* is in principle chosen by the founder, on condition that the candidate is competent. When this is not the case, the bishop appoints a *mutawallī*. As he acts as *nāẓir*, the bishop is authorized to dismiss or substitute the *mutawallī*. Both functions should be performed.

f. *Tatimma al-shurūṭ*: the beneficiaries of a waqf lose their rights only when they become extinct; sale of a waqf or part of a waqf is not permitted. If this prescription is not heeded, the alienating party will be punished and the money will not be refunded to the buyer, unless he was unaware that the sale related to a waqf. The waqf is subsequently put at the disposal of the bishop. A waqf may not be donated or accepted as a donation (nor as a *ṣadaqa*), nor be pawned (*rahn*), nor be exacted as a security for a loan. It is not permitted to lease the waqf to persons who will, or intend to, appropriate the revenues. If the waqf is unprofitable and cannot be replaced by substitution (*istibdāl*), sale is allowed on the condition that the money is used to purchase a substitute of equal value;

f/1. The conditions stipulated by the founder must be adhered to, including those relating to the exploitation of the waqf;

f/2. When a waqf is founded for the benefit of someone absent (*ghā'ib*) or when the line of beneficiaries becomes extinct, the waqf reverts to the church and the revenues will be distributed to the poor. In such cases, poor relatives of the founder are the first rightful beneficiaries. Waqfs which are wholly or partially founded for the benefit of persons who do not meet the legal conditions, revert to the church. When a waqf is founded for a limited period, it reverts to the church after the period has expired;

f/3. When someone possesses a share (*nasīb*) of shared property (*milk mushāᶜ*) and converts it into waqf, the participation of the partner(s) is recommended;

f/4. The foundation of a waqf should preferably be recorded in a written document, in the presence of seven or five witnesses, but at least three or two witnesses;

f/5. The foundation of a waqf may not be kept secret;

g. These prescriptions are supplemented by rules from other chapters:

g/1. When a mortgaged object is converted into waqf, it must be substituted by an object of equal value, or the debt must be paid;

g/2. Whoever converts an object which he has purchased in a "reprehensible" way (*makrūh*) into a waqf, must match the sum paid by a sum equivalent to the estimated market value. If he is incapable of doing this, the injured party has the choice between retaining property to the value of the amount to be paid, or granting deferment of payment and participating in the pious act;

g/3. Someone whose property is converted into waqf contrary to his will, can demand financial compensation if he so desires;

g/4. For objects acquired by usurpation (*ghaṣb*), stipulations are analogous to g/2 and g/3;

g/5. Someone who leases an object and converts it into waqf renders the lease invalid, on condition that the interests of the tenant are not harmed. If advances have been paid, these will be restituted;

g/6. The possessions which someone has converted into waqf during his lifetime are not counted as part of the two thirds of his property which he can dispose of freely in his will.[43]

In comparison to Islamic *fiqh*, al-Qarāᶜalī's legislation on waqfs is far from complete. Especially with respect to the conditions that may

[43] Qarāᶜalī (1959), pp. 53, 69, 78, 80, 88, 108-111, 123.

be stipulated by the founder, which in the practice of Islamic waqfs gave rise to the designation of "family waqf" (*waqf ahlī*, or *waqf dhurrī*), his rules are by no means elaborate. It is clear that the prescriptions aimed to keep these foundations within the orbit of the church as much as possible. While he does not want to discourage potential founders in any way, al-Qarāᶜalī continues to demand that in case of irregularities or doubt the object reverts to "the church", a term which is not clearly defined in the legal sense. In no case can a waqf be alienated by the church. These rules were obviously intended to secure the preservation of the material basis of the church.

Significantly, al-Qarāᶜalī borrowed less from Canon Law than from Islamic jurisprudence. His compilation contains no references to canonical lawyers or ecclesiastical councils, and does not elaborate on the authority and function of the clergy. He only summarily states that the *muṭrān* is the supervisor (*musalliṭ*), but he grants the founder the right to appoint the *mutawallī*. There is no effort made to define the legal position of the founder and the clergy in a clear way, in the form of a Maronite variant of the *ius patronatus* of Canon Law. He attempts instead to define the position of the founder within the context of Islamic Law, with the exception that any profit for the founder is prohibited and that in the case of irregularities the property reverts to the church. The compilation of al-Qarāᶜalī should be considered to be an attempt to reform, or at least institutionalize, traditional practice, although perhaps not in the sense which the Vatican desired. It was a reformist initiative which aimed to formalize practices, not to impose a new system. Nevertheless, al-Qarāᶜalī's rules strengthened the Maronites' ability to build an economic basis for their church institutions, a right acquired by tradition and customary practice. However, the fact that his compilation is based on Islamic *fiqh* shows that he was anxious to incorporate it into Hanafi legal interpretations, and to avoid transgressing the state-endorsed legal system. A compromise was sought in order to strengthen, rather than endanger, existing practices.

Although the coexistence of several legal systems concerning Maronite waqfs—Tridentine and the Islamic-Maronite—may have been to a large extent theoretical, it nevertheless provides a curious mixture. It appears that this complex juridical encounter can only be explained by a set of factors which were, in the context of the Ottoman Empire, confined to the Maronites in Mount Lebanon.

5.3.1 *The partition of the "mixed" monasteries*

Among the reform measures to which the Vatican attached the utmost importance, was the partition of the monasteries in which both women and men resided. Mixed monasteries were not an exclusively Maronite phenomenon. Since it was such an important part of the reform proposals and since it affected the authority of laymen over monasteries and their administration, the partition of the mixed monasteries should be briefly discussed in the context of Maronite waqfs. In Europe, too, mixed monasteries had existed, but these had been abolished in the 13th century after a fierce campaign by Pope Innocence. Of course, the living together of men and women in monasteries often provoked suspicion and accusations of moral misbehaviour, since the male and female compounds were usually not completely separated from each other, and sometimes, when they were separated, connections existed which seemed to arouse even more suspicion. Although it is impossible to determine whether the behaviour of the monks and nuns was really incompatible with the moral standards required by monastic life, accusations of immorality often fueled tensions among the clergy. The mixed monasteries were therefore a vulnerable spot in the organization of the church, which could not be neglected in any attempt at reform.[44]

Apostolic envoy Yūsuf al-Simʿānī, who supervised the Lebanese Council, took the reform of the mixed monasteries seriously and showed no hesitation in his efforts to implement it. Immediately after the conclusion of the Lebanese Council he set out to visit the monasteries in question and carry through their partition. Al-Simʿānī sought to achieve this with the consent of the clerics and monks concerned, and of the *muqāṭaʿajī*s who exercised certain legal privileges. The first monastery on which agreement was reached was Dayr Mār Ilyās al-Rās in Kisrawān. The monastery was to be transferred to the Lebanese Order and to be allocated to its female inhabitants. The arrangement was formally approved by the *muṭrān*s al-Qarāʿalī and Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin, superior-general of the Lebanese Order Tūmā al-Labūdī, and sheik Fayyāḍ al-Khāzin (*awlād* Abī Nawfal). Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin subsequently departed for ʿAjaltūn, carrying with him letters from al-Simʿānī referring to the partition of the monasteries in the domains of the *awlād* Abī Nawfal and *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf al-Khāzin. He was also commissioned to try to persuade the sheiks to give their consent. The *awlād* Abī Nawfal sent dispatches granting their approval, and al-Simʿānī went to ʿAjaltūn, where

[44] See for European double monasteries: Ursmer Berlière.

he was received by Kanᶜān al-Khāzin, Ṭūbiyā's brother. He was also visited by Nawfal and other Khāzin sheiks. From ᶜAjaltūn he wrote to the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh to inform them of his arrival.[45]

From ᶜAjaltūn, al-Simᶜānī set out for Dayr Mār Jirjis al-Rūmiyya, in the domain of the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh. The *muṭrān* who resided in this monastery, Ḥannā Isṭifān (Beirut), refused to attend the meeting, fearing the anger of the Patriarch and the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh, who were not prepared to accept the partition. After al-Simᶜānī had insisted that he should be present, arguing that the patriarch had assented to the reform proposals and that the sheiks were not allowed to interfere with church affairs, Isṭifān finally agreed to the partition, though only after having been threatened with excommunication. The agreement was recorded in a document which was ratified by the attending clerics and sheiks (Fayyāḍ and Anṭāniyūs ibn Abī Naṣr al-Khāzin of the *awlād* Abī Nawfal).[46]

Subsequently, *muṭrān* Ighnāṭiyūs al-Sharabiyya (Tyre) was sent to his monastery, Dayr Mār Ilyās in Ballūna, with a letter to its patron (*ṣāḥib al-dayr*), Ilyās ibn Nimr al-Khāzin (*awlād* Abī Nāṣīf), to prepare for the partition. From al-Rūmiyya al-Simᶜānī moved to Dayr Sayyidat al-Ḥaqla, where he received the news that Ḥannā Isṭifān of Dayr Mār Jirjis had reconsidered his decision. Al-Simᶜānī immediately excommunicated him. The partition of Dayr Mār ᶜAbdā Harhariyya, Dayr Buqayᶜa and Dayr Mār Anṭūniyūs Buqᶜātā, the monastery of Ṭūbiyā, was effectuated without complications. The patriarch personally gave his permission for the partition of Dayr Mār ᶜAbdā Harhariyya.[47]

From Buqᶜātā al-Simᶜānī once again wrote to sheik Sakhr al-Khāzin and his *bayt*, the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh. He reported to the patriarch on the progress achieved in the domains of the other two branches of the Khāzin family and asked *muṭrān* Ilyās Muḥāsib to be present at his monastery, Mār Shalīṭā in Ghusṭā. A few days later al-Simᶜānī was welcomed by the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh. He, as well as the sheiks, wrote to the superior of Dayr ᶜAyn Warqa, to summon him to be present at his arrival. The *muṭrān* refused with the words: "The monastery is in the domain of the *mashayikh*, and without their consent and the consent of the patriarch I can do nothing." Al-Simᶜānī, however, insisted and emphasized that the patriarch and the sheiks were not opposed to the monastic reforms. He declared the monastery suspended (*marbūṭ*). Again,

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[45] Fahd (1973), pp. 140-141, 147-148; *Relazione Dell.*, ff. 15-16.
[46] Fahd (1973), pp. 150-156; Lābūdī to Dibsī (1736), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, p. 198.
[47] Fahd (1973), pp. 156-159; *Relazione Dell.*, f. 17.

Ilyās Muḥāsib was ordered to be present at his monastery, or at least to send a representative, and was threatened with suspension (*rabṭ*). The sheiks Nawfal, Anṭāniyūs, Nādir and Ibrāhīm al-Khāzin (*awlād* Abī Nawfal) intervened in vain with the apostolic envoy, on behalf of the monasteries of al-Rūmiyya and ᶜAyn Warqa, to have the sanctions lifted.[48]

Upon his return to al-Luwayza, al-Simᶜānī sent dispatches to the patriarch to inform him of the progress he had made with the partition of the monasteries. He stressed that the measures were taken in accordance with the orders of the Propaganda, and asked him to come to Rayfūn to arrange the partition of Dayr Mār Sarkīs wa-Bākhūs. At this point, however, the patriarch proceeded to deny al-Simᶜānī any authority over the Maronite church and monasteries, and wrote that he had given the punished monasteries his absolution and had forbidden the *muṭrān*s and monasteries to obey the envoy's instructions. He announced that the case would be presented before the Church authorities in Rome. Efforts at mediation by the sheiks Nawfal, the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf, the *awlād* Abī Nawfal and Qablān, ᶜĀd and Mūsā al-Khāzin were to no avail.[49]

5.3.2 *A petition from the patriarch*

The partition of the mixed monasteries was in itself no major intervention. Technically, only slight transformations were involved. The separation of Dayr Mār ᶜAbda, for instance, involved the church, the kitchen and the storeroom. However, the document also explicitly mentions the *muṭrān* as the main spiritual supervisor of the monastery. That the interests at stake went beyond a mere administrative measure on moral grounds, is shown by the petition which was sent to the Propaganda by Yūsuf Ḍarghām, defending his opposition to the monastic reforms.[50]

In his petition, the patriarch argued first that the majority of the female inhabitants of the mixed monasteries should not be considered to be "nuns" (*monache*), but as beguines (*pinzoche*), who had not taken a vow. Consequently, the monasteries should rather be considered to be "retirement homes" (*conservatori*). The women in question lived off subsidies provided by the monks, who worked on the estate, on the

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[48] Lābūdī to Dibsī (1736), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, pp. 198-199; Lābūdī to Rossioli (1738), id., p. 236; Fahd (1973), pp. 158-168; *Relazione Dell.*, f. 18.

[49] Fahd (1973), pp. 168-176; *Relazione Dell.*, ff. 19-20.

[50] Contract for the partition of Dayr Mār ᶜAbda Harhariyya (1736), Patr. Arch., Coll. *Y.Ḍ. al-Khāzin*, no. 21.

condition that they took care of all the household tasks. The "cohabitation" was restricted to the pantry, the kitchen and the church. Even then, in the monasteries of ʿAyn Warqa, Mār Shalīṭā and Mār Sarkīs, a further separation had been implemented, to avoid suspect contacts as much as possible. These measures had initially been accepted by al-Simʿānī, but subsequently rejected as insufficient.[51]

The patriarch stressed the economic aspects of the double monasteries and held that the demands of al-Simʿānī, an immediate separation, were financially impracticable. After all, neither the "nuns" nor the monks had sufficient capital to finance the erection of new buildings, while the population as a whole was too poor to pay the building expenses. Undoubtedly, the patriarch acted as the spokesman of the majority of the lay patrons of the monasteries, who were reluctant to split the economically efficient units into two expensive, and presumably unprofitable, compounds. Thus, the opposition to the reform measures was not confined to the clergy, but also had its adherents among the lay notables. No monastic reform could be limited to an administrative decree, but should extend to the overall system of administration of monasteries, and to the relations between lay patrons and their monastic estates.[52]

The arguments of the patriarch were not heeded by the Propaganda, which, after the setbacks suffered by al-Simʿānī, continued to exhort the Maronites to carry through the separation of the double monasteries. Only at the beginning of the 19th century would the Maronite patriarchs dedicate their energy to this ambitious and delicate task.

Although the regulations of the Lebanese Council aimed to redress the legal framework of Maronite waqf practice and to reduce the influence of lay patrons, during the 18th century they could not achieve systematic reform. In fact, as the practice of waqfs continued to be shaped by practical circumstances, they remained a theoretical factor only, at least as far as the autonomous monasteries were concerned. The complex legal context obviously contributed to the preservation of informal secular authority over waqfs, as it constituted the only basis for the enforcement of the law. However, in the 18th century the practice of religious foundations was certainly not limited to the autonomous monasteries under lay patronage, but also included the rapidly expanding estates of the Lebanese Order, which will be analyzed in the next chapter.

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[51] Gazeno, ff. 5-8.

[52] Gazeno, ff. 10-11; al-Simʿānī to Prop. (3-7-1737), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 5 (1737-1740), f. 103; id. (28-6-1737), id., ff. 104-106.

CHAPTER SIX

THE MONASTERIES OF THE LEBANESE ORDER

The 18th century witnessed a remarkable revival of monasticism among the Maronites of Mount Lebanon and Aleppo. For the first time in Mount Lebanon initiatives were taken to integrate separate communities of monks into centralized orders, which were to follow a specific rule and to adhere to the authority of the Vatican. Thus, in the first years of the 18th century, two orders were founded: the Lebanese Order, founded by Aleppine monks; and the Antonine Ishᶜayyā Order, founded by monks from Mount Lebanon. While the former assumed an important role in Mount Lebanon, both in the spiritual and the socio-economic field, the latter remained marginal and proved unable to become a major factor in the affairs of the church. In this chapter, we will focus on the material basis of the Lebanese Order, the role of waqfs in its expansion and the connections of the Khāzin sheiks with the new monastic movement.

The foundation of the Lebanese Order at the beginning of the 18th century and its growth in the subsequent decades had a profound impact on the various levels of the relations between the Maronite notables and the clergy. Firstly, as explained above, it increased the pressure on the secular clergy to implement the reforms, which were advocated not only from an idealist point of view, but which were also inspired by the wish to facilitate the incorporation of the Order into the church organization, and to ensure the support of the Vatican against elements which were hostile to the nascent monastic movement. Secondly, the growth of the Order meant a division between the traditional "autonomous" monasteries, under the patronage of notable families, and the monasteries which were part of the network of the Order, within a new administrative framework. Thirdly, as the Order expanded its possessions, it gradually came to represent a considerable economic force. This force was based on estates which had a complicated status, being subject to waqf regulations, complemented by the rules of the Lebanese Council and directives adopted by the Order itself. The Order thus operated on the borderline between secular and clerical material interests, while on the ideological level it deliberately interfered with the struggle for reform.

6.1 The expansion of the Lebanese Order in the 18th century

Although the possessions of the Order steadily increased in the first half of the 18th century, it could not immediately be considered a viable economic undertaking. At first, the revenues derived from collections among the Maronite population, but these were prohibited by patriarch Yaᶜqūb ᶜAwwād in 1729. This prohibition probably did not prevent the Order from receiving gifts, especially from the Maronite community of Aleppo. The estates which were acquired were usually burdened with debt or in need of considerable investment. In the period 1696-1738, a total amount of more than 200.000 *qurūsh*, provided by the Maronite community in Aleppo, was spent on the acquisition of eleven monastic estates in Mount Lebanon. In the same period, these monasteries generated a revenue of 134.906 q. against expenses reaching 191.492 q., creating a deficit of 58.570 q.[1]

From the onset, the administration of the Order was highly centralized, which implied that economic transactions were the preserve of the superior-general, and that the influence of the rank and file was limited. The tensions that occurred in the 1740's were probably partly due to this rigid structure, as the separate monasteries complained that the superior-general assumed financial obligations which weighed heavily upon the monasteries, and for which the individual congregations were ultimately responsible. Although several attempts at reconciliation were made, some of which appeared in fact to be successful, the *de facto* partition of the Order forced both factions to try to gain control over as many monastic possessions as they could, to create a favourable, irreversible *status quo* and a strong position for eventual negotiations. These occurred in 1745 and 1748 and largely focused on the distribution of the monastic estates between the two branches. The Ḥalabīs turned out to be the decisively weaker party and only succeeded in acquiring some of the minor monasteries, while the Baladīs, who were numerically superior, secured their hold over the main estates, such as Dayr Quzḥayyā, Dayr Mashmūsha and Dayr Ṭāmīsh. This, of course, provided the

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[1] Bulaybil, vol. 2, pp. 268-269; Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 9, pp. 21-23; id., vol. 9, p. 25; id., vol. 2, p. 494; *mudabbir*s to Simᶜānī (1729), id., vol. 1, p. 223; Qashūᶜ to Iskandar (1729), id., vol. 1, pp. 236-245; the Khāzin sheiks mediated between the Order and the *muṭrān*s: Lābūdī to Iskandar (1728), id., vol. 1, pp. 292 ff.; Qarāᶜalī to Iskandar (1728), id., vol. 1, p. 302; Nawfal too opposed the Order: Qarāᶜalī to Iskandar (1728), id., vol. 1, p. 311; Tayah, vol. 2, p. 385 note 54.

Baladīs with an economic advantage. Although quantitative data is too scarce to attempt a reliable estimation of the Order's growth and economic potential, it is clear that after the partition in 1770 the Baladī branch succeeded in building up a profitable organization.[2]

Apparently the Baladī Order was able to achieve an efficient balance between centralized control and decentralized economic administration because, although the superior-general remained responsible for the overall supervision, some authority was delegated to a council of superiors (*majlis ᶜāmm*) and a body of four administrators (*mudabbir*s), who regularly convened with the *mudabbir*s of the individual monasteries (*majlis al-mudabbirīn*). An important feature of the financial organization was the introduction of a central treasury. Although the monasteries apparently had independent budgets, the central treasury provided capital for investment in unproductive or newly acquired estates. In this way, a safe and closed circuit for the accumulation of capital was created, which was centred around the most productive estate, which was also the see of the superior-general, Dayr Mār Anṭūniyūs Quzḥayyā in Jabbat Bsharrī. This set-up ensured the Baladīs a profitable exploitation by the turn of the 19th century.[3]

A separate estate served to provide for the sustenance of the superior-general. This estate in al-Zāwiya, which was purchased in 1714, consisted of mulberry trees and fruit orchards.[4]

In the next paragraphs, an analysis will be given of the way in which the Order built up its extensive network of estates in the course of the 18th century. Documents which refer to the transfer or purchase of land will be analyzed, in order to throw light on the legal and economic aspects of the transactions. Although the source material is as yet insufficient to provide a complete picture of the size of the possessions, it is possible to assess some factors which shaped the estates and the way in which they were exploited. The conclusions will be put into the context of the socio-economic circumstances and juxtaposed to the prevalent situation of the autonomous monasteries.

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[2] For the tensions in the 1740's, see: Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 4, pp. 1 ff., 54-57, 70 ff., 96; Shiblī, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 30; a short survey of the history of the Order is given by Shiblī, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 51.

[3] For the organization of the Order, see, besides Fahd and Bulaybil: Mahfoud; Karam.

[4] Bulaybil, vol. 1, p. 91; Ra'īs ᶜĀmm to Prop. (1763), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 4, p. 339; id., vol. 9, p. 23.

6.1.1 *The first monasteries in Jabbat Bsharrī*

The first efforts of the founders of the Lebanese Order to acquire a territorial basis were directed at Jabbat Bsharrī, in spite of the fact that the advantageous circumstance of a large concentration of Maronites was combined with the disadvantage of the Matāwila Ḥamāda overlords and the vicinity of Tripoli, the centre of the Ottoman governor.

In 1695 the "possessors" (*wāḍiᶜīn al-yad*) of the waqf Murt Mūra in Jabbat Bsharrī transferred the monastery and the waqf, which were part of the estate of Ihdin, to the Ḥalabī monks Jibrā'īl Farḥāt and ᶜAbdallāh al-Qarāᶜalī. No specifications are given as to the nature of the waqf involved or the fiscal conditions. A contract from 1701, however, is more explicit, as it mentions the property (*milk*) of Murt Mūra, consisting of mulberries and vineyards, which was transferred (*taṣrīf*) by the population of Ihdin to the monks of the monastery. The *kharāj* tax and the other, new, *ᶜawāyiḍ* were annulled, while expenses for the restoration of the terrain and the mulberry trees would not be charged to the monastery.[5] The acquisition of the estate of Murt Mūra, which was probably comparatively small, was soon followed by that of Dayr Mār al-Yashaᶜ. The monastery, which had been founded as a waqf in 1640, was transferred to the Order in 1696 by the population of the village Mār al-Yashaᶜ. The *mīrī* tax and other levies (*takālīf*) were suspended, and only a tax of 1/2 q. per *shunbul* wheat was demanded. Even when the monks had restored the vineyard, no *kharāj* was to be exacted.[6] In the course of the century, the possessions of the monastery were expanded by several waqfs and purchases. An important grant was the *mazraᶜa* of Mār Nuhrā, which was part of the "lands reserved for the income of the emirs" (*baklīk al-mukhtaṣṣa li-maᶜāsh al-umarā'*). The land became the property (*milk*) of the Order, while the *mīrī* obligations remained unchanged.[7]

During the 18th century, several formal agreements with the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s concerning Dayr Mār al-Yashaᶜ were drafted. In 1743 a continuation of the existing situation was agreed with Ḥusayn Ḥamāda, with no tax increase, while the Order obliged itself to extend the plantations. In 1754 a similar agreement was signed between the Order and Ḥusayn and Ḥaydar Ḥamāda, concerning the rights of the Order to

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[5] Qarāᶜalī, 'Mudhakkirāt', Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, p. 41; id., vol. 3, p. 229; Bulaybil, vol. 1, pp. 22, 42; Qar'ālī (1932), vol. 1, p. 61

[6] Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 7, pp. 252-253, 255-258; Qarāᶜalī, 'Mudhakkirāt', id., vol. 1, p. 42; id., vol. 3, p. 230; Qar'ālī (1932), vol. 1, p. 35.

[7] Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 7, pp. 266-267.

exploit the estates of Dayr Mār al-Yashaᶜ, Dayr Quzḥayyā and Dayr Mār Ḥūqā. After the administrative takeover of Bsharrī by Yūsuf al-Shihāb, a new assessment was made (1766; repeated in 1810, 1832). In 1770 a new *ṣakk* was drafted in which, next to the *mīrī* tax, a *mashyakha* of 4 *maṣārī* per *qirsh* and a *ᶜaddād maᶜaza* of 6 1/2 q. was imposed, with an exemption from other taxes, such as the *muwakkala li-al-mashāyikh* or the *dhakhāyir*. The monastery remained the property of the Ḥalabīs.[8]

In subsequent years, the Shihāb emirs Saᶜd al-Dīn and Ḥusayn (1802; 1803), Amīn (1830) and *mudabbir*s Jirjis and ᶜAbd al-Aḥad Bāz sent dispatches confirming the tax privileges enjoyed by the monastery and lifting oppressive taxes exacted by the *mashāyikh* of Jabbat. Saᶜd al-Dīn claimed that the monastery was exclusively his (*makhṣūṣ fīnā*), including the right to send away or keep the sharecroppers. The taxes were limited to the normal *mīrī*, although Amīn mentions a maximum for the *dhakhīra* of 1/2 *mudd*, while suspending the *ᶜaddād*. The revenues of the *mīrī* tax were directly collected by the Shihāb treasury. In the case of *mazraᶜa* Mār Nuhrā it is explicitly stated that the sheiks did not have the right to interfere with the collection of the *mīrī*, since the land had the status of *baklīk*, as had been agreed by the original founders.[9]

The most profitable acquisition of the Order in Jabbat Bsharrī was Dayr Mār Anṭūniyūs Quzḥayyā, which became the administrative centre of the Baladīs. The monastery was founded in the 17th century by the Samrānī family from ᶜAyntūrīn and later sold to the Ḥabqūq family. In 1708 *muṭrān* Yuḥannā Ḥabqūq handed the estate over to the Lebanese Order, with its revenues and donations (*rizq*, *nudhūrāt*). The Order received the full rights of disposal (*taṣarruf kāmil*) and the donator renounced any claims to the alms, with the stipulation that he could fall back on the waqf for a living if he fell ill or was reduced to poverty through no fault of his own.[10]

The estate of Dayr Quzḥayyā was eventually to become the largest and most prosperous possession of the Baladī Order and the see of the superior-general. Initially, however, difficulties with the Shiite notables had to be resolved. In 1726 the Ḥamāda *muqaddam*s attempted to reassess the tax distribution of Jabbat Bsharrī. To achieve this, they convened the village sheiks and representatives of the clerical and monas-

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[8] Id., vol. 7, pp. 258-259, 262, 287-288, 290, 292, 297.
[9] Id., vol. 7, pp. 262-265, 287.
[10] Bulaybil, vol. 1, pp. 59-60; ᶜAyntūrīnī, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 47, p. 63.

tic institutions in the area. The fiscal reorganization in fact amounted to an increase in the levies, and the farmers and monks refused to comply. To underline their resistance, the monks of al-Yasha^c, Quzḥayyā and Mūra abandoned their monasteries, claiming that a profitable exploitation was no longer possible, although a "delegation" temporarily returned to collect the harvest. Confronted with this inflexible attitude, the Ḥamādas reconsidered their demands, and eventually the monks returned to their monasteries under new conditions: the *māl* was to be raised from 450 *qurūsh* to 520 *qurūsh* (15 %) and 10 *shunbul* wheat and 10 *shunbul* barley. (The produce of the monastery was estimated at 40 *shunbul* wheat in 1728.)[11] The relations between the Ḥamādas and Dayr Quzḥayyā were renewed by Ḥusayn and Ḥaydar, who granted full rights of disposal to the Order and pledged not to interfere with its administration, nor to remove the inhabitants, nor support dissident monks. In 1754 and 1763 Dayr Quzḥayyā was formally transferred (*taslīm shar^{c}ī*) to the Baladī Order by Salmān Ḥamāda. The estate became the property (*milk*) of the Order, which was granted the right of disposal and a free hand in the administration of the *shurakā'* and workers. The monastery was to pay 400 q. *fāyiḍ*, as well as 10 *shunbul* wheat, 10 *shunbul* barley and 4 animals as a *^{c}īdiyya* for ramadan. In exchange, Salmān promised to protect the monastery and to refrain from interference.[12]

6.1.2 *Jubayl and al-Batrūn*

The cases of Dayr Quzḥayyā and Dayr Mār al-Yasha^c serve as a good example of the methods by which the Order gathered its possessions in the first half of the 18th century. A network which stretched over several *muqāṭa^{c}a*s and which, in general, was based on the combination of tax privileges and the obligation to cultivate the land, was quite rapidly formed.[13] The most important acquisition, for the Baladīs, was the grant they received from emir Yūsuf al-Shihāb in 1767. After Yūsuf had asserted his control over the *muqāṭa^{c}a* of Jubayl in the 1760's he set about reforming the administration of the area in coordination with the local Maronite notables. Moreover, he redistributed part of the land

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[11] Lābūdī/Zanda, Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 3, p. 204.

[12] Farḥāt, Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, pp. 83, 148 (=1723), 150-151; Lābūdī/Zanda, id., vol. 3, pp. 62-65, 102; id., vol. 4, p. 337; Karam (1972), p. 30; Bulaybil, vol. 2, pp. 156, 265.

[13] The texts of various transactions of the Order can be found in Bulaybil, Fahd (*Tārīkh*) and Karam (1972).

which had been owned by the Ḥamādas. Part of this operation was the transfer of a large network of monastic estates and churches which had apparently fallen into ruin to the Lebanese Order, with the specific purpose of stimulating productivity and recultivating arable lands.[14]

In the contract referring to the transaction, a description of the estates in question is first given: a. Dayr Mayfūq, with mulberry trees and vineyards. The village itself will remain at the disposal of the Order until the former inhabitants have returned; b. Dayr Kfīfān, including the dependency (*unṭūsh*) in the city of Jubayl, with the shops (*dakākīn*) and church, and the revenues and alms. The *mīrī* tax is lifted from all the Order's possessions in the district of Jubayl as an act of piety (*iḥsān*) towards God; c. Dayr Mār Simᶜān al-ᶜĀmūdī, with the churches in Jubayl, including a plot of land for cereal growing; tracts of land suitable for plantation from the *baklīk* terrain (*min rizq al-baklīk*) and another plot; d. Dayr Ḥūb and Mār Ḍūmīṭ, according to the boundaries designated in the *waqfiyya*s.[15]

These possessions were donated to the Order to be cultivated, and became its property (*milk*); the *mīrī* would amount to 1/4 q. per *ḥiml*, while other taxes included 2 *shāhiyya* for each 100 handfuls (*jafna*) of grapes; 1 *shāhiyya* for the olives; 1/2 q. per *bidār kayl*; no extra costs and no *ᶜaddād* were to be levied and no *mīrī* or *jawālī* from the *shurakā'*; no other taxes were imposed, as the monasteries were "their preserve" (*mukhtaṣṣ lahum*). In 1770 the tax privileges were reconfirmed in a letter from Yūsuf to the sheiks Manṣūr al-Daḥdāḥ and Simᶜān al-Bīṭār. Besides this, a separate transfer document was signed for the waqf of Dayr Simᶜān al-ᶜĀmūdī, which thus became the property (*milk*) of the Order, preserving its *mīrī* obligations. In 1768 another waqf, consisting of mulberry trees and houses, was added by Yūsuf to the estate of Dayr Mayfūq, as *milk* and a perpetual waqf.[16]

Among the possessions allocated to the Daḥdāḥ shaykh was the monastery Dayr al-Banāt, with a field for growing wheat and 5 shops, as a waqf for the monastery. The shaykh received the *taṣarruf* in exchange for the payment of the *mīrī* according to the arrangements for the waqfs in the area (*al-wuqūfāt allatī fī al-bilād*). Shaykh Manṣūr al-Daḥdāḥ subsequently handed the monastery over to the Lebanese

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[14] Khāṭir, p. 56-59; ᶜAyntūrīnī, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 46, pp. 438-440, 526-529; id., *al-Mashriq*, vol. 47, pp. 36-37; Dibs, part 4, vol. 8, pp. 500-503; Ḥattūnī, pp. 182-189.

[15] Ḥattūnī, pp. 182-184; Bulaybil, vol. 2, pp. 273-277; Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 4, p. 352; ᶜĀqil to ᶜAbd al-Aḥad (1777), id., vol. 5, p. 206; id. (1777), id., vol. 5, 216-219.

[16] Bulaybil, vol. 2, pp. 282, 283, 293, 321.

Order, according to a *taslīm* from Yūsuf, with the provision that members of his family be allowed to enter the congregation if they so wished.[17]

6.2 The administration of the Order's estates

The examples given in the preceding paragraphs show that the expansion of the landed possessions of the Lebanese Order was a complex process, which touched on several aspects of the social and economic life of Mount Lebanon. The expansion was not limited to Jubayl, al-Batrūn and Jabbat Bsharrī, but included al-Matn, especially, and to a lesser degree, Kisrawān and al-Shūf. As far as the legal context for the expansion of the Order is concerned, some aspects should be kept in mind. Firstly, the Order was itself a manifestation of the reform tendencies within the community, and thus in some respects contradicted interests which were rooted in tradition or in the traditional equilibrium between the clergy and the Maronite notables; secondly, being a reformist movement, it could not easily be incorporated into the existing practices concerning waqfs and monastic properties; thirdly, from the start the leaders of the Order had a clear idea that their interests were best served not only by a spiritual reorientation, but also by a broad economic basis of possessions, which would facilitate both its integration into the Maronite community and the establishment of links outside the community. Therefore, it will be useful to discuss the socio-economic role played by the Order in the course of the 18th century, and to define its contribution to the process of change occurring in this period as outlined in chapter 3 above.

In the next paragraphs the impact of the Order in two fields will be analyzed: the legal aspects of the administration of the Order's estates, and the economic exploitation of the estates.

6.2.1 *The legal framework*

In the sources the possessions of the Order are usually categorized as *wuqūfāt* or *amlāk*. As in the case of the autonomous monasteries, however, the estates generally consisted of lands of varying legal status, and the term waqf is mostly used as a general designation. In his

[17] Bulaybil, vol. 2, pp. 321-322.

historical survey of the Baladī Order, Bulaybil distinguishes four types of waqf: firstly, waqfs founded in praise of God in order to gain spiritual salvation, without any material benefits for the founder; secondly, waqfs founded to preserve estates and to protect property against ruin; thirdly, waqfs founded or purchased by the Order with its own capital or labour; fourthly, waqfs founded by notables with the intention of deriving profit from the recultivation of abandoned agricultural lands and the repopulation of deserted villages, and increasing the tax revenues.[18]

The contracts analyzed above show that the transactions concluded by the Order were of various kinds and included the purchase of *milk* and *mīrī* land as well as waqfs. However, the distinctions between these categories became increasingly blurred, as the possessions, whatever their legal status, came to be described as *milk* and "part of the *amlāk*" of the Order, while they were simultaneously seen to be a waqf and subject to the payment of the *mīrī* tax. This suggests that the legal distinctions between the types of land became less relevant than the fact that they were gathered together under a single administrative framework and subject to a uniform set of regulations. This was, of course, an important development, since the subordination of existing formal legislation to an evolving administrative practice formed the essence of a process of transformation, which was stimulated by the expansion of the Order as a new organizational framework.

The juridical categories of the transactions concluded by the Order can be summarized as follows:

1. Waqf: The waqf transactions can be divided into several sub-types:

1/a. Waqfs founded by individuals, such as priests or widows, who endowed their possessions to a monastery in exchange for a livelihood for the duration of their lives from the revenues of the waqf, and the reading of a fixed number of masses. Obviously, these waqfs were virtually identical to Islamic pious foundations, but clearly contradicted the rule imposed on ecclesiastical properties by the Church, that founders may lay no claim to the revenues of their foundation. They were contrary to Muslim rules about Christian waqfs, too, but in the period under study they were nevertheless an accepted practice.[19]

1/b. Waqfs founded by individuals, families or village communities for the upkeep of schools, through a will (*waṣiya*; possibly similar to

[18] Bulaybil, vol. 1, pp. 400-403.
[19] Bulaybil, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 54, p. 41.

1/a.), or through a grant for life of land or of an orchard, etc., usually exempted from taxes.[20]

1/c. The transfer of existing waqfs with the aim of facilitating the performance of religious services or schools. Although the terms "transfer" (*taslīm*) and "transfer of rights of disposal" (*taṣrīf*) frequently recur in the contracts as a legally valid type of transaction (for instance *taslīm sharʿī*), this seems to be a negative specification, implying "not contrary to the law", rather than a positive reference to a type of transaction defined in legal terms. The contracts seem to relate primarily to a transfer of the rights of disposal and administration, comparable to the function of *mutawallī*, although this is not specifically mentioned, and not to an alienation of property rights. In the context of the Lebanese Order, however, *taslīm* meant that the possessions were placed under the Order's supervision as part of its *amlāk*.[21]

1/d. The transfer of existing waqfs of indebted or unprofitable estates by the patrons. These transactions formed the major source for the expansion of the Order, but also required the investment of capital and labour. In general, the transaction meant that the patrons conceded their privileges to the Order, except, in some cases, the right of receiving a livelihood in case of poverty, or the right to enter the monastery, while the Order took over the debts and pledged to revitalize the estate. Significantly, the relations between the Order and the previous patrons were usually clearly defined, the patrons giving up any right to interfere in the administration of the estate and the congregation of monks, and promising protection and support. In some cases, when the patrons were not the same people as the *muqāṭaʿajī*s of the area, this pledge was repeated by the latter. Although the distinction between autonomous monasteries and the Order's monasteries was thus clearly drawn, this did not mean that the ties with the former patrons or the *muqāṭaʿajī*s were completely cut off. Obviously, especially when the patrons were also the *muqāṭaʿajī*s, as was often the case with the Khāzin sheiks, they would continue to have a keen interest in the administration and preservation of the estates. As the Order established its economic position in the course of time, however, the patronage of individual families and *muqāṭaʿajī*s became less relevant to the prosperity of the Order as a

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[20] Bulaybil, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 51, p. 493; id., *al-Mashriq*, vol. 52, pp 23, 209, 551; id., *al-Mashriq*, vol. 53, p. 350; id., vol. 2, pp. 108, 234; Qar'ālī (1932), vol. 1, pp. 97-98; Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, pp. 352-357.

[21] Bulaybil, vol. 1, pp. 48-50, 53-55, note 1, 218-219, note 1; see also the transfers of Dayr Quzḥayyā and Dayr Yashaʿ, above, paragraph 6.1.1.

whole or to the individual estates, and lay interference not only diminished, but was in some cases actively reduced.[22]

1/e. The transfer of existing waqfs by *muqāṭaʿajī*s who did not have the patronage rights or other founder's privileges. The large grant to the Order by Yūsuf al-Shihāb in 1767 in Jubayl was such a transaction. The possessions which were transferred to the Order as a donation (*hiba*) at least partly consisted of existing waqfs over which the emir did not exert formal authority as a patron or founder. No mention is made in the documents of a patronizing family and apparently Yūsuf needed no further permission for the transaction than his own authority as *muqāṭaʿajī*, and, significantly, the mediation of his *mudabbir*s, al-Bīṭār and al-Khūrī.[23]

2. Other transactions, such as purchase, donation, lease and *ḍamān*:

2/a. Purchase contracts are scarce among the material published by Fahd, Bulaybil and others, although according to the historians of the Order many possessions were acquired by purchase. In a few cases existing waqfs were purchased, which was, of course, contrary to all the regulations.[24]

2/b. Most donation contracts (*hiba*) concern existing waqfs as has been explained in paragraph 1/e. There were, of course, other donations, one of which was specified as an *iqtiṭāʿ* (1714) of waste land and a ruined mill, with the aim of restoring its profitability and cultivating the waste land, for a *kharāj* of 6 q. per year, 5 q. for every 100 new plantings and 5 q. for each millstone. After the restoration the mill was to become *milk* of the Order. The document is signed by the *ḍābiṭ* of al-Zāwiya.[25]

2/c. Lease contracts include an *isti'jār* (1715) in al-Zāwiya, for a period of ten terms of three years, including taxes, for a yearly sum of 150 q. and 35 q. *jizya*. Other levies are 1/2 *mukūk* barley, 4 chickens on Islamic holidays (*ʿīdiyya*) and 4 *aḥmāl* firewood. Payment is distributed over the year: the first installment of 3/4 to be paid in the silk season, the second of 1/4 before the end of the year. Interestingly, this agreement is referred to as being the usual arrangement for the district of Tripoli.[26]

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[22] Bulaybil, vol. 2, pp. 153-154, 194, 199-200, 205-206, 209, 210; id., *al-Mashriq*, vol. 52, p. 212.

[23] For the Shihāb-transaction: see above, note 14 and 15.

[24] Bulaybil, vol. 2, p. 271; id., *al-Mashriq*, vol. 52, p. 211; Karam, p. 97.

[25] Bulaybil, vol. 1, p. 88 note 1.

[26] Bulaybil, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 51, p. 494; id., vol. 1, p. 91; Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, p. 489.

2/d. It is not completely clear what the juridical implications of *ḍamān* contracts were. Usually, *ḍamān* is defined as the farming out of the right to collect taxes for a period of several years, in exchange for a fixed annual remittance, similar to the *muqāṭaᶜa*.[27] In the sources concerning the history of Mount Lebanon a few cases of *ḍamān* are mentioned, as a grant to the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s by the Sultan or the emir. The *ḍamān* grants to the Order do not contradict this description, but they are too few to justify a general characterization of the practice of *ḍamān*.[28]

Some general conclusions about the juridical aspects of the Order's transactions in the 18th century may be drawn:

a. The contracts contain virtually no references to Hanafite jurisprudence or Ottoman legal practice, which together formed the Islamic legal framework. In the case of waqfs, few contracts elaborate on the specifications for the exploitation or the functionaries.

b. The transactions were usually concluded in the name of the superior-general and the *mudabbir*s, even when they related to individual monasteries. Sometimes, but not necessarily always, the documents were confirmed by the patriarch or/and by the *muṭrān* of the diocese. This suggests a highly centralized administration, at least as far as the large transactions were concerned, and it also indicates that the Order was not seen as an institution representing a corporate body with legal competence. The competence of the patriarch and the *muṭrān*s *vis-à-vis* the Order was not really clear, as it took the greater part of the 18th century to resolve the internal dissensions and to complete the formal incorporation of the Order into the church administration. Relations were strained, as the authority of the superior-general was not defined and several *muṭrān*s were members of one of the Order's branches. In spite of this and the expansion of the Order took place largely beyond the supervision of the secular clergy. Clearly, ultimate supervison was retained by the patriarchs, who, in the cases of Simᶜān ᶜAwwād and Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin, were closely involved in the partition process of the 1740's and 1750's.[29]

The *muqāṭaᶜajī*s were often involved in the larger transactions, either as one of the parties or as supervisors. However, their involvement was far from being the intimate connections they had with the autonomous monasteries, an independence that was closely guarded by the Order.

c. An important aspect of the alienation of lands involving the Leba-

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[27] EI2, art. 'Bayt al-Māl'.
[28] See above, part 1, chapter 3; Bulaybil, *al-Mashriq, vol. 51*, pp. 678, 683.
[29] Shiblī, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 51, p. 306.

nese Order is, of course, the juridical status of the land and the legal supervision of transactions. Firstly, it should be noted that the transactions took place without the interference of the Ottoman bureaucracy, or, in other words, there are no indications that transactions were as a rule endorsed by a Hanafite qadi or registered in the *maḥkama* courts of Tripoli, Sidon or Damascus. Secular authority was not represented by the Ottoman administration or by delegated branches of the juridical apparatus, but in most cases by the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s and in some cases by the Shihāb emir. This is not necessarily an anomaly or a departure from normal practice in the Empire, as probably the extent to which these transactions were embedded in the Ottoman legal system depended on the proximity of the urban administrative centres, while the delegation of judicial authority was by no means exceptional. The documents show that in Mount Lebanon in the 18th century, as elsewhere in the Empire, state supervision of the alienation of land and its legal categories was not strictly observed. Contracts referring to transactions with existing waqfs, for instance, rarely elaborate on the legal complications which they represented, such as the original intentions of the founder, the distribution of revenues, legal competence regarding the alienation of waqfs, etc. Moreover, land with the *mīrī* status was converted into waqf, described as *milk* of the Order, while preserving its tax obligations, without any juridical justification.

These irregularities should be put into the context of the specific circumstances in Mount Lebanon and the exceptional nature of the Lebanese Order as an organization. The transactions were apparently not seen as reprehensible acts which should be scrutinized as to their legality; they were primarily inspired by economic motives, which, at least in some cases, overruled juridical objections. At this stage, the legal categorization of land had become less relevant than economic considerations, such as the way lands were exploited, or than the tax system, as the *mīrī* remained the basic taxation regardless of the formal status of the land. Some of the distinctions between the categories of land were upheld, however, as in the case of Dayr Mār al-Yashaᶜ, which enjoyed the disposal of possessions which belonged directly to the Shihāb emirs, to the exclusion of local notables (*rizq*, or *baklīk*).[30]

Whatever the original status of the estates had been, within the framework of the Order they acquired a new status, or at least a new element was added, as they became subject to the administrative rules of the

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[30] Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 7, pp. 260, 262-265, 289, 292.

board of *mudabbir*s. In fact, the Order embodied the "essence" of the waqf principle, since its intention was to gather properties together under its supervision, not allowing or at least discouraging any form of alienation. Thus, it was a logical step to entrust the supervision over existing waqfs to the Order. It enabled the Shihāb emirs to adopt a flexible policy towards the juridical status of the land and to let economic factors prevail in their dealings with the monks.

d. Although Ottoman legal formalities were not explicitly substituted by precepts derived from Canon Law, the central concepts promulgated by Church law were clearly visible in the organizational function of the Order. No explicit reference to the sources of Canon Law or the Lebanese Council was made, but the principles of reducing lay interference with clerical properties and the ban on their alienation were carefully adhered to. The Order apparently, and perhaps paradoxically, was better equipped to implement the "church centred" regulations of the Lebanese Council than the secular clergy was, being still largely within the sphere of influence of the Maronite notables. Thus, the authority of *muṭrān*s over church property was relatively reduced, while the material interests of founders or lay administrators were confined to the collection of official, often reduced, taxes. As the effectiveness of the secular legal framework decreased, the Order contributed to the increased role of the church with regard to the administration of church properties, a tendency which was encouraged by the Vatican, but was in principle contrary to the spirit of Islamic and Ottoman social, legal and administrative precepts.

6.2.2 *Economic factors*

As explained above, in the second half of the 18th century, the *muqāṭaʿajī*s in Mount Lebanon increasingly suffered from economic difficulties. Economic circumstances in the area became affected by the overall recession in the Ottoman Empire, due to the depreciation of the Ottoman currency, the interruption in the Asian trade as a result of the Ottoman-Persian wars, and tensions within the structure of the internal market. These factors cannot be dissociated from the efforts of the provincial Syrian rulers to appropriate the means of production, to monopolize trade and to control and skim off financial circuits. Increasing tax demands led to political tension and tended to drain the financial resources of the Lebanese *muqāṭaʿajī*s. In spite of these adverse influences, however, no unilinear process of economic decline can be discerned in

Mount Lebanon, and efforts at economic expansion occurred alongside signs of decline.

Sericulture provided the *muqāṭaʿajī*s in Mount Lebanon with some advantages over their counterparts in other areas of the Ottoman Empire. On the one hand, the revenues from sericulture were to a large extent derived from export, which implied that economic development was vulnerable to fluctuations on the world market. On the other hand, however, the *muqāṭaʿajī*s had a commercial crop at their disposal which could be marketed relatively easily and which gave them access to the circuits of foreign currency. Moreover, the interruption of the Persian trade with Aleppo and Bursa was not to their disadvantage, as it created an increased demand for silk on the Ottoman market and gave a new impetus to sericulture in Syria. These factors indicate that, although the tax pressures on the *muqāṭaʿajī*s tended to exhaust their financial resources, the economic potential of Mount Lebanon was not yet fully exploited and prospects for expansion existed. This is confirmed by indications that in the second half of the 18th century, the exploitation of the *muqāṭaʿa*s suffered from a labour shortage. The efforts of both Yūsuf and Bashīr al-Shihāb to restructure the *muqāṭaʿa* system should be seen in this context, since they aimed to maximize their tax revenues by, firstly, increasing tax demands, secondly, expanding the areas under their control, and, thirdly, extending the areas under cultivation.

From an early stage, the *muqāṭaʿajī*s were aware of the opportunities provided by the nascent Lebanese Order for alleviating their economic difficulties. Although it had been founded as a spiritual movement, its novelty lay partly in its organizational setup and, accordingly, in its concern for a solid material basis. The transfer of Dayr Sayyidat Ṭāmīsh in 1727 is an early example of how the economic exploitation of many of the autonomous monasteries had become a burden to the *muqāṭaʿajī*s, as a result of inconsistencies in the administrative framework, increasing debts, internal dissension, and the absence of a clear arrangement for the financial obligations of the patrons. The organizational framework of the Order provided an opportunity for the *muqāṭaʿajī*s to release themselves from their financial responsibilities in exchange for cession of their patronage rights. Moreover, the Order opened up the prospect of reviving and restoring the estates by investment, in some cases provided by gifts from the community of Aleppo, and labour.

This tendency is reflected in the transfer documents that have been analyzed in the previous paragraphs. When the prospects for profitable exploitation of the monastic estates seemed limited, the Order came in

to ensure their continuation. Obviously, as the network of the Order grew, its economic potential increased, in spite of initial debts and financial deficits. This duality, indebtedness and the potential for growth, possibly lay at the roots of the discord which eventually led to the partition of the Order, as the rank and file, who represented a substantial part of the labour force, became increasingly concerned about the financial policy of the board. After all, the structure of the Order was unique in the sense that a small board decided its economic policy, while the labour for the actual productivity was provided by the bulk of the members, who were on the one hand excluded from the benefits of their labour, and were even responsible for the debts, and on the other were not incorporated into the traditional social system which determined the relations between the peasants and their overlords. Whatever the size of the Order's estates, the amount of its debts and financial deficits, and its total productivity may have been, investment was not without its rewards and the balance between indebtedness and potential productivity was never disadvantageous to the general development of the Order. In fact, land would eventually prove to be a much more reliable commodity than money, provided a sufficient labour force could be procured. The latter was mainly provided by the Baladī faction, which was more numerous and accordingly had a far greater economic potential than the Ḥalabīs.[31]

Some information about the general economic situation of the Order during the 1760's can be derived from a report on the possessions of the various estates. The list shows that Dayr Quzḥayyā, Dayr Ṭāmīsh and Dayr Mashmūsha had become the largest economic centres of the Order, and together represented approximately 55 % of its mulberry orchards (out of a total of 189 *ūqiyya bazar*), 40 % of the cereals and 56 % of its fruit orchards and vineyards. All other estates should be considered as small, except Dayr al-Shuwayyā (10% of the total of mulberry trees and 20 % of the wheat production) and Dayr al-Yashaᶜ (20% of the wheat production). Some monasteries also exploited workshops of several kinds, as for instance Dayr Karīm al-Tīn, which specialized in textile dyeing and manufacture.[32]

Not surprisingly, the negotiations between the Ḥalabī and Baladī factions, intitially under the auspices of the patriarch and, eventually, a committee of foreign missionaries, focused on the partition of the

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[31] For the number of members, see Karam (1975).
[32] Bulaybil, vol. 2, pp. 268-270.

Order's possessions. In this respect, the Baladīs clearly held the strongest position as its members outnumbered the Ḥalabīs and held most of the estates as their *de facto* possessions. Moreover, to the resentment of the Ḥalabīs, they were at least in some cases helped to acquire estates by *muqāṭaᶜajīs*, who preferred the economic performance of the Baladīs to that of their rivals. Thus, for instance, the Junblāṭ sheiks formally transferred Dayr Mashmūsha to the Baladīs with an explicit economic motive. The Baladīs received the monasteries of Quzḥayyā (Ḥamādas) and Shuwayyā (Billamaᶜs) for similar reasons.[33]

As the *de facto* distribution of the estates proved irreversible in most cases, the negotiations concentrated on three monasteries, Rashmayyā, Sīr and Ilyās al-Rās, which were occupied by the Ḥalabīs, but claimed by the Baladīs. Finally, the Ḥalabī leaders ceded them to the Baladīs. In 1764, a proposal for the partition of the estates was forwarded by papal envoy Bossu, who was in favour of the Ḥalabī faction. His plan was based on the revenues of the estates, of which the Ḥalabīs held only a fifth, though they had a right to at least a third. Eventually, he succeeded in awarding the Ḥalabīs with a quarter. Another complication was that the Ḥalabīs wanted to divide their possessions among the two provinces (Tripoli and Sidon), in order to have a refuge in case of oppressive measures by one of the governors. They claimed Dayr al-Yashaᶜ on these grounds.[34]

After the partition, the economic role of the Order, especially of the Baladīs, became more prominent. At this stage initiatives were taken by the Shihāb emirs to incorporate the Baladī Order into their economic policy, and it is no coincidence that the takeover of Jubayl by Yūsuf al-Shihāb and the subsequent administrative reforms were immediately followed by a large transaction with the Order. The economic incentives appear unequivocally in the documents: the estates were handed over free, and tax privileges were granted in exchange for the recultivation of abandoned lands and the reclamation of waste lands for sericulture.

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[33] Bulaybil, vol. 2, p. 252; Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 4, pp. 204-206, 211-212, 379; 'ᶜArīḍat ᶜAwwād' (1754), id., vol. 4, pp. 235-237; Rājī to Bānī (1756) id., vol. 4, pp. 261-262; Rājī to Rome (1757), id., vol. 4, p. 280; id., vol. 4, p. 337.

[34] Distribution of the estates: Baladīs: Quzḥayyā, Ḥūqā, Ṭāmīsh, Mashmūsha, al-Burj, Rashmayyā, Sīr, Sinnīn, Ḥabashī, Ḥūb, Nāᶜima, Banābīl, Ilyās al-Rās; Ḥalabīs: Luwayza, Shuwayyā, Karīm al-Tīn, Yashaᶜ, Badwānī; Bossu to Prop. (17-9-1764), Vat. Arch., *Missioni*, 118; see also: *S.O.*, vol. 820, ff. 162. 165, 166; Ra'īs ᶜĀmm to ᶜAbd al-Aḥad (1768), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 4, pp. 374-376; confirmation of the partition (1770), id., vol. 4, pp. 384-391; ᶜAyntūrīnī, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 47, p. 62; *Bull. Pont.*, vol. 4, pp. 126-127; Bulaybil, vol. 2, pp. 268-269; Ra'īs ᶜĀmm to Prop. (2-4-1764), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 8, f. 191.

Moreover, the economic stimulus provided by the Order should ultimately lead to a repopulation of deserted areas. The transaction was clearly beneficial to both parties, while the preservation of the estates was guaranteed. It decisively established the Baladī Order as an economic force and enabled it to emerge as a prosperous organization by the turn of the 19th century.[35]

The dealings of Yūsuf and later Bashīr al-Shihāb with the Order were specifically directed towards an intensified exploitation of the economic potential of their domains, which would result in higher tax revenues. Another important element was the effort to counteract the labour shortage, as is shown by the clauses granting tax privileges to peasants coming from outside the *muqāṭaʿa*. At least in some cases, the peasants on monastic estates were thus favoured in comparison with their counterparts on the estates of the *muqāṭaʿajī*s.

Although tax privileges were part of Bashīr al-Shihāb's policy towards the Order, this did not mean that he refrained from skimming off the capital accumulated in the circuit of monastic estates. In 1789 and 1791 he exacted extraordinary levies from the Order, which were contested by the superior-general, who succeeded in reducing the amounts, respectively, from 8 to 4, and from 30 to 17 *kīs*. The levy was distributed over the monasteries.[36] Tax privileges were granted to the Order on two levels: firstly, in some cases peasants were exempted from the poll-tax (*jawālī*), while, secondly, the Order was in most cases exempted from various surplus taxes, which were usually exacted by the *muqāṭaʿajī*s. Although the *mīrī* obligations were in general left intact, in some cases they were annulled, reduced or postponed. These arrangements were clearly designed to enable the Order to accumulate capital for investment, which was, however, siphoned off by incidental levies. Compared with the *muqāṭaʿajī*s, the agreements were highly favourable, as the conditions for expansion, the reintegration of estates and an intensified exploitation were enlarged, in a period when most *muqāṭaʿajī*s saw their domains crumble and their capital sources drained.

An impression of the growth of the economic potential of the Baladī Order after 1770 can be derived from the accounts and registers of Dayr Ḥūb and Dayr Kfīfān in Jubayl. The acquisition of these properties

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[35] ʿĀqil to ʿAbd al-Aḥad (1777), Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 5, p. 216; *S.C.*, vol. 8, ff. 552-554, 555, 558; Haydar to Prop., Vat. Arch., *Missioni*, 118; id. (n.d.), *S.C.*, vol. 8, ff. 552-554, 555, 558.

[36] Bulaybil, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 52, p. 35; see also: Karāma, p. 113; Munayyar, /Khalifa, p. 381.

gave a considerable boost to the economic strength of the Order, as was noted by contemporary observers. The accounts of Dayr Ḥūb show that the revenues steadily increased in the period 1785-1842, especially in the 1820's and 1830's. From 1785 onwards a regular pattern of land purchases can be seen, which culminated in a mass of purchases in the years 1820-1823, to be followed by more peaks in 1825, 1827, 1832 and 1842; these purchases can be traced back in the accounts, which show that the expenses for acquisitions were 13.986 q. (1823), 8147 q.(1832) and 8905 q. (1842). Most of the land was sold by the Ṭarbay family, sheiks of Tannūrīn.[37]

A similar pattern can be perceived in the accounts of Dayr Kfīfān. The years 1778-1799 still show a deficit, but from 1805 onwards the revenues from silk rapidly increased, and the balance in general became positive. In this period the expenses for land acquisition rose, too, peaking at 26.342 q. in 1814 and 24.874 in 1835. However, the monastery retained a debt throughout the prosperous years. The German traveller Seetzen, who visited the monastery in 1806, remarked that Dayr Kfīfān was extremely prosperous.[38]

Both monasteries were incorporated into the network of the Order, receiving "donations" from the superior-general, and providing financial support to other monasteries. Obviously, the taxes increased in the period under study; taxes paid by Dayr Kfīfān roughly increased from an average of 10% of the revenues in the 1790's to some 20% from 1805 onwards, a rise of 100%. The revenues themselves, however, increased from an average of 4000 q. in the 1790's to 9508 q. in the 1800's and 1810's, to 40.000 q. in the 1820's and 1830's. An explanation for this discrepancy could be the rapid rise of the silk prices in the first decades of the 18th century, since at both monasteries silk generally provided more than one half of the revenues.[39]

Little data is available on the relations between the Order and the *shurakā'* working on its estates. Apparently the labour force of the Order at first consisted of the growing numbers of its monks, but at an early stage peasants were attracted. To illustrate the relationship with the peasants, three *mushāraka* documents concerning the estate of Dayr Mār al-Yashaᶜ should be mentioned. In the first one (1748)

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[37] *Sijill* and accounts Dayr Ḥūb; about the Ṭarbay family, see Ṭarbay.

[38] Accounts Dayr Kfīfān; Kruse/Müller, vol. 1, p. 194.

[39] id., Dayr Ḥūb and Dayr Kfīfān; Seetzen mentions both Dayr Ḥūb and Dayr Kfīfān as prosperous, producing, respectively, 20-50 and 100 *ruṭl* silk; Kruse/Müller, vol. 1, pp. 190, 194.

it is stipulated that at the first harvest an assessment will be executed after which the *sharīk* will pay 1/4 of the value of the mulberry trees and keep 1/4 of the property and 1/2 of the harvest. In the second document (1760), which is more elaborate, the peasants pay 80 q. for 80 *ḥiml* and receive the same amount if the contract should be nullified. The crops (grapes, walnuts, wheat and silk) are shared equally between them and the monastery. A *mushāraka* document concerning the same estate, but dating from 1829, is still more elaborate. The crops of grapes and walnuts are shared, while 1/3 of the wheat is taken by the *sharīk*. The peasants pay for the seed and plant the mulberry trees. The silk harvest is shared, while the peasants pay 3 q. per *ḥiml* (*qīma al-rub*ᶜ *muwāraqa*). Taxes include a *mīrī* tax of 2 q. per *ūqiyya bazar* (20 *ḥiml*) and 1/2 of the costs of the silk worm eggs. The peasants have no property rights. Apparently the costs for the peasants increased, while, significantly, any rights of the peasants to parts of the land were rejected, indicating that the position of the peasants *vis-à-vis* the monastery had weakened.[40]

A word remains to be said about the crops which were produced on the Order's estates. From the various surveys it appears that the economic activities of the Order were variegated and included sericulture, wheat, grapes, olives, walnuts, honey, and cattle breeding. This variegated activity of course enhanced the economic basis of the Order, which was further strengthened by the acquisition of mills. The contracts show, however, that sericulture was seen as the essential activity, and that expansion was predominantly directed towards the planting of mulberry trees, or, in other words, at the intensification of the commercialized sector of agriculture.

The success of the economic performance of the Baladīs was partly due to the introduction of a central treasury, from which capital could be provided for indebted or newly acquired monasteries that needed investment. In this way the administration of the differentiated network of estates was brought into a single administrative framework which was more than able to compete with *muqāṭa*ᶜ*ajī* estates. The Order had its own channels for marketing their crops in the coastal towns where it owned dependencies (*unṭūsh*) and also utilized the services of middlemen. One might assume that the efficiency of this setup was likely to reduce the costs of labour and thus the production costs, though figures

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[40] Fahd, *Tārīkh*, vol. 7, pp. 266-267; see for the relations between the Billamaᶜ emirs and a Melkite monastery: Abou Rousse Slime.

on this are lacking. A report on the situation of the monastic orders in Mount Lebanon (1830) shows, nevertheless, that the Baladī branch was prospering, while the Ḥalabīs became impoverished.[41]

6.3 The Lebanese Order and the Khāzin sheiks

Although the Lebanese Order acquired some monasteries in Kisrawān (notably Dayr Ṭāmīsh, Dayr al-Luwayza and Dayr Shuwayyā), it is conspicuous that it developed relatively few relations with the Khāzin sheiks. As has been explained above, in the first decades of the 18th century, contacts with the Order were mainly limited to members of the Ḥalabī faction (al-Qarāᶜalī, Farḥāt, Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin), and although their claim to the diocese of Aleppo became increasingly contested, the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf al-Khāzin continued to uphold relations with the Ḥalabīs, by the foundation of a school in ᶜAjaltūn, and by the confirmation of the Ḥalabīs' rights to Dayr Sayyida al-Luwayza and Dayr Mār Shuwayyā. As has been argued above, however, the Ḥalabīs remained a marginal faction.

Contacts between the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh and the Order were strained from the beginning, partly since the former upheld contacts with the Ishᶜayyā Order. At the onset of the 18th century, the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh founded several monasteries in Kisrawān for the Ishᶜayyā Order and attempted to benefit from the gifts it received from the population. However, the Ishᶜayyās remained a small and marginal community, which stayed aloof from the upheavals that harrassed the clergy and did not become an economic force of any importance. Only a few cases of incidents between the Order and its Khāzin patrons are recorded.[42]

Some Khāzins did cooperate with the Baladīs for tactical purposes. Thus, vice-patriarch Mīkhā'īl al-Khāzin was supported by the Baladīs during the conflict over Yūsuf Isṭifān.[43] Moreover, there were Khāzins who joined the Order, and one of these even became superior-general. Simᶜān al-Khāzin (ibn Sālim ibn Junblāṭ) of the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf was *mudabbir* for several terms before he became superior-general in 1799 and, for a second time, in 1805. Little is known about Simᶜān, apart from his part in the plot during the patriarchal election in 1809. Signifi-

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[41] 'Relazione Dello Stato de' Monaci Marroniti,' *Acta*, vol. 193, ff. 466 ff.

[42] For the contacts between the Khāzins and the Ishᶜayyā Order, see: Baᶜabdātī, and documents in KHA1; Shaybān al-Khāzin, Khāzin/Masᶜad, vol. 3, p. 523.

[43] See above chapter 4.

cantly, the plot was frustrated partly by the new superior-general, who by doing so showed that he was in no way subservient to the Khāzins. Any other information on possible connections between his position and specific family interests in the Order or the church are lacking.[44]

It is no coincidence that most of the relations cited above mainly concern tactical alliances with no economic dimension. The economic expansion of the Baladīs occurred predominantly in the districts al-Matn, Jubayl and al-Batrūn, and their interests in Kisrawān were of relatively minor importance. It seems, however, that monks from Kisrawān and al-Matn—perhaps as a result of the first monastic revival in Kisrawān in the 17th century—still dominated the organizational board. This is revealed by an "insurrection" of monks in Jubayl which started in the 1830's. In 1844 these monks attacked monasteries in Jubayl in order to oust superiors who were not originally from Jubayl, and to put superiors from Jubayl in their places. They claimed that their number and positions were disproportionate, since the Order's wealth derived mainly from Jubayl.[45] This incident illustrates that the Baladīs defied the regional balance which had grown into the structure of the Maronite community.

Not surprisingly, the Order found it far more profitable to intensify their relations with the Shihāb emirs. After all, Yūsuf al-Shihāb had granted them the opportunities for expansion, and the cooperation was continued under Bashīr. In the 1830's the Order even operated a powder factory together with Bashīr. Significantly, at that time the Khāzins complained about the financial problems of the Ḥalabīs, whose administrative centre in Kisrawān (Dayr Sayyidat al-Luwayza) had become burdened by debts.[46]

6.4 The Lebanese Order and the concept of waqf

To conclude this chapter on the Lebanese Order, some remarks should be made about the way in which the Order relates to the general observations on waqfs in the Ottoman Empire which are given in the introductory paragraphs. Obviously, the purely juridical definition of waqf

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[44] Bulaybil, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 51, pp. 680, 691; id., *al-Mashriq*, vol. 52, pp. 25, 32, 48, 199, 211, 208, 349, 356, 540, 544, 548; Karam (1975), pp. 24, 198, 208, 213, 232.

[45] Ra'īs ʿĀmm and 3 *mud.* to Prop. (24-9-1844), *S.O.*, vol. 966, ff. 353-354; *Acta*, vol. 207, f. 383.

[46] 'Relazione,' *Acta*, vol. 193, ff. 466 ff.

is insufficient to comprehend the nature of the estates of the Lebanese Order, whose possessions were, nevertheless, generally considered to be waqfs. It seems more appropriate to suggest a broader approach stressing the socio-economic factors which shaped the implementation of waqf regulations and the administration and functioning of waqf properties.

Firstly, on the economic level, it seems obvious that the two main elements of the rationale of the waqf principle are prominently present in the history of the Lebanese Order: the preservation of properties and the creation of opportunities for investment and re-exploitation. The possessions of the Order fit smoothly into the general type of waqf administration, based on tax privileges, the revitalization of ruined waqf nuclei of estates, the upkeep of a money circuit to facilitate capital accumulation and investment, and protection against disintegration and uncontrolled alienation. In spite of legal variants, the economic aspects of the possessions of the Order did not differ essentially from their Islamic counterparts. What is more, as an economic phenomenon the growth of the Order seems to correspond to the interpretation of waqf as a "dynamic" device, more than to the suggestion that waqfs were a symptom of "stagnation" and the immobilization of capital and property. As has been argued above, however, in our view this corresponds with the function that waqfs could fulfill in certain circumstances: a capital reservoir which could be used to respond to economic transformations. Economic requirements tended to shape this practice to a large extent.

Secondly, the function of the Order as a waqf institution covered two fields. The supply of spiritual guidance and care for pious endowments made by widows, priests, sick and elderly people, etc. is obvious. From its economic strength, however, derived other functions. Firstly, as its possessions expanded, the Order provided the Maronite community with new economic opportunities, an expansion of the area under cultivation and a new framework for agriculture, which relieved some economic pressures, which lay beyond the power of the Maronite notables. Secondly, the Order gradually became the main source of revenue for the ideological apparatus of the Maronite community, as represented by the religious institutions and the clergy. The juridical and economic power wielded over the church and the clergy by the notables was gradually replaced by an independent organization which no longer needed the patronage of the traditionally powerful notables. Significantly, from the end of the 18th century, increasing pressure from the Baladī Order can

be perceived regarding the appointments of *muṭrān*s. The Order's influence among the clergy was secured by payments which were both regular and irregular.[47]

The Order's estates were not confined to a single domain, and thus could not easily be controlled by the notables. Moreover, the Order developed a structural cooperation with the Shihāb emirs, to their mutual advantage. While the monks enabled the emirs to strengthen their economic position, the Shihābs helped the Order to shake off lay tutelage and to develop an economic, juridical and administrative framework which could to some extent be dissociated from the traditional social structure of the Maronite community. As economic factors were more influential than legal rules, the Order represented a flexible force which was able to respond to and even engender change, as it was itself part of these changes.

Again, the Order fulfilled one of the vital functions of waqf institutions: it provided the economic basis for the reproduction of ideology and the preservation of that ideology as part of the realm of religion.

[47] Auvergne to Prop. (1-6-1834), *S.C.*, vol. 21, ff. 42-43; Bulaybil, vol. 3, p. 504; Ra'īs ʿĀmm to Prop. (18-5-1776), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 9, ff. 515-516; Fāḍil to Prop. (3-8-1782), *C.P.*, vol. 139, f. 438; documents about the role of the Order concerning the succession of Thābit (1833) in: *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 20.

CHAPTER SEVEN

REFORM

The council of al-Luwayza, which was convened in 1818, is usually seen as a landmark in the rapprochement between the Maronite church and the Vatican, which had been initiated by the Lebanese Council. For the first time serious endeavours were made to have the main reform measures implemented. Although the old controversies had by no means subsided and continued to throw obstacles in the way of the reformist faction, the balance of power had changed. This was due, firstly, to economic tendencies, which favoured an intensified exploitation of the agricultural lands, and, secondly, to developments in the political and administrative framework, both in the Ottoman Empire and in Mount Lebanon.

In this chapter the renewed attempts to implement the reform measures are studied, concentrating on the issues of the residences of the patriarch and the *muṭrān*s, and of the administration of waqfs, particularly the definition of patronage rights. Firstly, however, a short ouline of the situation of the judiciary as it developed under Bashīr al-Shihāb will be given, in the context of the reforming tendencies within the Ottoman administration.

7.1 Bashīr's legal reforms

For the Ottoman Empire, the 19th century was an age of reform which did not pass unnoticed by the Syrian provinces. One of the threats to the stability of the Empire was the uprising of the Wahhābīs in the Arabian peninsula, who, with their puritanic, revivalist Islamic fervour, acquired wide appeal among the population of the Arab provinces. Apart from military precautions to stem the advance of the Wahhābīs, attempts were made to adopt some of the general notions of the movement into the ideological orientation of the administration, in order to neutralize their impact. Thus, in 1807 Yūsuf Kanj Pasha was appointed governor of Damascus and proclaimed that he would revise his administration according to strict Islamic precepts. On the basis of this policy of "Islamization", the Pasha opened negotiations with the insur-

gents, which took the form of a debate on religious dogmas.[1]

The efforts at reform, which had a strongly religious flavour, especially in the Syrian provinces, also touched on the relations between Christian and Muslim subjects. In 1806 Sultan Selim III issued a firman in which he guaranteed the rights of the Christian communities as Ottoman subjects. In Syria governor Kanj Yūsuf issued his own directives concerning the restoration of the strict Islamic rules on the conduct and position of *dhimmī*s in the Syrian provinces. These included the rule that Christians were not allowed to build new churches or to repair religious structures near mosques.[2] These tendencies, which combined a centralization of control over religious minorities according to Islamic principles with a policy aimed at safeguarding the minorities against any infringement of their formal and traditional rights, naturally affected the administration of Mount Lebanon. As early as 1799 Bashīr was urged to adhere to Islamic Law as the basis for the judiciary in the whole Mountain, which forced him to abolish certain privileges to which the Maronites had traditionally grown accustomed. Although complications might be expected, the measure did not contradict Bashīr's policies, and the emir set about to comply with his instructions.[3]

In the 18th century legal cases had normally been dealt with by the Druze qadi, who acted as the chief judge of al-Shūf and its dependencies, and who even endorsed transactions or decided cases between the Maronite prelates themselves. Shortly after the Lebanese Council the clergy decided that *muṭrān*s would henceforth be allowed to act as judges in their diocese. In 1785, Yūsuf al-Shihāb had appointed the Melkite *muṭrān* Jirmānūs Ādam as a judge for the Maronites of Mount Lebanon, a measure that reflected his wish to centralize the judiciary. The Shihāb emirs Ḥaydar, Qaᶜdān and Bashīr adopted the practice of formally confirming the judicial powers of the Maronite patriarch. This constituted only a formalization of existing practice, since the clergy, and especially the patriarch, had enjoyed judicial power. The restrictions on their jurisdiction had been agreed upon by the Maronites themselves: *muṭrān*s only had jurisdiction in their own diocese; and the Khāzin sheiks were allowed to choose the judges of their preference. Under emir Bashīr the formalities of confirming the judicial authority of Maronite clergy went one step further, as he formally appointed *muṭrān*s as "judges of Mount

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[1] Shihābī (1933), pp. 523-525, 534.
[2] Shihābī (1933), pp. 523-525; Nawwār, p. 172.
[3] Ḥubaysh to Prop. (29-9-1826), *S.C./Mar.*, 18, ff. 525-526.

Lebanon". Apparently, during the 18th and 19th centuries it remained customary to ask fetwas on legal issues from the mufti of Beirut. In 1821 the *muqāṭaᶜajī* families drafted a document providing for two judges in Mount Lebanon, one Maronite and one Druze.[4]

In 1826 patriarch Ḥubaysh dispatched a letter to the Propaganda in which he addressed the legal complications deriving from the strict application of Islamic Law, or in his terminology, "Civil Law". He stated that since 1799 the Maronite qadis had been used to administer justice on the basis of the Islamic Sharia in civil cases (*daᶜāwī madaniyya*), except in cases concerning faith (*īmān*) and traditional customs (*adab*). Previously, jurisdiction had been founded, according to him, on al-Qarāᶜalī's codex, the prescriptions of the Lebanese Council and the concepts (*iṣṭilāḥāt*) accepted by both Christian and Islamic Law. Moreover, the community had accepted the practice of qadis appointed by the emirs, even in the case of Jirmānūs Ādam, who was not a Maronite.[5]

In a second letter the patriarch asked the Propaganda if it would be legitimate for the Maronites to accept the predominance of Turkish "Civil Law" in Mount Lebanon. He himself did not expect any major difficulties since, according to him, both Turkish Law and Church Law derived ultimately from Justinian Law, and thus were similar in purport. He suggested that the Propaganda should not oppose the implementation of the measure. Significantly, in 1803 the Propaganda had already informed patriarch Yūsuf al-Tiyyān that, as a rule, the Church advised the acceptation of the supremacy of secular, local legislation, and that, in consequence, the Maronites should accept the implementation of Turkish Law. Eventually some graduates from the College of ᶜAyn Warqa were sent to study Islamic Law, and in 1826 Jibrā'īl al-Nāṣirī was appointed as "civil" judge of the Maronites.[6]

Two complications emerged in connection with the initiatives towards judicial reform. Firstly, as has been observed by others, the new regulations were an infringement of the inheritance regulations adopted by the Maronites, as henceforth female descendants were to inherit one half of the share of male inheritants, whereas Maronite custom had only allowed daughters a trousseau (*jihāz*) and no inheritance rights. It was feared

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[4] Ziyāda, pp. 59-61, 64-66; see the numerous fetwas in KHA.1 and KHA.2; Patr. and muṭrāns to Khāzins (11-9-1747), Patr. Arch., Coll., *S. ᶜAwwād*, no. 42.

[5] Ḥubaysh to Prop. (29-9-1826), *S.C./Mar.*, vol 18, ff. 525-526; Isṭifān to Nāṣirī (1819), in: 'al-Sharᶜ al-Masīḥī fi Lubnan,' *al-Majalla al-Sūriyya*, vol. 4, p. 366.

[6] Ḥubaysh to Prop. (10-4-1831), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 19, f. 751; Prop. to Tiyyān (1803), in: 'al-Sharᶜ al-Masīḥī,' *al-Majalla al-Sūriyya*, vol. 4, p. 369; id., vol. 4, p. 373.

that the new arrangement would lead to a fragmentation of estates, and wealthy landowners soon began to donate their estates to their sons during their lifetime. This *hiba* was only valid with a transfer of the right of disposal, which they were forced to concede. This device resulted in conflicts and to the impoverishment of elderly people, and fueled Maronite grievances against the predominance of Islamic Law.[7]

A second, less structural, complication occurred when the Maronite qadi, *muṭrān* Jibrā'īl al-Nāṣirī, was appointed superior of Dayr Mār Shalīṭā in 1826 at the request of its patrons, the Muḥāsib family. Voices were raised in protest at the fact that Jibrā'īl would have to combine this function with that of judge. It was feared that the monastery, which was inhabited by women, would become more or less a public building, endangering the segregation of the nuns. More importantly, the concern was expressed that Jibrā'īl's double responsibilty would eventually draw the administration of Maronite waqfs into the realm of Islamic jurisprudence, thus risking the abolishment of traditional privileges enjoyed by the Maronites, in accordance with the Islamic prohibition of waqfs founded for the maintenance of clerical buildings and clergymen. Patriarch Ḥubaysh, however, was not impressed by these objections, and instead pointed out the advantages, since the Maronites would not have to resort to the Islamic courts in Sidon, Beirut and Tripoli. The nomination of Jibrā'īl was subsequently endorsed by the Propaganda.[8]

The debate on this sensitive issue was a reflection of the conflicting tendencies in this period. The implementation of Islamic Law was connected to the centralizing efforts of the Ottoman state which were probably acclaimed by Bashīr as a means of achieving a greater uniformity within his *iltizām* and to foster its integration into the Ottoman administrative structure. It was accepted by the patriarch in a period when ties with the Vatican were stronger than ever, and only after consulting the Propaganda on the fundamental aspects. Therefore, the patriarch acted from a position of strength, and any formal expansion of the domain of Islamic jurisprudence was by now balanced by increased coordination with Rome. The attitude of the patriarch reveals

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[7] Ḥubaysh to Prop. (29-9-1826), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 18, f. 525; Ḥubaysh to Prop. (1827), in: Qar'ālī (1929), 'al-Sharʿ al-Masīḥī,' *al-Majalla al-Sūriyya*, vol. 4, p. 367.

[8] Thābit to Prop. (3-11-1827), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 18, f. 748; Thābit to Prop. (15-3-1831), id., vol. 19, f. 603; Ḥubaysh to Prop. (4-7-1828), id., vol. 19, f. 23; Tiyyān to Prop. (5-6-1802), id., vol. 15, f. 145; 'Relazione,' 'Mgr. Losana Risponde...' and 'Lettera scritta dal P. A. Habisci,' in: *Acta*, vol. 193, ff. 26, 38-40, 53-54; Muḥāsibs to Prop. (3-3-1827), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 18, f. 626; Prop. to B. al-Shihāb (8-5-1830), *L.D.B.*, vol. 311, f. 343; Isṭifān to Nāṣirī (10-9-1819), in: 'al-Sharʿ al-Masīḥī,' *al-Majalla al-Sūriyya*, vol. 4, p. 366.

a firm confidence in the co-operation of emir Bashīr, who, in turn, had good relations with the Propaganda in Rome. The main opposition to the Islamization of the judiciary seems to have come from the Maronite notable families, who resented the Islamic rules of inheritance in particular.[9]

The frictions over the issue of judicial reform show that a new constellation had appeared, represented by Bashīr, the patriarch and an emerging Maronite elite, who strove to incorporate existing practices into a formalized legal system, which suggests that a process of change was perceived in which certain groups wanted to consolidate their newly acquired prerogatives. This may explain why Bashīr, as well as the Junblāṭ sheiks and some Maronite notables in the first decades of the 19th century, urged the clergy to renew the attempts to restore order in Maronite church affairs and, moreover, why the clergy and some of the notables were prepared to accept a renewed reform initiative, especially in the field of monastic properties. Apparently, the atmosphere was now favourable for reform, within the community as well as in the wider context of secular administration, and in close coordination with the Propaganda a renewed initiative was launched.

7.2 Renewed attempts at reform

Although the council of Bkirkī, held in 1790 under the supervision of Jirmānūs Ādam, succeeded in bringing a protracted period of turmoil within the Maronite church to a close, conflicts were by no means over. Ādam had succesfully warded off an attempt by the Maronite notables, especially the Khāzin sheiks, to reimpose their control over the clergy, but even after the council the resistance of the Khāzins had not been subdued. The Khāzin sheiks are reported to have threatened Jirmānūs Ādam and other clergymen in order to have the decisions of the council reversed, and even apart from this the short reigns of the patriarchs Jumayyil (1794), Fāḍil (1796) and al-Tiyyān (1796-1809) were not uneventful. Still, after the council of Bkirkī the concern of the Vatican came to be concentrated on one issue which had been considered a fundamental part of the reform process: the partition of the double monasteries. Renewed efforts were undertaken by the patriarchs al-Ḥilū

[9] Ḥubaysh to Prop. (29-9-1826), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 18, f. 525; population of Kisrawān to Prop. (1816), in: Ziyāda, p. 58, nt. 1; id., pp. 56-58, and KHA1.

(1809-1823) and Yūsuf Ḥubaysh (1823-1845), in cooperation with papal envoy Luigi Gandolfi.[10]

As has been observed above, monasteries in Mount Lebanon were not legally independent institutions, but embedded in a complicated setting of administrative relations, which involved the church hierarchy, lay patrons and their overlords. Any reform attempt was therefore bound to touch on various, sometimes contradicting, interests. Firstly, the patronage rights of the founding or patronizing families, in the light of historical legal documents and the regulations of the Lebanese Council, had to be taken into account; secondly, any restructuring of the organizational system could only be implemented with the agreement of the *muṭrāns*, especially in the case of monasteries which were designated as episcopal residences. As in both instances a status quo had evolved which had been shaped more by power struggles than by the application of formal legal rules, the prospects for a harmonious completion of the proceedings seemed dark.

At the close of the 18th century and the onset of the 19th century the Propaganda repeatedly sent exhortations to the patriarch to resume the reform process. These pleas became ever more acute as conflicts between patronizing families over contradictory claims increased, and no agreement could be reached about the residence of the patriarch. The Propaganda entrusted papal envoy Gandolfi with the task of seeing to the implementation of the regulations of the Lebanese Council, but it urged him to be sure to respect valid patronage claims, in order to soothe the opposition of the Maronite notables. What is more, the Propaganda proposed that a general survey of patronage privileges be carried out and that claimants should have the opportunity to present their documents to a council in order to have their patronage rights confirmed. This was a resourceful approach, as patronizing families might be willing to accept the reforms in exchange for an official confirmation of their rights.[11]

The challenge was again taken on by patriarch Yuḥannā al-Ḥilū, who in 1814 began to rally support for a monastic reorganization. He started by consulting emir Bashīr, his *katkhudā*, the Maronite sheik al-Daḥdāḥ, and, significantly, sheik Bashīr Junblāṭ. The patriarch suggested having

[10] Benjamino to Prop. (9-4-1791), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 14, f. 167.

[11] Gandolfi to Prop. (5-4-1807), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 15, f.338; Decree Prop. (12-8-1816), id., vol. 16, f. 518; Breve Pius VII (12-8-1816), id., vol. 16, ff. 522-526; Prop. to Ḥilū (29-3-1817), *L.D.B.*, vol. 298, f. 167; Istruzioni di S.C. di P.F. al. P.F. El-Gemaiel (1796), Anaissi (1921), p. 165; id. (1911), p. 365.

the *muṭrān*s moved to fixed residences within the confines of their dioceses, and removing the nuns from the mixed monasteries and accommodating them in five monasteries, whose superiors were to be appointed by himself. This proposal was accepted by some of the superiors and *muṭrān*s, but was rejected by others, notably Isṭifān al-Khāzin (Damascus; Dayr Mār Mūsā Ballūna), Anṭūn al-Khāzin (Baalbek; Dayr Sayyidat Baqlūsh), Mīlān al-Khāzin (superior of Dayr Sayyidat al-Bizāz) Mīkhā'īl Fāḍil (Beirut; Dayr Ḥarrāsh) and Jirmānūs Thābit (Jubayl and al-Batrūn; Dayr Mār Shalīṭā). These *muṭrān*s claimed that they resided in "family waqfs" (*awqāf ahliyya*) and that their rights over the monasteries had been affirmed by the legitimate patrons, who had thus acknowledged their supervision. The patriarch then suggested that the *muṭrān*s move to a monastery in their diocese, but retain their legal rights over the financial administration and the spiritual direction of *ahlī* monasteries under their authority. According to a report by the Ḥalabī superior-general (1814) this proposal "could only have been inspired by those with material interests in church properties". The refractory *muṭrān*s, however, rejected the compromise.[12]

The Khāzin sheiks, too, were quick to react. In 1814 they sent two letters to the Propaganda accusing the patriarch of trying to ruin the monasteries, of vilifying their daughters and ruining the family with his oppressive measures. They referred to their long-standing services rendered to the Maronite community and requested the Propaganda to take over the supervision from the patriarch. They claimed that the monasteries had already been reorganized twice and that the estates were the property of their family and had been founded for the convenience of their daughters and sons who aspired to the monastic life. If another reorganization was inevitable, they pledged their obedience, but they were not prepared to accept ruin. At the same time eight superiors of monasteries in Kisrawān expressed their willingness to submit to the orders of the Vatican and the *muṭrān*s concerning the implementation of the Lebanese Council's regulations for monastic estates.[13]

In December 1814 the patriarch sent a dispatch to the Propaganda

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[12] Simʿān to Prop. (10-11-1814), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 16, f. 170; Ḥilū to Prop., id., ff. 293-294; Isṭifān to Prop. (15-1-1818), id., vol. 17, f. 284; *Acta*, vol. 166 (1796), f. 16; id., vol. 163 (1793), ff. 125-126; B. Junblāṭ to Prop. (n.d.), KHA1; B. Junblāṭ to Khāzins (n.d.), Hīshī, vol. 2, p. 76.

[13] Khāzins to Prop. (5-10-1814), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 16, ff. 187, 191; Khāzins to Prop. (9-11-1814), id., vol. 16, f. 165; Khāzins to Prop. (15-4-1817), id., vol. 17, f. 107; Ḥājj Sulaymān to Prop. (s.d.), id., vol. 17, f. 240; Khāzins to Prop. (1-2-1818), id., vol. 17, f. 313; superiors mon. Kisrawān to Prop. (15-10-1814), id., vol. 16, ff. 132, 197.

to clarify his policy. He recalled that the partition of the monasteries had been initiated by Yūsuf al-Simᶜānī after the Lebanese Council, and that eight years later Patriarch Simᶜān ᶜAwwād had been ordered by the Propaganda to continue the execution of the task. In spite of professed support, some *muṭrān*s refused to leave their mixed monasteries. Appeals to Yūsuf Isṭifān, Jirmānūs Ādam and Yūṣuf al-Tiyyān went unheeded, while efforts by himself were thwarted by the four *muṭrān*s mentioned above, who, moreover, took recourse to the secular notables. The patriarch proceeded to suggest the following course: mixed monasteries should be abolished and some of them should be converted into schools; the *muṭrān*s should be forced by threat of deposition to choose a residence within their diocese, although some *muṭrān*s (Thābit) might be inclined to abandon their diocese to be able to stay in their monasteṛy; a letter should be sent to emir Bashīr to secure his support for the implementation of the reforms; finally, and perhaps paradoxically, a decree should be issued forbidding clergymen of any rank from seeking the intervention of secular notables.[14]

The patriarch supplemented his proposal with a categorization by size of the monasteries in question: five large monasteries, including Dayr Mār Sarkīs wa-Bākhūs; six medium-sized monasteries; and finally thirteen small monasteries, including Sayyidat al-Bizāz, Sayyidat Baqlūsh and Mār Mūsā Ballūna. The latter two were the sees of, respectively, the *muṭrans* Anṭūn al-Khāzin and Isṭifān al-Khāzin, who could not easily be removed due to the resistance of the Khāzin sheiks. The patriarch therefore proposed to deprive these monasteries of the designation and status (*sharaf*) of "monastery" (*dayr*) and to consider them henceforth as "retirement homes" (*maḥfaẓ*; Italian: *ritiro*) for the elderly and unmarried female family members. In this way the Khāzin sheiks would retain the full authority over their waqfs, without obstructing the implementation of the reform efforts. The Khāzin sheiks were willing to accept this solution.

Concerning the administration of the monasteries allocated to women, the patriarch presented another proposition: a. the college of Dayr al-Rūmiyya was to be placed under the immediate supervision of the patriarch and the Propaganda by papal decree, which should confirm, too, that the *arzāq* may only be sold or pawned in a case of extreme necessity (*lāzim*, *ḍarūrī*) with the consent of the patriarch and the *muṭrān*s;

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[14] Ḥilū to Prop. (5-12-1814), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 16, f. 270; Ḥilū to Prop. (5-12-1814), id., vol. 16, ff. 293-296; letter by *muṭrān*s (12-9-1744), id., vol. 16, ff. 297, 298.

b. a separate compound (*maḥall ḥājiz*) should be built at the four monasteries; c. the nuns were to receive their provisions (*maʿāsh*) from the monastery on the condition that they accepted the arrangements; those who refused would be deprived of their status as "nun" (*sharaf rāhiba*) and would be allowed to resume a secular life; d. spiritual guidance was to be the responsibility of the patriarch and the *muṭrān* of the diocese; e. every year the superior was to present the financial accounts to the patriarch and the *muṭrān*; he may only alienate properties (*arzāq*) with their consent.[15]

The Propaganda responded to these propositions by insisting on the execution of the partition, demanding, however, that a council be convened to examine the claims of lay patrons and to demarcate the respective authority of the patriarch, the *muṭrān* and the patrons. According to apostolic envoy Gandolfi, these instructions irritated the patriarch, who refused to convene a council for fear that this would deprive him of the freedom to control the reform procedures. Gandolfi described the patriarch as eager to appropriate the authority over the monasteries, while at the same time complaining of the lack of support from the papal envoy himself, the *muṭrān*s and the patrons. The notables resumed their opposition to the patriarch and appealed to the emir and sheik Bashīr Junblāṭ, who reprimanded al-Ḥilū. Eventually, however, the sheik sent him a letter allowing him to reform the monasteries as he liked, on condition that the rights of third parties were not impaired. The patrons now raised their voices *en masse* in protest in order to force Bashīr Junblāṭ to withdraw his endorsement. At this stage Gandolfi intervened to explain to the most influential Khāzin sheiks, the *muṭrān*s and the superiors that no violation of their rights was envisaged. According to Gandolfi this clarification satisfied all parties, who now restricted themselves to requesting a confirmation of his policy from the Propaganda.[16]

Next, the papal envoy presented his own reform proposals:

a. Mār Shalīṭā would be allocated to women in perpetuity, under the jurisdiction of Jirmānūs Thābit for the duration of his life, in accordance with the documents; the patrons were to retain the right to present a candidate for the function of superior, who would have to be approved

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[15] Large monasteries: Mār ʿAbdā Harhariyya, Dayr Sayyidat al-Ḥaqla, Dayr Rayfūn, Dayr Mār Jirjis al-Rūmiyya, Dayr Mār Shalīṭā; medium: Mār Yuḥannā Ḥarrāsh, Mār Jirjis Bikfayyā, Mār Rūḥānā, Mār Anṭūniyūs Buqʿātā, Mār Ilyās Ballūna, Mār Yūsuf al-Ḥusn; Ḥilū to Prop. (5-12-1814), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 16, ff. 293-6.

[16] Gandolfi to Prop. (10-1-1818), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 17, ff. 273 ff.; B. Junblāṭ to Khāzins (1821), Hīshī, vol. 2, p. 76.

by the *muṭrān*. The latter was to appoint the spiritual director without consulting the patrons, and had the right of visitation according to Canon Law; however, Thābit's residence was to be in the diocese of Jubayl and al-Batrūn and after his death the monastery was to revert to the *muṭrān* of the diocese;

b. Mār ʿAbdā Harhariyya would similarly be reserved for women; the monks would have to move to another monastery yet to be built; superior Yūsuf Āṣāf, who had the *ius patronatus*, would retain his function during his lifetime; the *muṭrān* was to appoint the spiritual director and, after the death of the present superior, would appoint the new superior with the consent of "the other patrons" (the Khāzin family); if a capable cleric of the Āṣāf family was available, then he would be given preference;

c. Sayyidat al-Ḥaqla would be reserved for women, and Mūsā Dīb, having the patronage rights, would remain superior until his death; after his demise the *muṭrān* of the diocese was to appoint the superior with a preference for members of the Dīb family; the appointment of the spiritual director would be reserved for the *muṭrān*; the monks should be moved to Dayr Mastītā, a dependency of Dayr al-Ḥaqla, whose superior used to appoint the administrator of Dayr Mastītā;

d. Sayyidat Baqlūsh, which belonged to the Khāzin sheiks, would be inhabited exclusively by women, under the jurisdiction of the *muṭrān* of the diocese, who was to confirm the nomination of the superior with a preference for members of the Khāzin family;

e. Sayyidat al-Bizāz, where only two nuns of the Khāzin family lived, was to be abolished; the nuns were to be moved to Sayyidat Baqlūsh, of their own free will and with the agreement of their relatives; the possessions and the building would be incorporated into the estate of Sayyidat Baqlūsh, as this also belonged to the Khāzin family;

f. Mār Ilyās Ballūna was to be reserved for the nuns under the administration of the present superior Jirmānūs al-Khāzin. In future the Khāzin patrons were to present the candidates to the *muṭrān* for approval; the latter would also appoint the spiritual director; the monks working on the land would be allowed to stay, provided that the storage room, refectory and kitchen were divided off, with no communication with the women's compound;

g. Mār Anṭūniyūs Buqʿātā was to become the residence of the *muṭrān* of Damascus with the consent of the patrons, the sheiks *awlād* Abī Kanʿān al-Khāzin, whose rights were to remain untouched; the four aged nuns may stay in the monastery until their demise;

h. similar arrangements were proposed for other monasteries in Kisrawān, such as Mār Jirjis ʿAlmā (Ḥubaysh family), Mār Yūsuf al-Ḥuṣn (school; Shanayʿī), Mār Jirjis al-Rūmiyya (school; Ṣfayr), and for Mār Ḍūmīṭ (monks; Daḥdāḥ family), and monasteries in al-Matn.

All the women's monasteries would be subject to strict *clausura*; the superiors were to be appointed every three years; the patriarch would preserve overall supervision.[17]

Gandolfi added a scheme for the distribution of the episcopal sees:

Aleppo: the city of Aleppo; Tripoli: the Khāzin *muṭrān* Ighnāṭiyūs could stay in his monastery; after his death a priest from the diocese would be ordained in order to facilitate the choice of a fixed see; Jubayl and al-Batrūn: the college of Mār Yuḥannā Mārun; Baalbek: Mār Sarkīs wa-Bākhūs in Rayfūn, after the nuns had been removed and a superior of the Mubārak family had been appointed; these, after all, had *a* (*sic*) right of patronage; Damascus: Mār Anṭūniyūs Buqʿātā; Cyprus: the college of Qurna Shahwān; Beirut: the town of Beirut; *muṭrān* Mīkhā'īl Fāḍil would, however, retain the jurisdiction over Dar Ḥarrāsh; after his death the monastery was to revert to the *muṭrān* of the diocese; Sidon and Tyre: preserved for the patriarch *pro tempore*.[18]

At the instigation of emir Bashīr, the Daḥdāḥ sheiks and the Junblāṭ sheiks, the opposition against the projected council which would study these proposals was overcome, and in 1818 the clergy met in Dayr Sayyidat al-Luwayza and formally ratified the reform proposals of Gandolfi. However, as in previous instances, formal decisions were only a distant reflection of reality. Rome refused to acknowledge the exceptional arrangements which had been conceived for the monasteries of the Khāzins, while the sheiks themselves, in turn, adamantly refused to relinquish any of their traditional prerogatives concerning the monasteries they considered to be their property. The Khāzin *muṭrān*s proceeded to walk out of the session. In a letter to the Propaganda Gandolfi expressed his fear that the delay would endanger the cooperation of emir Bashīr, who had delegated the matter to his *mudabbir*s, and that the patrons would succeed in bribing him, "as in these countries money is the heart of everything". He complained about the patriarch, who harboured the illusion that he could force his way and appropriate all powers, to the exclusion of the *muṭrān*s and patrons. Finally, he criticized the patriarch for having no eye to the rights of patrons and risking the ruin of the monasteries.

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[17] Gandolfi to Prop. (10-1-1818), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 17, ff. 273-278; *Acta*, vol. 182 (1819), ff. 1-17.

[18] Gandolfi to Prop. (10-1-1818), *S.C./Mar*, vol. 17, ff. 277-278.

He proposed to take the affair in his own hands, as apostolic delegate. Procedures focused on two issues: the choice of the fixed residences for the patriarch and the *muṭrān*s; and the patronage rights of laymen.[19]

7.2.1 *The question of the patriarchal see*

The question of fixed residences for the patriarch and the *muṭrān*s was complex and covered frictions both in the field of clerical and in the field of secular administration. The residence of the patriarch was the most sensitive issue, since the monastery of Qannūbīn seemed to have become an anachronism during the 18th century, when the political and economic centre of the community shifted to Kisrawān. Patriarch Yaᶜqūb ᶜAwwād had been the last patriarch to reside in Jabbat Bsharrī; his successors had all preferred other residences, in accordance with their interests in the framework of the relations between the notables and the church. From the end of the 18th century on, the population of Jabbat Bsharrī became dissatisfied with this situation and attempted to have the patriarchal see returned to Qannūbīn. Their demand was strengthened by the fact that the administration of Yūsuf al-Shihāb had enhanced the Maronites' freedom of manoeuvre.[20]

During the patriarchate of Yaᶜqūb ᶜAwwād, the affairs of the patriarchal see were partly entrusted to a certain Ṭarbayh al-Shadrāwī, who arranged for the collection of the *mīrī* and acted as a go-between in any dealings with the governor of Tripoli. He was also employed as dragoman by the French consul of Tripoli. Apparently, he was succeeded by his son, Fransīs, but, as has been explained in chapter 4, the Khāzins arranged for a *wakīl* of the patriarchal see in 1726, who operated under their care. In 1733 the administration was taken over by Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin, who was replaced by Ilyās Muḥāsib, but resumed his function in 1747. After Ṭūbiyā's death in 1765, patriarch Yūsuf Isṭifān pleaded with the French consul to have, once again, a dragoman for the French appointed with a fixed salary, with the task of administering the patriarchal see and of representing the Maronite community before the governor of Tripoli. Due to the turmoil during his patriarchate his request came to

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[19] Gandolfi to Prop. (15-12-1818), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 17, ff. 384-386; decisions of Luwayza, id., vol. 17, ff. 515-519; Prop. to Ḥilū (29-3-1817), *L.D.B.*, vol. 298, ff. 166-173; Prop. to Khāzins (29-3-1817), id., vol. 298, ff. 160-163; Hefele, pp. 309 ff., 479 ff.; Fahd (1975), pp. 262 ff.

[20] Pop. Bsharrī to Prop. (25-8-1783), *S.C/Mar.*, vol. 12, f. 205; Anchese to Boschi (23-4-1772), id., vol. 8, ff. 13-14.

nothing. At the end of the century, the worldly affairs of the patriarchal see were entrusted to Yuḥannā al-Ḥilū, and, probably after his election as patriarch, to Jirmānūs Thābit.[21]

The function of administrator of the patriarchal see could be profitable. As has been noted above, *muṭrān* Ilyās Muḥāsib used his function to build a network of financial connections with the monasteries and *muṭrāns* in order to enhance his power within the clerical hierarchy. Ṭūbiyā only succeeded in contracting debts during his term. Yūsuf Isṭifān was accused of using the revenues of the patriarchal see to finance his own monastery in Kisrawān. A subsequent investigation of the accounts by Jirmānūs Ādam showed, however, that this accusation was unfounded. Under Yūsuf al-Tiyyān a financial arrangement was devised to pay back the patriarch's debt to the patriarchal see: Yuḥannā al-Ḥilū was to administer the diocese of Tyre and Sidon, normally the preserve of the patriarch, annually remitting 650 q. to the patriarchal see; in this way the debt could be paid back in twelve years. Jirmānūs Thābit, finally, used his personal capital to cover the deficit of the estate of Qannūbīn.[22]

One of the monasteries which was mentioned in the second half of the 18th century as a possible fixed see for the patriarch was Dayr Sayyidat Bkirkī in Kisrawān. This monastery, which had been transferred by the Khāzin sheiks to the Ishᶜayyā Order in 1735, had been bought from them in 1750 by *muṭrān* Jirmānūs Saqr, with the consent of the Khāzin sheiks, in order to be handed over to the newly founded Order of the Sacred Heart. The estate of the monastery was subsequently extended with capital provided by the Maronite community of Aleppo. After the suppression of Hindiyya's Order and the reinstallation of patriarch Yūsuf Isṭifān, it was suggested that Dayr Bkirkī should be considered to be one of the patriarchal residences, after Qannūbīn, and that the church administration would be concentrated there. The Vatican was willing to consider this option. At this stage, however, the Ishᶜayyā Order started a procedure contesting the legitimacy of the purchase of the monastery, and claimed that the estate had been forcibly taken from

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[21] Patr. Arch., Coll., *Isṭifān II*, no. 230; *Duwayhī*, no. 25; Poullard to Pontchartrain (1705), Ismail (1975-), vol. 3, p. 272; Qannūbīn was handed over to the Lebanese Order for a short period (1742-1744): Patr. Arch., Coll., *S. ᶜAwwād*, no. 7; Isṭifān to Prop. (16 adhar 1767), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 8, f. 345; id., id., vol. 8, ff. 929-930.

[22] Patr. Arch., Coll., *Tiyyān*, no. 22; *S. ᶜAwwād*, nos. 96, 125; accounts D. Qannūbīn (30-1-1807; 1-10-1807), *Tiyyān*, nos. 193, 195; A. Shukrī to Prop (1-5-1779), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 10, f. 616; Y. Isṭifān to Prop. (16-3-1767), id., vol. 8, f. 345; Ra'īs ᶜĀmm to Boschi (23-4-1772), id., vol. 8, 813-814; Muṭrāns to Prop. (30-8-1773), *C.P.*, vol. 138, f. 595.

them and should now be restored. Circumstances such as these, and claims by some Khāzin sheiks that the monastery should revert to them, meant that the decision to convert Dayr Bkirkī into an official patriarchal see was not realized. In 1816 sheik Bān al-Khāzin complained about this, claiming that the indecisiveness had led to the ruin of the estate and asking the Propaganda to reconsider the issue.[23]

In 1808 the *muṭrān*s collectively proposed to designate Dayr Mār Shalīṭā in Kisrawān as the new patriarchal see. They argued that Qannūbīn was too far away from the *muṭrān*s, while Mār Shalīṭā was conveniently built and located. Conditions included that the nuns be removed, that the income of the estate be destined for the patriarchal see and that strict regulations be adopted against the alienation of possessions. Moreover, an arrangement with the monastery's patrons, the Muḥāsib family, should be concluded allowing impoverished family members to receive financial support from the revenues of the estate. The proposal was supported by papal envoy Gandolfi and sheik Bishāra al-Khāzin. The choice of Dayr Mār Shalīṭā was inspired by the fact that in 1788 the monastery had been handed over to Yūsuf al-Tiyyān, who kept it as his see after his election as patriarch in 1798. After al-Tiyyān had moved out, the administrator of the monastery, Jirmānūs Thābit, claimed that he had incurred a debt of 30.000 q.[24]

Upon al-Tiyyān's election to the patriarchate, Jirmānūs Thābit was appointed superior of Mār Shalīṭā by a transfer (*taslīm sharᶜī*) from al-Tiyyān. The transaction was endorsed by Haykal, Asbar, Jallāb and Fransīs al-Khāzin, who stated that the monastery had been erected by the "donations and effort" of their ancestors, and that now the administration of "their" monastery was to be transferred (*taslīm sharᶜī*) to Thābit, who was also to receive the exclusive right of disposal of the estate. At the same time, al-Tiyyān issued a more detailed document containing a transfer (*taslīm sharᶜī muṭlaq)* and authorizing Thābit to assume the administration, including both the spiritual and the material welfare. All registers and money were to be under the control of Thābit and Yuḥannā

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[23] Documents on Dayr Bkirkī: *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 7, ff. 49-60; Ḥajjār to Prop. (31-7-1783), id., vol. 12, f. 192; Maṭar to Prop. (28-8-1781), id., vol. 11, f. 371; Diyāb etc. to Prop. (1-3-1773), *C.P.*, vol. 138, f. 239; *Acta*, vol. 166 (1796), ff. 13, 15; Bān al-Khāzin to Prop. (10-9-1816), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 16, f. 533; Khāzin sheiks to Prop. (1-1-1781), id., vol. 11, ff. 199-200; Muṭrāns to Ḥilū, id., vol. 1, f. 620; 'Iḥtijāj raᶜiya Ḥalab,' Patr. Arch., Coll. *Isṭifān I*, no. 94.

[24] Gandolfi to Prop. (18-6-1811), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 15, f. 482; Gandolfi to Prop. (10-1-1818), id., vol. 17, ff. 273-275; Gandolfi to Prop. (6-1809), id., vol. 15, f. 405; *muṭrān*s to Prop. (1808), id., vol. 16, f. 291; Ḥilū to Prop. (5-12-1814), id., vol. 16, f. 295.

al-Ḥilū, the *wakīl* of the patriarchal see. An account of the revenues and expenses of the estate was to be presented in two years' time.[25]

The position of Jirmānūs Thābit was confirmed by the *muṭrān*s and Luigi Gandolfi in 1809. It was explicitly stipulated that under no condition should the monastery become a patriarchal residence. Patriarch al-Ḥilū issued a confirmation of Thābit's rights according to the rules of the Lebanese Council in accordance with the authority of the *muṭrān* over the monasteries in his diocese. He was authorized to appoint the superior and the *murshid* and control the accounts, without the interference of the patriarch. This arrangement would, as far as the patriarch was concerned, not be altered in the case of a decree (*iᶜlām*) from the Propaganda. However, the patriarch specified Dayr Mār Yuḥannā Mārūn as the formal see of the diocese of Jubayl and al-Batrūn. Thābit would retain the right to visit Dayr Mār Shalīṭā whenever he wished.[26]
Apparently, Thābit agreed to comply with the patriarch's wishes, on the condition that the decision be confirmed by the *muṭrān*s. According to one source the patriarch offered Thābit 50.000 q. and vainly sought the support of the Maronite *mudabbir*s of the emir.[27]

In spite of pleas by Gandolfi (1819) and Bishāra al-Khāzin (1818), the Propaganda refused to recognize the monastery as a patriarchal see and reserved this status for Qannūbīn. In 1811 Patriarch Yuḥannā al-Ḥilū settled in Qannūbīn and restored its *arzāq* to resume the production of silk and make the estate profitable again. Patriarch Ḥubaysh finally resolved the matter by taking both Dayr Qannūbīn and Dayr Bkirkī as his official residences.[28]

7.2.2 *The episcopal residences*

The discussions concerning the patriarchal see show the complexity of the issues involved in the administration of the monasteries. The case of the episcopal residences was perhaps even more complex, since in

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[25] Documents Mār Shalīṭā, *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 17, f. 242; vol. 19, ff. 610-611; *taslīm* doc. (15-4-1815), id., vol. 16, f. 324.

[26] Gandolfi to Prop. (25-6-1809), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 15, f. 405; vol. 17, f. 234; Ḥilū to Prop. (15-4-1815), id., vol. 16, f. 324.

[27] Gandolfi to Prop. (10-1-1818), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 17, f. 273; Thābit to Prop. (3-11-1827), id., vol. 18, f. 748; Thābit to Prop. (15-3-1831), id., vol. 19, f. 603; Thābit to Prop. (1-10-1832), id., vol. 20, f. 206; sup. M. Shalīṭā to Prop. (11-6-1833), id., vol. 20, f. 472.

[28] Gandolfi to Prop. (5-7-1819), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 17, f. 531; Ḥilū to Prop. (7-12-1819), id., vol. 17, f. 569; Zuwayyin to Prop. (2-1-1828), id, vol. 19, f. 188; Bishāra al-Khāzin to Prop. (16-7-1818), id., vol. 17, f. 320; Prop. to Ḥilū (5-8-1820), *L.D.B.*, vol. 301, ff. 656-657.

the course of time it had become intimately connected with the various claims on the monasteries. After all, as there was no clear differentiation of lay rights and clerical rights with regard to monasteries or waqfs in general in Maronite tradition, control over the monasteries had to a large extent been determined by the *de facto* power of either the clergy or the lay patrons. Thus, when the council of al-Luwayza issued its proposal to establish residences for *muṭrān*s, the implementation of the measure proved problematical in several cases, such as the sees of Jubayl and al-Batrūn (Dayr Mār Yuḥannā Mārūn), Baalbek (Dayr Mār Sarkīs wa-Bākhūs), Damascus (Dayr Mār Anṭūniyūs Buqᶜātā), Beirut (Dayr Mār Yuḥannā Qattāla) and Tripoli. The difficulties were caused by various factors, such as the absence of a suitable monastery with sufficient revenues to maintain an episcopal see; the refusal of the patrons to have their monastery turned into an episcopal see; and the claims, both legal and financial, laid by some of the *muṭrān*s to certain monasteries, which were incompatible with the envisioned distribution of residences. In addition to these problems, the poverty suffered by the population prevented the building of new monasteries.[29]

a. Jubayl and al-Batrūn: as has been observed above, Jirmānūs Thābit could produce several documents supporting his legal claims to Dayr Mār Shalīṭā. Nevertheless, in 1827 he agreed to accept a compromise devised by the patriarch. He was to move to Mār Yuḥannā Mārūn, without losing his rights concerning Mār Shalīṭā, which he could continue to administer through an administrator (*wakīl*). This arrangement was accepted, but became uncertain when the patriarch confirmed the nomination of *muṭrān* Jibrā'īl al-Nāṣirī, recently appointed chief judge by the emir, as superior of Mār Shalīṭā, at the request of the Muḥāsib patrons. Thābit stated that the nomination was against the wishes of the *muṭrān* of the diocese and the Muḥāsibs, and repeated his claim that the monastery had a debt of 30.000 q. to him. He insisted on payment of the amount and threatened to reclaim the monastery. The demands of Thābit went unheeded, and in 1831 the *muṭrān* proposed to forget the debt (as a waqf and *iḥsān*) provided that the *wilāya* be returned to him. The superior of Mār Shalīṭā refuted the claims of Thābit and denied the authority of the Muḥāsibs, who allegedly conspired with Thābit. He considered the debt to be a matter for trial by the Propaganda.[30]

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[29] Ḥubaysh to Prop. (13-6-1837), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 22, f. 71; Ḥubaysh to Prop. (1831), id., vol. 19, f. 789; *Acta*, vol. 163 (1793), f. 125.

[30] Ḥubaysh to Prop. (1831), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 19, f. 789; Thābit to Prop. (3-11-1827), id., vol. 18, f. 748.

b. Beirut: a similar case was that of Mīkhā'īl Fāḍil, *muṭrān* of Beirut and superior of Dayr Mār Yuḥannā Ḥarrāsh in Kisrawān. The official see for the diocese of Beirut, as designated by the council of al-Luwayza, was Mār Yuḥannā Qattāla, which was, however, in a bad state. Therefore, Fāḍil was allowed to stay in Dayr Ḥarrāsh. He was succeeded by Buṭrus Karam in 1819, who declared in 1837 that he had bought a plot of land yielding as yet little profit, as a basis for accumulating sufficient capital to found a residence in his diocese. He complained, however, that his predecessor had left a debt on Mār Ḥarrāsh, while the *muqāṭaʿajī*s exacted a yearly sum, leaving him with a limited income, which he could not spend on the episcopal see. According to the patriarch, the income of the see of Beirut consisted only of the *ʿushūr*, since the yield of the *arzāq* was insufficient. Consequently, it was agreed that Karam should stay in Dayr Ḥarrāsh until the financial basis of the see of Beirut had been adequately provided for.[31]

c. Damascus: the problems concerning Dayr Mār Anṭūniyūs Buqʿātā were of another nature and were connected with the rivalry among the different branches of the Khāzin family. The monastery had been founded by Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin from the *bayt* of Abū Kanʿān Qays, who were still considered to be the owners (*aṣḥāb*) of the monastery. They refused to put the monastery at the disposal of the *muṭrān* of Damascus, since, according to patriarch Ḥubaysh, the *muṭrān*, Isṭifān al-Khāzin, was from the *bayt* of ʿAbd al-Mālik (*awlād* Abī Nāṣīf). For this reason the *muṭrān* had settled in Dayr Mār Mūsā Ballūna, in the domain of his family branch.[32]

c. Tripoli: according to patriarch Ḥubaysh there was no convenient episcopal residence in the diocese of Tripoli, partly, in the words of the patriarch, because of the presence of so many different communities (*umam*). Therefore *muṭrān* Ighnāṭiyūs al-Khāzin was allowed to stay in his monastery.[33]

d. Baalbek: The most complicated case with regard to the division of fixed episcopal residences was Dayr Mār Sarkīs wa-Bākhūs in Rayfūn

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[31] 'Ristretto...,' *Acta*, vol. 182 (1819), ff. 4 ff.; Ḥubaysh to Prop. (1831), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 19, f. 789; Ḥubaysh to Prop. (13-6-1837), id., vol. 22, f. 71; Ḥubaysh to Prop. (20-5-1837), id., vol. 22, ff. 55-56; Prop. to Auvergne (9-2-1833), *L.D.B.*, vol. 314 (1833), f. 127.

[32] Gandolfi to Prop. (10-1-1818), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 17, f 277; Ḥubaysh to Prop. (1831)., id., vol. 19, f. 789.

[33] Ḥubaysh to Prop. (1831), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 19, f. 789; Gandolfi to Prop. (10-1-1818), id., vol. 7, f. 277.

(Kisrawān). Traditionally, Dayr Rayfūn was the see of the *muṭrān* of Baalbek, who, also traditionally, was selected from the Mubārak family under the supervision of the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh al-Khāzin. Thus, the superior of Dayr Rayfūn was, as a rule, a member of the Mubārak family. This continued until 1808, when not a Mubārak, but Anṭūn al-Khāzin, from the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh al-Khāzin, was ordained *muṭrān* of Baalbek. Since Dayr Rayfūn was officially proclaimed as the see for the diocese of Baalbek, Anṭūn drafted an agreement with the superior of the monastery, Fransīs Mubārak, renouncing all claims to the monastery and granting Fransīs unrestricted authority, but nevertheless took up residence there. This arrangement was not to the satisfaction of the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh, who claimed that they, and not the Mubāraks, held the patronage rights. The question of the episcopal see was thus related to a controversy over patronage rights, which had become ambiguous in the course of time. The implications of this controversy will be discussed below.[34]

In addition to this, the designation of Dayr Rayfūn as the residence was contested by Isṭifān al-Khāzin, who claimed that the monastery was located within the confines of his diocese (Damascus) and not in the diocese of Baalbek. He accused Anṭūn of usurping part of his diocese and demanded justice from the Propaganda. However, this claim, although reiterated several times by Isṭifān, remained a side issue in the more fundamental controversy over the patronage rights.[35]

7.2.3 *Patronage rights*

As has been shown above, the system of patronage rights according to Canon Law was based mainly on the decisions of the Council of Trent. The regulations of Trent had been intended to harmonize the manifold practices existing in Europe at the time concerning the administration of clerical possessions, in the form of prebends, *Eigenkirchen*, lay patronage, etc., and especially to counter malpractices which had spread over the course of time, such as the appropriation of revenues by lay claimants or the usurpation of legal privileges. These practices had been shaped by the way in which clerical and lay authorities had succeeded in balancing their mutual interests and dependency, which could, of

[34] See below, paragraph 7.2.4.
[35] See also: Isṭifān al-Khāzin to Prop. (1-1-1815), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 16, f 261; id. (1-11-1824), *Acta*, vol. 195, (1832), f. 338.

course, vary according to the power balance in the different regions. Although the Council of Trent introduced a new and authoritative legal framework to redress these practices, and, in fact, to redress the balance between secular and clerical authorities, the question of the administration of clerical possessions nevertheless remained complex and subject to various factors beyond the reach of legal theory. Thus, the way in which the reforms were implemented, or the extent to which they were implemented, was dependent on factors which could vary considerably according to the location.[36]

The regulations issued by the Lebanese Council concerning the administration of clerical possessions were inspired by similar incentives as those of Trent: systematizing existing practices, and limiting the opportunities for usurpation by laymen. At the time when the Council met, the power balance between the clerical and secular authorities was not particularly favourable for the implementation of reforms. In the period after the Council, the attention of the Propaganda and the Maronite hierarchy was too much absorbed by the recurring conflicts to enable them to impose a systematic policy aimed at the examination of patronage rights. When the Propaganda did turn its attention to the Maronite monasteries, it was mainly to exhort the clergy to end the existence of mixed monasteries. At the turn of the century this concern for the moral aspects of monastic life became connected with the desire to re-examine the administration of monasteries in all its aspects and to scrutinize the legal claims to monasteries. Founders and lay claimants were summoned to present their documents and have their rights confirmed by the Propaganda on the basis of the rules of the Lebanese Council.[37]

In the next paragraphs the reorganization of the system of patronage rights will be analyzed, as it occurred in the first decades of the 19th century. In 1818, the council of al-Luwayza installed a special committee charged with the investigation of the patronage rights over several Maronite monasteries, consisting of Yūsuf al-Tiyyān, papal envoy Luigi Gandolfi and chief judge Yuḥannā Mārūn. In some cases no complications came to the fore; in others, however, the first investigation was only the start of protracted procedures and a chain of verdicts and appeals. Not unexpectedly, in most cases the Khāzin sheiks were among the claimants. As explained above, they resisted the intended reforms to the monastic system on various grounds, and they

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[36] See, for instance, Thomas.

[37] *Acta*, vol. 166 (1796), f. 16; vol. 163 (1793), ff. 125-126.

were reluctant to attend the council of al-Luwayza. Only pressure from emir Bashīr and Bashīr Junblāṭ had convinced them of the necessity of a church council, whose decisions did not in the end satisfy their wishes.[38]

7.2.3.1 *Claims by the Khāzins*

As has been noted, the Khāzin sheiks were not particularly eager to have their rights over monasteries in Kisrawān scrutinized and formalized under clerical auspices. Their authority in this respect was vested in tradition, which could not be easily absorbed into a new legal and administrative structure. Moreover, their authority had been established in a period when secular power had clearly prevailed over clerical interests, which implied that the church had to conform to the requirements of the secular administration, rather than vice versa. The sheiks accordingly included administrative arrangements, such as the remittance of the annual *ᶜīdiyya*, or the exemption from the *mīrī* tax, among the arguments supporting their claims. As in the 18th century, they continued to regard the monasteries founded by their ancestors as their property, or rather, as the property of the various branches, and, remarkably, suggested a differentiation between family waqfs and clerical waqfs, a distinction known in Islamic waqf-practice, but unknown in Maronite legislation and Canon Law. The idea was that in the case of a family waqf (waqf *ahlī*, or *dhurrī*) the monastery was only temporarily entrusted to the clergy by way of *taslīm*. The Khāzins now accused the *muṭrān*s of using the council to lay their hands on these "private" waqfs, although they had exclusively been founded as a relief for the poor and disabled of the family and for those family members who wished to pursue the monastic life.[39]

The relations between the Khāzin sheiks and the monasteries under their supervision, especially Dayr Buqᶜātā, Dayr Ilyās Ballūna, Dayr Baqlūsh and Dayr Rayfūn, were complicated by the fact that the monasteries were used as residences by Khāzin *muṭrān*s, by territorial or other disputes among the *sheik*s themselves, and by the impoverishment of some branches of the family. Thus, the enforcement of any verdict by the church was bound to affect a complex set of intertwined interests, and the continuation of the reform process required extensive negotiations between the Khāzin sheiks and the patriarch concerning the

[38] Gandolfi to Prop. (5-2-1817), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 17, ff. 72-75; appointment committee, (15-4-1818), vol. 17, f. 410; Prop. to Ḥilū (29-3-1817), *L.D.B.*, vol. 298 (1817), f. 167.

[39] Khāzins to Prop. (1-2-1818), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 17, f. 313; see also note 14.

status of the Khāzin monasteries. The compromise that was achieved, according to which the monasteries would be considered as "retirement homes" (*maḥfaẓ*; *ritiro*) and lose their status as monastery, was an arrangement which emphasized the secular nature of these waqfs and which, interestingly, had previously been suggested by patriarch Ḍarghām al-Khāzin in his refutation of the decisions of the Lebanese Council in 1744. The alternatives were a complete abolishment of the monasteries or the removal of either the *muṭrān*s or the elderly widows from the monastery.[40]

The arguments put forward by the Khāzins were, not unexpectedly, mainly derived from traditional practice and the prestige of their ancestors as benefactors of the church. In the case of Dayr Buqᶜātā the *awlād* Abī Kanᶜān argued that the monastery had been built by their ancestors Qays and Ṭūbiyā, with their money, as the exclusive property of their descendants to house impoverished family members. The estate had from its foundation onwards been in their possession, and they had held the supervision over its inhabitants, without the interference of the clergy or the secular rulers. Consequently, they claimed the right to reject the decision of the patriarch and the *muṭrān*s to designate the monastery as the residence of the *muṭrān* of Damascus, and asked the Propaganda to confirm their patronage rights. These were acknowledged by the investigation committee in 1818.[41]

Dayr Baqlūsh was the see of *muṭrān* Anṭūn al-Khāzin of Baalbek, whose position had been confirmed by patriarch al-Tiyyān in 1798. On that occasion al-Tiyyān issued an *iᶜlām* containing the provisions for the administration of the monastery by a superior (Anṭūn al-Khāzin) and a *wakīl* (Isṭifān al-Khāzin), and for the strict segregation of the nuns. In 1816 Anṭūn al-Khāzin requested reconfirmation of his rights. He stated that the monastery had been founded out of the *arzāq* of his relative Mīlān al-Khāzin, for the benefit of the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh. As the monastery was located within the boundaries of his diocese, he asked the Propaganda to issue a decree (*barā'a*), promising the protection of the Vatican, and to permanently delegate the *tadbīr* to himself and his successors within the family. To the letter was added an endorsement by the *muṭrān*s. In 1818 the patronage rights of the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh were acknowledged, according to the standard precepts, with-

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40 Gazeno, *Risponsa alla Rel.*, pp. 5 ff; see also note 17.

41 *Awlād* Kanᶜān al-Khāzin to Prop. (4-1818), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 17, f. 291; verdict 10-1818, KHA2.

out recognizing the concessions asked for by Anṭūn. The see of the diocese of Baalbek was established in Dayr Rayfūn.[42]

In the case of Dayr Mār Ilyās Ballūna an elaborate exposé was presented by Shaybān al-Khāzin, the historiographer, who complains in his chronicle about the efforts by the clergy to usurp the waqfs. He argued that the monastery had been founded by his grandfather with his *milk*, and had been exempted from the *mīrī* tax and other levies. As the family became impoverished and was forced to sell land, they had spared the monastic estates out of respect for the founders and the present and future inhabitants. Among the regulations adhered to was the one that ensured that family members enjoyed preference for entry into the congregation, and that they held the "rights of possession" and of "protection", while the patriarch and the *muṭrān* held the ultimate authority. He had the following remarks about the decisions of the Council of al-Luwayza:

a. he had dispatched a request to the Propaganda to confirm the rights of his family and to convert the monastery into a hospital (*sbīṭār*) on the model of the school of ʿAyn Warqa (Isṭifān family). However, the council had postponed the decision and had ordered an investigation, which had not yet been executed;

b. his refusal to accept the decision that the monastery should become exclusively female had not been discussed. Moreover, it had been decided that the monastery should accept nuns from other monasteries, which had caused concern among the inhabitants who feared that their maintenance would become insufficient, the more so since some of the *amlāk* had been transferred to *shurakā'*, who had also taken part of the waqfs to build houses;

c. the regulation that the administration of the properties and the control of the accounts were to be taken away from the patrons would endanger the profitable exploitation of the estate and, as in other cases, would lead to neglect and the loss of rights;

d. he rejected the ban on new novices and deemed that imposing a statute on the monastery was unthinkable in this country which so much "valued its freedom".

Finally, he proposed to have a family member appointed as superior or *wakīl*, as before; to introduce a setup similar to other women's monasteries; to appoint Luigi Gandolfi as supervisor (*munāẓir*) and to place

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[42] Verdict 24-11-1818, *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 17, ff. 415-416; A. al-Khāzin to Prop. (23-8-1816), id., vol. 16, f. 534; *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh al-Khāzin to Prop. (1-10-1819), id., vol. 17, f. 564; Gandolfi to Prop. (1-10-1818), id., vol. 17, f. 276; *Iʿlām* al-Tiyyān (18-4-1798), Patr. Arch., Coll. *Tiyyān*, no. 82; Letter from Tiyyān (1-2-1800), id., no. 118.

it under the protection of the Propaganda. If these conditions could not be met, the monastery should be converted into a school or hospital.[43]

In November 1818 a verdict was issued confirming the rights of Shaybān and his descendants on Dayr Mār Ilyās Ballūna. The *muṭrān*, however, was to exercise the right of visitation and the control of the accounts.[44]

A fourth monastery which became a source of conflict, not only between the Khāzins and the Propaganda, but also among the Khāzin sheiks themselves, was Dayr Mār Mūsā Ballūna. The monastery had been founded in 1785 out of the inheritance of ʿAbd al-Salām al-Khāzin, of the *awlād* Abī Nāṣīf. In the will the administration was entrusted to Iqlīmūs (Isṭifān) al-Khāzin, who was ordained *muṭrān* in 1796. With the consent of the patriarch he allowed women to enter the monastery, which caused the monks to lodge a complaint against him before the emir. Iqlīmūs was subsequently deposed in favour of his cousin Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin, with the endorsement of the patriarch and *muṭrān* Mīkhā'īl al-Khāzin. Iqlīmūs, however, turned to his relatives for support, since the emir had summoned him to pay an amount of 500 q., which he was unable to do. A proposition to abolish the monastery, distribute the possessions among other monasteries and send the nuns away, since they were not bound by a rule, was accepted by two branches of the Khāzin family, but was rejected by the family of Iqlīmūs.[45]

Among the monasteries which became the object of a fierce dispute between two families, in this case Dīb and al-Khāzin, was Dayr Sayyidat al-Ḥaqla. For some time rumours had been spread about alleged abuses in Dayr al-Ḥaqla, which induced the papal delegate to examine the administration of the monastery in 1816. After a "thorough investigation" he declared the monastery suspended, had the monks removed, discharged the superior and transferred the administration to the patriarch and the *muṭrān*s. It was decided that the monastery be converted into a school.[46]

While the case of Dayr al-Ḥaqla was pending, the Khāzin sheiks seized the opportunity to present their claims to the monastery before the Propaganda. According to them, Dayr al-Ḥaqla had been their exclu-

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[43] Shaybān al-Khāzin to Prop. (s.d.), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 17, f. 109; Khāzins to Prop. (22-5-1818), id., vol. 17, f. 316; Khāzins to Prop. (s.d.), id., vol. 17, f. 111.

[44] Verdict 25-10-1818, *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 17, f. 417.

[45] *Acta*, vol. 163 (1793), ff. 126-129; Khāzins to Prop. (15-6-1781), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 13, ff. 3-4.

[46] Gandolfi to Prop. (25-8-1816), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 16, f. 535; Gandolfi to Prop. (10-1-1818), id., vol. 17, f. 276.

sive property (*khuṣūṣ*) from its foundation onwards, and they had appointed superiors and cared for its preservation. After some unspecified commotion had occurred, they had proposed to the patriarch to discharge the superior and to transfer the monastery to another superior. Subsequently, infringements of the rule had taken place, followed by an investigation and the punishment of the transgressors. A certain *khūrī* Yūsuf al-Khāzin was appointed as superior. The punished monks, however, returned to the emir and moved back into the monastery, forcing Yūsuf to relinquish the *taslīm*. The Khāzins (*awlād* al-Ḥājj Sulaymān), now feared that their patronage rights to Dayr al-Ḥaqla would be annulled in spite of the evidence in their favour.[47]

This evidence apparently consisted of documents which indicated that the superiors of the Dīb family had at the very least closely cooperated with the sheiks of the branch of al-Ḥājj Sulaymān. In the opinion of the papal envoy Gandolfi, however, these were not sufficient proof of the Khāzins' rights of patronage. Gandolfi accused the Khāzin sheiks, who suffered from impoverishment, of attempting to usurp the monastery in order to profit from its revenues. The only title on which they based their claim was that they had received the *ʿīdiyya* from Dayr al-Ḥaqla, a privilege also enjoyed by other Khāzins, who received an annual tribute from virtually all the monasteries in Kisrawān. The other Khāzin sheiks were also opposed to superior Mūsā Dīb, and demanded the right to appoint a superior themselves. The conflict over the superior became so fierce that Gandolfi proceeded to involve the patriarch (pro-Yūsuf) and emir Bashīr (pro-Mūsā). The patriarch contacted the Druze governor, who after a gift of 30.000 q. put pressure on emir Bashīr to have Yūsuf appointed, on the condition that both parties pledged to present their case before the Propaganda tribunal. Gandolfi concluded his report with the remark that the value of the monastery should be estimated at half a million *qurūsh*.[48]

The claims by the Khāzins were reiterated in letters to the Propaganda, contending that the waqfs of the monastery had originally been part of the *amlāk* of the Khāzin family, and that the case of the Dībs had been advocated by dissident *muṭrān*s with the help of bribes. Sheik Bishāra, too, complained about the precedent these bribes represented, since their result had been that the punishments of the trespassing monks

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[47] *Awlād* Ḥājj Sulaymān al-Khāzin to Prop. (s.d.), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 17, f. 110; id. to Prop. (15-4-1817), id., vol. 17, f. 107; id. to Prop. (s.d.), id., vol. 17, f. 240.

[48] Docs. Dayr al-Ḥaqla, *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 15, f. 103; Mūsā Dīb to Prop. (1817), id., vol. 17, f. 71; Gandolfi to Prop. (3-2-1817), id., vol. 17, ff. 72-75.

had been lifted. He again requested the punishment of the guilty monks, as well as punishment for those who had sought the support of the secular authorities, and a confirmation of the rights of the Khāzins over Dayr Sayyidat al-Ḥaqla.[49]

These pleas were to no avail, as the investigation committee in 1818 issued a verdict in favour of the Dīb family, based on the standard precepts and formulas.[50]

7.2.4 *Dayr Mār Sarkīs wa Rayfūn*

In the wake of the council of al-Luwayza in 1818, the policy of the Propaganda to implement the monastic reforms which had been promulgated by the Lebanese Council of 1736 seemed relatively successful, especially in its dual approach which aimed to acknowledge and formalize patronage rights in exchange for acceptation of the regulations for the *ius patronatus* and segregation of the mixed monasteries. Of course the official verdicts issued by al-Tiyyān, Gandolfi and Mārūn were themselves no guarantee of a satisfactory exploitation of the monasteries, as frictions between the parties concerned could not always be avoided. These frictions were usually related to rivalry within the newly appointed patron-families, the lack of cooperation of the notables, or the reluctance to put the instructions concerning the fixed residences of *muṭrān*s into effect. This combination of administrative factors, which were connected, of course, to traditional rights and customs, hampered the effectiveness of the legal measures.

The complexity of the implementation of the reforms surfaced during the struggle over the patronage rights of Dayr Mār Sarkīs wa-Bākhūs in Rayfūn (Kisrawān). The case was first presented to the committee of the council of al-Luwayza (1818), and was re-examined in 1821, 1829 and 1832, as the contending parties, the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh al-Khāzin and the Mubārak family, refused to relinquish their claims and reiterated their appeals to the Propaganda.

As has been shown above, in the course of time Dayr Rayfūn had become connected to the diocese of Baalbek, which had for some time

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[49] Khāzins to Prop. (s.d.), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 17, ff. 366-368.

[50] Dīb to Prop. (20-7-1828), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 19, f. 109; Dībs to Prop. (15-7-1828), id., vol. 19, f. 87; verdict 28-10-1818, id., vol. 17, ff. 420, 422; id., vol. 19, f. 115; id., vol. 17, f. 413; id., vol. 17, f. 512; id., vol. 17, f. 426 (D.M. Rūḥānā; D.M. Jirjis ʿAlmā; D.M. Jirjis al-Rūmiyya; D.M. ʿAbdā Harhariyya); the case of Dayr al-Ḥaqla was complicated by the fusion of the monastery with the Khāzin monastery Dayr Buqayʿa in 1736, at the instigation of Y. al-Simʿānī, doc. KHA1.

been in the hands of *muṭrān*s of the Mubārak family, under the auspices of the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh. Several Mubāraks had acted as superiors, too, apparently with the consent of the Khāzins, fostering a further linkage of the clerical and material interests of the Mubāraks to the monastery. This situation became a problem in the first two decades of the 19th century because of two factors: firstly, the ordination of Anṭūn al-Khāzin (*awlād* Abī Qānṣawh) as *muṭrān* of Baalbek, and, secondly, the designation by the Propaganda of Dayr Rayfūn as the permanent see for the *muṭrān* of Baalbek. This immediately caused two problems: the protests of *muṭrān* Isṭifān al-Khāzin of Damascus (*awlād* Abī Nāṣīf), who claimed that Anṭūn had usurped the monastery and its estate, which rightfully came under the jurisdiction of the *muṭrān* of Damascus; and the sensitive question as to who was actually entitled to the patronage rights, the Mubāraks or the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh al-Khāzin. The second issue was obviously the more important one and came to overshadow the first, although the two issues were to some extent interrelated.

In 1816, shortly after his ordination, Anṭūn al-Khāzin reported to the Propaganda that the situation of Dayr Rayfūn was deplorable, and that he wanted to restore the monastery as his responsibilities required. His initiative had been thwarted, however, by patriarch al-Ḥilū, who usurped full authority. Anṭūn now demanded his rights in accordance with the decrees of the Lebanese Council. Later that year, the patriarch appointed Fransīs Mubārak as *wakīl* of the monastery. Perhaps inadvertently, in 1817 Anṭūn signed a document by which he conceded the full rights of disposal of the monastery to Fransīs Mubārak, who was at that time acting as superior. Later that year, the Khāzins accused Fransīs of alienating some possessions of the monastery.[51]

In spite of the peculiar manoeuvres of Anṭūn, the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh persisted in their claim to the exclusive patronage rights of Dayr Rayfūn, a claim which was sustained by the al-Luwayza investigation committee. In a verdict dated 24-10-1818, Yūsuf al-Tiyyān, Luigi Gandolfi and Yuḥannā Mārūn allocated the patronage of Dayr Rayfūn and Dayr Sayyidat Baqlūsh to the *sheik*s Khaṭṭār Nīsān, Sharaf Nājid and Yaᶜqūb (*awlād* Abī Qānṣawh) on the basis of Canon Law, including the right to veto

[51] Docs. in: 'Vertenza fra le famiglie Mobarac o Benedetti e Abu Canso Gazeno pel diritto di patronato...,' *Acta* (28-5-1832), vol. 195; *S.O.*, vol. 947; 'Iuspatronato della famiglia Benedetti,' *Acta* (16-9-1833), vol. 196; some documents have been published in: 'Nubdha tārikhīyya ᶜan Dayr Rayfūn,' Khāzin/Masᶜad, vol. 2; and: Ḥarfūsh, *al-Mashriq*, vol. 8; A. al-Khāzin to Prop. (23-8-1816), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 16, f. 534; Ḥilū to Prop. (12-1-1816), id., vol. 19, f. 663; Zuwayyin to Khāzins (18-1-1817), id., vol. 19, f. 673.

any change in the status of the monastery, the right to present competent superiors, to be confirmed by the *muṭrān*, the right to profit from the revenues of the monastery in the case of impoverishment, and the obligation to protect the estate and to abstain from appropriating its revenues or possessions.[52]

This verdict was soon contested by the Mubārak family, who argued that their ancestors had founded the monastery, had donated and purchased its possessions, and had supplied superiors and administrators for more than 130 years. They claimed to have built and preserved the monastery and to have bought its possessions for the praise of God and as an asylum for the family. Surprisingly, the appeal of the Mubāraks was supported by patriarch al-Ḥilū and by Gandolfi, who now denied that the Khāzins were able to prove their claims with valid documents. However, a transfer of the monastery to the Mubāraks would require the consent of emir Bashīr al-Shihāb, who was unable to put pressure on the Khāzins, who were "at the service of the Druze Governor" (Bashīr Junblāṭ). Emir Bashīr thereupon asked the Propaganda to appoint incorruptible and impartial judges to re-examine the documents produced by both parties, who should then convey their verdict to the papal delegate to have it confirmed by apostolic authority. The emir should then immediately execute the verdict, leaving no opportunity for the Khāzins or the Druze "governor" to resist.[53]

The Propaganda agreed to reopen the case, since, in its opinion, the Khāzins had failed to prove that they had been the administrators of the monastery for 150 years without interruption. Two judges besides Gandolfi were appointed, viz. the *muṭrāns* al-Khayyāṭ and Mārūn. The new committee met in 1821 to examine the relevant documents. These included the agreement between Abū Qānṣawh al-Khāzin and the monks of Dayr Rayfūn dating from 1681 (cited above, chapter 5). The Mubāraks presented: a. an authentic act of purchase signed by the alleged founder, Sulaymān Mubārak (1655); b. a *waqfiyya* by a member of the family, Abū Yūsuf Mubārak (1670); c. various quotations from chronicles confirming that the monastery had been in their possession for 150 years; d. the register of the acquisitions of the monastery, which proved that the Mubārak superiors and not the Khāzin sheiks had been

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[52] Verdict 24-10-1818, *S.O.*, vol. 265 (1832), and: *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 17, 415, 416; see also: *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh al-Khāzin to Prop. (1-10-1819), id., vol. 17, f. 564.

[53] Lettera di M. Gandolfi, *Acta*, vol. 195 (1832), f. 216; 'Reclamo della fam. Mobarac' (8-1-1819), id., vol. 195 (1832), ff. 216-217; see also docs. (1819, 1820) in: id., vol. 17, ff. 680-679; Prop. Gandolfi (28-8-1819), *L.D.B.*, vol. 298 (1817), ff. 578-579.

the main benefactors and had supervised the expansion of the estate; e. apart from written documents, they claimed the actual possession of the monastery for a period of 150 years. They added that the fact that the monks had obliged themselves to celebrate masses for the salvation of Abū Qānṣawh and *muṭrān* Jirmānūs Ḥabqūq, as was stipulated by the document from 1681, was in itself no proof of any property rights. Moreover, the arrangement concerning the masses had eventually been changed. The three judges considered the Khāzin documents as insufficient evidence to support their claims and, accordingly, conceded the patronage rights to the Mubārak family.[54]

The Khāzin sheiks and *muṭrān* Anṭūn were not prepared to resign themselves to the verdict. Anṭūn sent a letter to the Propaganda denouncing the conflict as senseless, since Dayr Rayfūn, as an episcopal see, should formally be administered by the *muṭrān* in question. Perhaps tactlessly, he continued to refer to the glorious past of the Khāzins and their previous distinguished bonds with France and the Vatican. Although the Khāzins had of late been negligent of their obligations toward the monastery, it had been founded and administered by them, and the Mubāraks had acted only under their supervision. Finally, he stated that the Mubāraks had not held the post of superior uninterruptedly. The monastery should now become the residence for the diocese.[55]

The Khāzin sheiks, in their turn, lodged an appeal against the verdict, arguing that they had not had the opportunity to adequately defend their case. According to them it was public knowledge that their ancestors had founded churches and monasteries for the propagation of the Holy Faith and that all their possessions had been provided by the Khāzins, especially the *bayt* of Abū Qānṣawh. The evidence which was now produced by the Khāzins to prove their claims consisted of: a. the verdict of 1818; b. a letter from Anṭūn in which he asked the patriarch to confirm the rights of the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh on Dayr Rayfūn and Dayr Baqlūsh; c. two copies of the 1681 document, accompanied by a statement by *muṭrān* Jirmānūs Thābit, to the effect that the monastery had

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[54] Verdict (1821), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 17, f. 691; Lettera a M. Gandolfi (28-8-1819), *Acta*, vol. 195 (1832), f. 217; 'Sentenza' (17-1-1821), id., vol. 195 (1832), ff. 217-219; Doc. Fam. Mobarac, id., vol. 196 (1833), ff. 331-333; 'Test. M. Dolce' (8-10-1819), id., vol. 196 (1833), f. 333; id., (11-9-1820), id., vol. 196 (1833), f. 333; 'Notificazione' (11-9-1819), id., vol. 196 (1833), f. 334; Letters of al-Ḥilū, *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 17, f. 263.

[55] Ḥilū to Prop. (1823), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 18, f. 8; 'Lett. di M. A. Gazeno' (1-6-1820), *Acta*, vol. 196 (1833), ff. 328-329; 'Lett. de' Si. Gazeni' (13-2-1821), id., vol. 196 (1833), ff. 329-330; M. Gazeno (28-2-1821), id., vol. 196 (1833), ff. 337-338; Prop. to Gandolfi (8-9-1821), *L.D.B.*, vol. 302 (1821), f. 382.

been founded by Abū Qānṣawh in the presence of the *muṭrān*s Jirjis Ḥabqūq, Jibrā'īl al-Blūzānī, Buṭrus Qusṭānī, Yūsuf Ḥaṣrūnī and others.[56]

The documents put forward by the Mubāraks included: a. documents allegedly concerning the foundation of the monastery and its later acquisitions (1702 Yūsuf Mubārak; 1690 Yūsuf Mubārak, Jirjis Ḥabqūq, with the consent of the sons of Abū Qānṣawh; 1717 Jibrā'īl Mubārak; 1713 Sulaymān Mubārak); b. the letter from Anṭūn al-Khāzin (1817); c. testimonies by patriarch Yuḥannā al-Ḥilū, in which he confirmed that, according to the traditions of the ancestors, the Mubāraks should be considered to be the patrons of Dayr Rayfūn; moreover, the Mubāraks had been the superiors of Dayr Rayfūn for 75 years, and had held the possession for 150 years, whereas Canon Law required only 50 years of uninterrupted administration for the recognition of patronage rights; in another letter al-Ḥilū withdrew his endorsement of the verdict of 1818, which he now denounced as unjust; d. a testimony by the superior-general of the Baladīs implying that the first verdict had been unjust; e. a similar testimony by Simᶜān Zuwayyin, procurator of the patriarch.[57]

In addition to this, the Mubāraks procured further documents sustaining their claims: a. a testimony that the Abū Qānṣawh document presented by the Khāzins had been found accidentally in the monastery and had previously been unknown to both parties;[58] b. a document from Yūsuf Mubārak in which he altered the custom concerning the celebration of masses for the salvation of Abū Qānṣawh; c. two letters from patriarch al-Ḥilū in which he summoned Anṭūn al-Khāzin to relinquish the monastery; moreover, in the second letter he severely reprimanded Anṭūn for having sold possessions of the monastery contrary to the law, since he had no right to alienate the possessions of a waqf intended to provide sustenance for an episcopal see.[59]

Finally, to demonstrate their good intentions, the Mubāraks proposed to the Propaganda that the monastery be transformed into a school for

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[56] 'Istanza e doc. esibiti per parte de' Si. Gazeni,' *Acta*, vol. 196 (1833), ff. 335-336; 'Doc. originali,' id., vol. 196 (1833), ff. 261-265.

[57] See note 54.

[58] The text of the document was found by accident in a Karshūnī Bible, which is now in the possession of Ph. al-Khāzin in Jūniya.

[59] 'Doc. presentati dalla Fam. Benedetti,' *Acta*, vol. 196 (1833), ff. 339-341; 'Lettere del P.M. Dolce' (7-7-1821 & s.d.), id., vol. 196 (1833), ff. 341-342; a sale contract for 22 *aḥmāl*, 2200 q., concluded by Anṭūn was sent to the Prop. by the patriarch: *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 18, ff. 349-351.

the benefit of the whole "nation". They requested emir Bashīr to appoint a procurator for the administration of the monastery and to foil the schemes of the Khāzins.[60]

As the contending parties resumed their controversy and refused to acquiesce in the decisions of the judicial committee, in 1826 the Propaganda proclaimed all previous verdicts void and reopened the case on the grounds that new evidence had come to light. A new papal delegate was sent to Mount Lebanon, Pietro Losana, who at first attempted to achieve a compromise, proposing that the rights of patronage could be allocated to both families according to the male line of descendants; the monastery was to be converted into a clerical college and both families could send two pupils; the current superiors, Fransīs and Jirjis Mubārak, were to become the first directors of the college, a function that would be reserved for the Mubārak family; the superior was to be responsible to the *muṭrān* as far as the financial administration was concerned; as long as no permanent residence for the *muṭrān* of Baalbek was chosen, Anṭūn was to reside in Dayr Rayfūn.[61]

The proposition was unsuccessful and Losana set about forming a new judicial committee, consisting of patriarch Ḥubaysh, the Armenian Catholic patriarch Gregory, *muṭrān* Jibrā'īl al-Nāṣirī, the "judge of the Mountain", and Niqūlā Mūsā, *muṭrān* of Tripoli. The four judges and Losana convened on 26 March 1829 in ᶜAyn Ṭūrā to examine the claims. Their presupposition was, that since the monastery had been in the possession of the Mubāraks from its foundation onwards, the Khāzins were obliged to prove their claims and would, in the meantime, be considered as persons suspected of usurpation (*suspectae usurpationis*, or *accusatae usurpationis commissae*). Thus the Khāzins were clearly in a disadvantageous position from the start.[62]

7.2.4.1 *The plea of the Mubāraks*

In their plea the procurators of the Mubāraks, Fransīs Mubārak and Halīl al-Khūrī, declared that the case of the *awlād* Abī Qānṣawh was devoid of any legal or moral justification. According to them the docu-

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[60] 'Lettera dalla Fam. Benedetti' (3-11-1824), *Acta*, vol. 196 (1833), f. 339; 'Offerta fatta dalla Fam. Benedetti' (15-2-1821), id., vol. 195 (1832), f. 277.

[61] 'Ponenza,' *Acta*, vol. 195 (1832), f. 209; Khāzins to Prop. (1827), *S.C./Mar.*, vol 18, ff. 398-403; Prop. to Ḥubaysh (30-9-1826), *L.D.B.*, vol. 307, f. 628; Prop. to Mubāraks (23-8-1828), id., vol. 309, f. 646; Prop. to F. Mubārak (17-1-1829), id., vol. 310, f. 24.

[62] 'Ponenza,' *Acta*, vol. 195 (1832), f. 210; Prop. to Losana (8-9-1827), *L.D.B.*, vol. 308, f. 571; Prop. to A. al-Khāzin (8-9-1827), id., vol. 308, f. 572.

ments, in accordance with both civil and ecclesiastical law, proved that the monastery had been in the possession of the Mubāraks and had been administered by them for more than 150 years. This should give the Mubāraks the patronage rights according to the regulations of the Lebanese Council (cap. 424). This continuous administration was confirmed by Anṭūn al-Khāzin in his letter to Fransīs Mubārak (1817) and had never been contested by the Khāzins until they accidentally stumbled upon the Abū Qānṣawh document. In his letter Anṭūn recognized an inalienable right (*ḥaqq thābit*) based on the administration (*qiyām*) of the estate (waqfs and *arzāq*) and the succession of superiors. It could not be proved that the Khāzins had originally owned the land, since no documents of sale, donation or exchange transactions with the Mubāraks existed.

The procurators acknowledged that it was legally possible for a monastery to be entrusted to a superior with the founders' family retaining the property rights (*consegna*, or *taslīm*), as in the cases of ᶜAyn Warqa (Isṭifān) and other monasteries in Kisrawān. In the case of Dayr Rayfūn, however, the Khāzin sheiks had never had any control over the appointment of superiors in the form of *consegna*. Moreover, in the case of a *consegna*, the superior annually presented the accounts for ratification, a demand which the Khāzins had never made. Apart from this, the succession of superiors of *consegna*-monasteries did not, customarily, remain within a single family, as was the case at Dayr Rayfūn. Patronage rights entailed various administrative rights (*taslīm*, *ᶜazl*, *taghyīr*, *tabdīl*, *ra'y* and *shūr*), which had never been exercised by the Khāzins.

Therefore, the evidence produced by the Khāzins was extremely weak. The inscriptions cited by them had no legal value, while the documents could not be regarded as legally valid, since their drafting (*ṣūra*) did not correspond to the legal prescriptions. Moreover, the documents only clarified the position of the Mubāraks *vis-à-vis* the Khāzins in their role as secular administrators. That explained why Abū Qānṣawh was never unequivocally mentioned as the founder, but rather as "assisting", or "taking care" for the restoration. Other documents in which Abū Qānṣawh was mentioned as benefactor also referred only to financial support, not to property rights, such as the ordination of Yūsuf Mubārak, the assistance of Ḥabqūq, the obligation to celebrate masses, or the presence in the monastery of patriarch Yūsuf Ḍarghām al-Khāzin.[63]

This refutation of the claims of the Khāzins was supplemented by the

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[63] 'Esposizione,' *Acta*, vol. 195 (1832), ff. 244-252; *S.O.*, vol. 947, ff. 371-379.

testimony of an "informed person", implying that, since under Turkish authority the building of monasteries was prohibited, Dayr Rayfūn was self-evidently built under the protection of the Khāzins. This did not mean, however, that the latter could claim prerogatives or property rights.[64]

7.2.4.2 *The plea of the Khāzins*

The defence of the Khāzins' claims was entrusted to three family members: Yūsuf, Ghālib and Kanᶜān al-Khāzin. They not only presented a booklet containing the evidence supporting their claims, but also proceeded to refute the claims made by the Mubāraks. In their plea they essentially focused on two points: that the evidence presented by the Mubāraks was inconsistent and even contradictory; and that the claim that they had held the administration of the monastery for the legally prescribed period was invalid. They argued that the mere "possession" (*waḍᶜal-yad*) of a monastery did not nullify the rights acquired by "foundation" (*ta'sīs*) and "equipment" (*tajhīz*), as defined by the Council of Trent. The documents showed that, if the Mubāraks had indeed held the possession of the monastery, this possession was illegitimately acquired and in contradiction of the patronage rights of the Khāzins. The three criteria for the allocation of patronage rights had, therefore, certainly not been met by the Mubāraks.[65]

7.2.4.3 *The verdict of 1829*

The essential argument of the verdict which was finally issued by the investigating committee was that the assumption of the Khāzins that these three fundamental criteria justified their claims, was countered by the Mubāraks' objection that the evidence produced by the Khāzins merely referred to their administrative status and the corresponding authority over all the monasteries and private possessions in Kisrawān. Although the authority was inheritable between them, the monasteries and private possessions remained the property of their owners. Thus, a difference should be made between, for instance, Dayr Baqlūsh, which had always been under the control of the Khāzins, and the other monasteries, which did not legally belong to them.

According to the verdict, the Khāzins had failed to present documents with the legal form necessary for them to be accepted as authentic and

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[64] 'Memoria,' *Acta*, vol. 195, ff. 256-257.

[65] 'Ṣūra tataḍamman,' *Acta*, vol. 195 (1832), ff. 268; *S.O.*, vol. 947, f. 450.

as valid evidence according to both civil and Canon law; the evidence which they did produce was considered to be insufficient to attribute to them the patronage rights based on foundation, donation and possession. The manuscripts did prove, however, that the Mubāraks had founded and built the monastery and conceded donations, and had held uninterrupted possession. This was confirmed in particular by the letter of Anṭūn al-Khāzin (1817). These considerations were in accordance with the regulations of the Lebanese Council (part 4, cap. 1). Consequently, the patronage rights should be awarded to the Mubāraks. The verdict was endorsed by Losano, al-Nāṣirī, judge of the Mountain on behalf of the emir, Yuḥannā Mārūn, Būlus Mūsā and, remarkably, Isṭifān al-Khāzin.[66]

Conspicuously, the seal of the Armenian-Catholic patriarch was lacking. According to Losana the patriarch had been added to the committee at the request of the Khāzins, to promote their case. During the deliberations he was apparently put under pressure by the Khāzins, and argued that he was reluctant to join the committee since, according to him, it was useless to issue a verdict when one of the contending parties (i.e. the Khāzins) wished to have the case tried before the Propaganda, and refused beforehand to acknowledge a tribunal in Mount Lebanon. However, no other Armenian-Catholic prelates could be found who were prepared to risk their relations with the Khāzins by cooperating with the committee, since they "had to live among them".[67] The patriarch was thus persuaded to fill the vacancy, and at the same time Jibrā'īl al-Nāṣirī was added to the committee, presumably to compensate for the adverse influence of the wavering Armenian-Catholic patriarch. Apparently the patriarch was unable to avoid professing his support for the Mubāraks' position, but he refused to openly endorse the final verdict. Still according to Losana, the patriarch asked whether the case was to be judged according to civil law, or according to Canon Law, suggesting that he was not competent in the field of civil law. To this, Losana retorted that, since the case concerned a clerical *benefizio*, it should be tried by clerical judges according to ecclesiastical law. Thereupon the patriarch agreed to participate, but, in the words of Losana, as an advocate of the Khāzins' interests and not as an independent judge.[68]

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[66] 'Sentenza' (17-5-1829), *Acta*, vol. 196 (1833), ff. 241-242.

[67] The Khāzins had founded Sayr Bzummar, the see of the Armenian Catholic patriarch.

[68] 'Lettera di M. Losana' (6-6-1829), *Acta*, vol. 195 (1832), ff. 236-239; 'Ponenza,' id., vol. 195 (1832), f. 211; Ghālib, Kanʿān and Yūsuf al-Khāzin to Prop. (12-5-1829) *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 19, 231-232.

Seemingly, the Khāzins were aware from the beginning that the composition of the committee under Losana was not in their favour. Apart from trying to influence the Armenian-Catholic patriarch, they were not very cooperative, and refused to send all their documents, since they intended to bring the case before the Propaganda. They argued that only two judges, i.e. two *civil* judges, had signed the verdict, which was consequently not endorsed by a majority. Moreover, one of the judges had also figured in the previous committee and was on friendly terms with Fransīs Mubārak.[69]

7.2.4.4 *The appeal of 1832*

The Khāzins, rejecting the verdict of 1829, sent an extensive collection of documents and testimonies to the Propaganda in support of their claims, which obviously had already been partly presented to the committee and which consisted of the following items: a. an inscription on a stone at the monastery, proving the role of Abū Qānṣawh; b. a line inscribed in a copy of the Bible; c. the aforementioned document of Abū Qānṣawh (1681); d. a testimony by Yūsuf Mubārak that he had been ordinated *muṭrān* in 1683 "with the support of Abū Qānṣawh, who built his monastery for us"; e. an inscription on a tile stating that the monastery was in the possession of patriarch Yūsuf Ḍarghām al-Khāzin (1734); f. two testimonies that the document of Abū Qānṣawh had been found as was claimed by the Khāzins (1828); g. a testimony that the text on the stone was authentic and that two superiors had not come from the Mubārak family, but nevertheless controlled the revenues and expenses; h. a testimony that patriarch al-Ḥilū had confirmed the *ḥukm* of Anṭūn and Yaʿqūb Haykal al-Khāzin (1828); i. a testimony that the monks were only allowed to enter the congregation with the consent of the sheiks; Najd al-Khāzin allegedly once chased a trespassing *sharīk* away (1828); j. a testimony that Abū Qānṣawh paid the workers for the construction of the monastery; that the taxes were paid by Abū Qānṣawh (the *kharāj*); that entrance was conditional on the permission of the sheiks; that the monks used to present Abū Qānṣawh with one *ruṭl* coffee every year by way of *ʿīdiyya*; that the Khāzins in Darʿūn had sold their possessions to buy mulberry trees for the church of Rayfūn; that the position of superior had for some time been held by the Muqayyar family (1828); k. two similar testimonies, adding that Jibrā'īl Mubārak

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[69] 'Appello dei Sgg. Gazeni' (13-5-1829), *Acta*, vol. 195 (1832), ff. 257-260; Khāzins to Prop. (12-5-1829), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 19, ff. 231-232; F. Mubārak to Prop. (21-11-1830), id., vol. 19, f. 683.

had been allowed to enter the monastery as a tenant (1828); l. a testimony by the Muqayyars that the monastery was founded by their ancestors; m. a testimony that the Muqayyars had been superiors and that Fransīs Mubārak only rented a room in the monastery and stayed there only rarely (1828); n. a letter from patriarch al-Ḥilū, conceding the monastery to Sharaf al-Khāzin (undated); o. a letter from Zuwayyin, *wakīl* of the patriarch, confirming the ownership rights of the Khāzins, as conceded by the council of al-Luwayza and the patriarch; p. a testimony that the Muqayyars had been superiors; q. a document from *muṭrān* Jibrā'īl Mubārak, concerning his stay in Dayr Rayfūn, pledging to do his utmost to ensure the prosperity of the monastery and to preserve its possessions without laying any claims to its waqfs; besides, he was to be at the service of the *awlād* Khaṭṭār al-Khāzin and the sheiks Najd and Khazᶜal (1763); witness: Simᶜān al-Bīṭār.[70]

The Propaganda failed to produce a decisive, unambiguous verdict. It was decided that the monastery be turned into a school, under the patronage of both families, and under a Mubārak superior. Moreover, in a rather peculiar manoeuvre, the monastery was withdrawn from the authority of the patriarch and put under the direct care of the papal delegate and the Propaganda. This left one of the main issues, the see for the diocese of Baalbek, undecided. Moreover, the related question of the authority of the *muṭrān* of Damascus, Isṭifān al-Khāzin, was never even tried. Not surprisingly, the solution failed to ease the tensions and even occasioned a new wave of petitions in which the administration of Fransīs Mubārak was criticized and the restoration of the patriarchal responsibility was requested.[71]

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[70] *Bayt* Abī Qānṣawh al-Khāzin to Prop. (30-8-1832), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 20, f. 190; minutes of the trial: 'Sulla forma proposta per il nuovo collegio Maronita de' Ss. Sergio, e Bacco in Raifum,' Sett. 1833, *Acta*, vol. 196, ff. 317-323.

[71] Sups. Hal. and Bal. to Prop. (20-6-1834), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 21, f. 173; Mubāraks to Prop. (s.d.), id., vol. 21, f. 473; S. Mubārak to Prop. (25-2-1845), id., vol. 23, ff. 230-231; Ḥubaysh to Prop. (19-6-1834), id., vol. 21, ff. 158-159; Auvergne to Prop. (1-11-1834), id., vol. 21, f. 256; A. al-Khāzin to Prop. (22-5-1834), id., vol. 21, ff. 52-53, 56; Mubārak to Prop. (3-5-1835), id., vol. 21, f. 389; Auvergne to Prop. (19-5-1834), id., vol. 21, f. 408; Auvergne to Prop. (15-12-1835), id., vol. 21, f. 545; Murād to Prop. (3-2-1836), id., vol. 21, f. 603; Auvergne to Prop. (1-8-1836), id., vol. 21, f. 842; Mubārak to Prop. [1834], id., vol. 21, f. 194; Prop. to Auvergne (23-11-1833), *L.D.B.*, vol. 314, ff. 785-786; Prop. to Auvergne (28-5-1835), id., vol. 316, f. 684; Prop. to Losana (9-6-1832), id., vol. 313, ff. 535-536; Prop. to Ḥubaysh (9-6-1832), id., vol. 313, f. 537; Prop. to A. al-Khāzin (9-6-1832), id., vol. 313, f. 538.

7.3 Concluding remarks

A few points remain to be made. Firstly, in the early decades of the 19th century the circumstances for implementing the reform measures had considerably improved, due to changes in the social and political framework within the community and its environment. The measures consisted essentially of a formalization of a hitherto relatively amorphous set of legal practices, and a redefinition of traditional practices along the lines of Canonical sources. Thus, the verdicts pronounced by the various legal committees on patronage rights referred to the decisions of the Lebanese Council and the Council of Trent. Remarkably, most families saw the arrangements made for Dayr ᶜAyn Warqa and the Isṭifān family, conceived by patriarch Yūsuf Isṭifān in 1779, as a model worthy of being imitated.[72]

Secondly, the Khāzin sheiks still considered the reform measures to be an infringement of their traditional rights. In their opinion, the monasteries founded by their ancestors were their inalienable property, and the chronicler Shaybān al-Khāzin bitterly ascribes the decline of the Khāzin family fortunes partly to the efforts by the clergy to appropriate their monastic estates. The Khāzins adamantly held to the traditional practices that had shaped a complex set of *de facto* and *de jure* privileges. Significantly, however, they no longer tried to impose their authority on the church, but attempted rather to disengage themselves from clerical control by seeking an exceptional arrangement based on the concept of *awqāf ahliyya*. Instead of seeking ratification for an intensified connection with the reformed clerical framework, as in the case of most other patron families, they tried to become detached from clerical authority, which by now had become able to resist the sheiks' tutelage. Clearly, their own authority had eroded to such an extent that they were unable to enforce their influence on the judicial bodies deciding their patronage rights. Even the committees meeting in Mount Lebanon seemed to have been beyond their sphere of influence.

Thirdly, the formalization of the legal framework of patronage rights was associated with an increasing interplay between the Maronite patriarchs and the Propaganda in Rome. In the field of waqfs, this led to the curious circumstance that conflicts over landed possessions, which were officially part of the Ottoman territory and under the sovereignty of the Porte, were tried by a court in Europe.

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[72] See above, paragraph 5.2.3; *Waqfiyya* of ᶜAyn Warqa, *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 14, ff. 4-6.

Finally, it should be noted that, although the church succeeded to some extent in establishing its authority over waqfs at the expense of the secular administrators, both the autonomous monasteries and the possessions of the Lebanese Order remained incorporated into the administrative system. Monastic estates were subject to taxes, in most cases enjoying some kind of fiscal privilege. Moreover, especially in the 19th century, monasteries became sources of capital for the *muqāṭaᶜajī*s and emir Bashīr al-Shihāb. Not only the monasteries of the Lebanese Order but also some autonomous monasteries accumulated capital and provided loans for the administrators. This was probably a strong incentive to define the legal status and property rights of the monasteries and to reorganize their administration, especially since the prices of agricultural land were rising and opportunities for commerce were expanding in the first decades of the 19th century.

Of course, this economic aspect fueled controversies concerning the patronage rights of monasteries. It may explain the tenacity with which the Khāzins sought to retain their traditional rights in a period when their control of the main capital commodity, the land, was dwindling. The monasteries that remained under their patronage were apparently relatively small and were not particularly thriving, with the exception of Dayr al-Bishāra which was founded from the inheritance of Bishāra al-Khāzin. In the 1840's a short-lived effort to revive Dayr Sayyidat al-Bizāz was made. In general one might say that, even after the reforms, the autonomous monasteries met the essential features of waqf-possessions: they were stable centres of landed property, and a potential source for the accumulation of capital; they were incorporated into the socio-economic structure; and they were claimed and exploited by the clerical as well as the secular authorities. After the reforms, the clergy seems to have gained an important victory over secular interests.

CONCLUSION

The central assumption of this study has been that the developments in Mount Lebanon from the end of the 16th century onwards were shaped by increasing interaction with the world market. Of course, these developments should be placed in the wider context of the changes which the Ottoman Empire underwent as a whole and which can be explained, in general, as direct or indirect responses to the penetration of the European economies. This penetration gradually disturbed the congruency of the political and economic structures, and eventually led to the disintegration of the central control over the economy. The consolidation of regional economic circuits enhanced the possibilities of profiting from commercial opportunities on the one hand, but on the other undermined the centralized administrative structure. The main response of the Porte was increased efforts at centralization in order to enhance its grip on the flow of tax revenues.

The first contacts between Mount Lebanon and the world market, through the export of silk, culminated in the relations of Fakhr al-Dīn Maᶜn with the grand duke of Tuscany in the first decades of the 17th century. The role of the Tuscans was soon taken over by the French, who established close relations with the population of the area, especially with the Maronites. The second point at which an accelerated incorporation of Mount Lebanon into the world market occurred was the period of Bashīr al-Shihāb (1790-1840), who was forced to initiate a centralizing policy in order to gather as many domains under his authority as he could, and to adapt the regional tax system to his increasing financial needs. In doing so, his power became based on a new socio-economic configuration that had partly emerged under the influence of new trade opportunities. The above suggests that the period between Fakhr al-Dīn and Bashīr, particularly the 18th century, was no more than an intermezzo between two phases of incorporation. This is only partly true, since, even if direct French trade with Mount Lebanon did not increase dramatically, the area was still economically and administratively embedded in the Syrian provinces, which in that period were heavily affected by the consequences of European penetration. This indicates that there was a kind of symbiotic relationship between Mount Lebanon and its surroundings, in which Mount Lebanon remained a potentially prosperous area which could threaten the stability of Ottoman authority in Syria.

In the 18th century, trade with Europe changed the power balances in Syria and fostered the emergence of new trade networks. Subsequent fluctuations made it difficult for local administrators to consolidate their power, and commercial expansion coincided with an intensified integration of the regional economic circuits, in order to control the internal market and the flow of commodities and capital. Thus, especially in the time of al-Jazzār (1776-1804), Mount Lebanon experienced conflicting tendencies towards integration, towards maximizing the revenues from sericulture, and towards fragmentation, imposed by the policy of al-Jazzār in order to tap off its resources and secure its incorporation into the Syrian economy. This process reached a peak under Bashīr al-Shihāb, who stimulated the integration of Mount Lebanon as an economic substructure, and simultaneously strove for its incorporation into the Ottoman administrative system. In the 18th century and at the start of the 19th century, the specialization of the economy of Mount Lebanon towards the production of silk for commercial purposes was mainly fostered by the demand for silk on the internal Ottoman market, especially Egypt. However, export to Europe became important from time to time, while the demand from Egypt was probably partly due to the demand for manufactured silk on the international market.

What were the effects of these processes on the position of the local notables, particularly the Khāzin sheiks? Firstly, the Khāzins profited from the new trade opportunities provided by Tuscany and France, and established themselves as tax farmers in Kisrawān under the protection of Fakhr al-Dīn. A period of consolidation followed, approximately 1650-1750, in which the Khāzins strengthened their grip on the economy and the land in their domains. From the second half of the 18th century onwards, the economic position of the Khāzins began to decline, due to the political upheavals in Mount Lebanon, and economic difficulties which contributed to the exhaustion of their financial resources, the fragmentation of their possessions, and the marginalization of their political and administrative roles. Gradually, the *muqāṭaʿa* system on which their power was based was replaced by a structure in which new groups, such as merchants and moneylenders, played a dominant role. These elements fostered the integration of the agricultural potential of Mount Lebanon and the incorporation of the area into the new trade networks. They supported Bashīr's policies which led to the collapse of the traditional system.

It should be noted, at this point, that the complex interaction between

integration and differentiation can also be perceived at the level of the *muqāṭaᶜa*s of the area of Mount Lebanon. The incorporation of the tax-farms of Jubayl and al-Batrūn into the Shihāb domains resulted in an adjustment of their fiscal and administrative system and an intensification of their agricultural exploitation. Meanwhile, the economic situation of Kisrawān deteriorated or at least became stagnant. This differentiation, which had not only economic, but also social consequences, probably obstructed the unification of the predominantly Maronite tax-farms, even under Bashīr. The opportunities for development in Jubayl and al-Batrūn led to the emergence of new groups, personified by the powerful Maronite *mudabbir*s, who acted as a counterbalance to the political influence of the Khāzin sheiks. The traditional structure which had supported the position of the Khāzins as political leaders of the community rapidly eroded as their claims were increasingly contested by other Maronite notables.

Relations with the church

The complexity of economic developments in Mount Lebanon is reflected in the relations between the Khāzin sheiks and the church. In this field, the increasing penetration of the European economies into Syria was accompanied by intensified attempts on the part of the Vatican to incorporate the Eastern Christian churches into the Mother Church. This inaugurated a process of acculturation which affected the traditional organization and ideological outlook of segments of the Christian communities in the Ottoman Empire. As in the 17th century the Khāzins had established themselves as undisputed patrons of the Maronite church, they found themselves in a peculiar and delicate intermediate position. On the one hand their economic predominance was partly derived from their orientation towards Europe, and would thus suggest a favourable attitude towards the Vatican; on the other hand, however, too strong an identification of the Maronite church with Rome might foster aspirations towards independence among the clergy and endanger the Khāzins' tutelage over the church. The dilemma is aptly summarized by the statement of Nawfal al-Khāzin in 1711, in which he says that he was prepared to accept the authority of the Vatican in dogmatic, but not in organizational matters.[1]

The supervision of Rome brought the Maronite church into a much

[1] Poullard to Khāzins (1712), Ismail (1975-), vol. 1, p. 123.

broader framework than before, making it more receptive to external influences. Firstly, an increased interaction can be seen between the Maronites of Mount Lebanon and the Maronite community in Aleppo. During the 18th century, this tendency can be discerned in the contacts between the diocese of Aleppo and the monasteries in Mount Lebanon; the foundation of the Lebanese Order by Aleppine monks; and the foundation of Hindiyya's Order of the Sacred Heart, which was financed by Aleppine Maronites. Secondly, partly as a result of the contacts which had been established by the Khāzins, Maronite prelates could escape the isolation of their Ottoman environment and build a new network of relations, which included the Vatican and the French consuls. However, these factors made the Khāzins' authority in church matters less self-evident than before, and the sheiks tried to compensate for this by supporting members of the family who entered the church hierarchy. The clash of interests caused by the new constellation is most clearly revealed by the controversies during the Lebanese Council in 1736.

Although the efforts at reform initiated by the Lebanese Council ended more or less in deadlock, the influence of the Khāzins over the church began to decline. Dissension within the family prevented a strong unified stand, and the political turbulences at the close of the 18th century shook the foundations of the Maronite social structure. Yūsuf al-Shihāb's measures to revive the northern Maronite *muqāṭaʿa*s created a rift within the Maronite community; while Jubayl, al-Batrūn and Jabbat Bsharrī were developed under the supervision of several strong Maronite mudabbirs, the economy of Kisrawān stagnated and at least some of the branches of the Khāzin family became impoverished. This new balance led to the erosion of the traditional authority of the Khāzins and the emergence of new Maronite groups who supported the emirate of Bashīr and the dissociation of the church from traditional forms of patronage. Thus, the social basis in the Maronite community in favour of the reforms broadened. The lack of integration of Jubayl, al-Batrūn, Jabbat Bsharrī and Kisrawān, in this social sense, is illustrated by the increased intervention of the Maronite *mudabbir*s in church affairs, counterbalancing the influence of the Khāzins, by the repeated frictions over the location of the patriarchal see, and by the tensions within the Baladī Order in the 1830's. Although the reforms of the Lebanese Council were only partly implemented, the authority of the Khāzin sheiks, based on an appeal to tradition, had become a thing of the past. This became most painfully

clear during the disturbances in Kisrawān in 1858, when the church refused to unambiguously support the authority of the Khāzins against the refractory peasants.[2]

The role of waqfs

The second assumption of this study has been that the institution of waqf could constitute a dynamic factor in the Ottoman economy, as a means of capital accumulation and of stimulating economic activity. In addition, it has been assumed that waqfs provided the material basis for the apparatus guarding ideological orientations and the legitimacy of the state. In what way did waqfs affect the processes of integration and fragmentation, in the social and economic fields?

Firstly, waqfs contributed to the consolidation of the authority of the Khāzin sheiks in Kisrawān, both in the economic field – by reviving monastic estates –, and in the social field – by facilitating the "Maronitization" of the *muqāṭaʿa*. Secondly, in the 18th century, a revival of monasticism took place with the expansion of the Lebanese Order. The dual function of waqfs appears: the Order succeeded in gathering a large amount of land under its control, thus integrating agricultural lands into a single administrative framework; and, as a new element in the clerical organization, the Order supported tendencies which challenged vested interests based on tradition.

Waqfs affected the relations between the Khāzin sheiks and the church in two ways: on the one hand the Khāzins' patronage of monasteries enhanced their grip on the Maronite clergy; on the other, the Lebanese Order gradually provided a new economic basis for the ideological apparatus as represented by the clergy, and enabled the church to shake off lay tutelage to a large extent. Again, the regional factor emerges, since the Order experienced its economic growth especially in Jubayl, or at least outside Kisrawān. Moreover, the Order developed a mutually beneficial relationship with the Shihābs, thus becoming one of the mainstays of Bashīr's emirate, which increasingly antagonized the Khāzins. The conclusion that the waqf institution played a central role in a complex process of transformation, both on the economic level and on the level of ideological orientation, seems justified. The new balance of power became especially clear when the authority of the Khāzin sheiks, based on traditional privileges, proved insufficient to secure a

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[2] For the Kisrawān revolt of 1858, see Porath.

positive outcome at the tribunals concerning the patronage of Dayr Mār Sarkīs wa-Bākhūs in 1832.

Political leadership

The conclusions mentioned above should be placed in the framework of political power. How did their relations with the church, in various fields, shape the political authority of the Khāzin sheiks? An answer to this question should refer to the importance of political legitimacy.

At the height of his power, sheik Nawfal al-Khāzin signed his dispatches with the title "Prince of the Maronites" (*amīr al-Mawārina*).[3] His claim to the leadership of the community was based, firstly, on his economic potential, which had transformed Kisrawān into a prosperous core area for the Maronites, and, secondly, on the confirmation of the Khāzins' authority by the clergy. Thus, the endorsement of the apparatus that watched over the social and cultural cohesion of the community provided the Khāzins with the legitimacy to represent the Maronites in contacts with external actors. In this position, the sheiks achieved considerable prestige within the *muqāṭaʿa* structure.

In the 18th century, several factors combined to diminish this political authority of the Khāzins. Firstly, as we have seen, the economic position of the family deteriorated, while at the same time the economic activities of other groups and of the Lebanese Order grew. This meant not only that an alternative socio-economic framework was shaped from which the church could benefit, but also that the church as an institution became an exponent of political power. After all, the cooperation between Bashīr al-Shihāb and the Lebanese Order was not merely economic; it established direct links between the emir and the Maronite church, and with the Maronite community, thus bypassing the intermediary powers of the Khāzin sheiks. As the basis of the political legitimacy of the Khāzins' authority eroded, their role as representatives of the community towards the outside world was no longer needed. The interests of new social groups within the community, such as those of the reformist factions within the church and those of Bashīr al-Shihāb, began to converge, to the disadvantage of the Khāzins.

Secondly, in the first decades of the 19th century, Ottoman policy was focused on centralization and the formal incorporation of the Christian minorities into the social structure. As of old, and not illogically,

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[3] Nawfal to Prop. (25-2-1715), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 3, F. 33.

the Porte chose the religious authorities to be the representatives of their respective communities. Thus, during the negotiations on the administration of Mount Lebanon after the withdrawal of Ibrāhīm Pasha in the 1840's, the patriarch and his delegate, Niqūlā Murād, played a prominent part. The patriarch presented a list of demands to the Porte which clearly reflected his dual responsibility as the spiritual and secular head of the community. The Khāzin sheiks greatly resented the interference of the clergy in politics, which they considered an ominous development. Niqūlā Murād replied that the clergy's interference was, on the contrary, beneficial, as a way of stemming the expansion of both Islam and Protestantism.[4]

In 1845, a member of the Khāzin family was once more elected patriarch. However, his election was not a sign of the revival of the influence of the Khāzin sheiks, but rather revealed their increasingly isolated position. Yūsuf's election, which occurred in the midst of political upheavals, was one of the most tumultuous recorded in history. The *muṭrans* were divided into a Kisrawānī faction, led by *muṭrān* Anṭūn al-Khāzin, and a faction led by the prominent *muṭrān* Būlus Masᶜad. Typically, at first no agreement could be reached on a location for the conclave: Kisrawān or Qannūbīn? The French consul intervened to smooth the differences and the *muṭrāns* finally convened in Qannūbīn. However, when the election of Yūsuf was finally announced, a mob of Bsharrāwīs stormed the monastery and molested the new patriarch and his supporters, shouting that they would not accept a Khāzin patriarch, and that they considered the waqfs of the patriarchal see as "theirs". They demanded that separate *muṭrāns* for Jubayl and Jabbat Bsharrī be ordained, that a Bsharrāwī hold the function of administrator of the patriarchal see and that the patriarch reside in Qannūbīn. Eventually the Bsharrāwīs were reconciled to Yūsuf, although some continued to see him as a "creation of the French consul". Yūsuf prudently chose his see in Zūq Mīkhā'īl in Dayr al-Bishāra, which had been founded by Bishāra Jaffāl's heirs.[5]

This tragic incident reflects some of the regional and social tensions within the Maronite community in this period and the issues involved.

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[4] Murād to Prop. (30-8-1841), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 22, f. 428; 'Copia del Rapporto dato a M. Attieri Nunzio in Vienna all' Emo Lambruschini,' (7-10-1841), id., ff. 358-364; Khāzin, Ḥubaysh, Daḥdāḥ sheiks to Prop. (1844), id., ff. 24-25; Murād to Prop. (15-4-1844), id., f. 52.

[5] Yūsuf to Prop. (30-8-1845), *S.C./Mar.*, vol. 23, ff. 368-370; 'Sulla Elezione di Monsignor Giuseppe Gazeno in Patriarca della Nazione Maronita,' *Acta*, vol. 208, ff. 513 ff.; Villardell to Prop. (6-11-1845), id., f. 430; al-Daḥdāḥ (1932).


Significantly, Yūsuf, who was of a conspicuously mild disposition, was a weak patriarch, in contrast to his predecessor, Yūsuf Ḥubaysh, and his successor, Būlus Masᶜad. The latter two were forceful personalities who favoured reform and were not reluctant to assume political responsibilities. They embodied the new leadership of the Maronite community which aspired to a form of Maronite autonomy under a Shihāb emir, and which replaced the traditional, basically Ottoman orientation of the Khāzin sheiks.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX ONE

MAPS

a. Mount Lebanon



b. The muqāṭaʿas

1. al – 'Akkār
2. al – Ḍanniyya
3. al – Zāwiya
4. al – Kūra
5. Jabba Bsharrī
6. al – Quwayṭā'
7. Bilād al – Batrūn
8. Bilād Jubayl
9. Jabba al – Munayṭra
10. al – Futūḥ
11. Kisrawān
12. Qaṭi' al – Sāḥil
13. al – Matn
14. Beirut
15. al – Sāḥil
16. al – Gharb al – Fawqānī
17. al – Gharb al – Taḥtānī
18. al – Jurd
19. al – 'Arqūb
20. al – Shūf al – Biyāḍī
21. al – Shaḥḥār
22. al – Manāṣīf
23. al – Shūf
24. Iqlīm al – Kharūb
25. Iqlīm al – Jazzīn
26. Iqlīm al – Tuffāḥ
27. Jabal al – Rīḥān
28. Jabal 'Āmil

Sidon
Zaḥla
al – Līṭānī

Source: Chevallier 1971

c. Kisrawān

'Āqūrā
Qurṭubā
Nahr Ibrāhīm
al – Judayda
Ghazīr
Sāḥil 'Almā
'Arāmūn
Mayrūbā
Harājil
Fārayyā
Biqa'tūtā
Nahr al – Mu'amaltayn
Shanan'īr
Ḥārat Ṣakhr
Jūniya
Ghusṭā
Bzummār
'Ashqūt
Fayṭrūn
Biqa'ātā
Dar'ūn
Rayfūn
Mazra'at Kafr Dabyān
Ghādīr
Bkirkī
Zūq Mīkhā'īl
Zūq Muṣbaḥ
'Ayn Ṭūrā
Ballūna
Zūq al – Kharāb
J'ītā
Biskintā
Nahr al – Kalb
Bayt Shabāb
Bikfayyā
Antilyās
0 4 km


Source: Porath


Mediterranean Sea
Tripoli
Bsharrī
Qurṭubā
Jūniya
Beirut
Zaḥla

APPENDIX TWO


GENEALOGIES

a. THE KHĀZIN SHEIKS








I Ḥuṣn †1708
Nawfal 1694-1753
Kisrawān
Kīwān
Ḥuṣn
Sharaf
Dibillīn
Fā'ūr
Ḥakam
Nawfal
Yūsuf
Iṣṭifān
Maḥbūb
Yuwākīm
Bashīr
Ḥalīm
'Afīf
Jirmānūs
Nāyif
(m. Anṭūn)
†1858
Ḥuṣn
'Abdallāh
Yuḥannā
Dibillīn
Sharaf
Ḥakam
Ma'n
Jahjāh
Dāwūd
Qānṣawh
Nāyif
Manṣūr
Yūsuf
Sulaymān
Nawfal
Ghundur
Ḥuṣn





II Ṣakhr †1751
'Ād
'Ādī
'Adwān
Ḥasan
Salwān
Sannān
Ghīzān
Nīsān
'Azāz ('Adrā)
Darwīsh
Tarrāf
Ṣakhr
Salmān
Anṭūn
Khaṭṭār
Nabhān
Jaffāl
Khashān
Luwīs
Wardān
Laṭṭūf
Yuḥannā
Fāris
Ṣakhr
Buṭrus
Yūsuf
Qusṭanṭīn
Ayyūb
Kalīm
'Abdallāh
Amīn
Raf'ān
Anṭūn
'Ād
Milḥim
Mīlān
(Jibrā'īl)
Yūsuf
Amīn
Salmān
Niqūlā
Qānṣawh
Mīlād
Amīn
Jaffāl



III Khaṯṯār
Khāzin
Najīd
As'ad
Khaz'al
Najd
Khaṯṯār †1828
Bān †1841
Fransīs
Yūsuf
Sharaf
Niqūlā
Fāris
Efendī
Khāzin
Kan'ān
Rājī
Ilyās
Sim'ān
Luwīs
Manṣūr
As'ad
Manṣūr
Ṣāliḥ
Najd
Khaṯṯār
Ṣalībī
Rushayd



IV Haykal
Santū
Haykal
Qānṣawh
Ya'qūb
Yuḥannā
Buṭrus
Ghālib
Manṣūr
Ṣāliḥ
As'ad
Ḥabīb
Santū
Nādir
Fransīs
Ilyās
Rushayd
Haykal
Yūsuf



V Dahām
Mushrif
Qablān
Asbar
Mūlā
Fayyāḍ
Anṭūn
Da'ībs
Khalīl
Jabr
Fransīs
Qablān
Milḥim
Mūlā
Ibrāhīm
Asbar
Dahām
Mas'ūd
Yūsuf
Jabr
Fransīs
Qablān
Shāhīn
Anṭūn



VI Ḍarghām (Patr. Yūsuf) †1742
Mīlān †1781



VII Nāṣīf
Nāṣīf
Tarbūsh
Nāfi'
Jahjāh
Salmān
Sarkīs
Tūmā
Jād
Nāṣīf
Haykal
Isṭifān
Nāfi'
Sarkīs
Salmān
Nāṣīf
Walad



VIII Khālid
Khāzin
Khālid *1720
Rāshid
Kisrawān
Khāzin
Zu'aytar
Bishāra
Yūsuf
Ibrāhīm
Khālid
Niqūlā
Mīkhā'īl
Rāfā'īl
Sulaymān
Rāshid
Luwīs
Yūsuf
Ḥabīb
Bākhūs
Yuḥannā
Kisrawān
†1847
Manṣūr
Mārūn
Asad
Rāshid
Khalīl
Amīn
Ẓāhir
Saj'ān



IX Sarḥān
Nawfal †1738
Mūsā
Buṭrus †1760
Sim'an
Yuḥannā
Nawfal
Rābiḥ
Sarḥān
Fāris
Manṣūr
Ghālib
Anṭūn
Sarḥān
Buṭrus
Mūsā
Sulaymān
Najā
Nawfal
Manṣūr



X Nimr 1668-1726
Ilyās †1753
Shaybān
Nimr
Yūsuf
Ṣābir
Bishāra
Wafā
Nūr
Ilyās
'Abbās
Shaybān
Sim'ān
Yūsuf



XI 'Abd al-Malik †1734
Ṣaqr *1699
Ḥadhīfa *1717
Fakhr *1717
'Abd al-Salām
Mur'ib
'Abas
Sahhāb (m. Isṭifān) †1830
Jallāb
Yūsuf
Lubnān
Jarrār
Rashdān
al-Qass Ṭūbiyā
Wardān
Rāfi'
Rustum †1798 Ṣalībī
'Arab (m. Istifān) †1868
Ṣaqr
Ya'qūb 'Abbūd
Salīm
Manṣūr
'Abdallāh Sim'ān
Qays
Ḥabīb
Shāhīn
Rustum
Yūsuf
Dāwūd
Sulaymān
Sarḥāl
Wardān



XII Junblāṭ
Dhiyāb
Salīm
Barakāt
Marwān
Ṭarrāf
Efendī
(m. Ighnāṭiyūs)
Mūsā
Niqūlā
Sim'ān
(L.O.)
Shamsayn
Ṣafā
Buṭrus
Hunayf
Ghāzī
Wadī'
Dhiyāb
Yūsuf
Dāwūd
Yuḥannā
Shamsayn
Niqūlā
Mūsā
Efendī
Hunayf
Barakāt



XIII Mūsā †1751
Sharwān
Jaffāl
Sarda
Bishāra
1765-1826
Walad



XIV Nādir
Sarḥāl *1703
Khāṭir *1709
Ṭālib
Yuhannā
'Abbās *1733
Salīm
'Īd
Yūsuf
Sarḥāl
Salīm



XV Yūnis
Ghālib
Rājī
Rashīd
Luwīs
Kurayyim
Bahīj
Yūnis
Janā
Shās (Patr. Yūsuf) †1854
Shās
Ghālib
Rashīd
As'ad
Rājī
Khalīl
Ibrāhīm
Manṣūr



XVI Fayyāḍ
al-Badawī
Sim'ān
Qa'dān
Faḍl †1835
Yuḥannā
'Abdallāh
Qa'dān
Jaffāl
Faḍl


XVII Sarkīs
Kanj
Shajī'
Sarkīs
Ilyās
Ni'mān
Sulaymān
Kanj
Khalīl
Asad


XVIII Kan'ān
Shibl
'Abbūd
Shaj'ān
Farjān
Kan'ān
Qays
Buṭrus
Būlus
Bākhūs
Yūsuf








Main sources: Shihāb; Ḥattūnī; Shaybān al-Khāzin; KHA.2.

b. The Shihāb emirs



Source: Chebli 1955.

APPENDIX THREE

CURRENCY, WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

a. Currency

1 *qirsh* = 40 *fiḍḍa* / *maṣārī*
1 *kīs* = 500 *qurūsh*

b. Weights

1 *ūqiyya* = 3,2 gr.
1 *uqqa* = 200 gr.
1 *ruṭl* = 2400 gr.
1 *himl* = 72 kg.

c. Surface measures

1 *ḥiml* = 8-10 mulberry trees = 50-62,5 m^2
1 *ūqiyya* eggs produces 10-12 *ḥiml* (2 *ruṭl* silk)
1 *kayl* = 15.000 m^2
1 *mudd* = 2500 m^2


Sources: Abou-Nohra; Abou Rousse-Slim; Chevallier.

APPENDIX FOUR

PRICES

a. SILK-PRICES 1787-1816


(*qurūsh* per *ruṭl*)



Source: Shihābī.

b. Silk-prices 1821-1831 (white and yellow silk)

(*qurūsh* per *ruṭl*)



Source: ʿIlm asʿār al-ḥarīr (KHA1).

c. Wheat-prices 1710-1860

ruṭl	*qurūsh*
1710-1735	0,75
1736-1760	1,75
1761-1785	2,6
1786-1810	3,5
1811-1835	8,5
1836-1860	22,5

Source: Abou-Nohra.

d. Land-prices 1720-1840

ḥiml	*qurūsh*
1720	5
1740	7,5
1750	12
1770	19
1780	20
1810	50
1820	100
1830	160
1840	300

Source: KHA1; KHA2.

e. Produce of the Maronite muqāṭaᶜa's in 1840

Muqāṭaᶜa	Wheat (kg)	Silk (kg)	Olives (kg)	Tobacco (kg)	Population
Kisrawān	60.000	20.000		2.000	17.000
Jubayl	3.000	35.000		60.000	8.640
al-Batrūn	12.000	30.000	10.000	52.000	14.430
J. Bsharrī	8.000	2.500	2.000		10.260
Ihdin	60.000	15.000			6.250

Source: Laurent, pp. 467-468.

APPENDIX FIVE

ECONOMIC DATA OF THE BALADIYYA ORDER

a. Dayr Mār Qubriyānūs Kfīfān

Period	Revenue	Expenses	Purchases
1790-1793	3.468	3.483	
1793-1796	1.864	2.064	
1796-1799	4.246	4.655	
1802-1805	10.800	9.790	
1805-1808	11.811	12.061	
1808-1811	10.900	13.670	
1811-1814	14.003	11.503	26.342
1820-1826	29.773	29.214	7.157
1826-1829	24.750	24.849	6.186
1829-1832	37.720	33.906	
1832-1835	38.320	34.567	24.874
1835-1838	73.269	50.351	
1839-1842	60.125	52.717	11.531
1842-1845	73.247	52.375	13.836

Source: *daftar* of the monastery; figures in *qurūsh*.

b. Dayr Ḥūb

Period	Revenue	Expenses	Purchases
1793-1796	7.635	7.153	
1796-1799	6.390	5.732	
1811-1814	18.823	16.305	
1814-1817	7.316	3.320	
1820-1823	23.079	34.826	13.986
1823-1826	39.469	31.258	
1826-1829	43.965	44.733	
1829-1832	50.456	46.436	8.147
1832-1835	75.768	50.982	
1835-1838	115.801	?	
1839-1842	130.770	77.338	8.905
1844-1847	80.948	81.119	18.961

Source: *daftar* of the monastery; figures in *qurūsh*.

c. Possessions of the Baladī Order in 1764

Monastery	Wheat[1]	Mulberry[2] orchards	Orchards[3]	Sheep goats
Yasha^c Dj. Bsharrī	70	3	2	200
Ḥūqā				300
Anṭ. Quzḥayyā	70	40	40	400
Luwayza	20	15	5	30
Yūsuf al-Burdj	12	10		100
Ṭāmīsh	30	40		50
Buṭr. Karīm al-Tīn	15	13	6	100
Ilyās Shuwayyā	70	21	10	120
Anṭ. Sīr	8	6	10	200
Yuḥ. Rashmayyā	3	14	5	100
Mashmūsha	30	27	10	300

[1] Measured in *mudd*; for measures, see appendix 3.
[2] Measured in *ūqiyya* eggs.
[3] Measured in *faddān* (ca. 4200 m^2).

Monastery	Cattle	Year of acquis.	Debt[4]	Number of inhabitants[5]
Yashaᶜ Dj. Bsharrī	6		1584	10
Ḥūqā		1738		12
Anṭ. Quzḥayyā		1708	2350	22
Luwayza	2	1707	3500	14
Yūsuf al-Burdj	4	1746		6
Ṭāmīsh	6	1727	6629	17
Buṭr. Karīm al-Tīn	4	1712	300	8
Ilyās Shuwayyā	4	1728	1530	8
Anṭ. Sīr	4	1709	129	7
Yuḥ. Rashmayyā	4	1706	400	15
Mashmūsha	27	1736	3637	20

Source: Bulaybil, vol. 2, pp. 268-269.

[4] Counted in *qurūsh*.
[5] According to a list made up in 1754; Bulaybil, vol. 2, pp. 132-134.

APPENDIX SIX

PATRIARCHS AND MŪṬRANS

a. LIST OF PATRIARCHS 1609-1856

1609-1633	Yuḥannā Makhlūf
1633-1644	Jirjis ʿUmayra al-Ihdinī
1644-1648	Yūsuf al-ʿAqūrī
1648-1656	Yuḥannā al-Saqr
1656	Jirjis Ḥabqūq
1657-1670	Jirjis al-Basba'lī
1670-1704	Isṭifān al-Duwayhī
1704-1705	Jibrā'īl al-Blūzānī
1705-1733	Yaʿqūb ʿAwwād
1733-1742	Yūsuf Ḍarghām al-Khāzin
1742-1756	Simʿān ʿAwwād
1756-1766	Ṭūbiyā al-Khāzin
1766-1793	Yūsuf Isṭifān
1793-1795	Mīkhā'īl Fāḍil
1795-1796	Fīlibūs al-Jumayyil
1796-1808	Yūsuf al-Tiyyān
1808-1823	Yuḥannā al-Ḥilū
1823-1845	Yūsuf Ḥubaysh
1845-1856	Yūsuf al-Khāzin

Source: Dāghir.

b. Muṭrāns

	Aleppo	Damascus	Tripoli	Baalbek	Cyprus	Jubayl & al-Batrūn	Sidon & Tyre	Beirut	*sharafī*
Isṭifān								1698	
Qarāʿalī		1726						1716	
Isṭifān								1743	
Isṭifān*								1754	
Fāḍil								1762	
Shanayʿī								1768	
Nujaym								1779	1767
Fāḍil*								1796	
Karam								1819	
al-Jamrī		1658							
Duwayhī*									
Qubrusī					1671				
Makhlūf					1674				
Ḥawā					1723				
Ṭ. al-Khāzin*			1734		1736				1732
Jumayyil					1756				
Jumayyil*				1786					
Bulaybil					1798				
Blūzānī*	?								
Blūzānī	1704								
Farḥāt	1725								
Ḥūshib	1732								
Shukrī	1762								
Kunaydar	1787								
Ḥawā	1804								
Arūtīn	1829								
Sharabiyya						1732			
Dibsī							1748		
Ḥubaysh*						1755			
Yamīn						1784	1769		
Zuwayyin						1816			
Bustānī							1819		
Duwayhī						1728			
Muḥāsib						1748			
Yuwākīm						1756			
Ḥāqilānī						1765			
Isṭifān						1776			
Thābit						1810			1800

* Muṭrāns marked with * have been elected patriarch.

	Aleppo	Damascus	Tripoli	Baalbek	Cyprus	Jubayl & al-Batrūn	Sidon & Tyre	Beirut	*sharafī*
Muḥāsib									1717
Blūzānī									1733
ʿAwwād									1733
Nujaym									1777
ʿAwwād									1736
Shadrāwī			1629						
Ḥaṣrūnī			1665						
Simʿānī			1669						
ʿAwwād*			1698						
Jumayyil			1705						
Basīl			1716						
ʿAzīrī			?						
Atāyā			?						
Saqr			1742						
Yamīn			1776						
Ighn. al-Khāzin			1795						
Ḥubaysh			1815						
Kassāb			1826						
Mubārak				1713			1713		
Mubārak				1763					
Mubārak				1787					
A. al-Khāzin			1808						
Ghazīrī		1697							
ʿAwwād*		1716							
Ṣāyigh		1746							
ʿAbd al-Aḥad		1755		1755					
Tiyyān*		1786							
M. al-Khāzin	1788								
J. al-Khāzin	1794								
Y. al-Khāzin*		1830							
Y. Ḍarghām al-Khāzin*									1730
Ḥilū*									1786
Ḥabqūq									1742
Nāṣirī									1820
Diyāb									1769
Nujaym									1767
Nastīr									1762
Ṭarbayh									1755
Ḥājj									1752

Sources: Daḥdāḥ; Ḥarfūsh (1938); Saʿāda.

* Muṭrāns marked with * have been elected patriarch.

APPENDIX SEVEN

GLOSSARY*

ʿaddād tax on livestock.
arāḍī amīriyya state-owned land, subject to the *mīrī* tax.
ashrāf descendants of the Prophet (sg. *sharīf*).

baklīk land whose revenues accrue to a *bey*.
barā'a (berat) official documents, especially endorsing the investiture of prelates and affording privileges to subjects working in the service of European consulates.
bayt 'household'; family branch.
beylerbey administrator; superior of several *sanjaqbey*s.

ḍamān tax-farm, similar to the *muqāṭaʿa*.
daymūs fiscal reassessment.
dhakhīra (pl. *dhakhāyir*) supplementary tax owed to tax-farmer.
dhimmī member of one of the 'protected' minorities in Islamic society.
dihqān village head.
dukhkhāniyya tax levied for the preparation of silk-worm eggs.

emir in Mount Lebanon: title of the leading tax-farmers' families.
eyalet Ottoman province administered by a *wālī* (= *wilāya*).

fakhrī litt. 'honorary'; title of *muṭrān* without a separate diocese.
fetwa legal opinion issued by a mufti.
fiqh Islamic jurisprudence.
firāgha fee levied for the alienation of possessions.

hiba donation.

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* For weights, measures and currency, see *Appendix three*.

ʿīdiyya tax paid to tax-farmers on the occasion of festivities.
iltizām tax-farm granted to a *multazim*; synonymous with *muqāṭaʿa*.
irsāliyya total amount of taxes owed by *beylerbey*s to the central government.
istibdāl exchange of waqf-properties in order to preserve the value of a waqf.

jāliyya (pl. *jawālī*) poll-tax.
jizya poll-tax levied on *dhimmī*s.

kanīsa church.
Kapikullari Janissaries under the command of the central government.
khādim 'servant' of a shrine or church.
khān warehouse.
kharāj originally 'land-tax'; eventually used to refer to the *jizya*-tax.
khāṣṣ state-owned land whose revenues are destined for specific administrative purposes.
khidma semi-official payment in addition to the tax-remittance.
khulʿa investiture of the Shihāb emirs as tax-farmers, by the governor.
khūrī priest.

maʿāsh livelihood; allowance.
maḥkama religious court.
majmaʿ council.
māl *mīrī*-tax.
mālayn double levy of the *mīrī*-tax.
malikāna grant of tax-farm as semi-property.
maqām shrine.
mashyakha additional tax owed to the tax-farmer.
mazraʿa agricultural field.
milk (pl. amlāk) freehold property.
milla (millet) religious minority.
mīrī basic tax on state-owned agricultural land.
muʿajjala payment to acquire a tax-farm.
mudabbir administrator, esp. of the Lebanese Order, and the minister of the Shihāb emirs.

mufti	scholar or official issuing fetwas.
muḥāfiẓ	administrator.
multazim	holder of an *iltizām*.
munāṣaba	share-cropping agreement, esp. for trees.
muqaddam	title of Shiite tax-farmers (originally also used among Maronites) corresponding to 'emir'.
muqāṭaᶜa	tax-farm.
muqāṭaᶜajī	holder of a *muqāṭaᶜa*.
muqāwaḍa	exchange of possessions.
murshid	teacher, spiritual leader.
musāqāh	share-cropping agreement, esp. for cereals.
mutasallim	administrator, usually of a town.
mutawallī	administrator of a waqf.
muṭrān	metropolitan, archbishop; bishop.
muzāraᶜa	share-cropping agreement, esp. for cereals.
nāḥiya	administrative subdivision of a *sanjaq*.
nāẓir	supervisor of a waqf.
qadi	judge.
qāᶜida	market town; rurla commercial center.
qānūn	legislation by state decrees.
qass	priest.
qisma	partition of property.
qurba	pious purpose.
ra'īs (f. ra'īsa)	abbot; superior of a monastery.
raqaba	property rights.
ri'āsa	function of *ra'īs*.
rizq	livelihood; land providing the livelihood of a tax-farmer.
ṣadaqa	pious donation.
salf	payment to acquire a tax-farm (= *muᶜajjala*).
ṣarf	additional levy to compensate for currency devaluations.
sanjaq	adminstrative division of a province.
sanjaqbey	administrator of a *sanjaq*.
shammās	chaplain.
sharafī	litt. 'honorary', title for *muṭrān*s without a separate diocese (= *fakhrī*).

Sharia	Islamic law.
sharīk	share-cropper.
shawbaṣa	spinning-tax.
shidyāq	dean.
shirāka	share-cropping agreement.
sipahi	cavalryman.
Tanzimat	period of reforms during the 19th century.
ṭarḥ	tax on silk.
taṣarruf	right of disposal.
taslīm	transfer of possessions.
taṣrīf	transfer of the right of disposal.
tawallī	function of *mutawallī*.
tawzīᶜ	reassessment of taxation.
timar	grant of land in exchange for military services.
ulema	religious, esp. legal scholars and officials.
unṭūsh	dependency of church or monastery.
ᶜuqqāl	Druze spiritual leaders.
ᶜurf	customary law.
ᶜushr (pl. *ᶜushūr*)	'tenth' collected from the believers.
usquf	bishop.
wakīl	administrative delegate.
wālī	governor of a province.
waqf	possessions withdrawn from market circulation in perpetuity for a pious purpose; religious foundation.
waqf ahlī (dhurrī)	family waqf.
waqf khayrī	pious waqf.
waqfiyya	waqf-document
wikāla	function of *wakīl*.
wilāya	province; function of *wālī*; right of patronage, *iuspatronatus*.
Yerliyya	Janissaries of local origin (Damascus).

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